



Milton
Sent to R. R. L. Oct. 1926

REFERENCE LIBRARY OF
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
2 PARK STREET, BOSTON



NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM THE SHFLVES
EXCEPT BY PERMISSION OF
THE LIBRARIAN

REFERENCE LIBRARY * HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO. * BOSTON, MASS.

*Archive
Collection*



*
This book may not leave the Offices
and if borrowed must be returned within 7 days
*



By Nicholas P. Gilman

METHODS OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE. Second Thousand. Crown 8vo, \$1.60 *net*, postage extra; or 7s. 6d.

PROFIT SHARING between Employer and Employee: A Study in the Evolution of the Wages System. Sixth Thousand. Crown 8vo, \$1.75, or 7s. 6d.

THE LAWS OF DAILY CONDUCT. Third Thousand. Crown 8vo, \$1.00, or 4s. 6d.

SOCIALISM AND THE AMERICAN SPIRIT. Third Thousand. Crown 8vo, \$1.50, or 6s. 6d.

A DIVIDEND TO LABOR. A Study of Employers' Welfare Institutions. Second Thousand. Crown 8vo, \$1.75, or 7s. 6d.

N. P. Gilman and E. P. Jackson

CONDUCT AS A FINE ART. Including in one volume **THE LAWS OF DAILY CONDUCT**, by N. P. Gilman; and **CHARACTER BUILDING: A Master's Talks with his Pupils**, by E. P. Jackson. Crown 8vo, \$1.50, or 6s. 6d.

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
BOSTON AND NEW YORK
MACMILLAN & Co., LTD., LONDON

Conduct as a Fine Art

THE LAWS OF DAILY CONDUCT

By NICHOLAS PAINE GILMAN

CHARACTER BUILDING

By EDWARD PAYSON JACKSON

We study Ethics for the sake of Practice
ARISTOTLE



BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
The Riverside Press Cambridge

Copyright, 1891,
By NICHOLAS PAINE GILMAN
AND
EDWARD PAYSON JACKSON.

All rights reserved.

THIRD THOUSAND

THE LAWS OF DAILY CONDUCT

By NICHOLAS P. GILMAN

CHARACTER BUILDING

By EDWARD P. JACKSON

THE LAWS OF DAILY CONDUCT

BY NICHOLAS PAINE GILMAN

*Health of mind consists in the perception of law
Its dignity consists in being under law*

EMERSON

To the Noble Army of Teachers

*This attempt to aid the cause of Moral Education
in the Public Schools of America is
dedicated with sincere esteem.*

O'er wayward childhood would'st thou hold firm rule
And sun thee in the light of happy faces,
Love, Hope, and Patience, these must be thy graces ;
And in thine own heart let them first keep school.

For as old Atlas on his broad neck places
Heaven's starry globe, and there sustains it, so
Do these upbear the little world below
Of education — Patience, Love, and Hope.
Methinks I see them grouped in seemly show,
The straightened arms upraised, the palms aslope,
And robes that, touching as adown they flow,
Distinctly blend like snow embossed in snow.
Oh part them never ! If Hope prostrate lie,

Love too will sink and die,
But Love is subtle and doth proof derive
From her own life that Hope is yet alive ;
And bending o'er with soul-transfusing eyes,
And the soft murmurs of the mother dove,
Wooes back the fleeting spirit, and half supplies ;
Thus Love repays to Hope what Hope first gave to Love.
Yet haply there will come a weary day,

When overtasked at length,
Both Love and Hope beneath the load give way.
Then with a statue's smile, a statue's strength,
Stands the mute sister Patience, nothing loth,
And, both supporting, does the work of both.

COLERIDGE.

PREFACE.

THE American Secular Union, a national association having for its object the complete separation of Church and State, but in no way committed to any system of religious belief or disbelief, in the fall of 1889 offered a prize of one thousand dollars "for the best essay, treatise or manual adapted to aid and assist teachers in our free public schools, and in the Girard College for Orphans, and other public and charitable institutions, professing to be unsectarian, to thoroughly instruct children and youth in the purest principles of morality without inculcating religious doctrine."

The members of the committee chosen to examine the numerous MSS. submitted were: Richard B. Westbrook, D. D., LL. B., President of the Union, Philadelphia; Felix Adler, Ph. D., of the Society for Ethical Culture, New York; Prof. D. G. Brinton, M. D., of the University of Pennsylvania; Prof. Frances E. White, M. D., of the Woman's Medical College, and Miss Ida C. Craddock, Secretary of the Union. As, in the opinion of a majority of the committee, no one of the MSS. fully met all the requirements, the prize was equally divided between the two adjudged to be the best offered, entitled respectively, "Character Building," by Edward Payson Jackson, one of the masters of the Boston Latin School, and "The Laws of Daily Conduct."

Although the two books were written with no refer-

ence to each other, they seem to be, both in manner and matter, each the complement of the other. The deficiencies of each are, in great measure, supplied by the other. While "Character Building" is analytic and cast in dialogue form, the present work is more general and synthetic in its style and treatment. The two are therefore published in a single volume, as well as separately, at the earnest request of the Union, and the authors hope that the joint book will be preferred by purchasers. Much of the matter in the introduction to "The Laws of Daily Conduct" is equally pertinent to "Character Building."

The authors of both books are friends to religion, and they have written from a deep conviction that there is a great need of instruction in morals in the public schools. Experience, however, has amply proved the inexpediency of the attempt to teach ethics there on a religious basis. Of the success of this endeavor to place the study on a scientific basis others must judge. But in a country marked by a great diversity of creeds, the way of practice is surely the one way to follow. To teachers and parents who would not neglect the main matter of human life while imparting general knowledge, I offer this volume, in the hope that it may be somewhat of an aid in moral training in the home and in the school.

N. P. G.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION: MORALS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.	
CAN THEY BE TAUGHT?	1
SHOULD THEY BE TAUGHT?	6
THE BEST WAY	10
NATURE AND DESIGN OF THIS BOOK	15
CHAPTER	
I. LIFE UNDER LAW	21
II. OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW	34
III. SELF-CONTROL	45
IV. TRUTHFULNESS	55
V. THE LAW OF JUSTICE	66
VI. THE LAW OF KINDNESS	75
VII. THE GREAT WORDS OF MORALITY	86
VIII. HOME	94
IX. WORK	100
X. THE LAW OF HONOR	106
XI. PERSONAL HABITS	114
XII. OUR COUNTRY	122
I. PATRIOTISM	122
II. POLITICAL DUTY	125
XIII. CHARACTER	130
XIV. MORAL PROGRESS	137
XV. LIFE ACCORDING TO THE GOLDEN RULE	144

INTRODUCTION.

MORALS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

THIS small volume has been written to aid teachers in public and private schools, and parents in the home, in the very important work of the moral education and training of the young. As it is intended primarily for professional teachers, it has been put into a form supposed to be especially suitable for their use. But I trust that some fathers and mothers will be glad to take hints, at least, from these pages. A line drawn between education at home and education in the school-room is surely somewhat artificial when the subject is such a matter as the right direction of the whole life. The distinction between the home and the school in this connection is not that the home has, properly, a monopoly of moral instruction, but that the field of the school is the more restricted.

There are three important questions relating to the teaching of morals in public schools which may well be answered here, before we take up the main subject of this book.

Can morality be taught in these public institutions, supported as they are from taxes laid upon the whole community, without doing injustice to any portion? This question, in our present condition, resolves itself into two distinct inquiries. 1. Can ethics be taught in our common schools without sectarianism, but from a religious standpoint? For one, I should answer this question without hesitation in the affirmative. It seems

to me possible to teach the primary truths of practical morals (all that it is wise in any case to attempt in schools open to all), grounding them on the great propositions of natural religion in such a way as to give no reason for offence to any person who accepts these. But this task, confessedly difficult when we simply mark the many diversities of religious belief in our country, it seems inexpedient to undertake when we remember that a considerable number of our fellow-citizens, who are likewise taxpayers, declare themselves to be destitute of any religious belief, or even vigorously opposed to all forms of religion. A much larger number of persons, again, are believers, but are none the less hostile to any inculcation, in the public schools, directly or indirectly, of any form of theology or religion. They consider the State to be, properly, a purely secular institution, and they would not have it wound the conscience of any citizen by teaching morals from a religious point of view. Granting that this would be the unavoidable effect with some, be they few or many, of the attempt to give ethical instruction on the basis of natural religion, we are led on to the second question under this first head.

2. Can morality be taught in our public schools in complete separation from religion and theology, from what may be called "the scientific standpoint"? Can instruction in practical ethics be so given that no injustice shall be done to any portion of the community, religious, unreligious, or anti-religious? In other words, is there a common ground, in the duties and rights confessed by all, on which the teacher may stand and give tuition in morals as securely as he does in geography or arithmetic? This question would probably be answered in the negative by the great majority of persons in our country. They would, it is most likely, say that while the teaching of morality without sectarianism is difficult, to teach it omitting religion entirely, even so-called

"natural religion," is practically impossible. As the present book is an honest attempt to do precisely this thing, it is evident that I emphatically differ with the great majority on this point.

It remains for the reader, or the user rather, of this volume to determine its value as an answer to the question whether morality can be taught from the scientific standpoint in our common schools. The work must speak for itself, but the fact that it is a manual of practical morals, not a short treatise on ethical theories, will at once suggest to many that the most troublesome of the supposed obstacles in the way of moral education are left on one side. In fact, I have aimed as directly as possible at actual practice ; I have so far omitted ethical theory that it would not be strange if some should be uncertain whether to rank the author in this school of ethical theorists or in that : he may belong to none ! Such uncertainty would be a source of gratification to him, as an indication of his success in keeping to the ground where all schools agree. The great facts and the main laws of the moral life are obvious to all mature men and women ; certainly, they are not dependent, for their clearness and their binding force, upon any notions as to the origin either of the universe, of mankind, or of the perception itself of these facts and laws. The facts of astronomy which affect men's daily life—such as the so-called rising and setting of the sun, the phases of the moon, and the phenomena of the ocean tides, for instance—are plain to every one ; the explanation of them given by the astronomer to the farmer and the sailor (whether correct or not) will not essentially change the arts of agriculture and navigation. So the common practical duties of human beings have long been familiar. Each new generation must learn them afresh, indeed, but it learns every-day morality as an art, not as a science. The difficulty lies in the practice, not in the theory. Philosophers may dispute as

to the exact reason why a man loves, or should love, his mother; but the duty of loving one's mother is not a question considered open to discussion in common life. The same may be said of the other obligations which make up the substance of their duty for the great mass of mankind, in all but exceptional times and situations.

When, then, we have in mind as a subject for public-school instruction, not the science of ethics, not the speculations of moral philosophers, but the orderly presentation of the common facts and laws of the moral life which no one in his senses disputes, we perceive how the religious or theological difficulty at once disappears, to a large degree. There is possible a theistic explanation of the moral law; there is possible an atheistic explanation; but there is a third course open here to the common-school teacher, — to attempt no such final explanation at all! It is not necessary for him to teach that morality rests upon religion as its ultimate foundation; it is just as unnecessary for him to teach that religion, on the contrary, reposes upon morality as its basis. Let the relation of religion and morality be as it may be: the teacher is not called upon to decide an issue of this magnitude. He can teach the duties of ordinary life, showing their reasonableness and their interdependence, in a consecutive, orderly manner, without appealing to religion; he can use the plain and usual consequences of actions, good or bad, as reasons for morality, without being open to a just accusation of irreligion. These consequences as he should teach them are admitted by all. He has, then, a right in reason to stop with them, because of the practical limitations imposed upon him by the time at his disposal, the immaturity of the faculties which he is training, and, most of all, because of the wide difference of men's minds as to the final explanation. The intuitionist and the utilitarian agree in attaching much importance to the consequences of action as a test of its moral quality. So far as these

two keep company, the teacher, then, may safely and properly go along with them, not because he is, necessarily, in his own theory, an intuitionist or a utilitarian, but because he is on common and undisputed ground. The *conduct* of mankind is but little affected by theories of the origin of the moral sense; this is in the highest degree true of the children in our schools. If the teacher will constantly bear in mind that religion is not morality, but an interpretation of the whole of human life and the universe, he will see that he is not unreligious or anti-religious in giving to moral instruction a practical limit, such as I have indicated, in a scientific presentation of practical duty — its facts, its methods, and its laws — fitted to the scope of the child's mind.

Such a limitation bars out all matters of theological controversy. The sectarian difficulty and the religious difficulty in moral education disappear when we keep to conduct and its common laws, and stop short of theological or philosophical explanations *why* right is right or wrong is wrong. If sectarians or religious people of any faith should denounce this abstinence from disputed matter as in itself unwise, wrong, or sinful, we must ask them to consider more carefully that the public schools are for all, and that the only ground on which they can stand and teach is common ground, — as much in morality as in arithmetic or language.¹

The first question as to the teaching of morals in schools — the question of its possibility, in justice to all kinds of religious belief and no-belief — has detained us

¹ The ancient philosophers disputed long and to little profit over a question which, as Dr. Jowett says, "no one would either ask or answer in modern times," — "Can virtue be taught?" In the *Protagoras* of Plato, Socrates maintains that it cannot be. But this "is a paradox of the same sort as the profession of Socrates that he knew nothing. Plato means to say that virtue is not brought to a man, but must be drawn out of him; and that it cannot be taught by rhetorical discourse or citations from the poets." The discussion is, to us, pure logomachy.

long enough. Allowing that such instruction on ground common to all, believers and unbelievers, and in a scientific manner, is possible, the second inquiry arises: Is it *desirable* to give general moral education in the schoolroom? The objection from sectarianism and diversity of religious beliefs has been anticipated. If it is, in fact, possible, and even far from difficult, to teach morality scientifically, giving no reasonable ground of offence to the various sects, — any or all of them, — then the further question of the desirability of imparting in the schoolroom a knowledge of moral law may be discussed on other grounds.

On general principles, the common criticism of our public-school system, that it looks too much to purely intellectual results, and that it has too little influence upon the life of pupils after they have left school, tends strongly toward giving moral instruction, now much neglected, a more conspicuous place in the school course. Many of the arguments forcibly used to recommend industrial training bear upon moral training as well. Fair-minded critics who are among the warmest friends of the common-school system find its chief defect, where it has been carried, as in the large cities, to its highest pitch of apparent excellence, in its actual overrating of knowledge alone. Sheer memorizing and cramming for examinations are generally to be condemned on purely intellectual grounds. The training of the mental powers of children, which is surely a most important part of the teacher's duty, is very inadequate when the two processes just named occupy the place of real honor in the educational course. The lack of adaptation to the needs of real life in which such a partial education results has long been obvious.

One good remedy for the old narrow and injurious insistence upon sheer book knowledge, gotten by heart and recited by rote, is the industrial training which takes the boy or girl away from textbook and recita-

tion for a part of the school day, and educates the hand, the eye, and the practical judgment in other work. It is a new discipline of the mind, compared with the usual round of study, and it complements admirably the intellectual training given by even the best teacher of book knowledge. But it is, as well, a new moral discipline in the virtues, the very essential virtues, of work. If the pupils are required to do their manual exercises in the training shop with neatness, alertness, and steady attention, with economy of time and material, and with a thorough interest in their work, the total discipline of mental faculties and the moral nature is in the highest degree helpful toward true success in after life. This kind of education boys and girls out of school, and men and women earning their living, must get from actual life; a gradual transition to it from the education chiefly by books is, therefore, most advisable. Industrial training, to be of any worth, involves no small amount of moral training, given, of course, by the same person. The latter discipline, equally as a matter of course, is not to be imparted in recitations from a book; it is given, as in the actual industries of men, by the word and the example of the skilful and energetic. There can hardly be any dispute as to the desirability of moral training in connection with this department of education; no separation of industrial and moral education is possible. The "virtues of work," as I call them further on, are indispensable to technical skill and to business success.

Numerous educators, however, will dispute the advisability of giving formal instruction in morals in our schools as they are now conducted (without any provision for industrial training); they take this ground even when convinced that the difficulties arising from sectarianism and religion in general have been overrated, and can be surmounted by the exercise of care and judgment. They say that the schoolroom has a

necessary moral discipline of its own, which is enforced by every capable teacher; that it is not well to go beyond this; that the number of branches of study in our schools is already sufficiently great; and that moral education is the proper function of the home and the church. But I quite fail to see why the moral matters which are continually coming up in the schoolroom, whether practically in the actual discipline, or theoretically as suggested in the reading-books used, should be thus artificially divided from the ethics of the rest of life. The set teaching of arithmetic and geography, for instance, is, indeed, the peculiar task which parents confide to the schools; but the instruction which bears on character is not to be dismissed by the teacher, on his side, as a thing to be attended to entirely by the child's guardians at home or in the Sunday school. This would be taking altogether too limited and partial a view of moral training. Wise instruction in the art of right living in human society can hardly be too frequent; the practice must always be going on, so long as we live here on earth, and help in making that practice better and more successful is not likely to be too insistent.

The child spends its earliest years entirely at home, and its parents are responsible for the moral influences which shape its infant character. When he is five or six years old, he is sent to school for some thirty hours a week out of the one hundred or so which are not given to sleep. Henceforth the responsibility of moral instruction must be divided between the parent and the teacher; but much the larger share continues to fall upon the home authorities, of course. Such obvious duties of the schoolroom as obedience, industry in study, punctuality in attendance, and ordinary politeness, even if thoroughly enforced, are far from exhausting the moral range of the life at home, with its more frequent and varied opportunities for the display of good or bad

character, in word and act. But though the father and the mother cannot properly throw the whole burden of the moral training of their children upon any person or persons beyond the home circle, they naturally look for a vigorous reinforcement of their own efforts from an institution so expressly adapted to training as the public school, with its special buildings, its determined hours, its professional teachers, and its ample apparatus of instruction and discipline.

The teacher who draws an artificial line in the child's life, dividing intellectual training from moral, to devote himself to the first and throw the entire burden of the second upon the home, commits not only a blunder, but also an offence. The child is growing as a moral being in school hours as well as out of them. In them there are some special advantages for effective ethical teaching which the home does not possess. The teacher and the parent are even more natural allies in this direction than in the field of purely intellectual effort. Every public-school teacher is bound, then, I hold, to make the school hours a time for instruction in character, so far as this is compatible with the chief object of imparting the elements of knowledge. But this does not by any means necessarily imply that we shall add a new branch to the course of study, which is often too full already of varied subjects, or that textbooks of virtue or moral theory shall be put into the hands of children in order that they may learn to define elaborately and recite by rote the rules and distinctions of a formal morality. On the contrary, I can imagine few studies more dry, repulsive, and ineffectual in reaching their proposed aim than such a study of morals! In the highest degree it is true of instruction in this art of life that it should come direct from the teacher's lips and pure from the teacher's heart and example. I am not a believer in textbooks of morals for the use of children in public schools. But it would be a great

assumption to suppose that the whole great army of teachers, as a rule, are already entirely competent to give familiar talks occasionally on points of good conduct, and that no assistance from a well-devised handbook of practical ethics, especially intended for their use, could be of value. Manuals of the art of teaching, in general and in particular, are multiplying every year. It would be a curious exception if only in the comparatively untried field of moral instruction the teacher were left to his own devices. Precisely the opposite method I hold to be adapted to the actual state of the case; in no part of the common-school course should a good manual for teachers be more welcome or more profitable than just here.

The present book is an earnest attempt to perform what seems to be the much-needed service of clearing the mind of the common-school teacher as to the nature and limits of the moral training which may advisably be given in the schoolroom. The younger and more inexperienced instructors may find here some useful hints as to the best way of putting things. But I shall leave it to the older and experienced teachers, who have realized the desirability of moral training, to answer the third question, "*How* shall morality be taught in our schools?" largely in their own way. The science of education has been amply and thoroughly illustrated of late years in books, many and excellent, for the guidance of teachers. The fit methods to pursue in moral education are essentially the same as those laid down in these numerous manuals and treatises on intellectual development in the schools. There is, of course, no fixed and plain line between the two disciplines. Writers on psychology and the principles of education nowadays devote no small part of their space to topics which are common to both. Their frequent remarks on the training of the will, on the formation of habit, on the influence of association, and similar subjects are of vital

importance to the proper method of instruction in practical ethics. From my own short experience as an educator, but much more from observation and reflection on the matter, I offer to teachers the following suggestions for what they are worth, as to manner and method in moral education.

The one principle to keep firmly in mind is to avoid didacticism ("preaching") as much as possible, and to hold fast to actual life as children already know it, or may easily be led to comprehend it. Concrete instances of right-doing or wrong-doing, happening in the schoolroom itself, or just outside, within the immediate knowledge of the boys and girls, afford the best starting-point for talks about the moral points involved. It will be easy to bring the children's minds, through a consideration of actual examples, to recognize in some degree the general principles involved. The same caution needs to be urged here as in the case of other general notions, against haste and consequent disregard of the immaturity of the childish mind. But if the teacher will shun formality and generality, and keep mainly to the particular and the concrete, he will find that few subjects interest children more than these questions of right and wrong in common conduct. These men-and-women-to-be find *people* the most attractive matter, just as they will find them later in life. Man is not only the "proper," but also the most engaging "study of mankind," large or small. Conduct is to children, who have not yet entered upon the great activities of business, art, or science, much more than "three fourths of life," and the lines of it on which they are beginners will continue unbroken through all their years. Elaborate casuistry, hair-splitting about imaginary situations, anything and everything in the line of pure ethical theory, should be utterly tabooed in the schoolroom. But with these precautions observed, and under the guidance of a teacher of well-developed moral sense, boys and

girls between eight and fourteen years of age (in the grammar schools, where moral education has its most fruitful field) will reason about points of ethical practice with interest, and often with a freshness and an acuteness that are surprising. If this be not so, then these children in school differ very much from these same children out of school!

If the course of study is, anywhere, so full or crowded as not to allow time for the occasional talks (one or two a week) about conduct, which I should advise as the best method, then that course should be shortened by the omission of some branch of much less useful knowledge sure to be found in it. I would avoid set times for these conversations; in them question and answer should play a large part; the more easily (if not very frequently) the teacher "drops into" one of them for a few vivacious minutes, the better. Some incident of the schoolroom life that has just occurred, or some matter in the lesson in reading or history, may well interrupt the routine of the ordinary recitation, as the teacher asks the opinions of the class or of the school on the moral point in question, incites them to think more carefully about it, and indicates the conclusion to which long experience has brought the world of man. The school itself will, naturally, supply the starting-point at least for the majority of these ethical talks, for, like every other social institution, it has its moral law which must be observed by all its members in order to attain its end. The plainly visible chief function of the public school is to impart the elements of knowledge. To this end there must be full obedience to the natural authority, the teacher; the prescribed conditions of quiet, order, and studiousness must be observed by the pupils. Punctuality in attendance and readiness for all the exercises; truthfulness in regard to absence from school, tardiness, or any other failure to comply with the regular order; honorable conduct with respect to

methods of passing examinations; polite treatment of the other scholars; attention and courtesy to the teacher, — such are some of the moral necessities of the school-room to be met by the scholars.

The pupils have no duties which should not be met by an equal faithfulness to his duties on the part of the teacher, who should not be there teaching unless interested in his work, qualified for it, and industrious in improving his practice of it. He must be just and impartial in his treatment of the scholars; he must, having the authority, exhibit the virtues of a ruler. Teaching politeness and honor, the instructor should be an honorable gentleman. He has some advantages over the parents at home in respect to the moral discipline demanded by the schoolroom. Indulgence or partiality for any individual child is out of place, of course, whereas at home it may sometimes be very natural; the aim of the school is more limited and definite than that of the home; the hours are set, the labors are plainly marked out, and to accomplish them successfully something like military discipline is necessary. On the other hand, the teacher has no direct influence over the pupil except in the school hours, and his earnest efforts may be rendered almost useless by the indifference, or the hostility even, of parents. But none the less must he strive to connect the morality of the schoolroom, which he can enforce, with the morality of life outside, as resting on the same general principles of reason. While the first rudiments of common sense will keep him from speaking of any vice, such as lying or stealing or drunkenness, in such a way as to proclaim his knowledge that it prevails in any scholar's home, he is still free to enlarge upon the manifold evil consequences of it. Thus his word may help somewhat to keep children pure in the midst of a bad home atmosphere, which he is otherwise powerless to change.

“Word,” — this will usually be easy for the teacher

to give in attempting moral education; but nowhere else does word amount to so little compared with example. If the word is not reinforced by the example, its influence will be small. The demand upon the patience and good nature of the public-school teacher is great, and by the vast majority the call is well met; but one good result of teaching practical morals may be in that reaction upon the teacher himself which is seen in other lines. What one teaches he learns more thoroughly than in any other way. So in respect to morals: the conscientious teacher, who cannot fail to apply to himself and his own conduct the precepts of justice and kindness which he instils into his pupils' minds, may be almost as much benefited by the study as the scholar. John Milton thought that "he who would not be frustrate of his hope to write well hereafter in laudable things ought himself to be a true poem; that is, a composition and pattern of the honorablest things; not presuming to sing high praises of heroic men or famous cities unless he have in himself the experience and the practice of all that which is praiseworthy." As Milton would have the poet himself a poem, so the excellent teacher of morals will be morality incarnate; showing forth its gospel as well as its law in the daily exhibition of sweetness and light, he will be "not virtuous, but virtue" itself! How difficult, but how necessary, is such a preparation of the heart and will in the well-rounded instructor of children or of men one does not need to reiterate to the teacher who has found his true vocation.

A single caution may be needed here by the most conscientious. Children take example from the whole man or woman instructing them. A severe conception of his duty may make a teacher sometimes harsh, where a little measure of good nature would be more effective in correcting the offence. "You have not fulfilled every duty until you have fulfilled the duty of being pleas-

ant" is a good saying to remember in the schoolroom. Strength of mind and fulness of knowledge have a moral bearing on the teacher's character; good taste, refinement, a sense of beauty, — these too should be cultivated in himself by the instructor of youth. They will fit him to be a better and more persuasive moral guide; they will not only favorably affect his own character, but they will also diffuse a moral influence, not the less powerful because of his unconsciousness of its existence.

Having answered the three questions as to the possibility, the desirability, and the general method of moral instruction in schools, I need add but a few paragraphs on the nature of this manual and the best way to use it. It is intended solely for the teacher: it is not a catechism for the scholar; it is not a book from which the teacher is to read selections to the school. It aims solely to be a help to instructors of children in preparing short talks on practical morals.¹ There is, to my knowledge, very little helpful literature in this special field; and in what there is I have not happened to find any work which takes the line I have chosen as the best to follow. In this venture at making a properly scientific handbook of practical ethics to aid the teacher as he is aided by manuals on the teaching of geography, arithmetic, and other studies, I have not crossed the line between morality and religion. But every one who uses this manual should beware of supposing that because the author has omitted appeals to certain great beliefs and sentiments of mankind, he is therefore a disbeliever in them. I am strongly of the opinion that the line followed in this book is, substantially, the best to take; that in our common schools it is well to begin and to end as I have done. Parents at home, preachers

¹ The teacher will not, for this reason, think the style of these chapters too simple; I have often written as if addressing boys and girls.

in the pulpit, or teachers in the Sunday school will supplement a distinctively scientific teaching of morals with a more religious or theological view. But no one can properly say that the method here taken is either anti-religious or anti-theological. Morality is here viewed as a practical art which has, of course, a working theory that it is well to know; but it seems unadvisable to extend this theory, in the case of children in our public schools, by bringing in considerations which are distinctively religious or theological. Religion may, later in life, become one of the greatest inspirations to good conduct, and a rational theology may supplement a practical science of morals most happily. Both, however, are here simply left out of view as subjects too great for the common school, and too much complicated with unsettled controversies. So, likewise, ethical theory has been shunned, in order to make clearer and easier the sufficiently difficult task of the teacher.

When the teacher who takes up this book has become well enough acquainted with it to sympathize with its spirit and appreciate its leading ideas, he will be wise if he uses it for the purposes of the schoolroom in an independent fashion. I would not advise a consecutive series of talks to the scholars, following the order of the chapters. This order is based upon a logical conception, but the development of it is meant for the instructor. The matter may well be left to the judgment of each individual teacher to decide, according as he is more or less inclined to system. But any striking occasion in school life fitted for driving home a moral precept ought to be improved at once, without regard to the place of a given duty in a handbook. A very free use of this volume will be the best use, so long as its method and spirit are accepted and followed. This method is to hold fast to the concrete and the actual; this spirit is cleaving to righteousness as the great matter in human life.

These fifteen short chapters begin with a simple explanation of Life under Law, showing what it means to live, as mankind does, in a law-abiding Universe. The special significance of Moral Law and Obedience to it is the next subject. Obedience is possible mainly through the power of Self-Control, which must be fundamental in the nature of any moral being. Exercising this, he can practice Truthfulness, Justice, and Kindness, not as instincts, acting more or less fitfully, but as perpetual forces, working steadily from within. After pausing to consider the Great Words of Morality, such as "duty" and "conscience," we pass to the groups of duties implied when we speak of Home, Work, Honor, and Personal Habits, — the last phrase covering "duties to one's self," as we often hear them called. The obligations to our country of Patriotism and Political Duty could not be omitted here. The meaning of Character and of Moral Progress is next considered, and we conclude with a chapter on life according to the Golden Rule, the most important precept of practical morals.

In the text which forms the body of this book, the teacher, as has been said, will not find discussions of the origin of the moral sense, the nature of conscience, the final test of right, and other similar matters which belong to the psychology or the metaphysic of ethics, not to practical morality. He will do well to consult, according to his interest, the books on ethics which are occupied largely with these matters; he will probably gain more in the way of illustrations from actual conduct found in such works than in any lasting satisfaction of his own mind as to the perennial problems of ethics. The constant appeal in the schoolroom should be to experience which has fully shown the consequence of obedience and disobedience to the simpler moral laws of conduct here treated. Especially, whenever it is practicable, should the law in question be traced in the experience of the children themselves, in what they

have seen, heard, felt, or done, at home, in school, or elsewhere.

The object of the Notes is to furnish supplementary matter to the text, in the way of hints for the development of the subject; illustrations from biography and history, which could only be referred to here; quotations, or references to passages, from great writers, particularly the poets and moralists, bearing upon the point of conduct in question; and occasional indications of places in the works on ethics generally accessible in which these points are well treated. It is evident that these Notes might be extended almost indefinitely; comparatively few are given, and in this direction especially the manual will need revision. The skilful instructor, accustomed to teach without relying upon a book, will know how to take the material in the text and the notes, work it over in his own mind, and give it forth in a form suited to the needs of the schoolroom and the hour.

One more suggestion remains: the songs sung in the school may be made influential in bringing home a sound moral lesson to the scholar's mind. Beyond its general refining influence, music may thus become an agreeable instrument for fixing plain truths of conduct deep in the memory and the heart. The songs should not be made exclusively didactic, but after a short talk on truthfulness, for instance, the moral could hardly be left on the mind more felicitously than with singing, "Be the matter what it may, Always tell the truth!"

In this attempt to set forth the laws of the good life — which is therefore the best, the happiest, the most truly successful life — in such a manner as to aid the great cause of the education of the young, I have used material from many quarters. A careful inquiry has not brought to notice any book, however, in English, French, or German constructed on the lines here followed. Books of ethical philosophy are many in these

languages ; but handbooks of practical morals for schools are comparatively very few. But wherever I have found anything to my purpose I have appropriated it. A book of this kind, as a German author has well said, should be a collective work to which many minds have contributed ; he would be pleased to have his own volume quoted as written "by the professors and schoolmasters of Germany." So, in offering this small book to the public-school teachers of my country, to make of it what use they may, I am careless of originality or plagiarism, but I earnestly invite such suggestions for its improvement as shall make it in the truest sense "a book by the teachers of America."

NOTES.

MORAL education in the public schools is one of the "questions of the day" most frequently debated in the press. The *Christian Union* and the *Independent* of New York, *Public Opinion* of Washington, and the *Christian Register* of Boston, have had of recent years many noteworthy expressions of opinion from prominent educators on the subject. Cardinal Gibbons has ably stated the argument *against* secular schools. Particularly good is a little pamphlet by W. T. Harris, the United States Commissioner of Education, entitled *Morality in the Schools* : it is a review of the discussion printed in the *Christian Register*, January 31, 1889. Mistaken methods of teaching morals without religion, are described, and a better way indicated, in a paper on *Ethics in the Sunday School*, by W. L. Sheldon of St. Louis. See also *Problems in American Society*, by J. H. Crooker. Among articles in the periodicals are *Religion in State Education*, by J. H. Seelye, *Forum*, i. 427 ; *Training in Ethical Science*, by H. H. Curtis, *Popular Science Monthly*, xxvii. 96 ; *Moral and Industrial Training*, by G. R. Stetson, *Andover Review*, vi. 351 ; *Religion, Morals, and Schools*, by M. J. Savage, *The Arena*, i. 503.

The Ethical Record of Philadelphia and its successor, *The International Journal of Ethics*, have frequently considered the

place of morals in education, and the best methods of instruction. Some of Professor Felix Adler's valuable lectures on moral training have been printed in pamphlet form.

In the multitude of works on pedagogy, which have more or less to say on the moral nature, and the wisest ways of developing it, these books may be named as among the best: Plato's *Republic*, books iii. and iv.; Richter's *Levana*; Herbert Spencer's *Education*; A. Bain's *Education as a Science*; Rosenkranz's *Philosophy of Education*, part II. chapters xii.-xviii.; G. Compayré's *Lectures on Teaching*, part I. chapters ix.-xii.; and *Psychology*; other works on psychology by J. M. Baldwin, J. Dewey, D. J. Hill, and James Sully; *The Senses and the Will*, by W. Preyer; *The Education of Man*, by Froebel. *Hints on Home Teaching*, by Edwin Abbot, D. D.; *School Life*, a series of lessons, by Mrs. F. B. Ames; and *Notes of Lessons on Moral Subjects*, by F. Hackwood (T. Nelson & Sons), are particularly helpful.

A point not to be overlooked by the teacher is the use of proverbs ("the wisdom of many in the wit of one"), which will often be effective in fixing a moral truth in the child's mind. Such a book as Bartlett's *Familiar Quotations* will supply brief passages of higher literary merit, bearing on points of common conduct. The reading exercises, especially the supplementary reading, may well be chosen with an ethical aim. While the school-room itself supplies the natural basis for instruction in morals, by precept and by example, much moralizing on every little incident should be avoided. The chief aim of the school, after all is said, is to get knowledge.

The biographies of Arnold of Rugby, and other great educational reformers (see R. H. Quick's work with this title) will be useful. Every teacher has, in a sense, to be a re-former of character, and Coleridge's lines (page iv.) indicate finely the chief virtues such a reformer must himself possess.

THE LAWS OF DAILY CONDUCT.

CHAPTER I.

LIFE UNDER LAW.

1. **All our human life is lived under Law.** At the outset let us be clear in our minds as to just what we mean by this comprehensive statement. We are well aware that in all free, civilized countries, such as our own, there is something called "the fundamental law," or "the Constitution" of the country. Thus the United States Constitution is for all the States. Moreover, whether we live in Massachusetts, Ohio, California, Louisiana, or any other State of the Union, we live under a State Constitution, too, which is in harmony with the "fundamental law" of the whole country. Congress and the State legislatures pass laws to adapt the provisions of the Constitutions to the circumstances and needs of our own time. Many large volumes contain these laws, which do not promise to reward any one for doing well, but declare punishments for persons who do not act in conformity with what they prescribe. Policemen, constables, or sheriffs arrest men or women who are supposed to be "breaking the law" of the town or city or State or Nation, and they are confined in jails or prisons or kept on bail, until they are tried and found to be innocent or guilty by the courts. Judges are appointed to preside over these courts, at the public expense, and juries are

chosen to decide whether the accused person has actually broken the law or not. There is a special class of persons, lawyers, who devote themselves to studying and practising law; they go into court and argue in behalf of one side or the other in a suit.

Now, when we say that the jury has convicted a person (found him guilty) of **breaking the law**, what do we mean? We do not intend to say that the law is something which can be broken as a pane of glass is broken by throwing a stone through it. We get a new pane of glass set in such a case, because the old one is no longer good for our purpose, to keep out the wind and the rain. But when a man breaks the law against taking human life by committing a murder, we do not have to pass a new law. The law which the murderer disobeys is the expression in words of the will and purpose of the people of this State that no person shall take the life of another at his own pleasure merely. If one man kills another, not in self-defence, he is a law-breaker in this sense, that he **disobeys** the expression of the will of the people. By the methods they have established for such cases, they proceed to *enforce* the law against him, *i. e.*, to put it into effect by making him suffer certain consequences of his bad deed as a **penalty**.

This punishment was laid down in the law before the murder was committed, and it was intended to be so severe as to prevent any person from killing a human being. But if, for any reason, a man or woman has actually been killed by another, then we say, "The law must be enforced; and the murderer must lose his life," because this is the punishment laid down in the law on purpose to keep people's lives safe generally. If the murderer is hanged (or imprisoned for life, instead, under certain circumstances) then the law against murder has been "enforced," and we might well say that the law has broken the murderer. He acted contrary

to the law ; but he was afterwards punished according to the law. He disobeyed ; but he had to take the consequences which the law threatened against disobedience. So with respect to offences of less importance than the taking of a human life : if a man breaks into another man's house at night and carries away some of that man's property, or if he steals something out of a dry-goods store in broad daylight, he is sent to jail, if it is proved that he did the act, and he is kept in prison as long as the law has determined for such cases.

This, then, is what we mean by "breaking" and "enforcing" the statute law of the Commonwealth in which we live. The great majority of the people living in the State believe that their lives and their property will not be safe unless laws prescribing punishments for certain bad actions are passed and enforced. So they choose legislators who make these laws, and pay judges and jailers to carry them out whenever any evil-minded person disobeys them. In all civilized countries human beings live under law in this sense, and we say that "a government of laws, not of men" is right, meaning that the same rule should be applied to all alike who commit a crime, and that no man should have the power to suspend or set aside the law so that a guilty person may escape the punishment he has deserved.

But this is only one meaning of "living under law." The laws of which we have been speaking were made by men, and they are changed from time to time, as men's ideas alter. But when we say "a law of nature," we are using the word law to mean **something very different**, something which men did not make and cannot alter. It is a law of nature, for instance, that the tides shall rise and fall twice in every twenty-four hours : it is a law of nature that the roots of an apple-tree shall spread out in the ground and that it shall leaf and blossom and bear fruit in the upper air

and sunshine. It is a law of nature that water shall run down hill, not up hill. We should only make ourselves ridiculous if we passed laws in our legislatures that the tide should go out and come in only once in the twenty-four hours ; that apples should grow in the ground like potatoes, and that rivers should run over hills instead of going around them. No law of nature can be set aside by laws that man makes. We may often be mistaken as to what the actual laws of nature are : we have to discover them by experience, and reasoning on our experience, of the facts of nature. But when we have once found a real law like that of gravitation, the widest-reaching of all laws of nature, we should never think that we can make it of no effect by saying so, or voting so.

A "law of nature" is our expression of the fact that **natural forces** act in certain ways. The **uniformity of nature** means that we find in all our experience that these ways do not change without a cause. Under the same conditions the natural forces — gravitation, heat, light, and electricity, for instance — always act in the same manner and produce the same effects. Just as we live together in towns and cities and states, feeling safe as to our persons and property so far as other persons are concerned, because of the human laws that have been made to protect us against attack by evil-doers, so we have a very much greater confidence in the laws of nature which man did not make and cannot alter. We feel perfectly sure that the force of gravitation will hold our houses down to the ground next year as well as this year ; so we build them to last for years, and we live in them in entire security. We are very confident that day will succeed night every evening that we lie down to sleep : we have no fear that harvest will not follow upon seed-time. Gravitation, and the revolution of the earth on its axis, and the growth of plants from seeds are all parts of the great uniformity of nature.

With respect to these laws of nature, we may say even more strongly than we could say it of the wisest laws of man's making, "They cannot be broken : *they break the persons who disobey them.*" If a little child puts its hand on a hot stove, its hand will be burned : if a boy who cannot swim goes alone into deep water, out of the reach of help, he will be drowned. It is the **nature** of fire and hot things to burn human flesh : it is the **nature** of water to cause the death of a person who gets under it so that he cannot keep on breathing. The judges and the juries sometimes let a person go free of punishment if he makes it seem probable that he did not *intend* to break the law printed in the statute-book ; or they impose a lighter punishment than they would in a case where they were sure that the person disobeyed the law knowingly. But what we call the "laws of nature" were not made by human beings ; so we cannot ask our fellow-men to change them or alter the penalties because we did not know all about them or intend to violate them. The man who handles a wire charged with electricity will receive a shock just the same, whether he knew anything about the risk or did not. It is our business to learn the laws of nature and to act in accordance with them.

These laws are very many in number, and we are constantly learning more and more about them : the more we learn, the more sure we become of the **uniformity of nature**. This truth is the foundation of science and the reason for our daily confidence in the future. If we believe that hereafter the same causes will produce the same effects as now, under the same conditions, we can plan our lives with a firm trust that we are building on a sure foundation. This is the reason why we are continually inquiring into nature and its laws ; we study physics and chemistry and botany and physiology, and all the other "natural sciences," as we call them, in order first to know, and then to act in

accordance with our knowledge. We study the facts of natural things and forces in order to find the laws of their existence and their operation and in order to make our own actions **conform to the nature of things**. We wish to make use of the forces of nature, such as heat and electricity, that they may serve our convenience. After we have found how these forces act, what the **laws** of them are, we have no choice about obeying or disobeying, and taking the consequences or not. We **must take the consequences**, if we act in one way or another, which "naturally" follow from that action. A statement of all the "laws" of any thing in nature would be a complete expression in words of the nature of that thing: so every thing or being is acting in accordance with law when it is acting according to its nature. We cannot reasonably expect that things will act contrary to their nature. We never find rocks, for example, putting out woody fibres and rooting themselves in the soil. We do not expect ever to see oak trees walking up and down the street, or animals standing on their heads to eat their food.

Every law of nature has an interest and a value for mankind, if purely as a matter of knowledge. But among all the sciences, the most interesting to man and woman are those which declare the facts and laws of our own human nature. We are living beings, and so we must act according to the laws of life; biology is the name we give to the science that tells us of the facts and laws of life in general, whether in plants or in animals. We are animals, and we call by the name of physiology the science that informs us about the facts and laws of animal life, whether in dogs or horses, or any other of the "lower animals," or in mankind.

As we study this animal life we find, as we get nearer and nearer in the scale to human beings, that there is more and more of that wonderful life which we call the life of *mind*. So we have a science of mental physiology

which is mainly made up of what men have found out about the organs and functions of the human mind — the brain and nerves which we can see, and the feeling and thinking and willing which we are conscious of in ourselves, but which no one can see. We can only **infer** that others are feeling or thinking or willing by the **signs** which they make, in expression or speech or action.

The fact that men are especially thinking animals with minds, is the reason why we have many other sciences than mental physiology, which has to do only with those organs of the mind which it is possible to see in a human being, the brain and the nervous system. *Psychology* is the name we give ("knowledge of the mind or soul") to the science of the human mind in general. But this is a very great subject in itself: so we divide it into branches, and give each one of these a name. There is the science of logic, for example, which brings together the facts about the ways in which men reason; the science of economics, which relates how they get wealth, and consume or distribute it; the science of politics, which expounds the methods in which men have come together under various forms of government; and the science of history, which shows us what mankind has done in all ages and countries where any record has been preserved of its doings.

All these mental sciences show certain *facts* of our nature as human beings, and sift them so as to discover their laws. When these laws are once actually found, we have no choice about obeying them and suffering a penalty or not. We **must** obey them if we would prosper mentally. So doing, we live in accordance with our nature as intellectual beings: but if we disobey these laws, as to a limited extent we may and can, we must take the natural consequences. If, for instance, we reason contrary to the laws of logic, which are simply statements of the way in which we *must* reason to arrive at

correct conclusions, we come to a wrong result. We cannot reason or fail to reason, just as we please, and still have a right to demand that we arrive at the truth in both cases alike. We cannot act contrary to the ways in which the science of economics shows that men acquire property, and then rationally complain that we are not well-off as to property. There are laws of logic and laws of economics which are just as sure and just as binding as the laws of physics or chemistry. They are, indeed, often harder to discover, as human nature is very complex, and we are subject to so many laws that we are more apt to make mistakes about them than about rocks and plants and the lower animals. But whether we know the law or do not know it, it is still in force. The one wise course for us to follow is to discover the law, if possible, and then conform our action to it. This is not a world in which we can "do as we please," and prosper. On the contrary, as a very wise man has said, "Only law can give us freedom;" we must obey the laws of our own human nature and of all nature, if we would have true liberty and happiness.

Most of all is what we have been saying true of the science of **ethics** or **morals** (the two words mean the same thing, one being derived from the Greek, the other from the Latin language). **Ethics is the science of human conduct in personal relations.** It tells us of the facts of human life which concern human beings, not in respect to reasoning (logic) for example, not in respect to the way to make and spend money (economics), not in respect to setting up a government that will last (politics), but in respect to the common conduct of men toward each other in the relations of **character**. Ethics, or morals, is a more difficult science to *define* than the others which we have been naming, so easy is it for almost any human action to take on a **moral** bearing, *i. e.*, to affect the welfare of other persons than the doer of the act, or to influence his own

ethical life. But, on the other hand, the vast majority of acts and words and feelings which may be called moral or immoral are of the commonest, and are constantly happening every day.

We live in **society**: not one of us can live entirely apart, as an isolated individual. Human society is just as much a fact as any single person is a fact. Men, we say, are social beings. Their nature marks them out as intended to live **together**, members of a family, of a neighborhood, of a town, of a nation, and of the great world of human beings. Ethics is not, of course, the only science of human action in society, for men in order to carry on trade or establish a government, for instance, must be living in communities, and so economics and politics are social sciences too; but ethics is preëminently the most fundamental and important science of **human life together**. The *art* of morals is by far the most interesting and constant of all arts to universal mankind. We are all the time living in social relations; society of some kind is absolutely necessary to human welfare. The science and the art which are concerned with the personal relations of the members of society to each other must thus be of supreme interest. No questions are more common than questions of moral goodness or badness; no words are more often employed than "right" and "wrong;" nothing is more thought of than the personal relations into which moral qualities may at any time enter; nothing is of more consequence to the very existence of human society than virtue, or the moral life.

It would be a very strange exception to all the rest of our life if these personal relations were not subject to law like other relations. Moral law, in the family, in the neighborhood, in the political organizations of men, is, in fact, **the earliest of all laws** to force itself upon the attention of men. Unless the social law is in large degree obeyed, the family would not endure, the

State would perish, men would fly apart from one another and live in solitude, and civilization would thus become impossible. So important to the very existence of social life is the moral life, that we find the earliest codes of law were largely collections of moral precepts. At once, on reflection, we see how reasonable this is. The moral law is the law which expresses the nature of society; just as the single human being must obey the laws of his own nature to some degree, even to live, so a society, a larger or smaller collection of human beings must obey the moral law, however imperfectly, in order even to exist. It may have been a very long time before books were written on moral science, but from the earliest days of human life on this earth there must have been some practical recognition of the moral law, for otherwise human society would have been impossible. To put this truth in another form, we might say that human nature has always been true to itself and that man has always acted out his own nature.

Since we can reason about an art and imagine it carried to a perfection which only few persons, if any, have ever attained, we may conceive a perfect morality, according to certain principles, which few individuals have practised thoroughly at any time. There is an **ideal excellence** which may be imagined in every direction of human effort. Nowhere else, as a matter of fact, has the ideal been earlier conceived or more constantly held up to mankind than in this very sphere of conduct, however rarely it has been realized. But as the moral law is the very law of life of human society, it has always been recognized and obeyed in some degree.

Mankind makes progress in morality, as in other arts of life, by taking heed to its ways. So strong is the force, however, in most human beings that makes them think too much of individual happiness and too little of the social welfare, that moral progress toward the higher

levels of conduct is necessarily slow. But we are able to-day to see at least that the moral law is inscribed in the nature of man, that its facts are a part of the facts of human nature, and that obedience to it is in the line of the true development of human nature. We live under moral law as we live under physical law, under chemical law, under physiological law. We cannot escape from it, except by leaving human society, for it is of the very nature of that society. We find our welfare in obedience to it; we suffer if we disobey it, knowingly or unknowingly. Owing to the complexity of many social relations we cannot be so exact in predicting the consequences of immorality as of disobedience to the laws of health, but we may be just as confident, despite all apparent exceptions, that there is a moral law and that it is binding on all human beings, as we are that there are laws for the body, which must be observed if one would have good health. The first thing for a rational human being here to do is to acknowledge that he lives **in every time, place, and condition, under law, and, most of all, under the moral law** of universal human nature, to which he owes obedience. What this obedience implies we will consider in the next chapter.

NOTES.

THE teacher will do well to dwell upon the great conceptions of modern thought, the universe governed by one law, the uniformity of nature, and the inclusion of human life under law. He will be aided himself by such books as J. S. Mill's *Logic*, *The Principles of Science*, by W. S. Jevons, John Fiske's *Cosmic Philosophy*, and *The Reign of Law*, by the Duke of Argyll. The popular writings of Spencer, Huxley, Tyndall, and M. J. Savage, are full of illustrations of scientific conceptions. The following quotation from Professor Huxley's *Science Primer: Introductory*,

explains the meaning of the phrase "a law of nature." (The sight of the Statutes of the State would impress the child's mind forcibly.)

"When we have made out, by careful and repeated observation, that something is always the cause of a certain effect, or that certain events always take place in the same order, we speak of the truth thus discovered as a law of nature. . . . In fact, everything that we know about the powers and properties of natural objects, and about the order of nature, may properly be termed a law of nature. . . . A law of man tells what we may expect society will do under certain circumstances, and a law of nature tells us what we may expect natural objects will do under certain circumstances. . . . Natural laws are not commands, but assertions respecting the invariable order of nature; and they remain laws only so long as they can be shown to express that order. To speak of the violation or the suspension of a law of nature is an absurdity. All that the phrase can really mean is, that under certain circumstances the assertion contained in the law is not true; and the just conclusion is, not that the order of nature is interrupted, but that we have made a mistake in stating that order. A true natural law is a universal rule, and as such admits of no exception."

So Montesquieu wrote: "Laws, in their most general signification, are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things. In this sense all beings have their laws."

Here are three famous sayings by lawyers on man-made law:—

"Reason is the life of law; nay, the common law itself is nothing else but reason. . . . The law, which is perfection of reason." (Sir E. Coke.)

"The absolute justice of the State, enlightened by the perfect reason of the State. That is law." (Rufus Choate.)

"There is a higher law than the Constitution." (W. H. Seward.)

Three other great minds have thus spoken of the relations of law and liberty:—

"That liberty which alone is the fruit of piety, of temperance, and unadulterated virtue." (Milton.)

"Liberty must be limited in order to be possessed." (Burke.)

"Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint." (Daniel Webster.)

As a popular exposition of the law of the land under which we live, E. P. Dole's *Talks About Law* is an excellent manual. The idea of justice is intimately connected with the political life of mankind, and the teacher will naturally be led into the study of politics as a science. Bryce's *American Commonwealth*, Woodrow Wilson's *The State and Federal Governments of the United States*, and John Fiske's *American Political Ideas*, are three good books to start with ; see the notes to Chapter XII. of this volume.

“Whenever a separation is made between liberty and justice, neither is, in my opinion, safe.” — EDMUND BURKE.

CHAPTER II.

OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW.

How do we obey what we call a **physical or natural law**, and what does such obedience mean? To answer these two questions, let us take some very plain and specific instances. Mankind has discovered, as the most universal of all laws of physical nature, the law of gravitation. This law finds expression in the facts of weight and of falling bodies. Like every other law of general nature, this is fixed and determined. We cannot abolish it either by our private will, or by a majority vote of all the people on earth. It is the force of gravitation, indeed, which keeps our bodies on the earth! When we are to build a large house we act in accordance with our knowledge of gravitation by digging deep into the ground first, and then laying the strongest part of the building below the surface, as a foundation for the rest. We do not think because we have but a short time for building, or because we have but little money to build with, or simply because "we happen to feel like it," that it will be well enough to go on fast with the work, and run up a high building without digging deep to lay a strong and heavy foundation wall. The power of gravitation would bring the house to the ground of its own weight if we did so; and men would call us, as we should deserve to be called, "fools."

We cannot know just how much weight to place on a certain foundation unless we have studied the matter in books, or have had much practical experience; but, if we are wise, we consult those who do know, and build

accordingly. We should be very foolish, indeed, if we had such an idea of our own importance as to think that the natural force would be modified, or fail to act as it usually does, because it is *we* who have built the house, however unwisely. "Shall gravitation cease if you go by?" writes the poet. No! it will *not* cease; and your bad building will fall, and perhaps crush you in its falling. We obey this natural law of gravitation by building as experienced men tell us we must build if we would be sure that our house stand firm. We have no choice in the matter. Stone and wood and iron, and the earth on which they rest, will act according to the laws of their own natures, and they will pay no attention to our fond wishes, our caprices, or our ignorance. They are all under universal law; they are parts of one whole, — the universe of things, — and they act accordingly, each in its sphere. We, too, must so act wisely, with a knowledge of law and according to law, if we would have our houses stand. People cannot build "just as they please" and have good houses that will last. Success is the result of conformity to natural law here; it is shown by the fact that the house *endures* and is strong. Failure and disaster are the result of neglect of natural law or conscious disobedience, — the house falls flat.

In our next example let us come home to ourselves, as human beings in animal bodies. Human physiology is the name we give to the science which brings together the facts which men have discovered by long and careful study of the human body. They have found out "the laws of physiology." These are the expression, in a few words comparatively, of the facts as to the ways in which the bodily forces work constantly in us. In accordance with their knowledge of the working of muscles and nerves and stomach and brain and all the other bodily parts and organs, the doctors tell us that we must do so and so if we would preserve the bodily

health, which is so indispensable a condition of human happiness and prosperity. They give the name Hygiene to the set of practical rules and directions about eating and drinking, breathing, sleeping, work and play, and other functions, which are founded on their study of physiology. If one follows these rules he will probably enjoy good health; if he does not follow them he is altogether likely to be sick or infirm. Of course, this matter of good health is very much more complicated than the matter of building a house so that it will stand firm. There are very many more things to be taken into consideration, and there are, *apparently*, a great many exceptions to what we call "the laws of health," because the conditions under which people live are so various.

But we need not doubt, first, that **there are laws of health**; and second, that **we know a good deal about them**, amply enough to show us what our bodily habits, as a rule, should be. One law, for example, is that our lungs should have pure air to breathe, and that they become weakened or diseased if we breathe the same air over and over. Now a farmer who works outdoors all the summer day may sleep in a small and poorly-ventilated room, and may not appear to suffer very much from bad air. He does not suffer so much, at any rate, as a man would who has to work all day in a close factory or machine shop. This difference does not affect the fact that *pure air is always best* for the lungs of every one, or the truth that because of this fact we should pay attention to ventilation in our houses and workshops. The Black Hole of Calcutta is the well-known instance of the absolute necessity of a certain amount of pure air merely to sustain the animal life. But the laws of hygiene in regard to pure air are confirmed in our common experience when the results of inattention are less tragical. Bad air produces headache and languor and a low tone of bodily spirits. Such effects as these we cannot get rid of simply by wishing

them away. We **must change our habits** with regard to the ventilation of our houses and work-places, the amount of exercise we take in the open air, and like matters. We have no choice. Our personal inclinations are not important in the case. We must have habits that are in conformity with our knowledge of the need of good, pure air; otherwise, we shall suffer for our nonconformity or disobedience.

So we might go on to speak of the rules of hygiene about eating and drinking, about sleep, and the work of hand or head. But the principle is one and the same throughout. Obedience to the laws of hygiene means **conforming our actions to our knowledge** of these laws, so as to be healthy and, so far, happy. The wise man values health very greatly. He knows that he did not make the rules of health and that he cannot unmake them. They are "bottom facts" of human nature, which all mankind cannot destroy. We must, then, if we wish to be well and strong and have a good animal life, submit ourselves to the guidance of those who know the laws of hygiene and learn of them how to fix our habits.

We have always to bear in mind that we shall thus attain, by acting in accordance with the laws of things, all the happiness and prosperity which things can give us. Obedience is the highway to welfare. We do not give up our own whims and follies and submit to the rule of facts and law merely in order to discipline ourselves, without regard to the result. Precisely the contrary is true. The happy, prosperous life would be impossible without conformity to the laws of human nature; therefore, the sooner we learn what these laws are, and obey them in our practice, the larger will be the measure of our welfare. The service of natural law is perfect freedom; it is the highest liberty we can conceive. Universal nature is under the reign of law, as Ulysses says in "*Troilus and Cressida*": —

“ The heavens themselves, the planets and this centre
Observe degree, priority, and place,
Insisture, course, proportion, season, form,
Office and custom, in all line of order.”

Now what do we mean especially by **moral law** ? When we speak these two words we imply that the actions, the whole life, of human beings in their relations to one another are *under law* ; that there are rules for social welfare and individual happiness which, as men have discovered by long experience, are entitled to be called **laws of human conduct**, and that these are not dependent on any person's caprice or whim or fancy, but are the consequence of the great facts of the nature of **man living in society**. We are not free, under the reign of moral law, to “do as we please,” any more than we are free to observe the law of gravitation in house-building or the laws of health, or not, just as we feel inclined. We **must obey**, or we shall suffer the penalty for disobedience.

There are moral laws which have to be observed in the family, in the school, in every kind of association of men with other human beings, whether it be common social intercourse, business relationship, or the life of the citizens of the town, state, or nation. Men come together to live in families and other larger groups through a **fundamental instinct** ; it is one of the strongest laws of their nature that they should so do. Every one of these groups has its conditions of life, which must be observed if it is even to *exist*, and other conditions also which must be observed if it is to *prosper*. Hence there is moral law for the family, moral law for the neighborhood, moral law for the school, for the state, for all kinds of associations. It is of the **very nature** of all these bodies of men that their members *must* act in certain ways if the associations are to continue. In the family, for example, the weak and helpless children must for years be cared for, and sup-

ported by their parents. As children do not of themselves know how to act wisely and live happily for all concerned, they have to obey their parents, who will teach them to act in such ways as to make life in the family what it should be, — peaceful, active, and happy. Fathers and mothers in their place should act according to the laws of the moral life of the family, by supporting and training and loving their children. Children have their part to do in returning their parents' love and rendering a cheerful obedience to their wishes. As boys and girls grow up they will understand better and better the *reasons* why they are obliged to do thus and so. But, *whether they understand it or not*, they must obey the moral law as it comes to them from the lips of their parents. The bond that holds the family together is this very power of the father and mother to make their children "mind," by force, if need be.

We say the word "ought" very frequently: it means "owe," and whenever we use it we imply that the person of whom we speak has a **debt to pay**. Children are under great obligations to their parents; for these give them food and shelter and clothing and education and all the love and help of home. They **owe** a great deal to father and mother, who gave them life, and will do their best to make their lives fruitful and happy. So boys and girls **ought** (owe it) to do all they can in return to make life at home pleasant and cheerful for their parents. So, likewise, men and women owe a great deal to the human society in which they are living, and which is the source of very much of their happiness and welfare. They **owe** it to one another (ought) to be polite, to be ready to assist in case of need, to take an interest in each other's well-being, and in all their relations to **give** as well as **take**.

"Duty" is another great word of the law which is over all men living together in society. Our duty is **what is**

due from us to others : so it means the same thing as "ought." "Ought" and "duty" — two of the greatest words in our language — always indicate that **we live in society**, that there are laws and conditions of social welfare, as of individual happiness, and that whatever these laws require men and women to do, in order that society may be strong and pure and helpful to each person who is a member of it, this all men and women **owe** to society ; this they **ought** to do ; this is their **duty**. "Each for all, all for each," is the proper motto of human society. It is a *whole* in which each of us is a part ; and each must act, not as if he or she were the centre of all things, but as if recognizing that we are to do each his part and to take each his portion. It is the natural function of the child, the scholar, the servant, the workman and the soldier, to act according to orders, — to obey parents, teachers, masters, foremen, or officers. These command in the interest of the family, the school, the factory, or the army-regiment **as a whole** ; they are themselves subject to the moral law of these associations, and if they command by right, they also have the duty, they *ought* to provide for those who obey their orders.

The end of all obedience to the moral law is the highest and greatest welfare of every human being as an individual and as a member of the great body which we call human society. This is a body, an organism, in which each of us is a member.¹ If every child took its own way, with out regard to the advice or the command of its parents, the true family life would be impossible ; if every scholar did as he pleased about studying or reciting, the very reason for having schools at all would be defeated ; if servants obeyed orders from their masters or mistresses only when they "felt like it," little work would be done ; if men in a factory acted according to

¹ Compare St. Paul (*First Epistle to the Corinthians*, xii. 14-26), and Menenius Agrippa in Shakespeare's *Coriolanus*, I. i.

their own fancy, and idled or worked as the humor seized them, the factory would soon have to be closed and the men would receive no more wages; if every private in a company acted as if he were just "as big a man" as the captain, there would be no use in trying to fight a battle. Thus the welfare of the whole household, of the whole school, of the whole factory, and of the whole company of soldiers depends upon obedience to those in authority. Every person in authority, in his turn, is bound in duty (ought) to work for the welfare of each and all of those who make up the whole body of which he has the control. We do not obey for the sake of obedience; we do not command for the sake of commanding, but whether we obey or command, we do it that each person may reach his highest happiness and welfare, both as an individual and as a part of society.

Disobedience means disorder in all the associations of men with one another; it means lawlessness, self-will, the setting-up of ourselves as the whole, or as the most important part of the whole; it means that we ask other people to take our will for law, instead of the moral law. But this will not do in the relations of human beings with one another, any more than it would do in our relations with natural forces. Society, therefore, in order to preserve itself and so give its members (you and me and all of us) the best things that human life can afford, enforces moral law. Some parts of this law, such as those which forbid killing and robbing, are written down in that "law of the land" or "statute law," which we began by speaking of. Other commands of the moral law men have found it best not to try to enforce by written laws, but to leave to what we call **public opinion** to deal with. Thus, if a man is unkind and harsh in his treatment of his children, the law will not do anything to him so long as he is not actually *cruel*. Most men are influenced very much by

what other people think and say concerning them, and we find by experience that many wrongs are righted more effectually by leaving them to public opinion to settle than by passing laws against them.

Still other parts of the moral law we leave to each person to discover and obey for himself, according to his circumstances, his education and his moral sense. But whatever is actual moral law, tending to the welfare of each and all, is to be obeyed; whether we know the law or not, we suffer bad consequences from not living in compliance with its demands, or we prosper because we are acting in accordance with it. For man the end of all obedience to law is his welfare; he lives under law, and he finds freedom and happiness, not in fighting against the conditions, physical or moral, of human life, but in full and cheerful acceptance of them. Freedom is not in "having our own way," but in following the best ways that mankind, in its thousands of years of life on this earth, has discovered. Freedom is realized in life according to the laws of human nature in society. Life through obedience to reason and all that reason tells us of law — this is moral life, the life that renders human society possible, and makes it better and better as we learn more of the moral law and obey it more faithfully. The natural rulers of human society are those who know more of life than ourselves; so we should respect the laws which have been ascertained by the wisdom and experience of many minds; we should respect the voice of public opinion in regard to matters of right and wrong. When we have been educated by experience of life ourselves, we shall still find that the moral law is supreme over every other law for man, as it is simply the highest law of our own nature. Desire to know this law and willingness to obey it — this is the fundamental matter in human life. The spirit that is essential to our highest welfare is the spirit of obedience. Our first lesson is to obey father

and mother at home, but we never outgrow the necessity of obedience to moral law.

“Who is it thwarts and bilks the inward *must*?
He and his works like sand from earth are blown.”

NOTES.

THE desire to command, or the love of power, is one of the fundamental desires in human nature; with many persons it is predominant. Obedience is not in itself pleasant to children, or to men and women. But there are few leaders and many followers in human life. Napoleon, the most masterful of men, declared that he learned to command through the obedience required at the school of Brienne, and Emerson says that “obedience alone gives the right to command.” The more perfectly parents seek to carry out the law of the home, and teachers the law of the school, which prescribe duties to themselves, the more capable will they be of commanding wisely. Children are quick to observe the evil consequences of disobedience at home or in school when their own conduct is not in question. Press home to them the reasons for the very existence of such associations, which are defeated by insubordination. The military drill furnishes a good analogy; the lives of great generals and the histories of wars are full of incidents illustrating the prime need of obedience. All associations for profit or pleasure must have leaders, and the submission we pay them is but a type of the obedience mankind owes to the whole moral law.

The great Stoic moralists, like Marcus Aurelius and Epicetetus, have dwelt forcibly on the virtue of obedience. The inscription on the monument at Thermopylæ ran: “Go, stranger, and tell at Lacedæmon that we died here in obedience to her laws.” The citizen of the ancient city was a devotee to its welfare. So A. H. Clough has said: “The highest political watchword is not liberty, equality, fraternity, nor yet solidarity, but *service*.” The Wisdom of Solomon declares that, “The very true beginning of wisdom is the desire of discipline. If a man love righteousness, wisdom’s labors are virtues; for she teacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude; which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in their life.”

Men become masters of the forces of nature by first obeying their laws; so in morality, "laws are not masters, but servants, and he rules them who obeys them." (H. W. Beecher.)

See Miss E. Simcox's *Natural Law*; James Martineau's *Types of Ethical Theory*, vol. ii. chapter 4, and Leslie Stephen's *Science of Ethics*, for discussions of the ground of authority in the moral law, and Lecky's *European Morals*, for a good view of Stoicism.

"I slept and dreamed that life was beauty;
I woke and found that life was duty."

Duty is changed to delight when love is seen to be "the fulfilling of the law."

CHAPTER III.

SELF-CONTROL.

It is very easy for us to say that we all ought to obey the moral law. But very often, and especially when we are young and have not had much experience of life, we find it **hard to obey this law** ourselves. Children like to have their own way when it seems to them pleasanter than to obey their parents or teachers who bid them take another way. John, for instance, is playing marbles, and his mother tells him to come and get ready for school, as he has only time enough to get there in season. But John prefers play to school, just then; perhaps he prefers it all the time! So he keeps on with his game, and his mother has to leave her work to speak to him again, and possibly she is obliged to come out and make him get ready at once. Then he is late at school, and probably he has got to feeling so ill-tempered, because he has been compelled to leave his game, that he will not study, and so he fails in his lesson, and the teacher keeps him after school to make it up. John feels worse than ever, and when he gets through he is disgusted with school and home, and he thinks it will be very fine to be a man and do as he pleases. All this is the result of his disobedience to his mother. But men and women laugh at him, and tell him that he is very foolish not to see how easy a time he is having now; his father and mother care for him, and he does not have to work to get his food and lodging and clothing and education. They are doing their utmost to make his life, present and future, good and happy; being much older, having been children themselves, and having gained

much more wisdom from experience than he can have, they know far more thoroughly what is best for him than he can know. When he is grown up, and is a man in fact, not merely in imagination, he will have a man's work to do, and he should have plenty of knowledge and skill to do that work well; he will not be able to "do as he pleases" and at the same time be a good and capable man.

A considerable number of persons who think they *can* do as they please find themselves, naturally, after a time, in jails or prisons, because people in general will not allow them to do as they like, when it comes to stealing or cheating, or doing bodily injury to others. No! the obedience due to father and mother and teacher is comparatively a **simple and easy matter** for John, if he did but know it. He is acting foolishly and unreasonably in setting himself up so, as the only person whose pleasure is to be considered. As a matter of fact, he is not so important a person as he thinks, and the sooner he learns this, the better it will be for all concerned.

Here is another boy, Thomas, who likes to play just as well as John does; but he loves his mother and desires to make her happy by obeying her cheerfully and readily. He wishes to please the teacher by being punctual, and attentive to his studies in school time. So he quits his game at once, when his mother reminds him that she has an errand for him to do on the way to school, and that it is time to go. He walks along whistling and thinking how fortunate he is that he can sometimes do little things, at least, to show his gratitude for all that his mother does for him in her love for her boy. When he gets to school he remembers that he is there to study; he puts all his mind on his book; the lesson comes easy, he recites well, the teacher is glad to see him so willing and ready, and he returns home with a light heart. All has gone well with him during the day.

Why? Because he has cheerfully **done his part**. It is not a great part, but it is something which no one else could do *for* him, and it is necessary that he should do it readily if, at home and school, all is to go on pleasantly and profitably.

When Thomas is at home, he feels that he is but one among several persons who make up the family; that his father and mother are wiser than he and anxious to have him do, and to do for him, only what is best; and that all goes well only when each one in the family group thinks of the welfare of all the others as well as of his own happiness; so he tries to do his share, to help as much as he can in making life happy for all at home. When Thomas is at school, he bears in mind that school is meant as a place to learn in, and that in order to learn well he must leave off playing, and “buckle down” to his book, and be quiet and obey the orders of the teacher. He sees that these orders are for the good of the whole school, of which he is a part and only a part, and that nothing could be more unreasonable than for him to neglect study and be noisy and mischievous, thus keeping the teacher’s attention on himself and disturbing the rest of the scholars in their duty. Thomas is a healthy, lively boy, who likes to play and have a good time. But he wishes others to have a good time too; such “good times” in school mean good order, and good lessons, and teachers and scholars all pleased and busy with the good work to be done by them, in learning and teaching. That is a **good time** anywhere, when *the* thing to do in that time and place is done finely and thoroughly. Now Thomas plays with all his soul in play-hours, and in the place and time for study he studies with all his might. He has a strong impulse to play too long, or in school, but he resists it — as we can resist any impulse in ourselves if we will — and conquers it, and the better impulse wins the day.

We have had much to say about obedience to law as the foundation of all good human life. But we all have inclinations at times to prefer our own wishes or desires, however unreasonable they may be, to the obedience which though reasonable seems hard and disagreeable. We are so made that there is often this conflict between what we *know* to be the proper thing for us to do and the thing we wish at the time to do. We must, therefore, learn **to control ourselves**; we must practise the very necessary art of making ourselves do what is disagreeable, if it seems to us the right and reasonable thing, until it shall come to be not only right and reasonable but also agreeable to us, for this very cause. This is precisely what we often have to do in other matters than our dealings with human beings.

We need **training in the art of conduct** as in every other art. Mary has musical talent and she is anxious to learn to play the piano-forte. So her father buys one and engages a teacher for her; and the first lessons are very pleasant. But after a time, Mary gets tired of scales and exercises, and begins to think that it is not "worth while." She is discouraged and talks of giving up. But others tell her, she can see herself, that excellence in piano-playing comes to most persons only through diligence and patience in mastering the elements. She is soon encouraged to find that she can play simple exercises without keeping her eyes on the keys; after a time she can play easy tunes without notes, and, if she continues to persevere, she comes in time to do almost automatically what was once very difficult for her. She is amused now at the recollection that she ever found a certain exercise hard to play. Mary has fully complied with **the conditions of excellence** in music. She controls her desire to give up and try something easier. She perseveres and conquers the difficulties, one by one. By "sticking to it" and practising and practising, she establishes what are called

“lines of least resistance;” her fingers move swiftly over the keys, she acquires *skill* in her art, and she finds future progress much easier in proportion, as her self-control increases.

With all our different characters and dispositions few of us find it easy to do always the thing that we know to be right. We must, then, if we are to acquire the fine art of good conduct, learn self-control, and this implies patience and perseverance. By practice we shall establish “lines of least resistance” in our relations with others, over which we shall in time move with an ease and freedom that will surprise ourselves.

Self-control is necessary to obedience to the laws of conduct. But it is not necessary that we should have a sense of *effort and difficulty* in doing what we call “right,” in order that it should be truly right or “virtuous” in us. On the contrary, the ideal we should always hold before ourselves is to make the doing of right deeds, the living of a virtuous life, **the easiest and most agreeable thing** to do. In the beginning, we have pains and trouble in making our habits better, until they are right and good in certain respects; then habit slowly becomes a second nature, taking the place of the former untrained and undisciplined nature,¹ until, at last, it is “as easy now for the heart to be true As for grass to be green or skies to be blue, — ’T is the natural way of living.” We need to practise self-control until the self is altered for the better — we *can* alter it — and then, when it is changed for the better, it may well have free play in that direction. A hasty-tempered man might find it hard at first to wait and count a hundred, according to the old rule, before he speaks, when he feels himself getting angry. But in time he should be strong enough, from long resistance to his native impulse, to trust himself to speak at once.

¹ “Habit a second nature,” said the great Duke of Wellington “it is ten times nature!”

In every art the acquirement of skill and excellence implies discipline, and discipline means patience and self-control. Most of all in the art of arts, at which we are continually practising, the art of a noble life, is the desire of discipline "the very true beginning of wisdom." On the other hand, it is the height of unwisdom to ask continually: "*Why* should I control myself? *Why* should I not have my own way?" This would not be so foolish if you were the only person in the world, and there were no one else to be affected by your actions. In that case, you might properly do many things which it is not right or reasonable for you to do in a world where you are surrounded by many other human beings. These other persons you expect to be considerate of the fact that you yourself exist, and that they owe you something, as another human being, in all their relations with you. When you are ready to say that others owe you nothing, then you can ask why you owe it to them to control yourself, to abate your extravagant claims, and to be content with your reasonable portion of good things. Each of these other persons has a "self" also, which he is bound to preserve and care for, according to the instinct of nature and the teachings of reason.

Very many things which are necessary to our life, to our progress, and to our comfort, we can do for ourselves better than any one else, or perhaps any number of other persons can do them for us. It is natural and right that we should "assert ourselves," and claim what is needful for living our human life. Nature makes this instinct of **self-regard** exceedingly strong in each one of us, and it is one of two or three fundamental forces in directing all our actions. Man is chiefly distinguished from the lower animals, however, in that he can *reason* to himself about this instinct of self-preservation and self-regard and the great instinct of regard for others (sympathy) which is just as much a part of

our nature, and can determine what is the proper place for each motive in his actions.

Constant experience teaches us very plainly how much stronger the natural instinct of self-assertion is than the other instincts which lead us to forget self in thinking of others. So we learn that **the essential spirit of morality is self-control by reason**. Morality holds us back from making a self-assertion that is "exorbitant" (*i. e.*, which takes us out of our proper "orbit"); it gives us a more moderate notion of what others should do for us (*i. e.*, of what we call our *rights*), and it stimulates us to do what we ought, what we really *owe* to others (*i. e.*, our *duties*). There is no rule for determining rights and duties but the rule of reason, as in all other human affairs. Men, however, have been living in social relations so many generations that they have found out a great many facts and laws of conduct. They have acquired a large amount of practical wisdom and of moral "faculty" which has been handed down from one generation to another, each increasing it.

A new person coming into the world does not need, therefore, to try all kinds of actions to find out which are hurtful and which are helpful to himself and others. But he should be **docile**, *i. e.*, teachable, and willing to learn what things have already been found good to do, and what things have been found to be bad. To be docile is to have such self-control that we shall not set ourselves up as wiser than everybody else. We need to live long before we can do wisely in contradicting or correcting any of the simple practical rules for common conduct which men ages ago found out, and which millions of human beings have learned are reasonable by trying to live according to them. These moral precepts are working laws of human conduct, which are gradually extended and made definite in the long course of human experience. It has thus become natural for civilized men to live obedient to moral law as to physical

law. But not all men are civilized. No one is really civilized until he has learned to know himself, in some degree at least, as a part of the social order, and to fit himself by self-control for his place in this order.

We are not called upon by reason to sacrifice ourselves in the common relations of social life, but rather to preserve ourselves wisely, and to **make the best and the most of ourselves**, keeping in view the good of each and the good of all. Human society is made up of as many "selves" as there are persons in it. Each of these selves appears, usually, *to itself* to be much more important and deserving of consideration than it does to others. This is a common fact of human nature, which is seen to be justifiable in reason when we consider the further fact that each one of these "selves" has the chief responsibility of caring for itself. There is, therefore, a very proper "selfhood"¹ for each and every human being; his self-existing, with no need of excuse, is a most important fact to him.

We need to cultivate and develop ourselves; self-culture is both an end in itself and an essential means to helping others most effectually. As a part of this development and cultivation, the control of self by our knowledge, by our reason, by our social instinct, by sympathy, by the Golden Rule, is of the first importance. We do not think of standing on our heads as a regular exercise or as a common position. Our feet are the parts of our body meant to walk with, and to stand on. So our minds are given us to use in discovering the laws of human life; and the laws of right conduct, when once discovered, are no less natural than the practice of walking on our feet. The general moral law of self-control means that any and every force in us — of

¹ Just as we say "childhood" and "manhood," not blaming or praising the child, because it is a child, or the man because he is a man. Dr. Dewey was wise in advising the restoration of the word to present usage.

feeling or passion or temper — must be kept obedient to our enlightened reason and our disciplined will. Reason teaches us, for example, to prefer a larger to a smaller good, and to subordinate the brief present to the long future. Education, therefore, is better for a child than unlimited play, because it will outgrow the desire for play, and its childhood will give place to manhood, and this should be instructed and capable, as only years of previous education can make it.

NOTES.

SELF-CONTROL should be taken to mean restraint of the lower self, — the animal, sensual, anti-social instincts and tendencies. The higher, nobler self, that finds its true life in the life of all, is thus free to emerge and assert itself with power. The higher self is to take the lower self in hand, and show its own ability to shape thought, feeling, and action toward an ideal excellence. (See the treatment of the Will by the various writers on ethics, such as Noah Porter in his *Elements of Moral Science*.) In this process the lower self is not *sacrificed*, but simply confined to its own sphere. An admirable discussion of this point is the lecture on *Selfhood and Sacrifice*, by Rev. Dr. Orville Dewey, in the volume entitled *Christianity and Modern Thought*.

The formation of good habits is the obvious step toward diminishing the difficulty of self-control. As Walter Bagehot says, the first step in the moral culture of the child is "to secrete a crust of custom." J. F. Clarke in his *Self-Culture* is especially good on the education of the will. "Self-reliance, self-restraint, self-control, self-direction, these constitute an educated will. . . . Freedom is self-direction. The two diseases of the will are indecision, or weakness of will, and wilfulness, or unregulated strength of will. The cure for both is self-direction, according to conscience and truth."

Read *The Conqueror's Grave*, by Bryant; "Prune thou thy words," by J. H. Newman; "How happy is he born or taught," by Sir Henry Wotton; Emerson's lines, closing,

"When Duty whispers low, 'Thou must,'
The youth replies, 'I can;'"

and Matthew Arnold's *Morality*,

“Tasks in hours of insight willed
Can be through hours of gloom fulfilled.”

He that ruleth his spirit is greater than he that taketh a city; so the lives of famous inventors teach us, as they bend all things to serve their aim. See Mr. Smiles's *Lives of the Stephensons*, *Men of Invention and Industry*, and *Life and Labor*, for instances of this truth.

CHAPTER IV.

TRUTHFULNESS.

WE have thus far been attending to the great facts that all human life is under law ; that one of the most important laws for man, if not *the* most important, is the moral law which springs from his very nature as a member of society ; and that we are obliged, as we are also able, to govern or control ourselves so as to live according to this law. We have been speaking of **the actual world of nature and human society** in which we all live. Now, a very large part of our life depends for its character and its results upon what we *report* to each other about what is or has been. We have by nature the faculty of speech by which we communicate with each other, and we have found out the arts of writing and printing. But we have not only eyes to see and ears to hear, and the organs of three other senses, which present to our minds the realities of the outward world ; we have also a faculty of imagination by which we can form to ourselves another view of things than that which our senses actually give, or have given us. We can *think* of things otherwise than as they are. We can use words to express our thoughts so that we shall in our speech re-present to others the realities we know, or we can alter them in our speech so that our words will not correspond to the facts as we think them to be.

We call it **speaking the truth** when any one describes things as they, in fact, appear to him to be, or relates events as his senses showed them to him. He may be *mistaken*, as his senses or his judgment may have misled him ; but so long as he intends to re-pre-

sent fact, he is *truthful*. On the contrary, when, for any cause, he means to speak, and does speak, of things or events as they were *not*, or are *not*, then he is *false*. He intends to deceive us, whether he succeeds in doing so or not. The first and natural use of words, or human speech, is to **represent reality**. We are in a very high degree dependent on each other's words as to what the facts of life are. A large part, probably the largest part, of our own words and actions are based upon our confidence that other human beings have spoken to us the truth.

In courts of law the witness who is called upon to state what he knows about the case, swears, or affirms, that he will tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." In ordinary life we go upon the assumption, generally, that the words we hear correspond to fact, that people are re-presenting to us the facts as they are, or have been; and we act in accordance with this confidence. We must live in an actual world: we cannot live in an imaginary world, as it has no reality. All our own words that are based upon a falsehood told us by another, instead of a truth, have no foundation in fact, and must, therefore, count for little or nothing in the end. All that we do, thinking and believing that a certain other thing has been done, because we have been told so, when, in fact, it has not been done, lacks proper foundation, and is likely to come to naught, or to work harm instead of good. A true report of facts is, then, the first condition of satisfactory intercourse of human beings with one another. They must have a substantial confidence in one another's general truthfulness. Otherwise, they can have little dealing with one another. All human undertakings must finally rest upon reality, and **correspond to fact**; every departure from fact means for all men loss and harm.

Hence arises the prime necessity of truthfulness in

human society. In the great majority of cases, men naturally tell the truth; *i. e.*, whether it is to their own advantage or not, they re-present things in speech as these have appeared to them in reality. If this were not the case, social life, in which men inevitably depend upon one another for information and guidance, would be impossible. But, on the other hand, it is very much easier to **say a false word**, thus misrepresenting fact in some degree, than it is to do any one of a hundred **wrong acts**. More than this: when we have consciously done a bad deed, we usually wish to avoid the consequences of it, and we naturally try to escape them by lying about it. So offences against truth are the common attendants of wrong actions of a thousand kinds. "Vice has many tools," it is said; "but a lie is the handle that fits them all."

We wish our clocks and watches to give us the true time—the hour and minute that actually *are*, as distinguished from those that have been and those to come. So we ask that other human beings shall give us "true time" in what they say to us. If the clock is an hour slow or half an hour fast, we cannot blame the clock, for it is only a machine, and cannot think, or be said to have any **intention** to deceive us so that we shall miss a train or be late at school: we properly find fault with the maker of the clock or with the jeweller who should have regulated it so that it would keep good time. But boys and girls and men and women *think*; they have an *intention* in what they say, and if they tell us what is not true, it is usually because they **mean to mislead** us. The result of their attempts to deceive us is that we lose that confidence which is the very first condition of human dealings. A boy who is found to have told a lie is often suspected afterward of deceiving even when he has no desire or intention of reporting anything but the exact fact. When a witness has taken an oath in a court of law to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and

nothing but the truth," and then tells a falsehood, known or afterwards found out to be such, he is punished for *perjury* ; and if he should ever come into court again as a witness, everybody would be slow to believe him in an important matter. When a man has the reputation of being "the biggest liar in the town," what he says may very often be entirely true ; but people do not believe that a thing is so because he says it. He has forfeited the confidence of those who know him, and they will not accept his sole word as probably true. He is put out of the pale of society, so to speak, in proportion to the greatness of his offences against truth, and non-intercourse with him is practically declared.

The person who tells a lie which is believed by people who have not yet "found him out," usually begins to think that a falsehood is a very easy substitute for the fact. A boy, for example, has disobeyed his father, who had commanded him not to go in swimming in the river because it is dangerous ; when he is asked if he has been in the river, he boldly answers, "No." Thus he adds to his first fault a second. As his father believes him, John is quite likely to try the same plan again, until, at last, he is found out. Then his father punishes him for the disobedience *and* the lie ; but the worst part of the whole punishment to John, if he is a self-respecting boy, is that his father and mother will probably not take his word as sufficient, in any matter of consequence, for some time to come, until he has shown that he is again to be trusted fully. But for John, or any one else, to deceive thus, and then ask people to treat him afterward as if he had always spoken the truth, is most unreasonable. If John were a man in a position of responsibility and were detected in lying, he would probably be turned out of his place at once, because the truth is one of the first things he owes his employer. When "thought is speech and speech is truth" we can trust each other and join together with

confidence in all kinds of undertakings, great or small. But when the act is one thing and the word is another different or contrary thing, we stand apart from such a man in suspicion and distrust, and we refuse to work with him, since truthfulness is of the very essence of voluntary association in all kinds of works.

Our house of life must be built upon fact, or it will fall. When we repeat "Great is truth and mighty above all things," we mean to say that the facts of this universe are far stronger than any mistaken or false report of them which any one may make. They will come to the light at last, since the mind of man is evidently intended to know the truth, *i. e.*, the reality of things. Any one, therefore, who tells us the truth, in small matters or in large, enables us so far to bring our life into harmony with the laws of all life in general and of human life in society in particular. He clears the way so that we can walk in it, if we will. But if another human being deceives us, we are led off from the right road, as when some one misdirects a traveller, and he goes the opposite way to that which he desires to take, or in any other direction which is wrong for him, and it costs him much time and trouble to find the right way.

To tell the truth is, then, **the first of services** we can render one another in the great association which we call human society. Knowledge must come before action. But as we can know from our own observation but a very small part of all that we need to know, we mainly depend upon others' report of facts and events in order to act wisely and properly. Lord Bacon said : "No pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of truth." This is, indeed, the case. When we tell the truth we are in harmony and union with the whole universe so far ; but when we tell a lie we leave the world of reality, *the only world that is*, and enter a world of unreality which we have, for a brief

time, created, so to speak, out of nothing, and which has only the substance of nothingness in it. We may add lie to lie in order to make a consistent story and gain belief for the time. But **the facts are against us**: we know it ourselves. It is not as if we had simply made a *mistaké*. We have deliberately directed our fellow-beings wrong on the way of life; we have given them incorrect time, and we have tried to raise around them a false world. They cannot fail to discover the deception sometime. Indignation, with a long loss of confidence; constant suspicion, even when we are telling the truth, and great difficulty in all their dealings with us, are the natural and inevitable results of such lying.

The person who lies gives way to a temptation too strong for him at the time. A boy who has broken a pane of glass in a window, while playing ball, is afraid that he will be punished for it, and so he declares, when he is questioned about the matter, that he did not break it. If he knew and realized how important truthfulness is as a constant habit in all our relations with one another, he would have preferred to be punished rather than tell a lie, which would deserve a severer punishment than the original fault. According to the law of habit, with each time that one tells a lie it becomes easier for him to lie again. With each time that he conquers the temptation it is so much the easier to tell the truth again.

It is just as important for us that we should **respect ourselves** as that others should respect us. The only way in which we can maintain our self-respect in this matter is by telling the truth; as Chaucer's Franklin says, "Truth is the highest thing that man may keep," and when he keeps it, he has a justifiable pride in the fact and in himself. Knowing how hard it is sometimes for children to tell the exact facts, when they have done wrong, teachers and parents should always try to make them feel that an offence against truthfulness is a great

weaker of proper self-respect and that it is often a worse fault than the original wrong-doing.

We should speak **the whole truth**. Often, by keeping back, purposely, some essential fact or circumstance, we can produce an impression on another person's mind directly the opposite of that which we are sure he would probably receive if we told this fact or circumstance. Invariably, we should tell those who have a right to know the facts of a matter from us, everything important that we know about it; then, if they get a mistaken impression, it is not our fault. We owe one another the whole truth simply as members of the human society in which all are dependent on exact knowledge as a precedent to wise and right action.

We should not tell *more than the truth* by exaggerating the facts or by inventing circumstances to make our talk interesting. When the exaggeration is plainly understood, it does not deceive. But we should not allow ourselves to fall into a habit of magnifying things as though we were always looking through a microscope. If a boy has seen two dogs fighting, he should not declare, "Oh, mother! there were a thousand dogs fighting in front of our house this morning." We should be satisfied to report things as they have been or now are, neither more nor less. This is the simplest course for every one to take and to keep.

Duplicity, which is another name for **falsehood in action**, means "doubleness." A person who desires to deceive others has "to keep up appearances," as to certain matters about which he lies. In all other respects, he may be willing and even anxious to let the facts of his life be manifest. Now, to keep up appearances, to seem to be what one is *not*, is a far harder thing to do than to live according to fact, and let the appearances be simply those of the facts. Duplicity is keeping up two courses of conduct, side by side, that do not agree with each other. We do not deceive ourselves by the

lies we tell, so we must act in large degree as if these *are* lies. But we wish to deceive others by these false reports, and in order to deceive them thoroughly we have to act as if we had spoken the truth. The farther we go in such a course of conduct, the harder it is likely to become; so a frank confession of all our untruthfulness is, at last, often a great relief to us. We come back with pleasure to simple fact and a life that is open and straightforward as the natural and right way of living. We have found

“What a tangled web we weave
When first we practise to deceive.”

We must throughout life take home to ourselves this lesson, that Truth is meant for man and man is meant for Truth. Language is our natural means for telling facts to one another, so that we may know the real world in which we actually live, and do wisely, kindly, and rightly in it. We must obey the laws of nature; we must control our actions so as to make them accord with these laws; but the most fundamental duty of men in all their dealings with one another is to represent things as they are, in nature, in society, in life. Truth is the first necessity of wise living, and out of truth comes the only beauty that is permanent. The good rests upon the true. All this means that we should recognize the facts and laws of our human existence and represent them to others as they are, as the only sure and lasting foundation for a good and happy life.

NOTES.

THE teacher will find some help, in treating the duty of veracity, in the sections or chapters of most of the standard books on ethics which pay attention to practice in any degree. Among the older works, Paley's *Moral and Political Philosophy* has rarely been surpassed for its concrete and sagacious treatment of prac-

tical morals : the chapter on Lies (Book III. chap. xv.) is interesting. Other works which give matter of value in this direction are Professor Noah Porter's *Elements of Moral Science* (Part II. chap. x. p. 416) ; John Bascom's *Science of Duty*, pp. 158-166 ; Mark Hopkins's *Law of Love* (on the "right to truth"), pp. 199-201 ; A. Bierbower's *The Virtues and their Reasons* ; and Paul Janet's *Elements of Morals*, translated by Mrs. C. R. Corson.

As a specimen of illustrative reading, take this from S. Smiles's *Character* (p. 214 ; the chapter on Duty-Truthfulness) concerning the great educator, Thomas Arnold of Rugby. "There was no virtue that Dr. Arnold labored more sedulously to instil into young men than the virtue of truthfulness, as being the manliest of virtues, as indeed the very basis of all true manliness. He designated truthfulness as 'moral transparency,' and he valued it more highly than any other quality. When lying was detected, he treated it as a great moral offence ; but when a pupil made an assertion, he accepted it with confidence. 'If you say so, that is quite enough ; of course, I believe your word.' By thus trusting and believing them, he educated the young in truthfulness ; the boys at length coming to say to one another : 'It's a shame to tell Arnold a lie, — he always believes one.' " (*Life of Arnold*, i. 94.)

There is an apposite story of Arthur Bonnicastle in Dr. J. G. Holland's novel of that name (p. 88). The story of Washington and the cherry tree belongs to *myth*, not to history, as one may see in Lodge's *Life of Washington* (American Statesmen Series) ; avoid it, as much as the myth of William Tell in teaching patriotism. Books of the style of Miss C. M. Yonge's *Golden Deeds*, Mr. S. Smiles's *Character and Self-Help*, and William Matthew's *Getting on in the World*, will afford pertinent anecdotes and stories of truth-telling and its opposite.

As to the causes of lying by children, the following points are useful, from an instructive paper by President G. Stanley Hall of Clark University. Aided by a number of teachers, he collected very many data as to the character of children's lies and the occasion of their development. He finds, that with children, as with primitive people, the enormity of the lie depends largely upon whom it is told to. A great many children have persisted in lies until asked, "Would you tell that to your mother ?" Then they have confessed the falsehood. A lie to a teacher who is liked stands upon an entirely different moral basis from a lie

to a teacher who is not liked. Lies to help people are generally applauded by children. One teacher reported to President Hall that she had been considerably saddened because her class of thirteen-year-old children would not apply the term "lie" to the action of the French girl who, when on her way to execution, in the days of the Commune, met her betrothed, and, to save him from supposed complicity, responded to his agonized appeals, "Sir, I never knew you." To the minds of the children the falsehood was glorified by the love.

President Hall sensibly recognizes that a great many children's lies spring from one of the most valuable and healthful of mental instincts. Children live in their imagination. The finest geniuses have shown this "play instinct" most strongly. The children who have this type of imagination most strongly developed are often the dullest at schools.

Exaggeration is a mild species of offence against truth, but children may be taught to respect things as they are; they should certainly be taught that it requires more care and thought to relate an event just as it happened, and that such an account is more creditable to them, than to indulge in exaggeration of any kind. Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes says: "I often tell Mrs. Professor that one of her '*I think it is so's*' is worth a dozen of another person's '*I know it is so's*.'" We should not exaggerate the degree of certainty in our own minds concerning what we say or believe; there is such a very good thing as "the rhetoric of understatement." Truth is stranger than fiction, and if held to consistently, it will yield more variety and charm. If a child is evidently imaginative the teacher should be especially careful to keep it to the real world (outside of its games and story-telling, understood to be such), which it should be taught to respect and distinguish as the world we have to live in, where we need veracity more than imagination.

Fear is another great cause of lying with children, when they have committed some offence. The parent or the teacher should not offer to remit the proper punishment for this offence in case the child will tell the truth; but he should, as a rule, make the punishment more severe for the lie than for the original transgression, and the two penalties should be kept distinct. The teacher may well say: "If you did such and such a wrong thing, I shall have to punish you for it, even if you tell me frankly that you did it; but if you lie about it I will give you a harder

punishment, *in addition*, because of the lie." But the temptation to lying should be made as slight as possible by the teacher.

Appeal to the sense of honor, as in Dr. Arnold's case, and to the feeling of self-respect ; show that duplicity (doubleness) is a hard part to play, that the liar "should have a good memory," as one lie breeds others which must be told, to be consistent, and all of these must be remembered ; that the facts are all the time troubling, and will finally triumph over, the liar, who gets into worse and worse difficulties continually, while he who is plainly telling the truth all the time has no such difficulties.

The loss of confidence which a lie, suspected or detected, brings about should be brought home to the child who has told an untruth, by declining to believe him the next time he makes an assertion at all doubtful, and telling him the reason why you must, inevitably, so do ; ask him how he likes the feeling of having his word doubted, how he felt when he has been deceived himself ("put yourself in his place") and how he felt when he saw he had deceived a person to whom he owed the truth in proper gratitude and honor. Be sure to give all due weight to the *intention* of the child in telling a falsehood, if you can get at it ; anything else than a plain intention to deceive should make him a subject of enlightenment rather than of punishment. But casuistry should be avoided in the general talks to children. There is little profit in discussing with them the question if one may properly tell a lie to a drunkard or an insane person, or in order to save life. Such debate should be left to older persons who will not be so apt to become confused in their minds. Nature will teach a person what to do in such a case better than any amount of discussion.

Remember how many a child that shamelessly reproduced the immorality of a savage or barbarian in its frequent lies has become thoroughly truthful when grown up ; the lively, mendacious Greek is thus often outgrown in time, and the truth-loving Teuton emerges and remains.

CHAPTER V.

THE LAW OF JUSTICE.

As we all live under the moral law, each of us has **a right** to the protection of that law. The moral law is written down in part in the laws of the land, and we see in every civilized country what are called "courts of justice." If any man thinks that he has been wronged by another who has taken away his property, he "goes to law," as we say, about it. The case is tried before a judge and a jury. The judge tells the jury what the law of the land bearing on the suit is, and the jury decides upon the facts of the case, whether it comes under the law or not. This is one way of **getting justice done**. There are many laws about property and other rights; there are many judges and lawyers and legislators, making or discussing or determining the written law. The object of all these arrangements and institutions is that every man may have his own, that which properly belongs to him.

As we all very well know, a large part of the moral law is not written down in the statute-book and is not executed by the courts, but is left to public opinion or to private persons to enforce, because it can be enforced in this way better than by the judges. However it is applied, justice always means **giving every person his due**; *i. e.*, what others **owe** him because he is a human being in society. Speaking generally, he himself owes the same things to other people as they owe to him, since all human beings are very much alike. What he calls his "rights" are the "duties" of others to him, and their "rights" measure his "duties" to them.

We must rule out, at once, from all our thoughts of moral law, the notion that we ourselves have **more rights** than other persons have, or that we have **fewer duties**. One and the same great law of human life is over us all; it makes **our duties equal to our rights**. In the great whole of human society, each person is a part. The whole has duties to each part: each part has duties to all the other parts and to the whole. This is the universal law for entire mankind. Practice of the obedience and the self-control of which we have had so much to say results in justice to all men. "The just" is the fair and due part of each and every person.

Meum et tuum: we know what this Latin phrase means, "mine and thine;" the law of **mine and thine** is that you shall have what belongs to you, no more and no less, and that I shall have what belongs to me, no more and no less. **Honesty** is a very important part of justice, and honesty is respect for the property of others. To take what is another's property, knowingly, is to work injustice. We may do this by violence, while he protests or tries to prevent us. In this case we are setting the law of the land openly at defiance, and the policeman or the constable or the sheriff will come and arrest us. We shall be taken before the court, and if we are proved to be guilty, we shall be severely punished, because it is for the interest of all men that the rights of property should be respected, and because private violence is contrary to all law except the rude law of the strongest, under which savages live. Reason and right cannot prevail unless violence be punished.

But if we take away another person's property without his knowledge, — this we call "stealing," — we are also breaking the great law of *meum et tuum*, and it is none the less wrong if we are not found out and punished. People often dispute about property, different persons thinking that they have a clear right to the

ownership of the same thing, — a house, let us say, or a piece of land. In such a case they should let the courts, or some other competent authority, decide for them, and both parties should respect the decision afterwards. But when we know that a thing does *not* belong to us, we owe it not only to the person who owns the property, but also to the whole community in which we live, to regard his right, and we should not try to cheat or defraud him of it, any more than we should take it away from him by force. There is enough in the world for all, if each will take only his part. So mankind thinks, and tries, therefore, to set up “even-handed justice,” as Shakespeare calls it. **Enjoy what is your own**, and let others enjoy their own. Such a rule would keep us from robbery or theft of any kind. If we are just to others, again, we shall not take or keep back any part of what belongs to them since they have paid for it. The grocer must weigh out sixteen ounces to the pound, as he is paid for the pound; the dry-goods clerk should give thirty-six inches to the yard, for otherwise he is keeping back what is another’s.

Justice is opposed to *partiality* or *favoritism*, as well; this means giving to one person more than his share, as when a teacher is kind to one scholar and severe to another, both being equally deserving. All the pupils in the school have a right to the teacher’s care and help, just as the teacher has a right to obedience and attention from all the scholars alike. The upright judge in the court room makes no distinction in his rulings because one man is rich and another man is poor, or because one is white and the other is black. He is no “respector of persons”: it is his duty to apply principles to cases and not to let his personal likings or dislikes influence his action.

The old Romans represented the goddess of justice by the statue of a woman blindfolded, holding a pair of scales in one hand and a sword in the other. The

bandage indicated that the just man should be blind to every consideration which would lead him to favor one person at the expense of another. The scales showed that the just man *weighs out* his part to each, that he may be fair to all. In our homes we should all weigh in our minds the parts we owe to father and mother, to brothers and sisters, and to other relatives there, and give them freely and heartily, full measure and ample weight. So at school, so on the street, so in business and so in all our relations with other human beings, we should be **just, first of all**. In order to do justly we have to recognize the truths we have thus far been learning: that we are all under one law; that we all owe it obedience; that we all ought to control our selfish dispositions, which tend to become the very opposite of reason and justice; and that we all owe one another the whole truth. As we go along further in our study of morality, we shall see that very much more of right conduct might be included under the name of justice: even kindness might be called a part of it. But let us think of it now as the giving his fair and equal part to every person, whether he is near enough to us for us also to be kind, or not.

As each human being is a member of society, each has a just claim to his fair part of the good things of the world. What we call "self" has its rights as well as its duties, and it is not "selfishness" for any one to desire to have that which in reason belongs to him. "Selfishness" means **asking or taking too much**, more than one's proper share. We need a word to signify without any shade of blame the existence and action of the self, that is, of each individual person, in its right and reasonable degree. Such a word, as has been said in a previous chapter, is the old English term "selfhood." Like boyhood, manhood, womanhood, and other similar words, it means simply the natural condition of each human being, existing as a person of the

first and nearest importance in his own eyes. Nature has given him consciousness of himself, and he can never take the same attitude toward himself as he holds toward every other human being. He views his self from within, but all other persons he sees, and must see, from without. The preservation of this self from danger or disease or death, and the maintenance of it in health and comfort are, by a law of nature, peculiarly the business of each one of us, more especially when we have reached our full size and strength. Each person can, on the whole, provide for himself better than others can provide for him. Self-help is thoroughly natural, and it is usually the best kind of help. The development of all one's powers of body and mind is peculiarly one's own duty and privilege. There is nothing selfish or wrong in any one's asking for what is, reasonably, **his share**.

We become *selfish*, *i. e.*, we carry our natural liking for ourselves too far, when we take away from others, directly or indirectly, what is theirs, to make it, wrongfully, our own property. As we all know, selfishness, the claiming or taking too much, is the most common form of all wrong-doing. It might be said that it is even the foundation or source of almost all wrong-doing. When we think very highly of our own merits and very little of the rights of others, we really act as if human society revolved around us as its centre; we are virtually claiming that we cannot have too much, or others too little, the main matter being that we shall be satisfied. This is making the same kind of mistake that men used to make when they imagined that the sun and the planets and all the stars of heaven revolved around this little earth of ours as their centre. It *was* not so; it *is not* so, and it *cannot be made to be so* by any amount of talking or doing on our part. So when any man or woman, or boy or girl, acts as if the whole family, or the whole school, or the whole neighborhood, or

town or city or state or nation revolves, or should revolve, around his or her own convenience or comfort or happiness, the same great mistake is made. All these associations of human beings are intended for the good of each and all together; every individual in any one of them must consult the welfare of all the others, as well as of himself, if the association is to continue in its natural and proper form, and if each is to receive from it the greatest degree of aid and comfort.

The rule of justice, then, is, **To each man his part.** The way to bring this about is to act, in the first place, *reasonably*, to have a moderate and sensible notion of our own merits, to remember that each of us is only one of many, that each, indeed, is very important to himself, but that all these different selves are to live together in a common society under one and the same moral law. So apt are we all to exaggerate our own personal merits, so very apt to take more than what in reason belongs to us, that it becomes a necessity for us to make a constant allowance for this disposition. Very few persons, indeed, are likely to decide impartially in a case where their own interests are involved. Hence, it is a matter of the highest importance for us to realize our comparative inability to judge ourselves correctly. Our one resource, if we must decide ourselves, is to try to obey the maxim, **Put yourself in his place.** When we have a dispute with another, or when it is a matter concerning *meum et tuum*, our safest, surest way is to obey the Golden Rule of conduct, "Do unto others as ye would that others should do unto you."

Practically, this is the most important of all rules for governing our actions, because we are strongly inclined by nature to think of ourselves more highly than we ought to think, in reason. But if we once put ourselves, in imagination, in the other person's place, and ask ourselves how we should then like to have him do to us as we were purposing to do to him, we get a new light on

the matter. It becomes plain to us, very often, that we should not at all like to be treated so by any one, and should consider such treatment unreasonable and unfair. If, then, it would be so for us, why should it not be so for him? The action remains the same, the difference being only that the one who does the wrong and the one who suffers the wrong have changed places. Many persons declare, by their practice, that they hold the view of the African chief who was asked the difference between right and wrong: "Right," he answered, "is when I take away my neighbor's cattle; wrong is when he takes away mine!" But this, of course, is the very height of unreason: it amounts to denying that there is one and the same law binding upon all men alike, which makes stealing or robbery wrong because it is an offence against the social life.

Justice and selfishness, therefore, are **the two extremes of action**. The just man obeys the social, moral law; the selfish man sets up his own will or pleasure as the only law that he wishes to obey. Liberty, the selfish person thinks, is liberty to do as he pleases and take all he likes; but he is very much mistaken. The real freedom for all men is liberty to act according to the Golden Rule. "Look out for number one" is the principle of the selfish man; by "number one" he means himself. But, as a matter of fact, *is* he "number one" in respect to other matters than his relations to his fellow-men? Was the sun made for him? Will the rain come at his convenience? Can he be idle and yet have all the rewards of industry? Can he disregard any other law than the moral law with safety and profit to himself? He surely *cannot* so do. He is no more "number one" before the moral law than he is before physical law. Moral law is law for the existence and preservation and progress of human society, including all its individual members. **Society is number one**, and the moral law leaves no individual

exempt from its equal operation and application. Honesty is "the best policy," therefore, because it is in harmony with the law of justice that includes all men without an exception.

We are obliged to balance **self and others** in very many of our moral judgments and actions. We may be very sure that the two parties are meant by nature to work together in harmony for the welfare of all. We have instincts of justice as well as instincts of selfishness. Through our faculty of reason and our power of self-control, we can bring ourselves and others to **a true selfhood which is just to all**. Living in it we should be true to our own selves and false to no man. But to reach this end we need to think upon justice first. Self will probably assert itself fully enough, with most of us, without encouragement. When we think earnestly about our duties, to do them, other men will usually be quite ready to give us our rights with pleasure. But if we are very clamorous about "our rights," they will probably ask us first if we have discharged our own part. Not England alone, but all mankind "expects that every man will do his duty." A man who attends to all his duties will not talk profusely about his rights.

NOTES.

"JUSTICE satisfies everybody, and justice alone," says Emerson. No word is more common to-day than "rights." See, for example, Herbert Spencer's *Justice*, with its chapters on the rights of women and children. But "duties" are, on the whole, much more profitable things to consider. Under justice comes honesty in all our dealings, as opposed to cheating, defrauding, stealing, adulteration of goods, and scamping work; the keeping of promises ("who sweareth to his hurt and changeth not"); regard for the reputation of others; fair methods of making money (read J. Wolcott's poem, *The Razor-Seller*), and a hundred other

topics. "Fair play" is an important aspect of justice easily brought into the view of boys and girls in school. Justice rests finally on the idea of equality, that all men have certain great rights as men, owed them by all other men as duties. "A man's a man for a' that." Justice is the law of the business world, where kindness is not often mentioned. See Dole's *American Citizen*, part third, on "economic duties, or the rights and duties of business and money." "The most enviable of all titles," said Washington, — "the character of 'an honest man.'" "Justice," said Aristotle, "more beautiful than the morning or the evening star."

CHAPTER VI.

THE LAW OF KINDNESS.

IN considering the full meaning of justice we have said that it might be so defined at last as to make it include kindness, and we came to the Golden Rule as its best expression. But still it will probably seem to many that, so far, we have been making morality *stern and forbidding*, since we have had so much to say about *law* and *obedience*, — joyless words, most often! We have taken this course deliberately, however, in order to think and reason clearly about this most important matter, — our conduct. But we should be omitting the view of conduct which changes its whole aspect, if we left out kindness. Justice we commonly regard as based upon deliberate thought, and we often say that one must not let his “feelings bias his judgment” on a question of right and wrong. Yet a very great portion of our life is the life of feeling. While we should not try to distinguish feeling and thought too closely, each has its large place.

In all our conduct **feeling has a great part to play**. We only need to be *sure* that the feeling is rightly directed and not immoderate in its degree. This being so, the more strongly we *feel* in matters of conduct *the better*, for feeling is the powerful force that makes action easy. If we “think clear and feel deep” we shall be most likely to “bear fruit well,” and this is what every “friend of man desires.” Now **kindness** is the word that stands preëminently for *good feeling*. In many of its uses it means as much or nearly as much

as Love, and Love is the word that marks the strongest possible feeling of personal attachment. We shall use the word Kindness in preference to Love in speaking of acts and feelings which concern many persons, because Love is, strictly, an intensely attractive feeling in persons very near each other, such as members of one family, intimate friends, or men and women who are "in love" with each other, as we say. The deep sympathy we call "love" continues strong while it is confined to a few as its object; but if we try to extend it to many persons it necessarily loses its intensity. As we are now considering feelings which are to be entertained toward the many, not toward the few, it is well to say "kindness," and reserve "love" for the highest degree of affection. We will speak then of "the law of kindness," rather than of "the law of love," for the present.

We all know that persons may, not rarely, deserve to be called *just*, and not deserve to be called *kind*. We often say that we respect a certain man because he does right habitually, but that we are not "attracted" to him. His conduct seems to us reasonable and just; but it lacks that element of **grace and charm** which we imply when we say that another person is thoroughly kind — "*kind-hearted*" we generally phrase it, making an implied distinction between the "heart" and the "head." We must be very careful **not to press this distinction too far**, and make too much of it, for head and heart, not only literally but in this figurative use as well, are necessary parts of the same person; they are not always or often to be set in sharp opposition. But there is a difference, plain to see, between good conduct that is simply *just* and good conduct that has "heart in it," *i. e.*, is also "*kind*." Real kindness is not opposed to justice, but is above it as a superior degree in right conduct. There is in kindness a notion of **wholeness, immediateness and inspiration**, which are more pleas-

ing and winning than the most careful, well calculated and deliberate justice can be by itself.

Kindness, in fact, is **the ideal of conduct** toward the great body of our fellow-creatures. We have said in the last chapter that mankind has a natural instinct to be just, as well as an innate disposition to be selfish. It is also true, and a very important thing it is to bear in mind, that human nature has another instinct, to be kind. **Sympathy** (*i. e.*, feeling with another, especially in his troubles) is precisely as **natural** to man as selfishness; sympathy is but another name for kindness. Selfhood and sympathy — feeling for one's self and feeling with and for others — are the two poles on which the world of personal conduct revolves. Each feeling is good and right in itself. The practical matter always is to keep each in its proper place and confine it to its right degree.

It may help us a little, at this critical point, to be just to self and to others if we consider closely the several meanings of the words "kind" and "kindness."¹ "Kind" as a noun means (this is the original use of the word) the species, or class, to which a being belongs, as in the phrase "cattle after their kind." There are kinds of plants and kinds of animals. Among animal beings, we belong to mankind. Each species or class has its peculiar nature, by reason of which we are led to call it a separate kind. This nature is, to all belonging to this kind, a necessary law of their action; they simply **must act according to their kind**. "They follow the law of their kind," we say of all living animals. In connection with this nature we also use the words native propensity, disposition, character; these are all "natural," if they are involved in the "kind." It is the disposition of the tigress, for instance, to be cruel

¹ The teacher will observe that elsewhere I have preferred to discuss in the notes the matter of etymologies — so interesting and important in ethical reasoning — or to leave it untouched.

to all animals but her own young : to them she is affectionate. Equally it is the character of the dog to be fond of his master, and faithful to him.¹ So men and women have a certain general disposition or character because they all belong to mankind. For instance, you are "led by kind to admire your fellow-creature," says Dryden.

The first use of "kind" as an adjective follows directly from these meanings which we have been mentioning. Whatever is "characteristic," *i. e.*, is a **mark**, of a species, whatever belongs to its nature, is natural or native to it, is therefore "kind" to it, in this primitive sense. ("Kind" and "kin," we have to remember, are etymologically the same word; "kin" or "akin," and "kind," in this present sense, mean just the same.) "The kind taste" of an apple is the taste natural to an apple. The hay "kindest for sheep" is the hay that suits best their taste. "Kindly" is another form of "kind." "The kindly fruits of the earth" are the fruits which the earth naturally produces, *i. e.*, after its kind. Next "kind" comes to mean especially, in the case of human beings, *having the feelings that are common and natural to the kind*, the feelings which indicate, as well as stature or complexion, a community of descent. "A kindless villain," such as Hamlet calls the King, is one who acts contrary to the usual disposition of men, as the King did in murdering his own brother, Hamlet's father. "A little more than kin and less than kind," says Hamlet again, of the king, playing on the related words. The chorus in "Henry V.," addressing England, exclaims : —

"What mightst thou do
Were all thy children kind and natural ;"

that is, were they all true to their nature as Englishmen, with no traitors among them.

¹ "The bee," says Richard Rolle de Hampole, the old English writer, "has three kyndes ; ane es that sche is neuer ydell."

“Kind” as an adjective easily passes on to imply not only the feelings which show a common nature in human beings, but in particular the feelings which show it *most*, the tender emotions. These prove the existence, in a person, of a high degree of sympathy or compassion (these two words are etymologically the same). “A fellow-feeling makes us wondrous kind.” “One touch of nature makes the whole world kin,” *i. e.*, it makes men feel alike, and *with* each other. When we are thoughtful about the fortunes of others, and dwell upon their lot so as to feel with them, “we become kindly with our kind,” as Tennyson writes. In this way “kind,” the adjective, reaches its present and usual meaning of tender and thoughtful for the welfare of others, in little things as well as in great.

The history of “kindness,” the noun, has followed the same course. In “Much Ado About Nothing” the uncle of Claudio is reported by the messenger to have burst into tears when he heard how his nephew had distinguished himself in battle. “A kind overflow of kindness,” says Leonato there, meaning, as he played upon the words, a natural overflow of tender feeling in one related, “akin,” to Claudio. “Thy nature,” says Lady Macbeth to her more humane spouse, “is too full o’ the milk of human kindness,” *i. e.*, to kill the king. ‘Kindness,’ then, points to the great fact on which the moral law rests, that we are living with our *kind*. In this *life together* we are to think very carefully about the things which tend to make it profitable and pleasant to all. We must obey the laws of human nature which not only bring men together but are also continually operating to make the life together richer, fairer, and sweeter. This is the action of the law of kindness, the highest law of human society, of life with our kind.

We are wont to say *human* society and *human* kind. Notice how this word “human” and the word “humane” are related. A human being, an individual of

the species *Homo*, would be partially described by the naturalist as an animal walking upright and having two hands, and a large brain with many convolutions. We are each of us a portion of such a "humanity," meaning physiological human kind, or the species *Homo*, through the possession of these physical characteristics. But "humanity" means, specifically, the thoughts and feelings proper, *i. e.* peculiar, to mankind, those which distinguish us from the lower animals more plainly than do any bodily marks.¹ Most of all it stands for tenderness toward our own kind, so that "humanity" and "kindness" are, to a certain degree, synonymous, the latter word having historically the somewhat wider meaning. "Humane" is the adjective corresponding to this last-mentioned sense of the noun "humanity." An old translator of Plutarch into English using the word in the earliest, literal sense, "of man," speaks of bearing "humane cases humanely," *i. e.*, bearing the lot of man like a man!

The change of signification which has come upon "kind" and "human" is one sign of the great fact of the progress of man. Universal history, indeed, is the record of man becoming more human, steadily working out the beastly and savage elements in his mingled nature, and giving ever freer exercise to those elements which are distinctively human. The humanization of man in society is the aim of all that we properly call civilization. Every step in this process, which takes mankind away from the beast and the savage, in thought, feeling, and action, is an improvement, since thus his special nature is working itself free. To humanize a race is to give it knowledge and art, a higher morality and gentler manners. Observe how this word "gentle," again, comes to mean what it does. A "gentle" person

¹ "Men that live according to the right rule and law of reason live but in their own kind, as beasts do in theirs," Sir Thomas Browne says.

was originally one belonging to "a good family," one "well-born." Now people of family, the well-born, among their other advantages have more leisure than most persons to consider the smaller things of human intercourse — manners, that is, and the "minor morals" — and give them pleasing shape. Manners with these persons are improved; they become more gracious and refined, largely because the conditions of life are easier here than those of the majority of mankind; the well-to-do can thus spend more time and thought upon minor matters in social intercourse. The manners of good, or polite society are, properly, the kindest manners, because they have been the object of much consideration with a view to making the relations of men and women in refined society pleasant and agreeable in every way. "Courtesy," our word for the finest kind of manners, comes from the "court" of royal personages where the greatest attention is usually paid to cultivating fine manners.

But politeness and courtesy have now, of course, no necessary connection with kings or nobles. The law of kindness requires consideration of others, in preference to a selfish absorption in one's own pleasure or profit, and such kindness is not chiefly dependent upon our outward rank. As far as external conditions go, it is more easily cultivated in a state of comfort and leisure than in a state of hardship and poverty, but its essence is in the kind heart. True kindness does not require that we try to suspend for any one the fit operation of the laws of human life, or that we excuse him from obedience, most of all, to the moral law. Kindness does not allow us to be untrue in our words or unjust in our deeds, but it implies a constant control over the tongue and hand, so that **the spirit in which we act** and speak shall be gentle and considerate of the feelings of all other human beings. To speak the truth in love, — to do justly while we love the mercy that is above all sceptred sway, — this is the ideal of human conduct.

Naturally, we learn most easily how to live in this best way through our experience in our own homes. There our kin are our teachers in kindness. Nothing can surpass a mother's kindness for her children, or a father's concern for the happiness of his sons and daughters, unless it be the love of the husband and wife themselves, united in a true marriage. The love of our brothers and sisters, the kind thoughtfulness and affectionate helpfulness which are the very atmosphere of a happy home, instruct us that the same quality of mind and heart will make our intercourse with other human beings better and more humane. Opportunities for forgetting ourselves, for thinking how to do good, and for the doing of it, are innumerable in every life, and the character of every person becomes stronger, richer, and more beautiful, as he improves these occasions. We are not doing our whole duty when we simply tell the truth without regard to the mode of telling it; when we give other people their rights, without considering the manner in which we regard these rights; or when we have brought ourselves to obey every precept of the moral law in an external way only. This law is a law of life; obedience should become a second nature, so that all its hardness and difficulty may pass away.

"Serene will be our days, and bright
And happy will our nature be
When love is an unerring light
And joy its own security."

The element of **beauty** is needed in our conduct, as elsewhere in human life. Kindness supplies this grace and charm, in that it carries regard for others to the point of making it a **fine art**. Nothing is more beautiful in human intercourse than purely unselfish love, — of man and woman, of mother and child, of brother and sister, of whole-hearted friends. Beautiful, too, is the good man's regard for all other members of the great human family, when nothing that is human is alien to

his heart; when the sight of the weak, the ignorant, and the poor, reminds him that we are all of one primal nature, and that the law of kindness is the supreme law for man.

The short and easy way to stamp this character of beauty on our conduct is to **begin with the heart**, out of which are "the issues of life." When we think clearly, we perceive how far beyond and above all the differences and distinctions between human beings are the great and fundamental likenesses of man to man, which should arouse and sustain in us all a feeling of the common brotherhood of humanity. The single person enters into a larger life by sympathy with another. Man and woman come together in marriage, the closest union of this kind, and find strength and beauty in a home where love reigns, and family ties multiply the sweetness and the power of life. The same feeling can extend itself, in various degrees, but in the one form of human kindness, to all the relations of life, to soften and refine and beautify human society.

The law of kindness tends to put down all "survivals" of the beast, the primitive savage, and the barbarian, in the individual and in the world at large. Unkindness is injustice to one of the same race with ourselves; it is untruthfulness to the great fact of our common humanity. But as a positive force of interest in others and sympathy with them, kindness becomes **the finest justice and the most delicate truthfulness**. Harshness is unjust, and cruelty is brutal; both these opposites of kindness are unhuman. But let us do a kindness to a person whom we have disliked, and what an effect it has in clearing away injustice in our own mind! We often see how false has been our view of what we called the facts of his nature. Human kindness preserves the family and the home, and makes them fair and satisfying. A man and his wife used often to quarrel, she said, but now that they kept "two bears"

in the house all went happily : the names of these two peacemakers were Bear and Forbear !

Kindness in the form of politeness and common courtesy makes the relations of men and women outside their own homes a source of pleasure and happiness, helping on every other good thing. Human kindness between nations would abolish war and all its horrors. Peace in the home and in the world, and, because of peace, larger opportunity for growth in knowledge and beauty and right and fulness of life in every direction, — this is the result of **love fulfilling every moral law**. When men act and speak and think and feel out of a generous, merciful, peaceful, kindly spirit, then their highest level here upon earth is attained, human nature comes to its finest flower, and the fullest fruitage of life is sure.

NOTES.

“THE quality of mercy is not strained.”

A CLASSIC book on courtesy is *The Gentleman*, by George H. Calvert, full of references to history and literature, from Sir Philip Sidney to Charles Lamb. Dr. Holmes defines good breeding as “surface Christianity,” and Cardinal Newman says the gentleman is “one who never willingly gave pain.”

“Moral life is based on sympathy ; it is feeling for others, working for others, aiding others, quite irrespective of any personal good beyond the satisfaction of the social impulse. Enlightened by the intuition of our community of weakness, we share ideally the universal sorrow. Suffering humanizes. Feeling the need of mutual help, we are prompted by it to labor for others.” (G. H. Lewes.)

Kindness to animals is distinctively a modern virtue in Christian countries. It is an extension to the lower animals, especially to those we domesticate, of the considerate treatment we have first learned to give to our own species.

“I would not enter on my list of friends
(Though graced with polished manners and fine sense,

Yet lacking sensibility) the man
Who needlessly sets foot upon a worm."

Read *Rab and his Friends*; such poems as *The Halo*, by W. C. Gannett, and selections from the biographies of men, like Sir Walter Scott, fond of dogs and horses. See Miss Cobbe on the *Education of the Emotions* in the *Fortnightly Review*, xliii. p. 223. *Lessons on Manners*, by Edith Wiggin, is a good handbook for the teacher. As for kindness in charitable works:—

"That is no true alms which the hand can hold;
He gives only the worthless gold
Who gives from a sense of duty;
But he who gives but a slender mite
And gives to that which is out of sight,
That thread of the all-sustaining Beauty
Which runs through all and doth all unite, —
The hand cannot clasp the whole of his alms."

CHAPTER VII.

THE GREAT WORDS OF MORALITY.

IN our previous chapters we have studied the meaning of "law" in general, and of the "moral law" in particular. "Duty," "ought," "justice," and "kindness" we have also explained. But there are numerous other words used very commonly in speaking of human actions, such as "right" and "wrong," "conscience," "virtue," and "vice," which we have not yet considered. In every art and in every science a clear understanding of the exact meanings of the words we use is important. But nowhere is it of more consequence than when we are speaking or writing about the moral character of actions. Indeed, in discussing matters of conduct the decision as to their rightness or wrongness often turns upon the definition we give of "right" and "wrong" in general. In this book we are trying to keep clear of controversies as to the ultimate nature of vice and virtue, of the morally good and the morally bad, and to remain upon the ground of practical ethics where there is a general agreement among men. In such a spirit, avoiding refinements and subtleties, let us look at some of the words which mankind commonly use in regard to morals.

In the first place, however, what do we mean precisely by "moral" or "ethical"? The two words have the same signification, the first coming from the Latin language, and the second from the Greek; both mean "pertaining to the habits, manners, or customs of men." Of course, not all possible actions of human beings are called "moral." We eat and sleep and do many other

things which all other animals do as a part of their animal existence. These are **not immoral but unmoral acts**: there is no propriety in applying the words "right" and "wrong" to them. We read and study, again; we employ our minds in many ways, and we do not think of vice or virtue as fit words to use about what we are doing. There is thus a great deal of human life which lies **outside of the world of moral distinctions**: our instinctive animal existence, the natural play of the mind, and numerous powers of conscious thought and action have standards other than those of morals. We may not judge a book, a picture, or a building by morals alone.

Only a *part of all the manners and customs of men* do we properly call moral or immoral. This part, evidently, takes in those actions which most directly affect the welfare of other persons. Man in society is the subject of moral or ethical science, and our actions show themselves to be moral or immoral according as they tend, immediately or ultimately, to the welfare or to the injury of other human beings. Eating my breakfast is not a moral act in itself; but if I give another person poisoned food for his breakfast, it is a highly immoral deed that I do. If any act of mine is plainly confined in its consequences to myself, then its moral quality is not immediately obvious. If every human being were out of all relations to every other, there could be no such science or art as morals or ethics, for "duties to self," as they are sometimes called, would not, alone, constitute such a science. But there is a law, as we have seen, governing all the many actual relations of men to one another, and because we are social beings and live our lives mainly together, this law, the law of morality, is of the very first importance to us. Duty, "the ought," as we have explained, is the obedience we "owe" to this law. But there is a very common phrase, "rights and duties." This combination

indicates the social nature of morals. Our duties are what we owe to others ; our rights are what others owe to us. **Their rights are our duties ; their duties are our rights.**

“Right” (which comes from the same root as *rectus*, straight) means, first of all, “in accordance with rule or law.” Righteousness, or rightness, is equivalent to rectitude, which means going straight by the *rule or measure*. This rule has come to be for all mankind the rule in particular derived from the moral law : right means, therefore, doing the things which the moral law, of truthfulness or kindness for instance, prescribes to be done. If we can find this law and merely *understand* it as we should any other law of nature, we are intellectually right, *i. e.*, correct in our thought ; if we act as it commands, we are morally right, so far as our action is concerned ; if we obey it in a spirit of gladness, as the inspiring law of our human life, then we are right, all through, — mind and hand and heart and will : then we are completely moral beings.

“Right” has in it the notion of straightness, straightforwardness, directness. A “right line” is the straight line between any two points. Right conduct is conduct tending directly to social welfare, the good of all embracing the good of each. But when one’s action is bent or swayed out of this straight line, when it tends to some other mark than the good of all, it is “wrong,” *i. e.*, it is **wrung** out of conformity with the rule or law.

Now the great occasion or cause of wrong-doing in the world is, as we have seen, that we are apt to think only of ourselves when we act. Our own welfare very often so takes the first place in our thoughts and feelings that we care little, or not at all, what the consequences of our deeds may be to other persons. There are, in truth, many matters in which we *must* think about our own comfort and convenience as the impor-

tant matter, since self-help is the best kind of help; and if the thing we desire is good for us, it may be entirely right that we should endeavor to obtain it. But when a benefit of any kind is one that may be shared, or that must be shared, in order that no one shall suffer because another gets more than his portion, then pure selfhood becomes selfishness, and is wrong. For example, a farmer works hard to make money from his land: he labors on his own place, and has his own interest, not his neighbor's, in view, as he buys and sells according to the usual laws of trade. This is right: there is no selfishness about caring for one's self in this way. But the farmer is bound to provide for his wife and children, to see that they have enough to eat, that they are well clothed, that the children go to school, that the hired men receive fair wages and are punctually paid, and that all the benefits of his prosperity, such as it is, are divided among those who have a just and natural claim upon him. But while the farmer is making money, he may compel his family to fare poorly and dress meanly; he may keep his children at work when they should have the opportunity to go to school; he may "beat down" the pay of his workmen and delay the payment. In all these ways, not to speak of other matters, he may disregard the fact that we are partners with one another. Instead of going straight to the mark of the plain and simple duty before him, he may force and complicate things into a state of wrongness by his selfishness. The crooked line is the proper emblem of the conduct that obeys no law; the straight line, of the conduct that is true to the direction which the law commands.

Vice, a common word in speaking of bad conduct, means, first of all, a **defect**: it refers to a deficiency in the exercise of that power of self-control of which we have before spoken as the root of morality in the private person. One man does not exert himself as he

might about his proper work: he has the vice of idleness. Another does not control his liking for intoxicating liquors, and he falls into the vice of intemperance. A third man may have a violent or an irritable disposition which he does not control, and he falls into the vice of bad temper. So the vicious man practically sets up his own pleasure or wilfulness as the law by which he acts. He is not strong, but weak, in that he does not have the mastery over himself which full obedience to the moral law requires.

Virtue, on the contrary, originally meant **manliness**, and especially the distinctive excellence of a man, **courage**. The word always implies strength, and when it came to be applied to conduct, it marked power of will to control one's self, according to the law of right. The "cardinal," or chief, virtues were formerly said to be justice, prudence, temperance, and fortitude. Underlying all these is the notion of **strength**. Justice demands the ability to put down one's exorbitant wishes and to limit one's self, as well as other persons, each to his share. Prudence (from pro-vidence, looking forward) signifies a will-power which is sufficient to curb our own indolence or extravagance or carelessness in view of our probable needs or interests in the future. Temperance implies just such a restraint, such a stopping short of excess, with a view to the more immediate consequences. Fortitude is courage, active or passive, in doing or bearing. These four "virtues" (from the Latin *vir*, a man) are **signs of manliness**: they belong to the manly mind and the manly will. Injustice, imprudence, intemperance, and cowardice are equally marks of moral weakness in a person. A training in virtue, then, is like physical training: its object is to give strength and power of self-control. In one case we strengthen the muscles by use that they may be ready servants of the will in time of need. In the other case we strengthen our powers of judgment and

self-control in small matters, so that we may show ourselves equal to emergencies which require the full strength of a man in resisting evil.

"Conscience" is the word we use to denote each person's knowledge of the moral law, or his power of knowing it and passing judgment as to matters of morality. Its meaning, etymologically, is doubtful. "Knowing with," its two members (*con-scio*) signify, but "knowing with" *what*? Some call it a faculty which gives an immediate knowledge of right and wrong, and does not need instruction, but only opportunity to speak. Others would call it a faculty capable of enlightenment like any other faculty of the human mind. Into such discussions as to the ultimate nature of conscience we have no need to enter here. The final ground of right, whether in utility or in experience or in intuition, is another point which belongs to the theory of ethics, not to the practical morality which now concerns us. On the main matters of conduct there is virtual agreement among civilized men as to what is right and what is wrong. *Why* this, finally, is right or why that is finally wrong, is another matter, on which philosophers differ and dispute. The great majority of mankind are interested only in determining **what to do**, not **what to think**, in the sphere of conduct. It is agreed by all that children need instruction and advice as to right and wrong, and a great part of the conversation and the writing of grown people consists of the giving of advice or suggestion about moral matters. Thus whatever our consciences may be, in the last resort, we all need instruction as to the facts in any case where we have to act, and we need to reason clearly and logically from these facts in the light of moral principles generally admitted. Not only is this so; we need to have our *interest* in right-doing, by others and by ourselves, kept up and quickened by thinking earnestly about conduct and clearing our minds, and by purifying and strengthening

our wills, so that we shall understand and do and love the right. If we are thus drawn toward the moral life with the full force of our nature, it is of little consequence how we define conscience, or what our theory is about its origin in the history of our race. Like the sense of beauty, the moral sense justifies itself by its results, not by its definitions: each aims at a practical result, not at the vindication of a theory. The virtuous life, all will say, is life in accordance with the highest laws of human nature. "Good" is, to us human beings, whatever is fit or suitable for man; moral good is what is fit or suitable for man to do or be in the society of his kind. The good man, morally speaking, is always **good for something**.

NOTES.

THE teacher will do well to trace the natural history of every word that conveys a sense of moral obligation. "Should," he will find, for instance, is derived from the Teutonic root *skal*, to owe: thus its meaning is radically the same as that of "ought." "Must," — a frequent word in this book, — is often equivalent to "ought." One *ought* to do so and so to attain an end = *one must* do it. Right is noted as the straight and obvious course in these lines: —

"Beauty may be the path to highest good,
And some successfully have it pursued.
Thou, who wouldst follow, be well warned to see
That way prove not a curv'd road to thee.
The straightest way, perhaps, which may be sought
Lies through the great highway men call *I ought*."

Right is simple, *i. e.*, without folds; wrong is often duplicity, full of complexities.

"Man is saved by love and duty," said Amiel; "society rests upon conscience, not upon science." "A society can be founded only on respect for liberty and justice," M. Taine declares.

"A right" can be made out only when it can be proved to be some person's positive duty; "the right" is what all ought to do,

i. e., what they owe to one another, or to society at large. The variations of conscience in different times and countries (see Wake, *The Evolution of Morality*) correspond to the degrees of enlightenment reached by the human race ; they prove that morality is a progressive art, not that right and wrong are delusions. Conscience needs enlightenment and training, like all other human powers. A high stage of progress is marked in Carlyle's saying: "There is in man a higher than love of happiness. He can do without happiness, and instead thereof find blessedness." *Rights and Duties* is a suggestive little manual by Mrs. K. G. Wells, and Mr. Smiles's *Duty* has an abundance of illustrative matter.

CHAPTER VIII.

HOME.

Home is the name we give to the place where our family life is lived. The family, made up of father, mother, children, and other blood-relatives, is the most important and most helpful of human associations. We are born into the family, and in our years of weakness we are supported and our life made stronger and better by the love and help of father and mother, and brothers and sisters. When we grow up, we marry and form other families, and become ourselves fathers and mothers, bringing up children, as we were brought up. Home, "sweet home," ought to be, as it is to most persons, the dearest spot on earth, where we find loving words and sympathy and kind deeds, and where we may return these, and do each his full part in this small and close society, — very powerful for good because it is a small body and the "life together" is here intimate and continuous. We have certain hours for work away from our homes; we associate with others in school, or business, or travel, and in divers other ways; but at home we not only eat at the same board and sleep under the same roof, but we know one another and can help and love one another day after day, and year after year, until in the family we die, as into the family we were born. "**Home**" is the **sweetest and strongest word** in our language, because it stands for so much of love and fellow-service, for the tenderest and fairest side of our life.

The family, which makes the home, is a natural institution, the outgrowth of our deepest human nature.

The love of man and woman which brings them together as husband and wife comes next to the instinct of self-preservation in its universality and power. It is the foundation of the family, and if we follow it along its course of development and refinement in the civilized countries of to-day, we find the virtues, that is, the strengths and the excellences, which go to make the true and perfect home.

The husband and father is the **natural head** of the family ; on him it depends for its support. He used to have in ancient times even the power of life and death over his children. But the power which he now has is based on right and reason. The wife and mother is his friend and dear companion and constant helper. On her more than on him, in the natural course of things, the daily care of the children rests. To father and mother, then, the boys and girls of the house should look up with respect and love as older and more experienced than themselves, and thus able to teach and guide them in many things of which they are ignorant and incapable. The first thing necessary to make a happy home is cheerful obedience paid by children to their parents, who are providing them with food and clothing and shelter and education, and who have no greater desire than to see their children growing up to be good and intelligent men and women. Children in their younger years can return but little for the **immeasurable love and help** which their fathers and mothers delight to bestow upon them. But they may make life pleasanter for their parents by showing a cheerful and contented spirit, by returning the love, and doing the little they can to aid in the daily work of the family life. In running errands, in learning to help itself about dressing, in tending the baby, for instance, the young child may exhibit a loving and helpful spirit, which will make it still dearer to the heart of father and mother.

At home, more than anywhere else, obedience to those

who have a natural right to command should be ready and cheerful. Our parents are older and wiser than we ; they give us directions only for our own good, and have our happiness always in view. Until we can see and understand the reasons why they order us to do this or that, we should do it *because* they have ordered it. Father and mother are the law-makers and law-executors for the children, who should obey as the sailor on a vessel at once obeys the captain or the pilot, as the soldier gives instant attention to the command of his officer, and as the hired man at work follows the directions of his employer. Father and mother are acting for the good of the whole family. The children must be content to obey, and take their own share, and should not make life hard for their parents by disobedience, stubbornness, idleness, or other forms of selfishness. The Golden Rule would teach children to remember constantly how much father and mother are doing for them, not only in the matters which any one can see, such as care for their health and comfort, but also in training them to become honest and upright men and women. This is the greatest thing that our parents can do for us, to bring us up in habits of self-control and truthfulness and honor and kindness, so that as we grow older, we can be trusted to walk by ourselves and to do the right **because we know it and prize it**, not simply because we are ordered to do it.

But this doing of the right is, quite naturally, what children often like very little or dislike very much. They want to have their own way, whether it is the right and reasonable way, or not. They do not always "feel like" going to school, or helping their parents or brothers and sisters in some small way. But **home rests upon law and love**. The father, who sees so much more clearly than the unwilling boy what is right and just and fair and reasonable, will make him "mind," by force, if necessary. The great law of the home is

helpfulness and kindness from each to all and from all to each ; it is always well with us if the law is enforced whenever we do not cheerfully obey it. Boys and girls are growing up to become fathers and mothers themselves, in their turn, and they cannot learn too soon that each must be ready and willing to do his own part in the work of life, and be satisfied with his share of good and pleasant things, helping and helped, happy and making others happy.

There should be **no other place like home** to us. There is no other place where we can show so plainly what we are, — kind and true and helpful, or selfish and false and careless of our duty. Moral training begins here, and throughout life it centres here. When a man is a good son or father or husband, he is likely to be a true man in business and in the larger life in general, beyond his home. We need, then, to think very carefully about our duties at home that we may be sources of sweetness and light there. In the right and true home we love and help one another without asking a return, and from no selfish motive whatever ; beginning with the simplest forms of duty we rise to the fairest heights of love through self-forgetfulness in kindly service.

The virtues of home are the qualities which tend to make it strong in a mutual helpfulness of all the family circle, and sweet and pleasant in a beautiful spirit of love. To serve, not to be served ; to give, not to receive ; to help and bless continually by word and example, — this makes firm the family bond, and keeps home as it should be, the dearest place on earth. The virtues, the strength and the excellence of home lie deep in justice and right and truth ; but nowhere else can we so love and be loved, nowhere else does duty so easily pass into affection. Home should, then, be a sacred place to us. We do well to remember the Lares and Penates, as the old Romans called the household

gods. Their images were in every house; a perpetual fire was kept on the hearth in their honor; on the table the salt-cellar stood for them, and the firstlings of the fruit were laid, and every meal was considered as, in a sense, a sacrifice to them. When one of the family came home after absence, he saluted the Penates as well as the family, and thanked them for his safe return. So we should consider our home **holy ground**, — too holy for wrong or vice to tread, — a place sacred to love and duty. Through these virtues home is deeply helpful to our best life beyond the family border.

NOTES.

THERE is a considerable literature on the origin and development of the family in human history. Such a book as E. B. Tylor's *Anthropology* (in the closing chapter on Society) will be sufficient for most uses. It is of vastly more consequence to study family life in its highest excellence to-day than to trace its animal beginnings. Ethics is concerned more with what ought to be than with what is or what has been; at the same time, a knowledge of the past and the present is necessary to any wise attempt to shape the future. Herbert Spencer, in his *Justice*, marks this fundamental difference between family ethics and state ethics: "Within the family group most must be given where least is deserved, if desert is measured by worth. Contrariwise, after maturity is reached benefit must vary directly as worth; worth being measured by fitness to the conditions of existence."

The monogamous family is the form under which modern civilized man obeys the imperious instinct which bids the race preserve itself. Self-preservation, in its broadest sense, is the companion-instinct. The dictates of both are obeyed in the close coöperation of the family, where the most exigent duties are rendered easy by the strong affections naturally engendered. The monogamous family, Goethe said, is man's greatest conquest over the brute; it rests not upon mere animal inclination, but upon the most constant obedience to duty, — an obedience rendered easy and happy by use and love.

Some classic poems of home are the "Cotter's Saturday Night;" Cowper's "Winter Evening;" Wordsworth's lines to the lark, "Ethereal minstrel, pilgrim of the sky;" and Whittier's "Snow Bound." Three good books are *Home Life*, by J. F. W. Ware; *Home Teaching*, by E. A. Abbott; and *The Duties of Women*, by F. P. Cobbe. The pamphlet lessons on *Home Life*, by Mrs. Susan P. Lesley, are suggestive.

CHAPTER IX.

WORK.

MAN is born to work and employ his powers of body and mind for good ends. That we have strength is a sign that we were intended to use it in order to preserve our life and make it comfortable through our exertions. That one may eat and drink, have clothing and shelter, get an education, own a house, be able to travel, or enjoy life in any one of a thousand ways, he must work, or some one must work for him. No human being is free from the necessity or the duty of working and making use of his natural powers.

Now all work has its conditions of success, and these demand certain qualities which we will call **the virtues of work**. They are such excellences of character as Industry, Punctuality, Orderliness, Intelligence, and Economy. Taking a general view of all kinds of labor, we see that to do any work well and succeed in gaining a good result, we must comply with these natural moral conditions; if we will not, then we fail, whatever our other virtues may be. As each one of us grows up and takes to some special kind of business to support himself and those dependent on him, he is obliged to learn the proper ways of doing things, whether it be farming, or carpentering, or teaching, or practising law, for instance. Each pursuit has to be learned by itself, having its special works and needs. One person must live on a farm and work under a farmer to learn agriculture; another must go into a printing-office and learn his "case" if he would be a compositor; a third must go to college and a professional school to learn medicine or

law. But in all these directions we find work has its general laws, *the same everywhere*, and we cannot begin too soon to recognize them and obey them, whatever we are doing.

I. We must be industrious. This means that we must be willing and ready each of us to do at least the share of work that comes to him, at home, in the school-room, or in business. We must learn to like work, if we do not naturally enjoy it, by working, and to rejoice in the fact that we are accomplishing something in this world. We have to form a habit, by practice, of steady, patient, and persevering labor. We must have intervals for rest and play or recreation, but while we work we should work with our might, and while we play, let us play; work and play are successful and reach their aim only when so taken. If we idle when we should be working, some one else must do the work that we should have done, and thus the fundamental rule, "each his part," is violated. Pure idleness is shirking one's duty as a soldier deserts his regiment. Idling over one's work, "scamping" it, is unjust to those who employ us, and naturally leads to our discharge. Into what we are doing we should put our whole strength; if disagreeable work is before us we must learn not to be concerned about the disagreeableness and in time the task will become easier and less irksome. The first law of each place of work is **work!** School is the place to study in; the blacksmith's shop, the cotton-mill, the shipyard, are places in which to use one's hand and eye in steady labor; let us, then, do the head-work or the hand-work faithfully.

II. Most of the work that men do must be done *at fixed times*, if it is to be done well. There must be an hour for opening the shop or the factory or the school, and at this time the workers must attend, for "time is money" to all who work. Punctuality, being **true to the point of time**, is one of the first of business vir-

tues. The hour is set for beginning the day's work, and we are to be paid for the day's time. If we are late in arriving at work, we are not performing our part of the agreement, and are thus doing wrong. Business of every kind must have its time set for beginning and ending, and time has more and more value as men become more civilized. So we should imitate in our human affairs the punctuality shown by the tides and the changes of the moon and even the comets, whose appearance is foretold by astronomers, ages beforehand, to the minute. When "on time," the school opens with all the pupils in their seats at the fixed hour, and the lessons and study begin at once. The school work is not hindered and delayed by Fred or Mary lagging behind, and no one loses the whole or part of an exercise. We make engagements with one another to meet at certain places, to do certain things, to deliver goods, it may be, to join in all sorts of enterprises. Everywhere "punctuality is the soul of business," and the unpunctual man will not be tolerated long in any direction. The railroad train will not delay for him, and men who have business with him will not wish to continue it if he wastes their time by keeping them waiting. In all our dealings with each other, in which there is any question of time, respect and courtesy demand that we be on time, "pat betwixt too early and too late."

III. **Orderliness** is necessary to success in business. There must not only be a **time** for everything to begin and to end, but there must also be a **place** for everything. In a well-managed carpenter's shop, for example, each saw and hammer and file has its hook or nail or slot where it belongs. When needed it is taken from that place, and when it has been used it is returned there. No time is then wasted in looking for it here and there, as in a shop where the workmen are slack and careless.

The orderly workman begins at the beginning of his

work: he keeps to one job at a time, so far as he can, until it is finished: then he takes up another. He arranges his work beforehand in such order that it will require the least outlay of time and strength to do it well. He has his mind on his business; all his energy and intelligence and skill he directs wisely, so as to procure the largest and best result.

IV. Not only should every worker be as methodical and systematic as possible, for his own good and the good of all, **skill is a duty for him**. Here is a certain thing to do, to raise a crop, or build a house, or manage a railroad. Since man is an intelligent being and can know, if he will, many of the causes and ways of things, the farmer, the builder, and the locomotive engineer are **bound to understand their business**: each should study persistently the nature of the forces and the materials with which he has to deal, and acquaint himself practically with the methods that other men have used to attain the end he is seeking himself. The best way of doing a thing does not come by chance to one who is ignorant and careless; it comes to those who use their eyes and ears and their whole minds, carefully and patiently. The successful worker is the one who concentrates his full power on the task in hand. He wishes to do the most good work with the largest and best result inside of a given time and in the most economical manner. How to do this is an affair requiring thought. So to our virtues of industry and punctuality and order and economy, we need to add all the knowledge of our occupation that keen observation and study of books or life can give us.

Intelligence is a duty, as well as perseverance, for everybody. Not until we reach the limit of possible knowledge or training can we say that we have done our full duty, as intellectual beings, to the work that lies before us. "The very true beginning of wisdom is the desire of discipline." The power and ability that

we have by nature are very well, but to be of much use or profit in the world, they must be **trained**: they must come and submit themselves to learn the virtues of work. Our human society stands firm because of the immense amount of patient work that is done day after day by millions of workers of all kinds; and it advances in knowledge and beauty and comfort as this work becomes more moral and more intelligent. The idle, the careless, the disorderly, the unwilling-to-learn are a burden on the industrious, the careful, the orderly, and the intelligent; and each one should resolve not to be such a burden, but, by complying with the laws of good work, do his own manly part, and so have a right to enjoy his own share.

NOTES.

THERE is no lack of inspiring examples to do our best work in the lives of the great men of our own generation, of whom the newspaper, the monthly magazine, and contemporary books tell us. Perhaps the most forcible instruction from biography in the virtues of work is based upon the achievements of living men. Their word has often telling power, as when Mr. Edison, asked for advice how to succeed, answered: "Don't look at the clock," *i. e.*, forget yourself in your work, be possessed by it.

Work is always to be disassociated from worry; see A. K. H. B. on *A Great Evil of Modern Times*.

"One lesson, Nature, let me learn of thee,
Of toil unsevered from tranquillity."

On the other hand:—

"Rest is not quitting
The busy career;
Rest is the fitting
Of self to its sphere."

Read from Whittier's "Songs of Labor;" *Captains of Industry*, by James Parton, two series; J. F. Clarke and J. S. Blackie on *Self-Culture*; and *Blessed be Drudgery*, by W. C. Gannett (it is

"the secret of all culture," he says). "Idleness," says old Burton, "the bane of body and mind, the nurse of naughtiness, the chief author of all mischief." "Labor is man's great function; the hardest work in the world is to do nothing." (Dr. Dewey.)

"There is a perennial nobleness, and even sacredness, in work. Were he never so benighted, forgetful of his high calling, there is always hope in a man that actually and earnestly works; in idleness alone is there perpetual despair. Work, never so mammonish, mean, is in communication with Nature; the real desire to get work done will itself lead one more and more to truth, to Nature's appointments and regulations, which are truth. All true work is sacred; in all true work, were it but true hand-labor, there is something of divineness. Labor, wide as the earth, has its summit in heaven." (Carlyle.)

Work is of the mind as well as of the hand; the tendency of civilization is set forth by Sir Thomas More: —

"The Utopians, when nede requireth, are liable to abide and suffer much bodelie laboure; els they be not greatly desirous and fond of it; but in the exercise and studie of the mind they be never wery. . . . For whil, in the institution of that weale publique, this end is onelye and chiefly pretended and mynded, that what time may possibly be spared from the necessary occupacions and affayres of the commen welth, all that the citizeins should withdraw from the bodely service to the free libertye of the mind and garnishinge of the same. For herein they suppose the felicitye of this liffe to consiste."

CHAPTER X.

THE LAW OF HONOR.

THE moral law, we have seen, is the law which declares the proper relations of human beings to each other in personal conduct. Like every other natural law, it is disclosed to us by study and observation of the beings whom it governs. It governs them because it is a part of their nature, which they cannot escape. Man is a social being, and if he would live in society as he desires, he must obey the laws of the social life : of these laws the moral law is a most important part. A portion of it is written down in the statute law of the land, and is carried into effect against wrong-doers by courts and police and prisons.

Another part is recognized in this or that country as binding on all ; but men do not judge it expedient to pass laws concerning it. A power that we call " public opinion " enforces certain duties, such as the education of a man's children according to his means, without legal penalties. The law of the land obliges every parent to send his children to school so many weeks in the year ; in the State of Massachusetts this must be done up to the age of fourteen. This is all that the legislature, or the State, thinks it wise to attempt in the way of obliging all parents to educate their children. But when a man is amply able to send his children to the high school or to college, and they wish to go, public opinion says that he ought to send them ; and so much do men, in general, care for the good opinion of their fellow-men, that children not rarely receive this further education when the parents themselves do not admit

the intellectual need of it. Public opinion, is, however, a very variable thing, and it often represents a sort of compromise between all kinds and degrees of private opinions, when it concerns a moral question. There must be some persons whose opinion is worth more than that of others on a point of right and wrong, just as there are on a matter of art or science. These persons every one will recognize as **the honorable people**, those who live according to the moral law of honor.

I. There are two very opposite senses in which a person may be "a law to himself." A man may be willing and ready to defy and disobey the moral law whenever and wherever he thinks he can do so safely. If the offence he has in mind is one against the written law, he will commit it in case he thinks himself sure not to be found out, or in case he cares less for the shame of the punishment than for the advantage to be gained from the crime. This man's law is his own self-interest, or the gratification of his passions, whether for his interest or not. He will care little for public opinion in respect to matters of which the law says nothing. So he will lie and cheat and steal and break his promises whenever he considers it to be for his own advantage. He will rob and do personal violence, perhaps even commit murder, if he considers himself very likely to escape punishment. He thus puts himself **outside the moral law** which declares these deeds wrong in themselves, and makes his own will his law. But such conduct is directed against the very life of human society, which would go to pieces if it were practised to any great extent. Therefore these dangerous classes, the open enemies of order and civilization and morality, must be kept down. Laws are passed against them: the constable and the policeman, the criminal courts, the jails and the prisons, and the gallows in the last resort, are employed against these savages and barbarians who are **survivals from the times before morality**.

Other enemies of morality are those men who are more crafty and prey on their fellow-men by taking advantage of the imperfections of the statute law to defraud and do any other wrong which they think for their own interest. They do not kill, or rob on the highway; but they make war on their kind by craft. Morality is to them simply an outside restraint: they cannot be trusted to do right when to do wrong would be for their own profit. Both these classes, the violent and the crafty, are "a law to themselves" in the bad sense that they reject all law but their own will.

II. At the other extreme in human society stand those men and women who are **a law to themselves** in the good sense of the phrase. They see that all the laws which mankind has ever made are but clumsy and imperfect attempts to carry out the full moral law as the highest minds and the best hearts perceive and feel it. They do what they know to be just, not because the authorities will otherwise punish them, but because they realize that justice is **the one fit thing** for men to do to one another. They keep the peace because they love peace and the things which peace brings. They tell the truth because they wish to live themselves and to have others live, at all times, in a real world; their word does not need to be supported by an oath, — it is always to be relied upon. Their verbal promises are as good as written contracts made before witnesses and under penalty. They pay regard to every known right of others because they feel that we are members one of another in society, and that "no man ever hurt himself save through another's side."

To live in this way is to live **under the law of honor**. Every honorable man feels bound to live up to his fullest knowledge of right, without regard to the statute law or to public opinion, which are satisfied with a lower standard. He is very sure that both are, and must be, imperfect, and that his duty is to remedy their

imperfections and to show in his own practice a nearer approach to what is demanded by the full moral law. His own enlightened conscience is his guide : it tells him to square his conduct not by the letter of morality, but by its spirit. "Conscientiousness" means having a delicate conscience and paying instant heed to it, in small things as in great things. To be conscientious, to be high-minded, to be magnanimous, to be honorable, — these are one and the same thing : the words mark the person to whom morality has become real and vital. The conscientious are truthful in the extreme degree ; the magnanimous do nothing mean by taking advantage of the weakness or the mistakes of others ; the honorable are themselves the highest moral law incarnate. The essence of honor is in fixing one's eye upon the **result to character** of any action and then acting as self-respect and kindness dictate. To follow the law of honor is the ideal of morality ; and no one desiring to live the right life should be satisfied until he values the moral life for itself as the highest and best expression of refined human nature : then he is one of the truly honorable of the earth.

Any practice that is dishonorable, however common, bears its condemnation in itself : it must disappear before a more active moral sense, a better instructed public opinion, or more thorough-going legislation. Every honorable man has the duty laid upon him of raising the standard of morality in his business or profession. There are tricks in every trade which do not cease to be evil because they are common ; there are offences against truth in every profession, which are none the less wrong because they are nearly universal. Morality and business, honor and trade, must be kept together. No man is justified in saying to his conscience, prescribing the law of honor, what Frederick the Great used to say to his people demanding a reform : "You may *say* what you like : I will *do* what I like."

A reputation for honorable dealing has a high business value: **honor pays** in the commercial sense, if a man will trust in it, in the long run, if not immediately. When the farmer "tops off" his barrels of apples or potatoes, or his boxes of berries; when the grocer sells oleomargarine for butter; when the tailor palms off an ill-made suit of clothes upon a near-sighted person; when the manufacturer sells shoddy for woollens, they are short-sighted. Steady custom cannot be kept by such tricks. A reputation for honorable dealing is of more value than all that can be made by occasional imposition.

But **honor pays** in a much higher sense. One of the surest foundations of morality is a just self-respect. A man who has lost his self-respect cannot be trusted: he cannot trust himself. Dishonorable practice saps this foundation: it introduces a kind of dry rot into the moral life. When some unusual strain of temptation to do gross wrong comes upon a man who has been guilty of dishonorable conduct, perhaps known only to himself, he will probably go down, as the great Tay bridge went down in the night, because of some flaw, carrying with it hundreds of lives.

The justly anxious passenger on an ocean steamer, in a severe storm, asked the captain if the vessel could live through the tempest. "If any ship can, this one can," replied the captain; "I know her builder, and I know that she was built on honor." That is a good word for all: **Build Life on Honor!** When we are children at home we cannot begin too soon to make our word the exact counterpart of fact so far as we know it, and our promise to do anything the assurance of honest performance. If we break any precious piece of glass or furniture about the house, let us not break the truth *too*: let us fear that damage more than any punishment that can come upon us.

In the school we can build life on honor, by refusing

to prompt, or to be prompted by, another scholar; we can scorn to use "ponies," we can take our examinations fairly, without the trick of scribbling the answers beforehand on our cuffs or elsewhere; when we have done wrong, we can take our punishment manfully, without trying to sneak out of it and letting some innocent person be suspected or even disciplined for it. When we leave school and take up the active business of life, we can build on honorable work, done carefully and faithfully. Let no one need to watch us or inspect our performance to see if we have been shortening the quantity or "scamping" the quality of our work. We agree to work certain hours, on understood conditions; honor bids us fill these hours with patient work, having a single eye to the interest of our employer; it bids us live up to every condition of our self-chosen task.

If we ourselves become employers, building life on honor means doing justice to our men, paying wages promptly and fully, and recognizing and rewarding merit. It means dealing justly in every trade, giving fair measure and just weight and due quality. If our chosen business has a certain dishonorable practice in it, it is our duty to try and "reform it altogether" if we can; no one knows how much he can do to improve the morality of his trade or business or profession until he has, very earnestly, *tried*. Honor forbids cheating an individual. It forbids cheating a corporation as well; if the "corporation has no soul," this is not a sufficient reason why you should not have a conscience! Pay your fare, then, if you take your ride in the horse-car, or the steam-car; the corporation has fulfilled its part of the contract in transporting you; fulfil your part by paying for the ride. It is dishonorable to take advantage of the mistake or oversight of those with whom you have dealings; in making change, or exchange, the honorable man takes and keeps only what belongs to him.

The honorable lawyer seeks, first of all, to have justice done, not to pervert it in the interest of a guilty client, that the innocent may suffer. The honorable physician prepares himself for his difficult profession by long study, and despises the bogus diploma. The honorable clergyman respects the dignities of his profession, and in all his dealings follows the strictest code of personal morals. The honorable statesman makes only pledges that he intends to keep, and builds "platforms" on which he means to stand.

Building life on honor is building it like a good master-builder, on honest day-labor, not on a contract out of which we seek to profit as much as possible. In the end it is always **better to be, than to pretend to be.** We are to respect the law; we are to respect public opinion; but, most of all, we are to respect our careful consciences. "Where you feel your honor grip, let that *aye* be your border," beyond which you will not go.

NOTES.

MAGNANIMITY is the end to be sought in all discourse of honor. The mind great in virtue, if not in talent, is strong, healthy, and serene; but parvanimity implies weakness, disease, and distress. "This is a manly world we live in. Our reverence is good for nothing, if it does not begin with self-respect." (O. W. Holmes.)

"The wisest man could ask no more of fate
Than to be simple, modest, manly, true,
Safe from the many, honored by the few;
Nothing to court in Church, or World, or State,
But inwardly in secret to be great."

(Lowell.)

Some have complained that in the human world disease is catching while health is not. This is a mistake; health is at least as contagious as disease. But in the moral sphere the truth

is obvious that honor calls out honor, the best way to advance in morality being to take the forward step yourself, relying on the innate disposition of men to do as they are done by. See De Quincey's story of *A Noble Revenge*.

“Be noble ! and the nobleness that lies
In other men, sleeping but never dead,
Will rise in majesty to meet thy own.”

The honorable persons in a community are the saving remnant, and they are never satisfied until public opinion inclines in favor of the just way which they advocate and practice. Moral progress usually begins with the exceptionally conscientious individual. He first persuades a few ; in time the few become many, and the public opinion, which governs all modern states, soon expresses itself in law, if it is deemed expedient.

The “law of honor,” criticised by Porter (*Elements of Moral Science*), is the technical code prevailing in a certain class or profession ; to this his objections are well founded. But the law of honor here set forth is limited by no artificial or class distinctions. Wordsworth's lines describe it:—

“Say, what is honor ? 'T is the finest sense
Of justice which the human mind can frame,
Intent each lurking frailty to disclaim,
And guard the way of life from all offence,
Suffered or done.”

CHAPTER XI.

PERSONAL HABITS.

THE greater part of morality has reference directly to our relations with other persons. But a large portion of our duty concerns things that we are to do for ourselves, as no one else can do them so well for us, and that affect others only indirectly.

I. Each of us has to care for his own person. Cleanliness of body and neatness in dress are matters of individual ethics, which we have to learn to attend to as early as we can in life. Such habits as frequent bathing and cleaning the teeth are parts of that physical virtue in which every human being should be diligent. Bodily health is so important in every way, in its bearings on our own happiness and the welfare of others, that we should make it no small part of the right life to conform all our physical habits to the rules of health. Some say that it is "a sin to be sick;" certainly, very much of the illness and disease in the world is avoidable. If this were prevented, as it might be, then a great addition would result to the comfort and prosperity of mankind.

Among the foremost of the laws of health is **Temperance**, or moderation in eating and drinking. Eating to excess, not for the sake of satisfying the natural desire but for the mere pleasure of gratifying an appetite artificially stimulated, is a great evil. Gluttony, beside causing immediate distress, brings on many diseases; it unfits one for mental occupation, and it makes one careless of the welfare of others; it puts the animal above the intellectual part of us, where it should not

be. Enough is not only "as good as a feast," but *better*, for it leaves us able to enjoy the pleasures of the mind, which the heavily-loaded stomach will not allow.

Intemperance is so much more plainly and widely injurious in the matter of what we *drink* that the word is commonly taken to mean this one kind of bodily excess. We are not in much danger of drinking water to excess, or those common beverages of the table, tea and coffee, although here we sometimes need to be on our guard. It is in the direction of those **intoxicating drinks** which are used, more or less, all over the world, to produce agreeable sensations, that men are most of all intemperate. So immense and wide-reaching are the bad effects of indulgence in these intoxicating liquors that it is altogether safest to **abstain totally** from using them as a beverage, taking them only in cases of sickness or absolute need. They are artificial stimulants, and the body is usually sounder and better off without them. The drunkard puts an enemy in his mouth that steals away his brains; he becomes insane for the time, and moral law has no power over him until he becomes sober. Through continued indulgence he loses his self-respect; he comes to care only for the gratification of his debased appetite. The result is waste and ruin to himself and to all who are dependent upon him. Loss, unhappiness, and misfortune of a hundred kinds attend upon drunkenness. It has been well said that **Debt and drink are the two great devils of modern life**. Total abstinence, then, from the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage, is the part of wisdom and virtue.

Less injurious, but still to be shunned as an unclean and wasteful habit, is the use of tobacco, especially in the worst way, — chewing. The frequent use of tobacco is apt to lead to drinking, and it is in itself a habit bad for the body and bad for the mind; increasing refinement should put an end to it.

One may be **intemperate in work**, in not regarding

the limit which his strength and his health fix for him. However good the motive, overwork is to be blamed as unwise ; injurious to one's self, it spoils the temper, and causes more unhappiness than it can cure. Too much study is worse even than too much play for the growing boy and girl. The course of wisdom for old and young is to find how much work of hand or head one can do without exhaustion, and stop there.

Of **physical virtue** men in ancient Greece used to think much, and the men of the civilized world are to-day concerning themselves much about it. The sound body is always the first thing, in order of time, to attend to ; the sound mind shows itself such in asking for a sound body as its ready and capable servant and helper. To balance work and play ; to keep every natural appetite true to its proper office ; to be clean and pure and active and sound *bodily*, — this is a great matter in human life, for without physical virtue all other virtues lack a strong friend. To physical soundness some kind of regular bodily work or exercise is indispensable.

II. Next comes **intellectual virtue**, the duty of cultivating our minds so that we can "see straight and think clear." The chief glory of man is his intellect : the very word, "man," is said to mean "the thinker." In every civilized state the education of the people is a vital matter ; it is especially such here in our own country. Nature will look after our bodily growth, if we will let her have her own way and not hinder her by bad habits. But our minds need more attention, so that we may start right in life ; the public schools are built, and we go to them as boys and girls that we may learn the elements of knowledge, and begin to use our minds capably. We are steadily growing intellectually, if we spend our time faithfully in school. When we leave school, whether it be the grammar school, the high school, the college, or the professional school, we

are more free to fix our own hours and plans of study. But we are not *intellectually virtuous*, we do not show ourselves possessed of strong and active intellect, unless we continue to cultivate our minds to the extent of our ability as long as we live. One way to do this is by mastering our work or business, whatever it is, by studying it in practice, and by reading what others have found out concerning it. Every art has its science, and we should never be satisfied to be mere hand-workers or to travel round and round the same dull routine. Art and science are inexhaustible, and the pleasures of the active mind are very pure and high and satisfying. Whatever one's intellectual ability may be, he should give it **lifelong cultivation**, as a matter of duty to himself and to others.

We can do the most for others when we make the most of our own ability; whether we have positive "talent" or not, it is a duty laid upon all to think soundly, that we may act wisely and rightly. The misfortunes of mankind are largely due to insufficiency in the knowledge which might be ours, did we strive for it, and to vices of the mind such as wilful blindness and obstinacy in the face of facts, and loose thinking. These troubles might be avoided largely if we remember that intellectual virtue is a great part of right-doing. In order to **do** the right we must first **know** the right, and we shall not know it if we are content to be foolish or ignorant. Always to be willing to learn, to be fair and candid, to defer to facts and the laws of facts, to try to think all around a subject and deep into it, to discuss disputed matters with good temper and a single desire to get at the truth, — these are some of the intellectual virtues which have a most important part to play in our life. In the common schools we cannot go far beyond **teachableness**; but this is the beginning of true intellectual virtue.

III. Much of our most valuable education we get

through the **work** we have to do in order to live and enjoy life. The training of our will by the discipline of school, of business, of regular employment of any kind, is necessary if our natural powers are to do their best work. We have spoken of "the virtues of work" under another head. Here we may mention them again with reference chiefly to the person who practises them. "Prudence" is a word which marks the application of mind to work and life. A shortened form of providence (foresight), it implies the training of **the eye of the mind** to look forward that we may prepare in the present for the future. It is a great intellectual and practical aptitude to be able to do this. The wisely prudent man is self-denying to-day that he may not be in danger of starving or some only less severe misfortune next month or next year; he is economical because he knows that every little counts in the end: he takes a long look ahead, and, like a good chess-player, adjusts his moves to this view.

Every man who wishes to think clearly and act wisely must be aware that one of the greatest obstacles to both of these excellences is indulgence in bad temper. When we are peevish and captious, or when we are in a positive passion, we cannot see straight, we cannot think clearly, we cannot do justly. We need to discipline our natural temper, then, to take account of ourselves, to realize, from our own knowledge or from what others tell us, the chief faults to which we are most exposed, the principal weaknesses of our minds and the deficiencies in our previous training, that we may by earnest self-culture do away with all these (oftentimes we think them points of strength), and become **strong by self-control**. Suppose that we think twice before acting once; that we stop long enough to count twenty before saying the sharp or bitter word that is on our tongue. The word will be kinder and wiser! the deed will be better! The patience we show

in training a dog or a horse ; the pains we bestow upon our own bodily habits when "in training" for a race or a match-game, — these are a type of the attention and the care that we should give to the training of our tongues and our tempers in the ways of sweetness and light.

We have different temperaments by nature : some persons are constitutionally more lively, cheerful, and fond of society than others. In our judgments upon others and on ourselves we cannot properly ask that all shall act and talk alike : each one must be allowed to **be himself**. But as man is a social being, a degree of cheerfulness and sociability is incumbent upon all in ordinary life. Cheerfulness may not be in itself a virtue, but it is a natural grace ; a happy and pleasant disposition may not be a duty for every one, but all acknowledge its charm. In the common social relations, then, at home and at school, for instance, we do wisely to cultivate **beauty in action**. Modesty, cheerfulness, and kindness in little things of manner belong to the beautiful. The "gentleman" and the "lady" show the excellence of refinement in conduct. Courtesy, which once meant the manners of court where the nobility lived in wealth and leisure, is the flower of right-doing, a flower which any one may cultivate. **Strength** is one of the two things which all men desire. The righteous action is usually that which requires the most real strength : moral courage, for instance, is the highest kind of courage. But **Beauty**, the other thing universally desired, comes into human actions with kindness. When it takes the form of politeness to all with whom one is brought into contact, of a gracious courtesy to the nearer circle of one's acquaintances and friends, and of personal affection for the nearest of all, "the Ought, Duty, is one thing with Science, with Beauty, and with Joy."

NOTES.

"OUR work," says Montaigne, "is not to train a soul by itself alone, nor a body by itself alone, but to train a man ; and in man soul and body can never be divided." The right care of the body includes some daily work or exercise ; abstinence from sensuality and intemperance ; regularity in eating and sleeping ; cleanliness ; training of the eye and hand ; the acquirement of physical skill in our particular trade or craft, if we follow one, and the harmonious development of all the bodily powers. Books of instruction in physical virtue are nowadays very plentiful, and it is not necessary to single out any here for special mention. "The first duty of every man is to be a good animal."

"Intellectual virtue" brings up the vast subject of education in general, — that which schools give us and that which we give ourselves. The care of the mind is more apt to be neglected by good people than it should be. Much bad temper is due to ill-advised bodily habits ; so also much wrong proceeds from carelessness in finding out the truth, the mental indolence which is satisfied with good intentions, when sound thoughts are needed almost as much to bring about welfare. Self-culture, in the sense of continual progress in knowledge and in the power of reasoning well, is within the reach of all in this age of books. "Pegging away" at one's own mental deficiencies will produce astonishing results. If only an hour or a half-hour a day is spent on some really great book, instead of being nearly wasted on the newspaper, the result of a few months' perseverance is most encouraging. It is in the direction of self-education (the best kind of all) that biographies help us greatly. To get the utmost profit from them, one should make a personal application to himself of the example of virtue set by the man or woman whose actual career is portrayed, and ask if there is not something especially adapted to himself in the methods of self-discipline described. Advice that we give ourselves, incited by the record of a true man's life, comes with tenfold power ; it is the best of all counsel.

The allusion in the last paragraph of this chapter is to the following words of Rev. F. H. Hedge, D. D. : —

"There are two things which all men reverence who are capable of reverence, — strictly speaking, only two : the one is

beauty, the other power, — power and beauty ; man is so constituted that he must reverence these so far and so fast as he can apprehend them. And so far and so fast as human culture advances, men will see that holiness is beauty, and goodness, power."

CHAPTER XII.

OUR COUNTRY.

I. Patriotism. We have spoken of the duties that we owe to the family, the school, and society in general. The family is a small society into which we are born and in which we grow up: its obligations are the strongest, even as the ties it makes between human beings are the closest. In other associations of men, each having a special object, — as when we make part of a school, of a business firm, or of a society for the advancement of some reform, — we have special duties according to the end and aim of the association. But there is a larger kind of association of men than the family or the school, or business partnership or the reform society, — to name no others. It is the natural grouping of great bodies of human beings, according to their race or their country, into **Nations** or **States**. These may include millions of people, living under one common law, enjoying the benefits of the same government, and bound together by the same great duties to it.

Here in the United States of America, as the name shows, we use the word "State" in a special sense to mean Massachusetts or Pennsylvania or California, for instance, all the different States being united in what is called a federal government to make the Nation. The distinction is very important politically in our country between the State government and the National government. But it is a distinction made for practical convenience, and it does not affect the fundamental notion of the State as the association of men under one government. When we speak of the State here then, we may

intend sometimes a particular State of the Union in which we live and sometimes the Nation, — the United States; but we always mean a great association of human beings for political ends. Whatever name it may bear, the State, large or small, is the supreme earthly power over each and every person in it. Usually, it is an association of multitudes of people of the same race in one particular land, — their native country, — as with the French in France or the Italians in Italy. In our own land we are a people made up of many races; but we are still one people, living in one country and subject to one government.

We Americans cannot be patriots after the manner of men who live in a small country with a king over them to whom they owe loyalty, and whose will is largely law to them. Our country is very great in size, and each one of us is part of the power that rules it all. As the Italian is loyal to the king, or the German to the emperor, we have to be loyal to the people. For the great American idea is that "The people rule." Government is here **of the people, by the people, for the people**, as Theodore Parker and Abraham Lincoln have said. This is the democratic principle which is carried out in a republican form of government. The American patriot is one who is loyal to this great principle of equal rights and equal duties, and will give his life, if need be, to aid the government which stands to defend it. Our country has a right to anything we can give: nothing that we can give her is equal to all that she secures to us, — our life, our liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. So when our country is in danger, from a foreign foe or from civil war, it is the simplest, plainest and foremost of all duties for each and every citizen to be ready to take up arms in her defence. For her defence means the defence of all that we hold dear, — family, home, friends, our great institutions, our high principles, our inspiring ideas of human brotherhood.

We will not say "Our Country, right or wrong!" in dealing with foreign nations, but **Our Country forever; we will keep it safe and hold it right!** In time of war our native land must first be defended against every assault: in time of peace it must be made the home of justice. When we see the veterans of the Grand Army of the Republic marching through the city streets, some of them bearing the tattered flags which once they carried through the smoke and fiery hail of battle, we loudly cheer these standards, and our blood thrills, for the flag is the sign of **Our Country**, and we feel that, like those war-stained men, we, too, would follow the flag to save the State. In great love for man, for the cause of our fatherland, we, too, would dare everything.

"Though Love repine and Reason chafe,
There comes a voice without reply:
'T is man's perdition to be safe,
When for the Truth he ought to die."

Happily, in our peaceful land, the call for such supreme devotion rarely comes. Whenever it has come, it has always been heeded by the great mass of men, who show how natural and right, how sweet and beautiful it is to die for their country. Rare, indeed, is the man,

"With soul so dead,
Who never to himself has said
'This is my own, my native land.'"

And when we say it, we feel that our country has a supreme claim upon us. It is the largest part of the whole human race the thought of which moves any but great and exceptional natures to self-sacrifice. We may be sure, too, that he will love all mankind best who loves his country best, and by his devotion makes it the strongest helper of all the sons of earth.

Men are more wont to feel deeply patriotic in time of war than in time of peace. The thought of our whole country as above party and creed, above North or South

or East or West, finds us and moves us most profoundly when the welfare of the whole country is visibly threatened. In time of peace, by far the longer time of the two, we are thinking mainly about our family, our business, our local interests, and of the things in general which are apt to divide one section or one State from another. The main duty of the citizen in peace is to save the State, not from destruction from without, but from error and wrong-doing within. Patriotism then takes another form, as important to the welfare of all as volunteering for the battle-field.

II. **Political Duty** is this other form of patriotism, the duty, that is, of doing one's part in the government of our country, in State and Nation. Every man over twenty-one years of age has the right to vote for other men who shall represent him, *i. e.*, stand for him, in the work of making and administering the laws. Each man is, therefore, a ruler in this country. His power and right as a voter brings along with it a very plain *duty* to exercise the right and use the power **for the good of all**. This signifies to the American voter four things: He should keep himself well-informed on public questions. He should do his part by his words toward constituting a right public opinion, made up of a great sum of single opinions become powerful by union. He should vote according to his own convictions of truth and justice. He should not, as a rule, *seek* office, but he should be ready to hold it for the public good when called to it by the voice of his fellow-citizens.

There are, usually, in a free country some great questions of public policy on which political parties are formed. One party advocates a certain line of action; another would do differently if entrusted with the power of government. In our country there are now opposite views about the tariff, for instance, about the coinage of silver, and about the proper relations of the National government to the State governments. As

each man by his single vote can affect the policy which is at last adopted by Congress, he should cast this vote intelligently. He should enlighten himself as to tariffs and free trade, for example, and vote so that his conviction as to what the welfare of the country demands may be carried into effect. He should not be satisfied to take his opinions from the newspapers of the party with which he usually votes, and let them do his thinking for him, talking and voting as they say. He should read books written by able men who are not partisans, on the particular subjects in debate, and he should inform himself, generally, about the history of our country, and have some knowledge, the more the better, of the sciences of politics and economics. The intelligent citizen who knows for what he is voting, and why, is **the mainstay of the Republic**. The illiterate voter who does not know what he is voting for, or why, is the greatest danger to free institutions.

It is the duty of every citizen who has thus formed an intelligent opinion on political matters to do his part in creating and sustaining a sound public opinion. This he can do by feeling and showing an interest in **politics in the good sense of the word**: this is not a selfish scramble for office, but the discussion and settlement of great public questions according to reason and right, through men of ability and character. Especially in the case of reform movements in political life is it the duty of each individual to stand up for what he honestly believes to be the right, and to express himself openly and freely in favor of the specific measure which would save the Republic from harm. The history of all reforms proves how important is the duty resting upon the private citizen to use his **right of free speech**. Slavery was abolished in this country as the final result of agitation by individuals endeavoring to arouse the conscience of the people. So it will be with the political evils of our own day: **the faithful conscience of**

the individual is the power which is to destroy them, sooner or later.

No man who has the right to vote has a moral right to refrain from voting, whenever it is possible for him. The plainest part of his political duty, bound up with his very right, is to exercise the suffrage. He is not doing his duty to his country when he stays away from the polls on election day, whatever the real cause may be, — indifference, contempt, or absorption in business or pleasure. The one method that avails in our country for procuring just laws and honest officials is to vote for capable and worthy men. Under this method each vote counts, and each voter should see that his own vote is thrown. He is not responsible when the opposite party succeeds in electing a bad man or in carrying a wrong measure, if he has voted against them: the responsibility rests upon the other party. But **he is responsible to the extent of his vote** if his own party elects a bad man or passes a wrong law. Hence, he is not only bound to vote, and to vote intelligently, but to vote with a single eye to the public good, with a certain party or against it, according to his own reason and conscience.

Few men are qualified by their abilities or character to serve the State in high political positions. But in the civil service, as a whole, there is a proper opening for any one who desires to work for the town, the city, the State, or the Nation rather than for a private employer. This routine business of the government has nothing to do with the political issues of the day, and should be kept apart from them and be conducted on strictly business methods and principles. When so conducted, it is open on equal conditions to every citizen who is capable and worthy, without regard to his politics. The representative offices should not be sought by the private citizen; but when his fellow-citizens call upon him to represent them in the town or

city government, in the legislature or in Congress, their summons should be heeded, unless there are strong reasons to the contrary. The talents and the worth of all its citizens are properly subject to the call of the community, and the public service should be esteemed by every one as the most honorable of all services.

In time of peace, then, the patriot thinks upon these political duties, — his obligations to inform himself, to spread right views, to vote, and to hold office at the will of the people.

NOTES.

I. The teacher will find without difficulty in the works of the leading American poets, and in "Speakers" containing extracts from our most noted orators, selections suitable for reading that are calculated to inspire an intelligent patriotism. Such poems are numerous in James Russell Lowell's works in particular : see "The Present Crisis" ("When a deed is done for freedom") ; the *Biglow Papers* ; his poems of the war, his three centennial poems, and, most of all, the "Commemoration Ode." Longfellow ("Thou too sail on, O Ship of State"), Holmes ("The Flower of Liberty"), Whittier ("Democracy" and numerous war poems), and Bryant have written many noble verses of patriotism. Webster, Everett, Winthrop and G. W. Curtis are names of orators that will occur at once to the instructor of American youth ; Lincoln's address at Gettysburg is foremost. Relating to patriotism in other times and countries are such poems as Byron's lines "They fell devoted but undying ;" "Horatius," by Macaulay, Browning's "Hervé Riel," and "A Legend of Bregenz," by Adelaide A. Procter. There are several good collections of ballads of heroism.

II. "Defence against the attack of barbarians from within is as essential in our democracies as defence against the foe from without." (Guyau.) The demagogue, well set forth long ago in Aristophanes' *Knights* (see J. H. Frere's translation), is the chief pest of democratic countries. "The people's government" of which Webster spoke, "made for the people, made by the people, and answerable to the people," must conform to the laws of poli-

tics and economics. Every citizen should understand somewhat of these laws and of the history of his country in which they have been exhibited. Happily there is a fast increasing number of good books on civil government, citizenship, and elementary economics ; there is now no sufficient excuse for ignorance in these matters. Among the best of these volumes are John Fiske's *Civil Government in the United States*, Charles Nordhoff's *Politics for Young Americans*, Professor J. Macy's *Our Government*, and C. F. Dole's *American Citizen*. No public-school teacher can afford to be ignorant of Bryce's *American Commonwealth*. The *Old South Leaflets* contain the great documents of Anglo-Saxon freedom, which it is well to read entire. Mr. Fiske's book gives full bibliographical data for all who would inform themselves concerning our free institutions and their history.

CHAPTER XIII.

CHARACTER.

A CHARACTER, if we use the word in its most literal sense, is a mark or sign by which we may know a thing or a person. **Character** in the most general sense is the sum of all the intellectual and moral qualities which make one human being different from another. We will speak here of moral qualities only. This man has a bad character, we say: he will drink, steal, lie, or cheat when he has opportunity. That man, on the contrary, is a man of good character: he is truthful, temperate, honest, and industrious. The servant-girl leaving one situation for another asks her mistress to "give her a character." This illustrates another common use of the word in which we employ it as by itself equivalent to "good character:" it is the sense in which we shall speak of character in this chapter; we mean by it the collection and blending of distinctively good traits or qualities in a person.

A man's character, of course, is **what he is in himself**, not what he **owns** as something outside of himself, or something he has personal relations with, as with his family or his partner in business. Now what he is in himself largely determines both what he will own and what relations he will have with other people. Very important, indeed, is it to a man, and to all connected with him, what he owns, — money, house, land, ships, warehouses full of goods, whatever it may be. But it is a great deal more important, both to himself and to others with whom he is in contact, what he is in himself, in his **disposition and character**. Health

has more to do with happiness than wealth, and few persons, probably, would choose a fortune if compelled to take bad health with it. Health of mind, soundness of soul, comes from living morally, *i. e.*, according to the laws of the life together, just as physical health is dependent on keeping the laws of the body. If we have health of mind and heart, this, again, is a still more important matter than what we own. Our welfare and the welfare of others with whom we are living depend far more on our being kind, truthful, and just, than on the number of thousands of dollars we may or may not own.

Character is, therefore, properly, **an aim in itself**, *i. e.*, a thing to be desired for its own sake. This we say not because it is out of relation to actual life or the persons in it, or can be separated from these, for all things in the world are related to one another, but because it is so evidently of the highest value when logically considered apart. We say that a certain man has a strong, independent, self-reliant character. He has the qualities in him indicated by these adjectives; he is mentally and morally strong, self-contained, and able to stand alone against a number of men in the wrong. When any occasion comes for showing strength of mind and will, he will be prepared. Plainly, it is well that he should have been accumulating this strength beforehand, if there is, indeed, any way to do it. So with the kindness, the power to tell the truth or to do justly, that we are needing every day we live. If there is any way to **store up in ourselves moral strength and beauty**, which are demanded by the life in common, surely the knowledge of it is most desirable.

Two things we must here bear in mind, especially. I. The good character that we show in our life-actions is not like a purse having so many dollars in it, out of which we take one or ten, as the case may be, and which we must be careful to fill up again before the

money is all drawn out. It is, on the contrary, **like a muscle** of the arm which grows stronger by exercise, **like a faculty of the mind**, such as memory, which improves by practice. Our ability to tell the truth, to do honest actions, or to conduct ourselves graciously toward others, is a power that grows with use, and the good act becomes easier to us each time that we do it.

II. Consequently we are wise when we **aim directly** at the good quality or moral faculty in itself. In other words, it is always well to **do right because it is right**. It is usually a difficult thing to trace out in our minds the probable consequences of this or that act which we are purposing to do, to imagine how it will affect this or that particular person, and a whole multitude of others. But if we know that it is **right**, so far as we can see, and that to do it will strengthen in ourselves the power to do right again, then we have considered, in the vast majority of cases, all that we need to consider. We must bear in mind that mankind has been living many thousands of years on this earth, and that all this time men have been learning from experience, hard or pleasant, sweet or bitter, how to live the life together. The teachings of this great, this vast experience have been solidified into the common moral rules concerning truthfulness and honesty and peacefulness and industry and all the other virtues and their opposite vices. These rules are repeated, again and again, in books, in proverbs about conduct, and in the daily talk of men giving advice to one another, or praising or condemning other men's actions. We ought to profit by this experience of multitudes of men who have been before us, so as to avoid their errors and defeats, and imitate only their wisdom and their victories. Obedience to **a few plain rules** is all that we need most of the time. But the **few strong instincts**, of which the poet also speaks, are not strong enough in us to bring about complete and constant obedience.

We wish to have our own way and do as we please, without regard to the effect on other people, who have just as much right as we — *i. e.*, **none at all** — to have their own way and do as they please. So we act as if we lived in a world where the most important of all affairs, the dealings of men with each other, were not subject to steadfast laws which take no account of your conceit or my selfishness, but forever determine that if men are to live in society and become civilized, they **must** do thus and so, as the severe and beautiful moral laws declare. Otherwise society cannot prosper: it **cannot even be at all**, and every individual must suffer accordingly.

When we consider how perpetually we are acting and reacting on each other, and how our human life is **three fourths conduct**, if not more, we see how vastly important it is to make morality easy and natural to ourselves so that we shall, indeed, seem to be acting always from those “few strong instincts.” How shall we do this? In just the same way, fundamentally, that any one must follow who would acquire **any other art**. If a boy would learn to be a carpenter he must handle the saw and the chisel often: if a girl would become skilful on the piano-forte, she must first practise scales and other exercises by the hour. **Faculty comes from practice**: skill is the result of industry in doing the thing. We see about us in the world men and women who are brave and generous and capable and true and kind and noble and sweet and gracious, whose words and acts are a great power of good to all who meet them or know of them. These persons are **masters in the moral art**. What they have done we, perchance, can do; and we can begin to do it, in a small way and a slight degree. We gain strength and skill with practice, like the blacksmith at the anvil or the player at the piano-forte; thus we find, in time, the moral line of least resistance, and do the right easily,

naturally, and spontaneously. Until we do it so, it is not done beautifully, and no art is perfect until **it comes to beauty** as well as to propriety. The higher powers and graces of conduct are unattainable until the ordinary virtues have become so natural to us through habit that we do right without thought, as without difficulty. "Habit a second nature," said the great Duke of Wellington; — "it is ten times nature."¹

We can *remake ourselves* to an indefinite extent, inside the limits of human nature, and the method is the formation of other habits. A certain good action may be very hard for us to do at first, but if we continue to do it, the difficulty diminishes and at last disappears: the action has become *natural* to us. But the "nature" we have in mind, in so speaking, is not the undisciplined nature we had two or ten years ago as it was, but that nature trained and cultivated **by the exercise of will**, aiming at a certain moral strength. We have left a lower character beneath us, and have climbed up to a higher.

We should then, each one of us, take ourselves in hand and realize that moral goodness is, least of all things, to be *given* by one person to another, that, beyond all other desirable possessions, it is an art to be acquired by personal practice and individual experience; that more than in any other direction, we can learn here from the errors and the excellences of others what to avoid and what to pursue; that here supremely, **to be is better than to seem**, and that if we aim to be like the good and the true, to enjoy their repute and wield their power, we must patiently acquire their skill in goodness, their faculty of righteousness.

We should encourage ourselves with remembering the immense aid we can derive from the record of the lives of the men and women who have made morality the finest of all human arts, not by their sublime in-

¹ This saying will bear a second quotation.

telleets or their illustrious deeds, but by heroic perseverance in self-control and self-devotion. Greater than this help even is the aid that we can all impart to one another by living sympathy and helpfulness. **Sweetness and light**, — we can give a small portion of these to one another every day, making the burdens easier and the path plainer. *Cogitavi vias meas*: “I have considered my ways.” When we consider them well we ask for guidance from the noble and the true of the past and the present. By dwelling on their example and on the ideal of the perfect man who unites all virtues and all excellences, we are inspired to become something better than we are; by patient continuance in well-doing we are slowly transformed into the image of our hope!

NOTES.

THE teacher of morals will do well to conclude every lesson by striking the note of character, distinguished from the note of external consequences as a test of conduct, and from the note of circumstances as a rule of action. “The character itself should be to the individual a paramount end, simply because the existence of this ideal nobleness of character, or of a near approach to it, in any abundance, would go further than all things else toward making human life happy, both in the comparatively humble sense of pleasure and freedom from pain, and in the higher meaning of rendering life not what it now is almost universally, puerile and insignificant, but such as human beings with highly developed faculties can care to have.” — J. S. MILL, *Logic*, Bk. vi. Ch. 12.

“It always remains true that if we had been greater, circumstances would have been less strong against us.” — GEORGE ELIOT in *Middlemarch*.

“A healthy soul stands united with the Just and the True, as the magnet arranges itself with the pole, so that he stands to all beholders like a transparent object betwixt them and the sun, and whoso journeys towards the sun journeys towards that per-

son. He is thus the medium of the highest influence to all who are not on the same level. Thus men of character are the conscience of the society to which they belong." (Emerson, "Character.") The Chinese have a proverb: "He who finds pleasure in vice and pain in virtue is still a novice in both."

"Even in a palace life may be led well !
So spoke the imperial sage, purest of men,
Marcus Aurelius. . . .
The aids to noble life are all within."

M. ARNOLD.

The "literature of power," as distinguished from the "literature of knowledge," tends to shape character in manifold ways. A large part of the great literature of the world, judged by literary standards, has immense influence, directly and indirectly, in forming the conduct of men. Lectures, sermons, and volumes on character are innumerable: see, simply as specimens, four books, Emerson's *Conduct of Life, Character Building*, by E. P. Jackson, *Character*, by S. Smiles, and *Corner-Stones of Character*, by Kate Gannett Wells.

The importance to refinement of character of an early acquaintance with the best literature is well emphasized by Mary E. Burt in her *Literary Landmarks* and in the *Atlantic Monthly* for May, 1891; see also C. D. Warner's article in the same periodical for June, 1890, and "Literature in School," by H. E. Scudder, in the *Riverside Literature Series*.

"He spoke, and words more soft than rain
Brought the Age of Gold again :
His action won such reverence sweet,
As hid all measure of the feat."

CHAPTER XIV.

MORAL PROGRESS.

THE first place where we learn about the moral laws is, of course, the home into which we are born. The family is the earliest and the latest school of morals. If we observe how children advance naturally in knowledge and practice of the right, we shall find the broad lines on which the moral progress of the world at large has taken place. For, as the philosophy of evolution teaches us, *the development of entire humanity is figured and summarized in the growth of each child.*

When the child has learned to obey father and mother, and when it will speak the truth to them constantly, it may still conduct itself unmorally or immorally toward persons outside the home bounds. Children not rarely tell an untruth to a mere acquaintance or a stranger without any sense of wrong-doing, while they would think it very wrong to tell a lie to father or mother or brother or sister. This will not be so strange to us when we reflect that they have not yet learned to know any larger world than the home, that their ideas of right and wrong naturally take a very concrete form and are concerned with a very few persons. Right is, for them, to "mind" father's and mother's commands, to do as they are told to do, and to tell their parents the truth. The general and abstract idea of obedience to the **Moral Law applying to all mankind** comes later and gradually with experience and enlarging power of thought.

All the mistakes and imperfections of the morals of children can be paralleled from the practice of savages

or barbarians now living, or from the records of early, historic mankind. The savage obeys his chief and complies very carefully with the customs of his tribe; he tells the truth, in a rough way, to his fellow-tribesmen, and in general, he deals with them according to his rude notions of justice. But he has no notion that men of another tribe have any rights that he is bound to respect. He can deceive, cheat, maltreat, or kill them, in peace or in war, and his conscience will never trouble him. He has a **tribal conscience**, just as the child has a home conscience. So in later times, and down even to our own day, persons of one nation or race hate those of another or of all others, and consider themselves practically free from this or that obligation of truth or justice toward them. Such are the actual relations, too often, of the white man and the man with a black or a yellow skin; of the Englishman and the Irishman; of the French and the Germans. But as respects the extent to which the moral law applies, it is very plain that we do not reach a logical limit until we have included the whole human race. **Morality is conterminous**, *i. e.*, has the same bounds and limits, **with humanity**, with all mankind. There are special duties and great differences in the degree of obligation according as we live in closer or looser relations with other human beings, from the nearness, constancy, and immediateness of home life up to our most general relations to the great mass of men whom we never even see. But whosoever the man may be, American, Negro, or Chinaman, with whom we have dealings at any time or in any place, the universal moral law dictates that he shall be treated justly. *Nihil humani alienum a me puto*, says a character in a play of the Roman writer, Terence, "I esteem nothing human foreign to me." So morality might speak if we were to personify it. Every relation of man to men, without regard to country or complexion or race or age, is sub-

ject to moral judgment. Ethics is a science of a part of universal human nature: and morality is an art to be practised by us toward every other human being.

Progress in general morals is going on, and must go on, until all mankind recognize that they live under one great moral law. This progress is marked by the discussion and agitation of **the rights** of this or that class of human beings that is constantly going on. What are the rights of women? What are the rights of children? What are the rights of the Negro or of the Chinaman in this country? This word "rights" very often means "political privileges," such as the right to vote, with which we are not concerned in this elementary book. But the **moral rights** of women and children, of negroes and Chinamen, for example, are much more important to them than these political privileges. Moral progress consists, in one aspect, in the increasing recognition, theoretically and practically, of the fact that there is the **same measure of right and duty for every human being**.

Each person has a right to himself, to his own person: so slavery, the ownership of one man by another, as if he were a piece of property like a dog or a horse, is wrong, whether the slave be white or black in color. Women have peculiar duties as wives and mothers; but as human beings in a civilized state they have the same general rights as men to education and property and labor. Children are morally bound to obey their parents and other superiors in authority; but parents are bound, as well, to respect the nature of the child and to give him an education to fit him for mature life. So there are the rights of workmen and servants, as well as their duties, which are to be borne in mind by masters and employers. As a rule, it is a bad sign for any person, man or woman, to be **talking very much about rights**; commonly, he would have fully enough to do in **attending to his duties**. We can never be

too well aware that each right has a corresponding duty in our relations with every other human being. So much, then, for the **extension** of the ideas of right and duty to all mankind.

We can make progress, as well, in the thoroughness with which we conceive and apply the idea of our duty to the persons with whom we have the most to do. In other words, our morality may be **intensive** as well as *extensive*. As we come to make no exceptions in the matter of persons, and thus include all other human beings in the range of duty; so we also make progress morally by deepening and intensifying the moral life, — thought, feeling, word, and act. Some persons seem to think or to care very little about right and duty; they do not pay attention to their own ways and habits to see if these may be improved morally, so as to be juster or kinder. Their life may not be vicious; and, if they are naturally amiable and cheerful, it may have much in it to commend. But thoughtlessness about one's own conduct can never properly be praised. The art of human life together is the greatest of all arts, and it can never be learned too thoroughly. We can make the most and the surest progress in it by "giving heed" to it.

We are not to become morbid and think overmuch about ourselves: we should **look out, not in; up, not down; forward, not back**; and be ready to **lend a hand**. But observation of the moral life in others, who excel in truth and goodness, should be frequent, that we may learn of them to be and to do better. We should not be satisfied with a low standard of right, content to do as most others are doing in our neighborhood, or town, in our political party, or our section of the country. To do a thing because others do it is **not a sufficient reason**. We are bound to consider if it is **right**, according to our highest and most correct ideas of right; if it is not right we are bound, in reason and

honor, not to do it. No moral progress would be possible if some one did not set the example of following his conscience rather than complying with a bad habit which many persons are practising. The strictly conscientious and honorable people are usually in the minority; but we should look to them, not to the majority, to discover the whole extent of our duty. If the truly honorable of the earth are wise, their practice in a particular field must in time widen and widen, until it has become general.

A very important part of our duty is to enlighten our minds by thought and discussion and reasoning on moral matters. We easily get into **the rut of personal routine and class prejudice**, and we often need to have a free play of fresh thought and feeling over the surface of our living. It is a good practice, in this respect, occasionally to go away for a time, from our work and our homes, even from those who are dearest to us. Returning, we find ourselves stronger and more interested in our work, and more appreciative of the beauty and love at home. It is good, too, every day to read and consider some inspiring word about conduct by one of the many great teachers who can help us to **live in the spirit**. Like Goethe, we can refresh ourselves and lift up the whole level of the day with five minutes spent over a poem or a picture. Thus we learn, little by little, what **magnanimity** is, and, however slowly, come to live nobly. Upon our actual practice a stream of earnest thought should play; and strength to do the highest right will come by exercise of the power we have, as we understand better and feel more deeply the full meaning of the whole moral law. So feeling, we rejoice to repeat the magnificent eulogy of the "Stern Lawgiver" in the "Ode to Duty":—

"Flowers laugh before thee on their beds,
And fragrance in thy footing treads;
Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong,
And the most ancient heavens through thee are fresh and strong."

With Wordsworth we join in the petition : —

“To humbler functions, awful Power!
 I call thee: I myself commend
 Unto thy guidance from this hour;
 Oh, let my weakness have an end!
 Give unto me, made lowly wise,
 The spirit of self-sacrifice;
 The confidence of reason give;
 And in the light of truth thy Bondman let me live!”

NOTES.

THE evolution of morals has been the theme of numerous writers of the present day, who have industriously collected a great amount of information concerning the conduct of mankind in all times and countries. But the difficulties to ethical theory presented by the wide variations of conduct among men have long been a familiar topic with writers on ethics. See for an example of a recent treatment of the subject, in Paul Janet's *Theory of Morals*, the chapter on the universality of moral principles and moral progress.

“The world advances, and in time outgrows
 The laws that in our fathers' days were best;
 And doubtless after us, some purer scheme
 Will be shaped out by wiser men than we,
 Made wiser by the steady growth of truth.”

LOWELL.

Civilization grows largely in proportion to the willingness and ability of men to coöperate; and coöperation demands great moral qualities which we cannot begin too soon to cultivate.

“All are needed by each one:
 Nothing is fair or good alone.”

“The enthusiasm of humanity” is the name happily given by Professor J. R. Seeley to the highest type of desire to work for others. Mr. Leslie Stephen has worked out the conception of society as a moral organism in his *Science of Ethics*; the idea of “social tissue” is fully developed by him. He concludes, however, “But it is happy for the world that moral progress has not to wait till an unimpeachable system of ethics has been

elaborated." *Progressive Morality*, by T. Fowler, and *Moral Order and Progress*, by S. Alexander, contain able discussions of the advance of morality.

The moral progress of most importance to each one of us is indicated in Wordsworth's "Happy Warrior":—

"Who not content that former worth stand fast,
Looks forward, persevering to the last,
From well to better, daily self-surpast ;"

in Dr. Holmes's "Chambered Nautilus," and in D. A. Wasson's "Ideals."

CHAPTER XV.

LIFE ACCORDING TO THE GOLDEN RULE.

Every art has its ideal, the standard of perfection, toward which the efforts of all who practise it are more or less consciously directed. In human conduct, the greatest of all arts for the mass of mankind, this ideal would be, theoretically, the realization in one life of all the virtues that we can name. But they are so many, and human beings have such different natural dispositions, temperaments, and talents that, practically, we do not expect any person, even the best, to be "a model of all the virtues:" such a phrase is ironical on the face of it. But there is one rule for conduct, observance of which is universally allowed to be a mark of every thoroughly good person. It is the precept known to us all as the Golden Rule: **Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you.** This is so extremely important a rule of conduct to bear in mind constantly and to obey every hour, that we shall do well to consider it carefully.

The beginning of morality, we have seen, is obedience to the law of life together, and this means self-control, the willingness to do our part, — no less, — and to take our share, — no more. But the greatest foe of the good life is the intense and irrational impulse almost every person has to assert himself, even to the loss or injury of others, to take more than his due share of the good things, and less than his share of the work, the hardships and the sufferings of human life. The extreme point of this selfishness is murder and war, in which one takes away from others even life itself, the

prime condition of every human good. If we briefly consider the history of the world down to modern times, we shall agree with Mr. John Fiske: "There can be little doubt that in respect to justice and kindness the advance of civilized man has been less marked than in respect of quick-wittedness. Now, this is because the advancement of civilized man has been largely effected through fighting." The world is becoming more peaceful, we trust, and will advance hereafter more through peace than through war. But to check the extreme selfishness and passion which show themselves in violence between persons, and in war between nations, to make peace — the condition of most of the virtues — between individuals and between countries possible and actual, some **universal maxim of conduct** would seem to be desirable. This, obviously, should refer not so much to any special action, as killing or stealing, as to the general disposition out of which all our acts proceed. Such a rule, applying to so widespread an evil as selfishness, should inculcate **a spirit** fatal to greed and violence and cunning. To obtain general acceptance it should be plain, direct, and searching. It should spring out of the actual experience of mankind in all times and countries, and justify itself at once to rational beings.

Such a rule has been hit upon, as a matter of fact, all over the world, we may say, in every country where men have risen from the condition of savages. It is a simple deduction from the elementary notion of justice. If you are acting in a certain manner toward another person, is it right that he should treat you in the same spirit? If you say that it would *not* be right, *why* would it not be right? Is your own conduct toward him right? Of course, we soon realize, when we have begun to reason about the matter, how difficult, if not actually impossible, it is for us "to see ourselves as others see us," and to judge our own acts, words, looks,

feelings, and thoughts, just as others do. In fact, a perfectly just judgment would have to take into account our thoughts and feelings as we ourselves alone can know them, as well as the expressions and words others see and hear.

Recognizing this common difficulty of passing right judgment on others and on ourselves, the immeasurable experience of mankind has yet shown that **the spirit in which we act is the main matter**. If we have acted, if others have acted, in a spirit of sympathy; if in the conduct of each there is an effort to imagine how his action would appear to himself if he were the other person, and to shape his conduct so as to approve it to himself, standing in the other man's place, — then we have gotten over the main evil in our conduct, we have risen, to a degree, out of self, and judged and acted impartially. Thus doing, we are at least acting according to a rule, not according to a blind and foolish determination to have our own way and get all we can, everywhere and always. The result, shortly stated, of millions upon millions of special experiences of men in social life is that the Golden Rule is the best attainable working rule of life: **Put yourself in his place; do as you would be done by**. This means: Try to see things as they are, not simply as they first appear to yourself, for you may be, you must be, hindered from seeing them completely by your personal interests or limitations. It means: Try, as far as you may, to see your own conduct from the outside, as well as from the inside.

This is **the method of science**. In every other direction we endeavor to see as *all* see, to know as *all* know, to find what is *fact to everybody* and what must be *law for all*, ourselves as well as others. Our conduct will be rational, and so right, when we conform it to the universal laws of morals. Practically, the easiest way for us so to conform it is to work according to

this Golden Rule. The act that you are about to do, would you like to have it done to yourself? The words that are on your tongue to speak, would you like to have them spoken to yourself? These are very searching questions! Beyond a doubt, if we paused to put them to ourselves and acted in accordance with the negative answer which we should often give, the world would be very much happier, very much better than it is. For it is one of the simplest facts of human nature that men naturally do as they are done by: wrong breeds wrong, and injuries are returned with interest, and so multiplied indefinitely. But if we are treated justly by others, we at least incline to treat them justly. Kindness, truthfulness, all the virtues, propagate themselves in this way.

That men, then, should do rightly to others and be treated rightly in return, it is chiefly necessary that they should bear these others in mind and act with some view to their welfare. The most direct way to this end is to imagine ourselves in others' places, and then act accordingly. So all the greatest teachers of morals the world has seen are unanimous in laying down the Golden Rule in one form or another. Let us hear what some of them say. The Buddhist *Dhammapada*, or Path to Virtue, declares: **In all this world evil is overcome only with good.** The Jewish Book of Leviticus says: **Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.** Hillel, the famous rabbi, commanded: "What thou hatest thyself, that do not thou to another: that is the whole of the law." Confucius, the great moral teacher of China, thus expanded the rule: "That which you hate in superiors, do not practise in your conduct toward inferiors; that which you dislike in inferiors, do not practise toward superiors; that which you hate in those before you, do not exhibit to those behind you; that which you hate in those behind you, do not manifest to those before you; that which you hate in those

on your right do not manifest to those on your left; that which you hate in those on your left, do not manifest to those on your right. **This is the doctrine of measuring others by ourselves.**" Briefer is the answer which Confucius gave to one who asked him, "Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one's life?" "Is not **Reciprocity** such a word?" he replied; "what you wish done to yourself, do to others." To the same effect spoke Isocrates the Greek orator, and Thales the Greek philosopher. So, in the most emphatic way, Jesus of Nazareth commanded: **All things, therefore, whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them.**

The Golden Rule must not be understood as taking the place of the whole moral code. It inculcates the **spirit** in which we should act. Justice and truth and kindness, — these are the virtues we wish men to show to ourselves: they are the very virtues, then, that we should exhibit to them. The Golden Rule cannot inform us precisely what is just, or true, or kind, in a particular instance; but it does remind us to act according to the knowledge we have of the just and the true, in a kindly manner. Living in obedience to this Rule, we should cultivate in ourselves the intellectual power of **imagination** and the capacity of **sympathy**. "The better we can imagine objects and relations not present to sense, the more readily we can sympathize with other people. Half the cruelty in the world is the direct result of stupid incapacity to put one's self in the other man's place."

No one has a right to ask that we set aside justice in his favor, or that we shall tell lies to shield him from suffering or punishment. But the Golden Rule demands that justice be done in a spirit of kindness, and that the truth be spoken in love. We have only to put it into practice to convince ourselves how excellent a

rule it is. At home, did parents and children, husband and wife, brother and sister, mistress and maid, endeavor to appreciate each other's duties, difficulties, burdens, and trials, and act in real sympathy ; did they enter into each other's feelings and thoughts, to help, to cheer, to bless and love : what a right, true, and happy home that would be ! If in the school-room the teacher is anxious to help the scholars, and the scholars to help the teacher, how that school would prosper in the giving and the getting of knowledge ! In the relations of employer and employee, of buyer and seller, in our common social intercourse, in our use of power and property, of knowledge and talent and skill, in every place and in every time of human "life together," we have only to do as we would be done by, to realize the wisdom of those who gave the rule and the happiness of those who have obeyed it.

When we do wrong to others as we think they have done to us, considering ourselves most of all, we live under an iron law of selfishness. When we only refrain from doing what we should not wish to have done to ourselves, this may be called living under a silver rule. But the one rule of conduct which deserves to be called Golden says, **Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye unto them !**

CHARACTER BUILDING

A MASTER'S TALKS WITH HIS PUPILS

By EDWARD P. JACKSON, A. M.

TO
My Father and Mother
WHOSE FAITHFUL TEACHINGS
AND WHOSE
LIVES OF SELF-SACRIFICE IN THE CAUSE OF HUMAN WELFARE
INSPIRED WHATEVER IS WORTHIELST IN THESE PAGES
THEY ARE
AFFECTIONATELY AND GRATEFULLY
DEDICATED



PREFACE.

THE American Secular Union, a national association having for its object the complete separation of Church and State, but in no way committed to any system of religious belief or disbelief, in the fall of 1889 offered a prize of one thousand dollars "for the best essay, treatise, or manual adapted to aid and assist teachers in our free public schools and in the Girard College for Orphans, and other public and charitable institutions professing to be unsectarian, to thoroughly instruct children and youth in the purest principles of morality without inculcating religious doctrine."

The members of the committee chosen to examine the numerous MSS. submitted were: Richard B. Westbrook, D. D., LL. B., President of the Union, Philadelphia; Felix Adler, Ph. D., of the Society for Ethical Culture, New York; Prof. D. G. Brinton, M. D., of the University of Pennsylvania; Prof. Frances E. White, M. D., of the Woman's Medical College; and Miss Ida C. Craddock, Secretary of the Union. As, in the opinion of a majority of the committee, no one of the MSS. fully met all the requirements, the prize was equally divided between the two adjudged to be the best offered, entitled respectively, "The Laws of Daily Conduct," by Nicholas Paine Gilman, editor of the "Literary World" of Boston, and author of "Profit Sharing between Employer and Employee;" and "Character Building."

Although the two books were written with no reference to each other, they seem to be, both in manner and matter, each the complement of the other. The deficiencies of each are, in great measure, supplied by the other. While "The Laws of Daily Conduct" is, in the main, synthetic and general in its treatment, the present work is more analytic and specific. The two are, therefore, published in a single volume, as well as separately, at the earnest request of the Union, and the authors hope that the joint book will be preferred by purchasers. Much of the matter in the introduction to "The Laws of Daily Conduct" is equally pertinent to "Character Building."

The avoidance of sectarianism was not a difficulty, but a relief. Although both writers wish to be known as friends of religion, they agree in the conviction that the public school, which belongs equally to representatives of all sects and to those of no sect, is not the place for special religious or theological instruction. There is enough in what is known as morals, without admixture of a distinctive religious creed, enough that the good, the pure, the noble, the patriotic, the philanthropic of all creeds can agree upon, to fill not one little book like this, but a library. The difficulty is, not to find material, but to select wisely from the abundance at hand.

What use to make of the following pages each teacher must decide for himself. They may serve merely as hints as to methods, or they may supply subjects and their treatment, to be presented in such other language as shall seem best adapted to different classes of hearers. Should the teacher or parent prefer to read them in their original form, the time required for each of the Talks will be found not to vary materially from that prescribed by "Dr. Dix," ten minutes, at most fifteen, of one day in each week of the school year.

E. P. J.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

	PAGE
PREFACE.	
PROLOGUE	1
I. SINCERITY	3
II. WHAT IS RIGHT?	8
III. THE SENSE OF DUTY	14
IV. "CREDIT," AND OTHER "REWARDS OF MERIT" .	19
V. GOOD BOYS AND "FUN"	24
VI. VIRTUE IS STRENGTH: VICE IS WEAKNESS . .	28
VII. MORE ABOUT GOOD BOYS AND "FUN" . . .	33
VIII. CLEVERNESS AND COURAGE	38
IX. THE BATTLE	43
X. WARS AND RUMORS OF WARS	47
XI. WHEN THE GOOD BOY WILL FIGHT	52
XII. WHEN THE GOOD BOY WILL NOT FIGHT . .	58
XIII. "GOODY-GOODY" AND GOOD	64
XIV. THE KNIGHT "SANS PEUR ET SANS REPROCHE"	69
XV. THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF VICE	75
XVI. CREEPING, WALKING, AND FLYING	80
XVII. THE DOCTOR IS FAIRLY CAUGHT	84
XVIII. THE CHAINS OF HABIT	90
XIX. THE ALCOHOL HABIT	96
XX. BENEFICENT LIONS AND TIGERS	100
XXI. TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS	106
XXII. TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS (CONTINUED) . .	113
XXIII. EXTRAVAGANCE IN LANGUAGE	118
XXIV. SNAKES IN THE GRASS	124
XXV. GREAT IS TRUTH, AND IT WILL PREVAIL . .	129
XXVI. HONESTY	136
XXVII. HONESTY (CONTINUED)	141
XXVIII. A BLACK LIST	146

XXIX. HONOR	154
XXX. "WHEN THE CAT'S AWAY THE MICE WILL PLAY"	160
XXXI. NAGGING	164
XXXII. INDUSTRY, WEALTH, HAPPINESS	171
XXXIII. INDUSTRY, WEALTH, HAPPINESS (CONTINUED)	176
XXXIV. VOCATION, VACATION, AND AVOCATION	182
XXXV. CRUELTY TO ANIMALS	188
XXXVI. CHARITY	195
XXXVII. WITH HAND AND HEART	199
XXXVIII. POLITENESS	205
XXXIX. PROFANITY AND OBSCENITY	211
XL. WHAT HAS ALGEBRA TO DO WITH VIRTUE?	218
XLI. HOME AND COUNTRY: THE GOOD SON AND THE GOOD CITIZEN	224

CHARACTER BUILDING.

PERSONS REPRESENTED.

JOHN DIX, Ph. D., Principal of the Freetown Academy.
HIS PUPILS.

PROLOGUE.

“A time to keep silence, and a time to speak.”

Dr. Dix [concluding a moral lecture]. Well, Jenkins, what do you wish to say?

Geoffrey Jenkins [with a sly wink at his classmates]. I beg pardon, but are we going to recite our Cæsar lesson to-day?

Dr. Dix [glancing uneasily at the clock]. Is it possible! Really, I had no idea it was so late. I was so engrossed in my subject that I was altogether unconscious of the flight of time. No, Jenkins, I regret that we must give up our Cæsar lesson for to-day. Jenkins should not have waited until it was too late before calling my attention. Ah, ha! he knew what he was about, did he [*laughing*]? Well, well, you need n't look so delighted. We'll take a double lesson next time, and give our whole attention to it. I hope, however, that the time to-day has not been altogether lost; and yet, as I said, I regret that our Cæsar lesson must be postponed. To be sure, the proper discussion of a great moral principle is more important than a lesson in Cæsar: but we are told that there is a time for every-

thing; and, in strict justice, we have no right to give the time that belongs to Cæsar to anything else, or to anybody else, however worthy. Well, what is it, Watson?

Archibald Watson. "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's." [*Laughter.*]

Dr. Dix. "And" — Why don't you finish?

Archibald Watson. "And unto God the things that are God's."

Dr. Dix. Well put, my lad, well put. An excellent application of a famous epigram. The past hour justly belonged to the author of the "Commentaries," and we have given it to Marcus Aurelius Antoninus.

It is nearly time for the bell, but I will mention to you a plan which I have been thinking of, and which I shall probably adopt. There are many things I wish to say to you not directly connected with your lessons. To avoid in future the mistake I have made to-day, it is my intention to set apart ten or fifteen minutes every Wednesday morning, not for set lessons, but for miscellaneous Talks. The time thus appropriated will be taken equitably from the various branches of study, and no one of them need to suffer perceptibly. But whether they suffer or not, I shall feel that I am doing no wrong; and certainly no one can doubt the importance of questions of conduct and motive in a school which professes to form character as well as to train the intellect.

If I should adopt this plan, I cordially invite you all to join freely with me in the discussions, to suggest topics, to ask questions, and to feel no hesitation whatever in expressing dissent from anything that may be said, — *honest* dissent I mean, of course. I hope no one will ever take part in a discussion simply to carry his point and win a victory, or merely to make a display of his skill at logical fencing. The one great object I wish every one to have before him is to discover and point out the *truth*.
[*Bell.*]

I.

SINCERITY.

Dr. Dix. Well, scholars, after further consideration and conference with certain ladies and gentlemen whose judgment I value very highly, I have decided to adopt the plan which I mentioned last week.

Until further notice, then, the first ten minutes of each Wednesday will be devoted to what I hope will prove not only useful but interesting conversations. I say conversations, for I want you to do your share of the talking. As, however, I have a much greater store of experience to draw from than any of you, I expect that my share will be much larger than yours; but I shall always take good care to give you a full opportunity to say all you feel inclined to say. You have only to indicate your wish in the usual way, and it shall be granted.

I desire that these Wednesday Morning Talks of ours shall have a distinct bearing upon the formation of character, that they shall be such as shall tend to make you loyal citizens, and good, noble men and women.

And first, let me say, the easiest and cheapest part of morality is the discussion of it. Of all things in existence, words — if they are mere words — are the cheapest. Nothing is easier for some men, who can do little else, than to talk; and of all subjects under the sun there are none upon which more empty words are uttered than upon questions of morality. As you have learned in your study of English Literature, some of the most exalted sentiments that have ever been expressed in our language have been uttered by men of essentially ignoble lives.

The first condition, then, that I shall impose upon you as well as upon myself in these discussions is entire *sincerity*.

Louisa Thompson. Do you mean that we are not to speak of good things that we do not do ourselves?

Dr. Dix [smiling]. I fear that such a restriction would close many eloquent lips.

Louisa Thompson. And are all those eloquent people hypocrites?

Dr. Dix [with emphasis]. By no means, Miss Thompson. But the noblest human character is full of imperfections. Before any good act is performed, before any noble quality is attained, it must be thought of and aspired to. The runner in a race must fix his thoughts intently on the goal towards which he is striving. By all means let our thoughts and words be in advance of our actual attainments. That is the very first requisite to progress, and the farther in advance they are the better. What I meant was, that we should not profess admiration of virtue or detestation of vice which we do not actually feel, — that, in short, we should not preach what we do not at least sincerely *desire* to practice, whether in our weakness we are able actually to practice it or not. I think we shall not find this too severe a restriction. I take it for granted that there is no one here who has not a genuine desire, more or less alive and awake, to become better, stronger, nobler, more admirable than he is. If this desire is encouraged — and there is no better way to encourage it than to think and talk about it — it will naturally grow stronger and stronger. As the desire strengthens, so will the power to gratify it. There is no other sincere desire of the human heart so absolutely sure to be realized as this.

Do not let our talks end with mere talk. Do not let any of us discuss the beauty and nobility of truthfulness, for instance, and straightway resume the prac-

tice of the petty deceptions so common in the school-room, as well as elsewhere. Let us not sound the praises of industry, cheerfulness, forbearance, generosity, and immediately proceed to the indulgence of idleness, ill-temper, impatience, and selfishness.

Susan Perkins. What is a hypocrite, Dr. Dix?

Dr. Dix. Let us hear your own definition first, Miss Perkins.

Susan Perkins. Why, if we should do what you have just asked us not to do, we should be hypocrites, should we not?

Dr. Dix. Not necessarily. No, not even probably. A hypocrite is one who attempts to *deceive* others in regard to his true character, especially one who pretends to virtue which he does not possess. I should not think of accusing any of you of such contemptible meanness, even if you should do what I have just asked you not to do. I should simply think that your sentiments, though strong enough to be expressed in words, were neither strong nor deep enough for the louder speaking of action. They would be like certain plants which put forth very showy blossoms, but which have not vitality enough to bear fruit.

No; far be it from me to suspect any of you of that degree of insincerity which amounts to hypocrisy, a thing so utterly mean as to be despised alike by the good and the bad. But if you give occasion, I shall, of course, recognize in you that unconscious sort of insincerity which makes us satisfied with mere words and fleeting emotions instead of action, — with impulse instead of steady, persistent purpose, — with the shadow instead of the substance, — the blossom instead of the fruit.

As I said a little while ago, there is nothing cheaper than words. But even those whose words are held the cheapest are not always consciously insincere. Their emotions and sentiments may be real and vivid while

they last, though they may scarcely outlast the noisy breath that utters them.

Whether justly or unjustly, it is the common disposition of mankind to place a low estimate upon the earnestness of great talkers, and more particularly upon their will and power to do. There are familiar old proverbs illustrating this. Let us have some of them.

Jane Simpson. "Empty vessels make the most sound."

Charles Fox. "Still waters run deep."

Lucy Snow. "Shallow brooks babble."

Dr. Dix. Yes. Proverbs are called the wisdom of many and the wit of one. Those you have given are among the wisest and the wittiest. There is danger, however, that their very wisdom and wit may lead to their too wide application. One of the most familiar of the proverbs may well serve as a check upon all the rest. Can any of you tell me what it is?

Geoffrey Jenkins. "There is no rule without exceptions."

Jonathan Tower. And, "The exception proves the rule."

Dr. Dix. If any of the proverbs needs the check of the first of these two, it is certainly the second. There is no rule with more exceptions, even in Latin prosody or German gender, than that "The exception proves the rule."

It is *not* true that all or even the most of great talkers are deficient in earnestness or in the power and will to accomplish good in the world. The mission of such—I mean really great talkers—is chiefly to talk; not to express what they do not feel, but sentiments and emotions which may be even deeper and more fervent than their eloquent words, sentiments and emotions that live as realities in their hearts, that they will stand by to the death, if need be.

Few men have wielded a more controlling influence

over their fellow-men than Pericles during the first years of the Peloponnesian War. Cicero attributes his power chiefly to his surpassing skill in oratory. But what could his oratory have accomplished if the men of Athens had not known that their eloquent chief meant every word exactly as he said it? It was not the words that gave power to the man so much as it was the man that gave power to the words. Many an actor on the stage has equalled and perhaps surpassed Pericles in the tricks of voice, facial expression, and gesture; but the sublimest triumphs of the stage last only so long as the illusion of reality remains. When the pageant is over, the consciousness of its unreality returns, and lo! the burning words have lost their power, save as they please the memory and the imagination.

And, again, it is *not* true that all "still waters run deep." There are shallow, stagnant little pools that lie more silent and still than the deepest tides of the Mississippi. Silence may be "golden" or it may be leaden. It may be the silence of wisdom and self-mastery, or it may be the silence of stupidity and cowardice, the silence of the owl, or the silence of the sphinx.

Do not, therefore, be afraid to talk. Only talk at the right time and in the right place, and be thoroughly in earnest. Mean what you say. Feel yourself what you urge upon others, and be sure that your feeling is something more than a momentary impulse. Do not mistake a passing breeze for a trade-wind.

II.

WHAT IS RIGHT ?

Dr. Dix. I don't wish you to look upon this new move of ours as merely the introduction of a new branch of study. If that were all I sought, I should simply have proposed the addition of ethics to our curriculum. I should have selected a suitable text-book, assigned lessons to be learned, perhaps, and appointed an hour for recitation ; in which case some of you would probably have thought more of your "marks" and "percentages" than of the branch itself, as I fear is true with some of you in other cases.

No ; it is not merely the *science*, but the *art* and *practice* of morality that I wish you to acquire. If this object is to be accomplished, it must be chiefly through your own efforts. Something of the science we may learn by talking ; the art, like all other arts, can be acquired only by faithful, persevering practice.

Charles Fox. What does ethics mean, Dr. Dix ?

Dr. Dix [*looking around his audience*]. Well, we are all waiting for an answer.

Isabelle Anthony. The science of morality, or moral philosophy.

Dr. Dix. And what is morality ?

Isabelle Anthony. I should say it was a comprehensive word, including all our ideas of right and wrong.

Dr. Dix. That will do very well for the present. I might ask what is meant by "right," and what is meant by "wrong." That would lead us at once into the very heart of the science of ethics.

Charles Fox. And is n't that what you wish ?

Dr. Dix. We can hardly practise an art successfully without knowing, either by acquisition or by instinct, at least the fundamental principles of the science which relates to that art. What I wish to guard against is, lest our talks, from which I hope so much, may degenerate into distinctly intellectual exercises. I can imagine our pursuing the science of ethics precisely as we study chemistry or logic, and with very much the same result. I do not mean that that result would not include moral benefit. I believe it would, just as I believe the study of chemistry — ay, even of algebra — is morally beneficial (and we shall speak of this more at length some other morning). I mean that the moral benefit would be secondary to the intellectual benefit, which is exactly what I do not wish.

I have often heard men of a philosophical and argumentative turn discussing ethical questions for no other purpose apparently than to while away a leisure hour, and to display their logical acumen. I have heard the loftiest conceptions of right and duty, in the abstract, eloquently set forth by men whose daily lives would indicate anything but a lofty conception of their own individual duty.

Of course we must have something of what is known as the science of ethics, but not enough of it to allow the head to usurp the functions of the heart. We will consider that this ten minutes belongs peculiarly to the heart, and we will allow the head to act only as an auxiliary. It is enough for him to be king the rest of the day, with the heart as only his modest and meek counsellor. Now I am ready to ask you what is meant by "right" and "wrong."

Miss Thompson, what do you think those words mean?

Louisa Thompson. Right is — is — why, it is that which is *right*. [*Laughter.*]

Dr. Dix. And wrong is, by the same process of reasoning, that which is *wrong*, eh? Well, I don't know

but that I ought to be satisfied with your answer. It shows, at least, that the words have a clear enough meaning in your mind. Right is right, just as gold is gold; and wrong is wrong, as dross is dross. And so, I suppose, the words have a definite meaning in the minds of all present. Still, it is possible that they may mean different things to different persons. Let us see how nearly we agree. Miss Thompson, will you try once more? What is "right"?

Louisa Thompson. Right is — doing good to others.

Geoffrey Jenkins. I was going to say that, and then I thought you would ask what I meant by "good." So I would n't say it.

Dr. Dix [*smiling*]. Precisely what I was about to ask Miss Thompson, not for the sake of puzzling her or you, but for exactly the opposite reason — that we might begin with the clearest possible ideas. What is "good"?

Louisa Thompson. Whatever causes happiness is good, is it not?

Dr. Dix. Let us see. It is said that the effect of certain deadly drugs upon the nervous system is to produce a sensation of intense happiness. Are they good?

Louisa Thompson. No, sir; but the sensations they produce are not true happiness; besides, they cause greater unhappiness afterwards.

Dr. Dix. Then, suppose we say that nothing is good, even though it may cause happiness — or what seems to be happiness — if it causes greater misery, or if it prevents greater happiness.

But suppose I do something which causes happiness to certain persons and unhappiness, though in a less degree, to others who are innocent; is *that* good?

Louisa Thompson. N-no, sir.

Thomas Dunn. And yet that very thing is often done, and called right and good, too.

Dr. Dix. When and by whom ?

Thomas Dunn. By the government, when innocent men are obliged to go to war to save their country.

Dr. Dix [*impressively*]. “*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.*”¹ Men ought and often do count it their greatest happiness, as well as glory, to make that sacrifice.

Archibald Watson. Then why should n't everybody count it happiness to make sacrifices for others ?

Dr. Dix. So everybody should, my boy ; but we are not speaking now of those who voluntarily make sacrifice, but of those who require it of others. And it must be remembered that the same rules cannot be applied to a government that are applied to an individual. What would be perfectly right and good in the government might be a capital crime in an individual. It would not be right for me to seek the happiness of some of you at the expense of the suffering of others who did not deserve it at my hands, — even though the total amount of the happiness I thus caused might overbalance the pain. So, though it is safe to say that all good is right and all right is good, yet we see that there is something involved in both the right and the good besides mere happiness. What is it ?

Julia Taylor. Justice ?

Dr. Dix. Yes. Justice and happiness may coincide, but we do not think of them as inseparably connected. Let justice be done is our instinctive feeling, whether happiness results or not. “*Fiat justitia, ruat cælum.*”²

George Williams. Is it not both right and good sometimes to set aside justice ?

Dr. Dix. No. Justice may be “tempered with mercy ;” but it is never right nor good that it should be “set aside.” Right demands that the mercy shown to some should never involve injustice to others, as, for

¹ It is sweet and glorious to die for one's country.

² Let justice be done, though the heavens fall.

instance, when a criminal, unrepentant and unreformed, is pardoned and let loose to prey again upon society.

Well, what besides kindness, mercy, and justice are included in right?

Susan Perkins. Truth.

Dr. Dix. Do not our commonest instincts teach us that nothing can be right or good that is not *true*? A lie, even though it may cause no unhappiness to any living creature, is and must be forever wrong. Right, *rectus*, means *straight, true*. A right angle is a square angle. Even in slang a man that does right is called "square" and "straight," while a rascal is sometimes called a "crook." Wrong is not straight nor square; it is oblique, crooked. Its very spelling shows what it is, — *w-r-o-n-g*, *wrung*, *wrested* from the true and the right. The wrong does not go straight on; it *writhes*, it *wiggles*.

But there is one particular word which, with its equivalents, expresses the idea of right more exactly, perhaps, than any that we have used thus far. What is it? That is right which —

Thomas Dunn. Ought to be.

Dr. Dix. That is the word, *ought, owed*. Right is what is owed by somebody or something to somebody or something. Right is a debt, *debitum*, something owed. And there are equivalents; what are they?

Jane Simpson. Right is what is *due, duty*.

Dr. Dix. Yes. But we must be careful that we do not take those words in too narrow a sense. Some men seem to consider that they do their full duty to their fellow-men when they pay what they call their business debts. Are they right?

Many Voices. No, sir.

Dr. Dix. What else do they owe?

Louisa Thompson. Kindness.

Henry Phillips. Charity.

Jonathan Tower. Help.

Lucy Snow. Forbearance.

Jane Simpson. Friendship.

Susan Perkins. Forgiveness.

Dr. Dix. And the influence and example of a noble, upright life. These are all debts, as truly as those which are entered in their ledgers.

III.

THE SENSE OF DUTY.

Dr. Dix. To do right, as we said last Wednesday morning, is simply to do one's duty. Now *things* always do that. Observe, in this last statement I am not using the word duty in its strict metaphysical sense, which involves the idea of a right voluntary *choice* between alternatives of action. I use it simply in its etymological sense, that of giving what is owed, what is *due*. As I said, things always do that.

Thomas Dunn. Do they always? Does a watch, for instance, do its duty when it refuses to go?

Dr. Dix. Always. If it is properly made in the first place, and is not abused afterwards, it will go until it is worn out, and then it is its duty to stop. If it is not properly made, and is badly enough abused, it is its duty, it is the law of its being, so to speak, not to go.

Thomas Dunn. May not the same, or at least a similar thing, be said of a man?

Dr. Dix. Yes and no. A man is like a watch only in that he does not do the impossible. He is entirely unlike a watch in that he does not necessarily do what he can. Yes, Dunn, things always obey the laws of their being. They always *pay their debts*.

Joseph Cracklin. But they deserve no credit for doing so — they can't help it.

Dr. Dix. Who *does* deserve credit for simply paying his debts? However, we will not consider the credit for the present; we will consider the fact and its results, which are precisely the same as if things could do wrong if they chose, but always chose to do right.

A part of the lesson we are to learn is the results of right-doing and of wrong-doing. If you and your watch-maker do your duty to your watch, it will infallibly do its duty to you. It will go on, never resting, never tiring, never losing a tick, whether the eye of its master is on it or not, working as faithfully through the long hours of the night as in the daylight.

In a school reading-book in use when I was a boy, there was an ingenious little allegory entitled "The Discontented Pendulum," by Jane Taylor. The pendulum of an old clock, that had been faithfully ticking the seconds year after year, was represented as finally becoming utterly discouraged by its unintermitting labors and the prospect of their never ending, and abruptly coming to a full stop. After pouring out its grief and discouragement to a sympathizing ear, listening to a due amount of remonstrance for its ignoble neglect of duty and of encouragement to persevere to the end, — remembering that it never had but one swing to make in a second and that it always had the second to make it in, — it was finally persuaded to dry its tears and return to its duty. I remember that I liked the fable very much ; but, with all my admiration, I could not quite forgive the injustice done to the pendulum in even imagining it capable of unfaithfulness of which only a living creature could be guilty.

No, things are never unfaithful. The stars never desert their posts for an instant throughout the ages. The planets never swerve a hair's breadth from the courses marked out for them by nature. Not an atom ever refuses to fulfil its duty, and its whole duty, in the unending work of the universe. The grand result of this unvarying fidelity to duty, this perfect obedience to the laws of nature, is perfect harmony throughout the physical universe. It is only in the moral universe that discord reigns.

The lower animate creation is no less faithful to duty

than the inanimate. No allurements will tempt the mother bird to desert her young. The working ant never idles away his time. Queens are only mothers in the hive and in the nest: neither kings nor queens are needed for government, for none of their subjects was ever known to violate a law of the realm.

Geoffrey Jenkins. The grasshopper idles, if the ant does n't.

Archibald Watson. Yes, sir; and we have the fable of "The Ant and the Grasshopper."

Dr. Dix. I have often thought that fable even more unjust to the grasshopper than Jane Taylor's to the pendulum. The grasshopper gets his living through the summer, his natural term of life, does he not? Many a Western farmer has learned that to his sorrow.

Geoffrey Jenkins. Yes, sir; he *steals* his living.

Dr. Dix. No, I cannot admit that. Human laws of property are binding only on men, not on grasshoppers. They know only the laws of nature, which recognize no monopoly of the green fields; they have never learned to read the warning legend, "No Trespass."

But let us see what even the grasshopper will do when duty calls. When the devastating multitudes sweep over the plains, leaving no green shred behind them, attempts are sometimes made to check their progress by lighting long lines of fire. Then comes the vanguard of grasshoppers, overwhelming the opposing walls of flame like an extinguishing wave of the ocean. There is no hesitation. *Haud mora.*¹ Like Napoleon's platoons at the bridge of Lodi, the countless multitudes go unflinchingly to certain death for the sake of the vastly greater multitudes behind them.

That is the way the little voluptuary of the fable does his duty. I have compared him to the heroic soldier, the human type of that perfect fidelity which we have seen in the inanimate and in the lower animate

¹ No delay.

creation. The true soldier's one object and ambition is to *do his duty*, no matter what the cost. You have all heard the famous story of the burning of the Czar's palace at Moscow — how in the general confusion the order to relieve the royal sentinels was not issued by the proper authority, and how the heroic fellows paced back and forth upon the blazing balustrades as if they were on parade, until the falling walls buried them from sight.

There was an example of fidelity to duty set before the world! It was an example not only to the soldier guarding his sacred trust, but to all men in all stations and conditions of life.

What seem to be little duties are as binding upon us as those which may gain for us greater glory and admiration. The regular army soldier is taught to be as faithful in the care of his horse and of his wardrobe as in the performance of his graver duties on the battlefield.

Now, can you tell me why the sense of the imperativeness of duty should be so especially prominent in the mind of the soldier? Why more so than in the minds of men in general?

Julia Taylor. It is no more so than in the minds of other *faithful* people.

Dr. Dix. Very true. Heroic fidelity to duty is by no means confined to those whose trade is war. There are cowards, traitors, and shirks in the army as well as elsewhere. From the earliest ages, however, the soldier has been a favorite proverb of devotion to duty, and an idea so general must have some foundation in truth.

Isabelle Anthony. One reason is, that bravery is so much admired, and cowardice so much despised.

Dr. Dix. That is doubtless a part of the explanation. But to be brave is not the soldier's only duty: his first and greatest obligation is to *obey orders*.

Thomas Dunn. I think the chief reason is, that

there is so much depending on his doing his duty faithfully. If he sleeps on his post, the safety of the whole army is endangered; if he is cowardly in battle, the victory is lost; if he is disobedient to orders, there can be no discipline, and without discipline an army is only a mob.

Dr. Dix. Yes; that is the explanation — *necessity*. Fidelity is indispensable to efficiency. An army composed of untrustworthy and disobedient soldiers would be like a watch — if such a thing is conceivable — in which the wheels should turn or not as they individually chose; or, to carry out my former comparison, like a universe in which the atoms should obey the laws of attraction and repulsion or not according to their sovereign pleasure. Such an army would be, as Dunn says, a mob: such a universe would be chaos.

Now, boys and girls, each one of us is like a soldier in an army — with this difference: however we might wish to do so, we can neither resign nor desert. We must ever remain parts of the great whole. Each of us is a little wheel in the great mechanism, and if we do not do our share of the turning, or if we turn in the wrong direction, we do so much to block the machinery, to disturb the general harmony that might prevail. Why should any of us feel the sense of imperative duty less strongly than the brave, true soldier? Why should man, the apex in the pyramid of being, be less obedient to the laws of his existence, less faithful to his duty, than the wheels of his watch, than the ant or the bee, than the minutest atom that helps to hold the universe together and keep it in harmonious motion?

IV.

"CREDIT," AND OTHER "REWARDS OF MERIT."

Dr. Dix. During my eulogy on things and the lower animals, last week, for always fulfilling the ends for which they exist, it was objected that they deserve no "credit" for doing so, because they cannot do otherwise. Well, as I replied then, who *does* deserve credit for simply doing his duty?

Joseph Cracklin. When a man pays a debt, it is put to his "credit" on the ledger.

Dr. Dix [smiling]. That sounds like a very clever answer; but it is only a play upon words. Even things deserve credit in that sense of the word. The farmer *credits* a field with the crop that he considers no more than his *due* for the labor and money he has expended upon it. When Cracklin made the remark that "things deserve no credit," he used the word in an entirely different sense, that of commendation for positive moral virtue. A man who merely pays his debts simply *does n't do wrong*. His act is like thousands of other acts, neither positive nor negative so far as their moral nature is concerned; whereas the man who not only pays, but gives from benevolent motives, is "credited" with an act of positive moral virtue.

Thomas Dunn. But didn't we decide, a fortnight ago, that kindness, charity, generosity were only *debts* that we owe our fellow-men?

Dr. Dix [laughing]. We seem to have stumbled upon one of those ethical subtleties that I was so anxious to avoid. It is not so subtle, however, as it seems. Words often have a very different force, according as

their application is high or low. We say, for instance, that this building is stationary. It is so only with reference to the earth on which it stands. Referred to the heavens, we know that it is in rapid motion. So that which may not be a debt in the business sense, may be a most binding debt in the moral sense. The payment of such moral debts has positive moral virtue, and is entitled to moral credit. Let us consider this moral credit, as distinguished from business credit.

It is a part of the natural and just reward of well-doing. The love of the approbation of our fellow-men is implanted in us by nature, and is entirely commendable, if properly regulated. There is no motion without a motor. The steam-engine will not move without steam, neither will man act without a motive. He labors for food and other necessities and comforts of life. Without reward of some sort he will not act, and this is right. As I said, the approval of his fellow-men is one of these rewards. But suppose it is the only or chief motive for doing good. You have read of a class of men who give alms that they may be seen of men. You know what is said of them: "They have their reward." Do you not detect a subtle sarcasm in that laconic awarding of the prize of "credit"? Are they really entitled even to the poor reward they receive? If men knew their actual motive, would they receive it? No; in order that their credit may be justly earned, it must be only a secondary motive of action. And the same may be said of all other rewards which appeal to our selfish passions and desires. You may name some of the motives which impel men to do good and shun evil.

Isabelle Anthony. I think the most general and powerful motive is expressed in the old copy-book line, "Be virtuous and you will be happy."

Frank Williams. People are afraid they won't get to heaven if they are not good.

Dr. Dix. And what do you think of such motives, unmixed with others ?

Isabelle Anthony. I think they are purely selfish.

Dr. Dix. Do you think they are entitled to much of the credit we are speaking of ?

Isabelle Anthony. No, sir.

Dr. Dix. Suppose no such rewards were offered, — suppose — if such a thing is conceivable — that virtue did not gain the approval of our fellow-men or lead to happiness, what do you think the effect would be on general human character ?

Jane Simpson. There would n't be much good done.

Thomas Dunn. I do not think there would be any good at all.

Dr. Dix. So you think all good acts have at bottom some selfish motive ?

Thomas Dunn. It seems to me that it must be so.

Dr. Dix. Do you think the Good Samaritan was selfish ?

Thomas Dunn. He *might* have been purely so. He could n't help pitying the man he saw suffering. Pity is no more truly an act of the will, I suppose, than surprise, or fright, or any other sudden emotion. His pity caused him a kind of suffering, and he took the most direct and effectual way of relieving it.

Dr. Dix. And so he was entitled to no credit ?

Thomas Dunn. I don't say that. I only say that his good act might have been purely selfish. If my head aches, I try to relieve it. I do the same when my heart aches.

Besides, he might have heard of its being "more blessed to give than to receive," and he might have been business-like enough to do that which would secure to himself the greater blessing.

Julia Taylor [*indignantly*]. I don't believe it possible for him to have had any such sordid thoughts. I don't believe the most remote thought of himself or of

rewards of any kind entered his noble heart. I believe his act was one of the purest and most unselfish benevolence.

Dr. Dix. Miss Taylor's supposition is at least as reasonable as yours, Dunn. I had no idea you were such a cynic.

Thomas Dunn. You invited us to express our views without restraint.

Dr. Dix. Certainly. I am not reproaching you for expressing your views; I am only surprised that such fully developed cynicism should come from such young lips.

Thomas Dunn. I merely repeated what I have heard from older lips. But I only said what might be *possible*.

Dr. Dix [*more graciously*]. But what in your heart you felt is not probable. That is not the way you ordinarily judge your fellow-beings. Only those without virtue themselves disbelieve in its existence in others; only those without benevolence themselves believe others destitute of that virtue.

Thomas Dunn. But the Good Samaritan was not one of my fellow-beings; he was only an imaginary character, after all.

Dr. Dix. He stands for the good heart of all mankind. In maligning him, you malign your race. Don't lose your faith in human nature, Dunn. It would be one of the greatest losses you could suffer. There is no doubt that selfish motives actuate a great amount of the good that is done in the world; but, thank heaven, not all, nor nearly all. The mother thinks only of her beloved child in danger. She thinks no more of herself than the planet thinks of itself as it wheels unswervingly in its celestial orbit. The hero who clings to the lever of his engine as it hurries him on to his death thinks only of the hundreds of precious lives entrusted to his care. He has no time to think of the glory

which his eyes shall never see, or of the fame of which his ears shall never hear. Napoleon's soldiers may have thought of *la gloire*, as they marched on to their fatal Lodi; but it was not that alone which led them on: there was besides the irresistible impulse to do their duty *because it was their duty*.

V.

GOOD BOYS AND "FUN."

Dr. Dix. The other morning I said that I took it for granted that all here feel a sincere desire to improve in character. Now, I am a pretty fair reader of countenances, and I must confess that I noticed what seemed to me a hesitating look here and there. I will not ask any one to speak for himself; but I wish some of you would express what you suppose may possibly be the feeling of others.

James Murphy. Please, sir, good boys don't amount to anything out of school hours. [*Laughter.*]

Dr. Dix [*graciously*]. Thank you, Murphy, for your free expression of opinion. I have urged you to express your views without restraint, and I am glad that one, at least, has shown his willingness to do so. If what Murphy says is true, I confess it is a new fact to me. Now, will you please be a little more definite. What do bad boys "amount to" out of school hours more than good boys?

James Murphy. Why, sir, good boys are afraid of a little fun, and — and — they don't know how to have any fun, any way.

Edward Williams. They are n't so *smart* as bad boys.

Richard Jones. It's all well enough for *girls* to be good; but with *boys* it is different.

Sally Jones [*with jealous indignation*]. Girls are just as bad and smart as boys are! [*Loud laughter, in which the Doctor himself joins.*]

Dr. Dix. Our young friends of the Sixth Class show a spirit of competition worthy of a better cause, which,

whether it be so candidly expressed in words or not, unfortunately prevails among many of larger growth. I trust they have not expressed the actual public sentiment of Room No. 6. At all events, they have furnished us with a subject for our Talk this morning.

"Good boys don't amount to anything out of school hours," because *"they are afraid of a little fun."*

Now, whether that is a fact to be lamented or not depends on what you mean by "fun." If you mean malicious mischief, the inflicting of injury or annoyance upon others for the sake of the pleasure it may afford to the perpetrators, or if you mean indulgence in immoral or injurious pleasures, then I must admit that you are perfectly right when you say that good boys and girls are afraid of it. But is such fear a thing to be ashamed of? There are two kinds of fear, that of the coward, and that of the hero. The bravest soldier is mortally afraid of one thing — disgrace. The noblest soul shrinks in terror from dishonor.

Without this kind of fear the highest kind of courage cannot exist. The man that boasts that he is not afraid of anybody or anything is most likely to be an arrant coward at heart. Everybody is, by this time, familiar with the story of the New York regiment recruited from the worst criminals and "toughs," — how it was confidently expected that they would show at least one virtue, that of desperate courage, and how, to everybody's amazement, — no, not everybody's, for there were some that already understood the true relation between manhood and vice, — they proved as utterly worthless on the battlefield as in the camp, showing that the only danger they were *not* afraid of was that of shame and disgrace. One of the most valuable lessons our great war taught was, that the best men make the best and the bravest soldiers. He that is truest to his duty in peace will be the most certain to be true to his flag in war. So much for the good boy's fear.

“ Good boys don’t know how to have fun, any way.”

Assuming for the present that the word fun has been correctly defined, I think you will all agree with me that it would be a most blessed thing for the world if all knowledge of it were forever lost. There are some kinds of knowledge which are a terrible loss rather than a gain. Many and many a youth knows altogether too much of certain things, and not enough of others, for his own happiness and good.

There is a kind of “ fun ” that is anything but funny in its results, a kind that brings far more tears than laughter. This is the kind that the good boy neither knows nor wishes to know how to have.

“ Good boys are not so ‘ smart ’ as bad boys.”

I presume that “ smart ” is here to be taken in its American sense, as meaning clever, able, energetic. If so, I confess that the idea expressed is a novel one to me. Does it require more cleverness, ability, energy, to do wrong than to do right? Most people find it quite the reverse. Which is easier, to give a wrong solution of a mathematical problem or the right one? Any one can answer a difficult question wrongly; only the “ smart ” ones can answer it correctly. It is the same in the moral as in the intellectual field; to do right requires effort, power; to do wrong generally requires neither.

Joseph Cracklin. I have heard my father say that a rascal will work harder to steal a dollar than an honest man will to earn ten.

Dr. Dix. A very wise and true saying it is, too. But the effort I am speaking of now is the effort of power, cleverness, ability, energy — not the effort of weakness and folly. The making of great efforts does not necessarily indicate power. A fool will work harder to accomplish nothing than a wise man will to build a ship. Then, again, some kinds of effort, desperate as they may seem, are much easier to make than others. Your rascal

would find it harder to make up his mind to honestly earn one of the honest man's ten dollars than to work day and night to steal a hundred.

No, it is not true that evil requires more power than good. Men are wicked because it is *easier* to be wicked than it is to be good. Like the lightning, they follow the path of least resistance.

Susan Perkins. "The way of the transgressor," I have always been told, "is *hard*."

Dr. Dix. Ah, that comes *later*.

Julia Taylor. Don't we often hear it said in praise of certain good people, that they find it easier to do right than wrong, — that it comes more natural to them?

Dr. Dix. I am glad you asked the question, for it suggests the most striking and admirable characteristic of all kinds of power, moral as well as intellectual and physical — *the ease with which it accomplishes its results*. The athlete does without apparent effort what might be an impossibility for the ordinary man. The genius dashes off in an hour a poem that we common mortals could not produce in a lifetime of effort. How have these good people you speak of attained their power for good? By long-continued perseverance in the paths of virtue. That which you say "comes natural" to them is simply the second nature of habit.

Jane Simpson. Is all virtue only second nature? Are there not some people who seem to have been born good?

Dr. Dix. Certainly some people inherit better natures than others, just as some inherit more vigorous bodies and keener intellects. We are not all favored alike. The point I am urging is, that good requires more power than evil; whether inherited or acquired is not now the question. This power may be inherited in vastly different degrees by different individuals; but one great truth I want to impress upon you: Every virtuous life that has ever been lived has been a life of persistent effort.

VI.

VIRTUE IS STRENGTH: VICE IS WEAKNESS.

Dr. Dix. Every virtuous life that has ever been lived has been a life of persistent effort.

Let no one palliate his own self-indulgence and belittle another's self-denial by saying, "It is easy for him to be good, he could n't be bad if he tried." Vice *per se* is always easier than virtue. The apparent exception I have already explained. If there are those of such exalted virtue that it seems well-nigh impossible for them to go wrong, it is because of their *strength*. Their inability is like that of the athlete who cannot act the invalid, the giant who cannot be a pygmy. I say again, vice *per se* is always easier than virtue: self-indulgence is always easier than self-denial; to resist temptation is always more difficult than to yield; to utter the angry word or strike the angry blow requires far less power than to restrain the tongue or withhold the hand.

Joseph Cracklin [pertly, looking about for applause]. Some men have found out that there was considerable power in one of Sullivan's angry blows. [*Laughter, more or less restrained.*]

Dr. Dix [with cold displeasure]. We have been speaking of "smartness," and we have thus far used the word in its colloquial sense. When correctly used, however, it has for one of its meanings shallow aggressiveness of speech or manner, with the added notion of impertinence. I think your attempted witticism, Cracklin, and more particularly your manner of making it, was a very good illustration of that kind of smartness. It was

shallow, because it betrayed a total failure to comprehend the subject we were discussing; and, in fact, had not the slightest bearing upon it. We were speaking of a power far greater than that of a puny arm of flesh and bone, even that of the notorious bully you named. It was impertinent, that is, not pertinent, for the same reason. It was aggressive — not in respectfully expressing honest dissent, which would have been proper and welcome — but in interrupting our discussion for the mere sake of displaying your wit.

Joseph Cracklin. I beg your pardon.

Dr. Dix. That is “smart” in the colloquial sense, Cracklin. It is right, and therefore strong. The other was wrong and therefore weak. We will let the one offset the other. And now let us return from the digression.

Virtue is a constant resistance to force, which tends to draw the soul to its ruin; vice is the simple, passive yielding to that force. The universal experience of mankind has led to the comparison of virtue to an ascent hard to climb, and of vice to a descent down which it is easy to sink. What does Virgil say on this subject, Miss Perkins?

Susan Perkins. “*Facilis descensus Averno; sed revocare gradum, — hoc opus, hic labor est.*”¹

Jonathan Tower. But simply because virtue is a climbing and vice a sinking, I don’t see how it follows that the good are necessarily cleverer or more powerful. I happen to know some clever people who are not regarded as very good, and I also know some very good people who seem to me rather weak than strong.

Dr. Dix. You have evidently misunderstood me. Perhaps you thought I was speaking of persons, when, in reality, I was speaking of actions.

Jonathan Tower. Pardon me, Dr. Dix, I have sup-

¹ The descent to Avernus is easy; but to return, — this is the difficulty, this the task.

posed from the beginning that the subject was one of persons. I thought the very question we were discussing was, whether, as Williams expressed it, "bad boys are smarter than good boys."

Dr. Dix. Not precisely. Virtue and vice is the subject we are discussing. I asked at the outset whether it requires more power or cleverness to do wrong than to do right, and Virgil's famous epigram, quoted just before you spoke, treats of actions, not of persons.

Jonathan Tower. I cannot understand the essential difference between speaking of *actions* and speaking of *actors*. Does not either word imply the other?

Dr. Dix. There is a very essential difference, my boy, between speaking of an action and speaking of the actor. Though, as you say, one implies the other, yet I should not necessarily pronounce one good or bad, weak or strong, because the other is. We are told that one may hate sin, but love the sinner. Wise people very often do foolish things, and foolish people, wise ones. So, though I may say with perfect truth that all evil is weakness and folly, and that all good is strength and wisdom, I could not say with truth that all good men are in all respects strong and wise, or that all bad men are in all respects weak and foolish. History is full of famous wicked men, and we all know plenty of good souls, strong and wise only in their goodness.

In general, however, it is fair to presume that among the doers of wise things there are more wise men than among the doers of foolish things, and *vice versa*. From this presumption alone I should feel perfectly safe in declaring that by far the larger share of the world's intellect and power is arrayed on the side of virtue. And when we look abroad we find that universal testimony confirms the deduction. The most intelligent and powerful nations are, on the whole, the most virtuous.

Charles Fox. I have read that criminals are, as a class, men of a very low order of intellect.

Dr. Dix. A state prison warden of many years' experience once told me that the most intellectual prisoner that had ever been under his charge was distinguished, not for any special breadth or depth of mental power, but simply for an intense keenness of cunning, which operated in the narrow circle of first defrauding his victims, and then attempting to outwit his keepers. Considered by itself, there is a wonderful amount of ingenuity displayed in the invention of instruments and other aids to the commission of crime; but how utterly insignificant it appears, both in quantity and quality, when compared with that employed for the benefit of mankind!

Of course, the single instance mentioned by the warden would not prove a universal rule; but it is safe to say that there is some fatal deficiency in the intellectual as well as in the moral make-up of every thoroughly bad man.

In the conflict between good and evil that is ever in progress, it is a most fortunate thing for us all that the enormous preponderance of intellect and power is on the side of good. It is to this that we owe the practically perfect safety with which we go unarmed and unattended from ocean to ocean. The bad are everywhere, and fain would make us their victims; but the strong right arm and the vigilant eye of justice-loving humanity are ever about us, and with so mighty a champion, we look upon evil lurking in its dark caves and feel no fear.

Archibald Watson. Men are robbed and murdered sometimes.

Dr. Dix. Alas, yes. We rarely take up a newspaper without seeing accounts of thefts, robberies, and murderous outrages. It is not that evil is not mighty and prevalent, but that good is vastly more mighty and vastly more prevalent. So great is the difference that, as I said, we have practically no fears for ourselves or for our friends. So little, as a rule, do we actually

suffer of wrong from our fellow-men, so little do we suffer from the combined efforts of all the intellect and power of the wicked, that, in order to complain at all, we pour out our bitter bewailings upon some petty three-penny tax or other that we feel to be unjust! Think of it, scholars! Think what might be the condition of the world to-day if evil were actually more clever and strong than good! What would become of our asylums, hospitals, and life-saving stations; our schools, churches, and libraries? What would become of veneration for the aged, of respect and homage to woman, and of the almost universal value placed upon sacred human life? In short, what would become of the law and order, national and international, which protects not only the humblest subject or citizen in his rights, but the feeblest state in its independence?

Frank Williams. Dr. Dix, when I said that good boys were not so smart as bad boys, I was n't talking of *men*, I was talking of *boys*.

Dr. Dix. And, pray, what should make a difference? The proverb says, "The boy is father of the man." Our other proverb, "There is no rule without exceptions," applies here, of course; but you will find it to be generally the case that the bad men of to-day are the bad boys of twenty years ago, and *vice versa*.

VII.

MORE ABOUT GOOD BOYS AND "FUN."

Dr. Dix. One of the specifications in the recent indictment of the typical good boy was, that he "is afraid of a little fun," and another was that "he does n't know how to have fun, any way."

Defining fun as malicious mischief, or as injurious pleasure, we admit both specifications, with no palliating circumstances.

But if you mean by fun pure, honest enjoyment of the pleasures so lavishly given us to enjoy, we deny both specifications.

An indispensable requisite to the highest enjoyment is a healthy, natural condition of mind and body. You have all heard of the miserable dyspeptic who finds no pleasure in the most luxurious table, and of the healthy hunger which finds a sweet morsel in a dry crust. The principle applies to all kinds and conditions of real enjoyment.

Thomas Dunn. You speak of *real* enjoyment; do you mean to imply that there is none in what are called forbidden pleasures—that wickedness actually renders men incapable of real enjoyment?

Dr. Dix. I mean that forbidden pleasures always entail more pain in the end than pleasure. So, if we strike the balance, or get what I may call the algebraic sum, it is nothing—less than nothing. I mean that every sinful indulgence diminishes the power of enjoying even the forbidden pleasure itself, until at last the power of enjoyment of the good or the bad may be utterly lost.

The opium-eater always secures the greatest effect from his first dose, because his nerve-system is then in its most vigorous condition, and therefore most capable of responding to the stimulant. His next dose must be larger to produce an equal effect upon his impaired susceptibility.

Thomas Dunn. You are speaking now of an indulgence which we all know to be injurious. Are there not immoral indulgences which are not necessarily injurious, — that is, I mean, to the health?

Dr. Dix. Do you know of any such?

Thomas Dunn. I know a good many that are *called* immoral, — going to the theatre, for instance, or dancing.

Dr. Dix. I cannot see how anything that is not injurious to the mind, body, or heart can be immoral. If drinking wine and smoking cigarettes were not injurious, they would not be sinful; if malicious pranks upon our fellow-pupils were not injurious, both to them and much more so to ourselves, — for health of body is not the only or the most important kind of health, — they would not be forbidden pleasures.

Henry Phillips. You just remarked, Dr. Dix, that health of body is not the most important kind of health.

Dr. Dix. I did.

Henry Phillips. Is not health of body the foundation of mental and moral health? and is not the foundation of anything the most important part?

Dr. Dix. The foundation is a *necessary* part, but not the most important. That which rests on the foundation, that for the sake of which the foundation exists, is the most *important*. As to whether physical health is the foundation of mental and moral health, we say, on general principles, that if one member of an organism suffers all will suffer. The mind suffers with the body, the body with the mind, and, if the law is true, the heart must suffer with both.

Louisa Thompson. It does not seem to me that the law *can* be true. Have not some of the most famous minds been found in inferior, weakly, and diseased bodies, from old Æsop down to George Eliot?

Julia Taylor. And do we not often hear of poor suffering invalids who show the best and noblest hearts?

Dr. Dix. Yes, all that is true. Still such apparent exceptions neither prove nor disprove the law. It can never be known whether those famous intellects were really strengthened or brightened by physical defects and sufferings. Disease often stimulates the faculties to abnormal but short-lived brilliancy; but is that real strength? We do not look upon the maniacal strength which fever sometimes gives as real strength; certainly not as we look upon the substantial and enduring strength of health. Some physiologists regard that which we call genius as nothing more nor less than a form of brain disease.

If only the physically feeble were intellectually and morally strong, the case would be different; but the truth is, that the majority of the world's leaders in great moral reforms as well as in intellectual achievements have been blessed with bodily health and vigor, have had the *mens sana in corpore sano*.¹

As to the saintly invalids of whom Miss Taylor spoke, we have all known of them; of all mankind they are most deserving of love, tender sympathy, and admiration: they prove to us that disease may exert a most benign influence upon men, that "as gold is tried by fire, so the heart is tried by pain:" they show us what lessons of heroic patience and sweet resignation may be learned by physical suffering. Yet who knows that the hearts even of these sainted sufferers might not have throbbed with still stronger love if the blood that vitalized them had been richer and warmer?

Do not, I pray you, misunderstand me. For no con-

¹ A sound mind in a sound body.

sideration would I disparage the merits of any of my fellow-men, — least of all those who most deserve our sympathy and appreciation; nay, our emulation. It is their fate to suffer rather than to do, and to suffer with godlike patience and fortitude is even nobler than to achieve with godlike power; in its influence upon other hearts and lives, even its achievements may be more beneficent.

But, though disease may sometimes exert a most holy influence, it is not only never to be sought, but it is always to be avoided by every means in our power, — except the violation of a higher duty. Body, mind, and heart are all stronger, better qualified to do their duty, in health than in disease.

And, to return to the subject with which we began this morning's Talk, one of our duties is to *enjoy*. We exist not only to make others happy, but to be happy ourselves. Both happiness and misery are contagious.

Other things being equal, our happiness is in proportion to our health; and again, other things being equal, our health is in proportion to our goodness, — that is, as I have already shown, in proportion as we obey the laws of our being.

Jonathan Tower. Dr. Dix, what do you mean by "other things being equal"?

Dr. Dix. By other things, I mean in the one case *character* and external circumstances, and in the other *natural constitution* and external circumstances. Thus, the bedridden invalid may sing with joy, while the vigorous criminal who never suffered a day's illness endures mental tortures that only he and such as he knows; or while the mother, herself in perfect health perhaps, is weeping for her children, and will not be comforted because they are not. Thus also one with inherited disease, or one placed in circumstances beyond his control, or one heroically discharging his duty, may to the very best of his ability obey the laws of his being, and yet

be sick unto death; while another who cares little for law or duty may live on in comparative health.

But, "other things being equal," both health and happiness are in exact proportion to goodness.

"*The good boy does n't know how to have fun*"? I tell you he is the only one who *does* know how to have it. Compare his cheek ruddy, his eye bright, his laugh loud and ringing, his pulses bounding, from his faithful obedience to nature's laws; his brow open and unclouded, his heart loving, light, and hopeful, from his obedience to the law of right, — compare these with the cheek pallid, the eye listless, the blood vitiated and sluggish, from nature's laws violated; the heart heavy, filled with dull, aching discontent, from the ever-living sense of wrongs done in the past and unrepented in the present, — compare all these, I say, and then judge who it is that "knows how to have fun."

VIII.

CLEVERNESS AND COURAGE.

Helen Sawyer. Dr. Dix, I think we are all convinced that *in reality* the intelligence, power, and courage of the world are on the side of virtue rather than vice; and yet it seems to me that it is very common for even older people than we are to look upon good people as rather slow and uninteresting, and upon bad people — at least *somewhat* bad people — as — as —

Dr. Dix. As fast and interesting?

Helen Sawyer. As more clever, and enterprising, and courageous, and all that.

Dr. Dix. Among many unthinking people no doubt such an impression prevails, — only, however, among those who know very little of what real goodness is. If there is any cause for it, aside from perversity of heart and judgment, it must consist in certain advantages which the unscrupulous possess over those who are restrained by their sense of right and wrong. To illustrate: Witty things may be said on certain occasions which would be wrong on account of their unkindness, irreverence, impropriety, or perhaps their profanity. A good man would not say them even if they came unbidden into his mind; a bad man would. There are persons who cannot be witty or brilliant without being at the same time cruel, immodest, or profane. A very cheap kind of wit and brilliancy, is it not?

Again, keen, shrewd, brilliant acts may be performed which would be wrong on account of their unkindness or positive dishonesty. A good man would not perform them, not because he lacks the shrewdness or the bril-

liancy, — he may possess these qualities or he may not; a bad man would not hesitate, if he thought of them, and thus he might gain a reputation for “smartness” and enterprise which his honest, honorable neighbor must needs forego. Scholars, do you know any such clever men in public or in private life? Do you envy the reputation they have gained? How do you suppose they are regarded in the secret hearts even of those who profess to admire them? With contempt, — yes, even by those who applaud the loudest. Many and many a time I have seen men laughing at the wicked drollery or cunning of some smart buffoon or scapegrace. Did he fondly imagine that he was winning their real admiration? Perhaps he did not care, so long as he won their noisy applause; but the fact is, there was not one of them who did not despise him in his inmost heart, not one of them who would not feel degraded by having him at his own table or fireside.

Archibald Watson. Those of his own kind would n’t feel so, would they?

Dr. Dix. I believe that even those of his own kind, congenial spirits, would, way down deep, feel a contempt for him, as well as for themselves for being of his kind. There is implanted somewhere in every human heart an unconquerable contempt for evil and admiration for good. Few men are so abandoned that they do not honestly wish their children to follow a path different from their own. There are times in the lives of all bad men when this inner sense awakens, and they feel the impulse to escape from their degradation; to be something like the good and the noble, whom they cannot but admire. In this inner sense, which, I believe, never utterly dies, lies the germ of hope for every living soul.

For a reason similar to that I have given, another common impression among the unthinking is that the good are apt to be wanting in hardy courage. A bad man will fight — sometimes, not always — when a good

man will not simply because his conscience will not let him. Fighting, as a test of courage, is apt to be greatly overestimated. There are few men, either good or bad, who cannot or will not fight on occasion. The whole human race has descended from a fighting ancestry. Every war has demonstrated this fact; and how the best compare with the worst, when the occasion renders fighting necessary and therefore justifiable, the story of the New York regiment to which I have already alluded most strikingly illustrates. When fighting is neither necessary nor right, it generally requires more real courage to resist the impulse to fight than to yield to it, inasmuch as it is harder for most men to endure ridicule, the suspicion of cowardice, or the smarting sense of wrong unavenged, than to endure physical pain and danger. This is not always true, of course. We must admit that there are some physical cowards who refuse to fight, not because they think it wrong, but because they are afraid of the bullet, or, among the more vulgar, of the bloody nose. That is a kind of peaceableness which is not goodness. It is even worse than the combativeness of the wicked man; for physical courage is a virtue, — one of a low order, it is true, when unattended by other virtues, one which we share with the brute creation, but still a virtue, — whereas cowardice, whether physical or moral, is not only no virtue, but one of the most justly despised of all despicable traits.

If, then, there is a boy among you who, on being insulted, refuses to fight, before you stigmatize him as a coward, satisfy yourselves *why* he refuses. If it is because it is against his conscience, admire him, honor him, crown him with the olive wreath of a victor; for he is a conqueror of the most heroic type, he is greater than one that taketh a city. If, on the other hand, it is certain — but how can you know? — that it is only because he is afraid of a black eye or a bloody nose, why, then you are at liberty to despise him, or rather

his cowardice, a little more even than you despise the cowardice of the bully who insulted him.

Charles Fox. Why do you say *cowardice* of the bully who insulted him?

Dr. Dix. Because a bully is almost always a coward. In the case supposed he is certain to be one. It requires not even physical courage to insult one who will not resent the insult.

Now, boys, don't look so complacently warlike. I have not been pronouncing or even hinting a eulogy upon the "manly art." I said distinctly that the good boy will not fight unless he is absolutely compelled; but it is n't because he is *afraid* to fight: the only thing he is afraid of is *wrong*. And, girls, don't look so indifferent and uninterested. There are more ways of fighting than with the fists — there are other wounds than those of the body. Good people are generally terribly shocked at a desperate set-to between two fiery-tempered, brawny-armed fellows, their eyes glaring, their breasts heaving, their muscles straining, their blood, perhaps, flowing. And well they may be shocked, — it is a disgraceful scene, worthy only of game-cocks and bull-dogs, a scene that rational beings should be ashamed of, as they would be ashamed of wallowing in the mud, grubbing their food out of the gutter, or of any other act of pure bestiality. But, brutal as it is, and disgusting to all persons of true refinement, there are other ways of fighting that do not bring into play even the virtues of brute courage and fortitude, ways meaner and more contemptible, if less brutish. Better be brutish than fiendish.

Helen Mar. Are those the ways girls fight?

Dr. Dix [*joining in the general laughter*]. Did I seem to imply that? If I did, I most sincerely beg your pardon. Those ways of fighting are not confined to any sex, class, or age. I am happy to believe we have as little of them in this school as in any civilized community of equal number.

But the time approaches to engage in an entirely different kind of contest, one neither mean nor brutal, but most honorable and ennobling.

Helen Mar. Before the tocsin sounds for that struggle, may I ask whether the desire for victory, which must be the chief motive in all contests, is not in itself purely selfish? The expressions "magnanimous foe," "generous rivalry," and the like, which we so often hear, have always seemed to me somewhat paradoxical. Even in our studies, the desire to stand first involves the desire that some one else shall stand second. How can that justly be called magnanimous or generous?

Dr. Dix. The question does you great credit, Miss Mar. But we are none of us accountable for the possession or lack of natural endowments. To make the best use of those we possess is a solemn obligation which must be evident to all. If we outstrip others in the race, it is strong presumptive evidence that we are faithfully fulfilling that solemn obligation, and we are justly entitled to the satisfaction which always rewards the performance of duty. This is the only satisfaction resulting from victory which is really magnanimous or generous. If we desire either that the endowments of others shall be inferior to our own, or that they shall neglect them for the sake of our triumph, we are not merely selfish, but actually malevolent.

But the desire to do something better than has yet been done is neither selfish nor malevolent. It is grand, noble. It is the lever which has lifted the race of men throughout the generations of the past to higher and higher planes of being, and which will continue to lift them throughout the generations to come.

IX.

THE BATTLE.

Dr. Dix. Scholars, it is not my intention to appropriate any part of this short period to individual discipline. The time is to be kept sacred to the purpose originally announced. One of the most effective means, however, of accomplishing that purpose is to take advantage of passing occurrences in school life, and I shall begin with the very unpleasant occurrence of yesterday.

In last week's Talk I hoped I had impressed you all with not only the wickedness, but the vulgarity also, the low brutality, of pugilistic encounters. I learn this morning, however, that after school yesterday two young men, from whom I had every reason to expect better things, committed the very fault I had so recently condemned. [*Hisses, which the Doctor's raised hand instantly checks.*]

I can account for the unpleasant circumstance only in one of two ways: Either it was due to a deliberate defiance of my expressed opinions and sentiments, and in deliberate opposition to the influence I was trying to exert —

Geoffrey Jenkins. Dr. Dix, I beg you will not think that.

Archibald Watson. And I, too, Dr. Dix. I assure you it was not so.

Dr. Dix. I am very glad to hear so much from you both. The only other supposition, then, I can entertain is, that our Talk suggested and actually led to your committing the offence which was its subject.

Although, as I have implied, your formal trial and punishment must be reserved for another hour, yet you may, if you are willing, state whether this supposition is correct or not. Jenkins ?

Geoffrey Jenkins. Well, it came about in this way : We got to talking after school about what you said about fighting. Watson said he believed every fellow that was not a coward would fight if he were insulted. I told him I did n't believe anything of the sort. He insisted upon it, and said that I would fight myself if I were insulted badly enough. I said I would n't, and I was no coward either. He said he would like to see it tested. I said I *could n't* be insulted, any way. "Oh," said he, "so *that's* the kind of fellow you are, is it ?" Well, this made me pretty mad ; but I kept quiet. I only explained that anybody who insulted me would be too low to be noticed. He said all that was very grand talk, but if the trial really came I would n't find it so easy as I thought. Well, the talk went on in that style, when all at once, before I knew what his game was — *He* may tell the rest.

Dr. Dix. Go on, Watson.

Archibald Watson [*hanging his head*]. I slapped him over the mouth. I only wanted to see if he was the saint and hero he pretended to be.

Dr. Dix. And you, Jenkins ?

Geoffrey Jenkins. My fist struck out before I could help it. He did it so quickly he did n't give me time to think. [*Applause, which the Doctor does not check.*]

Dr. Dix. And you, Watson, having satisfied your curiosity, having found out that he was n't "the saint and hero he pretended to be," took the blow in good part, laughed, and asked his pardon ?

Archibald Watson [*coloring with shame*]. N-no, sir. He hurt me a good deal, and—and I struck back, and—

Dr. Dix. Well, what then, Jenkins ?

Geoffrey Jenkins. Then we had it.

Dr. Dix. Yes, your appearance indicates pretty plainly that you both "had it." [*Laughter.*] Your senseless quarrel is a fair type of quarrels in general. Very rarely are both sides equally to blame; still more rarely is one side altogether blameless. Perhaps in the present instance one of the parties is as near an approach to —

Archibald Watson. Dr. Dix, may I say something more?

Dr. Dix. Go on.

Archibald Watson. I have been thinking about the affair ever since it occurred, and I want to say that I was entirely to blame [*Voices.* "Yes." "That's true."] — and I want to ask his pardon here and now. [*Applause.*]

Geoffrey Jenkins. No. I was partly to blame. [*Voices.* "No!" "No!"] Yes, I ought to have carried out my boast.

Archibald Watson. But he *couldn't*. I didn't give him time to think. His fist struck out almost of its own accord. He couldn't help it. And he served me right, any way. [*Applause.*]

Geoffrey Jenkins. It is not quite true about my not being able to help it. A sort of half-thought flashed through my mind, "Now is the time to prove my boasting true. Now is the time to do what Dr. Dix talked about;" — but with it came the other thought, "I'd like to do so well enough; but I'd rather show him that he can't slap *my* mouth without getting his own slapped a good deal harder," — and I want to ask his pardon for that.

Archibald Watson. Well, any way, I was the most to blame. Wasn't I, Dr. Dix?

Dr. Dix. Your schoolmates evidently think you were; and, since you ask, I have no hesitation in pronouncing you *very much* the more to blame. According to the account, in which you both agree, you were the entirely unprovoked aggressor.

Archibald Watson. And he was not at all to blame, was he ?

Dr. Dix. That does not concern you so much as it concerns him. He insists upon it that he *was*. Well, boys, in spite of me and my plans, you seem to have pretty nearly settled the whole affair between yourselves. So I will say what little remains to be said about it now. You were both to blame, though in very different degrees : one of you for his uncalled-for, his utterly unjustifiable insult to his friend and school-mate ; and the other for not yielding to the noble impulse of his higher nature, which, though feeble and momentary, he acknowledges he felt. Both of you are grievously to blame for the unrestrained rage to which you afterwards gave way. The actual physical pain you inflicted upon each other was the least part of your offence, and I will allow it to stand for a part of your punishment. Not only this, but so far as that physical pain cleared away the angry clouds from your brows and from your hearts, and led you to the magnanimous confessions you have publicly made this morning, I consider it a positive good. It certainly was far better than an outward peace preserved at the cost of bitter wrath and hatred rankling in secret.

So now you may shake hands in token of your mutual forgiveness and the renewal of a friendship which, I hope, will be strengthened by the wrench it has received. We will consider the purely personal part of this discussion at an end.

X.

WARS AND RUMORS OF WARS.

Dr. Dix. When I began these Talks, I was not so sanguine as to expect that the wrong pointed out would thenceforth be invariably shunned. If evil were so easily abolished and good so easily established, the world would have reached perfection ages ago, and the occupation of those who seek to do good, like Othello's, would be gone.

But character is not spoken into existence by the utterance of a few words, as were the palaces of the "Arabian Nights" by the magician's voice. It is formed by long, slow processes. It grows, like a tree, cell by cell, fibre by fibre, branch by branch; it is builded, stone by stone, like real palaces whose foundations are on the solid earth. But if it cannot be spoken into existence, neither can it be destroyed in an instant, by the magician's voice. Once builded, it is firm and solid "from turret to foundation stone." It is even firmer and more solid than any material palace or castle; for no enemy can batter down its walls, no treacherous torch can reduce it to a heap of ruins. No hand but the owner's can harm or deface it.

I expect no magical results from these appeals. I hope and expect something better than magic, — progress towards the good and the true, which shall be *real* progress, slow though it may be.

The incident of yesterday neither surprised nor disheartened me. Our Talk against fighting did not prevent an actual fight from taking place within a week. According to the account given by the participants, it

even suggested and in a certain way induced it. Did the Talk then do no good? Nay, did it not do positive harm? I trow not. I will not be over-anxious; for when the physician attempts to cure a disease, he sometimes finds its peculiar symptoms aggravated, rather than reduced, by his first treatment: but that does not trouble him; he knows that he must awaken the enemy before he can drive him out.

I do not expect that talking will altogether prevent fights and quarrels in the future; but, scholars, is it too much to hope that it will make them fewer, less bitter, and sooner mended? that it will make them more odious in your eyes, and make peace, harmony, and love more beautiful?

I have already characterized pugilistic encounters as low, vulgar, and brutal. Of all forms of contention among human beings, they seem to me the most so. I cannot perceive any respect in which man-fights or boy-fights of this kind differ essentially from dog-fights, except that, as a general rule, the dog exhibits more desperate pluck and fortitude than the man. Very few men would allow themselves to be torn limb from limb rather than relinquish their desperate grip on the adversary, as many a dog has done.

There is sublimity as well as terror in the spectacle of armies battling with each other amid the roaring of artillery, the flashing and clashing of steel, and the thundering, rushing tread of armed hosts. Even the spectacle of a pair of duellists, calmly facing each other with their deadly weapons, horrible indeed though it be, cannot inspire the utter disgust and loathing in the civilized mind that it feels at the sight of a pair of human beings, insane with rage, doing their utmost to pound the "divine semblance" out of each other's faces with their fists.

The human hand is a noble and beautiful object. Whether it wield the author's pen, the artist's pencil,

or the artificer's tool; whether it invoke the soul of music, thrill the heart of friendship or love with its warm grasp, or sway multitudes with its wide sweep, the human hand is a noble and beautiful object to contemplate;— but the human *fist!* faugh! how does it differ from a hammer or a club, except that it is not so heavy, hard, or deadly? As a weapon it is inferior to almost any other that nature has provided. Carnivora have terrible teeth and claws; the larger herbivora have horns and hoofs; other animals are armed with swords, arrows, or stings, — each kind showing that in its combats it only carries out the design of nature. Man was made for nobler things than fighting with his fists or with less vulgar weapons.

And now I wish you to notice how, as we ascend in the scale of being, we find the beastly instinct of fighting less and less developed. Savage man, in all ages and in all countries, is continually at war with his fellow-savage. The barbarian enjoys longer or shorter intervals of peace according to his degree of advancement beyond savagery; while civilized man frequently lives through entire generations without knowing war save in history. As the world advances in civilization we see the tendency still more strikingly shown. In ancient times war seems to have been the chief occupation of even the most civilized nations. The wonder is that, with such continual cutting and slashing at one another, such endless pillaging and burning, the human race, with the works of its hands, was not altogether exterminated.

Thomas Dunn. Their weapons were not so effective as those of modern times.

Dr. Dix. True. If they had been as effective, wars could not have been protracted through whole generations, as they sometimes were. The superiority of modern arms is often assigned as the reason why there is less fighting than formerly. Doubtless this is one great

reason ; but another and more adequate explanation is the improved moral and intellectual status of modern man over his ancient progenitor. As his intellect advances, he devises more and more effective means of destroying life ; but meanwhile his heart and soul keep pace with his intellect, and hence his disposition to make wanton use of his deadly inventions diminishes, and his disposition to settle his differences by arbitration increases.

Florence Hill. Do you suppose the time will come when war will be entirely unknown, when all disagreements between nations will be settled by arbitration ?

Dr. Dix. The civilized part of the world have the best of reasons for looking forward to such a time. It is a point in perfection towards which civilized man is slowly but surely advancing.

Florence Hill. That will be the time when men shall "beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning-hooks."

Dr. Dix. Try to imagine such a golden age, scholars. No repetition possible of such horrors as your fathers and mothers witnessed only a short quarter-century ago ; no such evils as exist even in the peaceful to-day ; no millions of treasure wasted in the making of arms and munitions and in the building of fortifications ; no hundreds of thousands of able-bodied men taken from the ranks of useful labor to consume in idleness the products of others' industry !

Florence Hill. Do you believe, Dr. Dix, that such an age will actually come ?

Dr. Dix. Why should I not ? The history, philosophy, and faith of mankind all point to that glorious consummation.

George Williams. And yet when it comes there will be something lost to the world.

Dr. Dix. Possibly. The proverb says, "There is no great gain without some small loss." What do you think will be lost ?

George Williams. Well, it seems to me such an age must be exceedingly tame. There will be no grand military heroes to admire, — no Grants, nor Shermans, nor Sheridans, nor Custers, nor Stonewall Jacksons. In private life there will be no father nor brother who has shown his courage and patriotism by going to the wars.

Florence Hill. Among all the horrors and sacrifices of our great war, did it not have at least one great and good effect? Did it not make men and women suddenly forget their selfishness and their avarice, and become devoted patriots?

Dr. Dix. We will reply next Wednesday.

XI.

WHEN THE GOOD BOY WILL FIGHT.

Dr. Dix. If there were no wars, there would certainly be no grand military heroes, no soldier fathers, brothers, husbands, or lovers to admire and be proud of — or to *mourn*.

But Peace has its heroes as well as War. There is other glory than that of the battlefield. The most heroic bravery may be shown in saving life as well as in destroying it. Does a young man weary of the tameness of peace, and thirst for the glory that heroic self-sacrifice brings? There is no lack of opportunity; the bravest soldier that ever charged battery, or leaped over parapet, was no braver than the physician or the nurse who remains unflinchingly at the post of duty, while others are fleeing from the pestilence that wasteth at noonday; or the fireman who dares wounds and death more terrible than those from the bullet or the bayonet; or the engineer who saves his train at the cost of his own life; or the ship captain who will not leave his sinking wreck until all others are saved, from the cabin passenger to the miserable stowaway; or the lifeboatman; or any one else who flings himself into the breach at the trumpet-call of duty, — not, mark you, to shoot and cut and thrust and stab, not to kill, *but to save!*

No opportunity for heroism when wars shall have been banished from earth? *Think of Father Damien!*

Susan Perkins. Can there really be such a thing as a righteous war?

Dr. Dix. Most people think so. We Americans look upon all our great wars as righteous, at least on one side.

Susan Perkins. And I suppose those who fought on the other side thought the same for *their* side ?

Dr. Dix. Unquestionably.

Susan Perkins. But *both* sides could n't be in the right.

Dr. Dix. That seems evident.

Susan Perkins. Does the side that is in the right *always* win the victory, as we Americans have always done ?

Dr. Dix [*smiling*]. "We Americans" have not always been victorious ; in our last war half of us were defeated. Now let me ask *you* a question : If millions of civilized people think one thing right, and millions of other civilized people think just the opposite, who is to decide which is really the right ?

Susan Perkins. Why, I suppose the stronger party will decide.

Dr. Dix. When strength has been appealed to, strength has always decided ; and the world has generally concurred in the decision. "Might makes right."

Susan Perkins. But it is n't always really true, is it, that might makes right ?

Dr. Dix. By no means. But in purely political wars, not involving any great moral question, it has always been so regarded. The party that revolted against the existing form of government, if successful, were "glorious revolutionists ;" if defeated, they were "traitors and rebels."

Susan Perkins. I don't understand how the time can ever come when it will be otherwise.

Dr. Dix. As I said, the nations are growing more intelligent and more humane. The time was when it was thought not only just, but perfectly rational, to decide by a mortal combat between private individuals which of them was in the right. The world has outgrown this palpable absurdity. Why should it not in time grow intelligent enough to perceive that a national

combat is no more rational a criterion of right and justice than a private combat is ?

Susan Perkins. Then, if the stronger nation is not to decide, who will ?

Dr. Dix. If what are called the "Laws of Nations" are not definite enough in themselves to settle a disagreement between two nations or two parts of the same nation, it will, by common consent, be referred to a commission of other friendly powers. This is what we mean by arbitration. What is the most famous instance of the sort that you know of ?

Susan Perkins. The commission that sat at Geneva on the Alabama Claims.

Dr. Dix. Yes. Undoubtedly it prevented what, less than a century ago, would have been a long and bloody war.

Susan Perkins. That might always have been done, might it not ?

Dr. Dix. Certainly, if only the parties interested had agreed to it.

Susan Perkins. Then I don't understand how any war that was ever fought can be called a righteous war.

Dr. Dix. Simply because it "takes two to make a bargain." It is not enough for one side to be willing to appeal to arbitration. If one side will not assent to this peaceable mode of settlement, then nothing remains for the other side but to fight or submit to what it considers wrong. As the world advances, the general sentiment of humanity will grow so strong in favor of arbitration, and its indignation at the barbarous criminality of forcing a war will be so overpowering, that no nation will dare to brave it. Wars will go out of fashion as duels have already gone.

Florence Hill. Dr. Dix, you spoke of one nation being forced to fight or submit to wrong. Are we not taught that it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong ?

Dr. Dix. Better to suffer wrong than to do wrong, *always*, either for a man or for a nation. But, though we may rightfully submit to wrong in our own persons, we have no right to allow others to suffer through our neglect. Especially is it our duty to see that our beloved country suffers no wrong from its enemies that we can prevent by any personal sacrifice; to see that future generations inherit no burden of injustice or oppression from our cowardice or neglect of duty. It is because our fathers did their duty in this respect so nobly and heroically that we are now enjoying our inalienable rights to liberty and the pursuit of happiness, with no earthly power to disturb us or make us afraid.

Charles Fox. Is it ever right to fight except as a soldier for one's country?

Dr. Dix. "Ever" is a very comprehensive word. I can truly say that I never saw the time in my own life when I thought it was right for *me*, and I hope you will never see the day when it will be right for *you*.

Charles Fox. But it *may* come, may it not?

Dr. Dix [*laughing*]. How natural it is for a boy to love to talk about fighting! If you should ever see as much of it as my comrades and I saw during the war, perhaps it will not seem so fascinating to you. Man is a combative animal; but he is generally pretty easily satisfied: a few weeks in the hospital are likely to cure him entirely.

Well, since you insist upon it, I believe I made the statement a while ago that the good boy will not fight unless he is absolutely compelled. That implies that there may be circumstances when it is not only not wrong, but positively his duty to fight.

Fighting is not wrong in itself: it is the hatred, cruelty, injustice, selfishness, pride, vanity, greed, or unreasoning anger that so often accompanies fighting that is wrong.

Jonathan Tower. You said a good boy will not fight unless he is absolutely compelled. Even a coward will fight then. I have read that the most timid animals sometimes defend themselves fiercely when driven to desperation.

Dr. Dix. The time when the coward will fight may be the very time when the good and really brave boy will not.

Charles Fox. Dr. Dix, will you please say when you think it would be right to fight, except as a soldier for your country?

Dr. Dix. You seem to think this is one of those occasions. [*Laughter.*] You seem most desperately determined to carry your point, at all events. Well, I will ask you to suppose a case.

Charles Fox. If you should be walking with your mother or sister, and a ruffian should attack her.

Dr. Dix. That *would* be a trying situation, indeed! The boy or man that would not fight then would be rather a sorry specimen of humanity. [*More seriously.*] And, scholars, don't you think the case supposed is an admirable illustration of the situation in which the loyal, patriotic citizen feels himself when his mother country is attacked by ruffians?

Many Voices [*heartily*]. Yes, sir.

Dr. Dix. Yes. There is a very close kinship between the instinct of patriotism in the noble soul and filial affection and faithfulness. Well, you may suppose other cases.

Henry Jones. When you see a big fellow abusing a little one [*glancing resentfully at Joseph Cracklin*].

Joseph Cracklin. Sometimes little fellows deserve to be punished for their insolence.

Dr. Dix [*with keen significance*]. A fellow with a big soul as well as a big body never recognizes "insolence" in a little fellow.

Henry Jones. And I only told him he was a —

Dr. Dix. And a little fellow with a big soul never tries to shield insolence with his little body. But enough of this. Go on with your cases.

Frank Williams. If a burglar should break into your house.

James Murphy. If a robber should attack you in the street.

Dr. Dix. With all due respect to your coolness and courage, boys, I think it scarcely probable that many of you will enjoy such opportunities to display those admirable qualities, however much you may covet them. Never mind doubling up your fists *now*, — there's no immediate danger that I can see. [*Laughter.*]

Without reference to any incident that has occurred among us, let me remind you that there is a wide difference between a blow struck in self-defence and one struck in mere revenge. And let me remind you, boys, and girls too, that there is a kind of self-defence besides that against blows upon the right cheek. There are enemies within our own bosoms far more dangerous than any we are likely to encounter without. Against *them* the good boy and the good girl will fight with all the heroic chivalry they possess.

Mary Rice. I understood you to justify self-defence, Dr. Dix. Are we not told that if any man smite us on the right cheek, we are to turn the other also?

Dr. Dix. I am not aware that I have as yet expressed any decided views on the subject of physical self-defence. We will talk further upon this subject next week.

XII.

WHEN THE GOOD BOY WILL NOT FIGHT.

Dr. Dix. Suppose that when men were struck upon the right cheek they always turned the other also, how would the great aggregate of fighting and quarrelling the world over be affected ?

Mary Rice. It would be very much diminished, of course.

Florence Hill. I should say it would disappear altogether, if everybody acted on that principle, for nobody would strike in the first place.

Dr. Dix. Well, suppose half the world were inclined to strike, but the other half were not inclined to return the blows.

Thomas Dunn. I think the effects would be very different with different people. Some would no doubt be satisfied with the blow they had already given, and would have no disposition to repeat it.

Dr. Dix. Do you think they would have no feeling besides that of satisfaction ?

Thomas Dunn. They might think the blow was deserved, that no more than justice had been done, and they might suppose that the reason why it was not returned was because the other party viewed it in the same light.

Dr. Dix. Even granting this to be the case (which, as human nature is constituted, would not be likely to occur very frequently), how would they probably regard such an exhibition of patient submission to justice ?

Thomas Dunn. They might admire it; that is, if they did n't despise what might seem a want of spirit.

Dr. Dix. But the supposition is that they regard the forbearance shown as due only to the sense of justice.

Thomas Dunn. In that case, of course they could n't but admire it.

Dr. Dix. Don't you think it possible that they might even feel something like regret,—that they might wish they had shown a like forbearance?

Thomas Dunn. Some might feel so.

Dr. Dix. A person of real magnanimity would, would he not?

Thomas Dunn. Yes, sir.

Dr. Dix. And if he were not a person of magnanimity, would it matter very much to the other how he felt?

Thomas Dunn. I suppose not.

Dr. Dix. At all events, the quarrel would be stopped.

Thomas Dunn. It might be, in that case. But there are other people who, if they find they can abuse anybody with impunity, will keep on doing so.

Dr. Dix. Do you think there are many such? Did you ever see an example?

Thomas Dunn. Indeed I have. He is known among schoolboys as a bully. Among grown-up people he has different names. I lived in a town once where there was a man who was always cheating the minister, because he thought he was "too pious to quarrel."

Dr. Dix. And did the minister submit without protest?

Thomas Dunn. I never *heard* of his protesting. All I know is that the same thing was going on when I left the town.

Dr. Dix. What do you think the minister ought to have done?

Thomas Dunn. I think he ought to have prosecuted the rascal for swindling. He ought to have done so for the sake of his family, if not for his own sake. Because he was smitten on his right cheek he had no right to

turn *their* left cheeks also. Because a man took away his coat he had no business to give him *their* cloaks, whatever he did with his own.

Dr. Dix [*coldly*]. It seems to me you make a digression for the sake of the opportunity to be caustic. We were speaking of *quarrelling*, not of prosecution in a court of justice.

Thomas Dunn. Isn't prosecution a species of quarrelling?

Dr. Dix. A court of justice bears a relation to private individuals similar to that which a court of arbitration bears to nations. The legitimate purpose of both is the same: to prevent or settle quarrels and see that justice is done. So, in a legal prosecution of the man who wronged him and his family, your minister could not justly be charged with quarrelling. On the contrary, if he found that personal appeals to the man's conscience and generosity were of no avail, he should be credited with resorting to the only peaceable means of righting a wrong that lay within his power, arbitration.

Is it not possible, however, that the good man feared lest the remedy might prove worse than the evil, — lest, in short, it might prove more costly to go to law than to submit to the imposition?

Thomas Dunn. My uncle offered to pay all the costs if he would sue the man.

Dr. Dix. Ah, there might be costs that your uncle could not pay. I know something of the relations between country clergymen and their parishioners.

Louisa Thompson. You called a court of justice a court of arbitration to prevent quarrels. In reality is there not more quarrelling there than almost anywhere else? Isn't the prosecution itself generally one long quarrel between the lawyers?

Dr. Dix. We must admit that even lawyers are not free from human imperfections. [*Laughter.*] There

need be no more quarrelling in determining the truth and its proper consequences in a case at law than in a question of science or mathematics. That men pervert and abuse their proper functions in the judicial department of human society, as they do in all other departments, is no reason why the citizen should not perform his own proper function as a member of society.

Not that he should be ready to appeal every trivial disagreement. Generally, not only magnanimity and dignity, but even common sense and common policy, dictate the quiet ignoring of minor injuries from our neighbors.

Florence Hill. Besides, as you said, it *costs* a good deal to go to law: poor people cannot afford it.

Dr. Dix. Yes, indeed, it costs! Often far more than the wrong it cures. But to resent the wrong in other ways is more costly still; for it costs what is more precious than gold and silver. Better suffer in person and property than in heart and character. And, heart and character aside, it is better to make a little concession, even if in doing so we suffer injustice, than to live in unending enmity with our neighbor.

Henry Phillips. Is there not danger that we may encourage our neighbor to continue in his wrong-doing, as the man did that Dunn told us of?

Dr. Dix. That person is an example of only one class of men,—I am happy to believe of only a comparatively small class. The more probable result of our forbearance would be to awaken feelings of shame and repentance in those who have wronged us. Men generally have a pretty fair knowledge of what is right and just. When their judgment is not clouded by anger, hatred, or revenge, they usually know when they are in the wrong, whether they confess it or not. And there is nothing which will sweep away those clouds from their minds like turning the other cheek also. There is nothing like a soft answer to turn away wrath.

One of the most curious and interesting phases of human emotion is that which accompanies a reconciliation after a quarrel. They whose chief object lately seemed to be to injure each other, now vie with each other in friendly words and deeds; whereas each strove to be more haughty, bitter, and unyielding than the other, now the question is, which shall be the more humble and apologetic. In short, the chief object of each now is to undo what before he was most anxious to do. What better acknowledgment could each make that he was mistaken? that all that energy and passion were wasted, — worse than wasted? It seems to me that no lesson can better teach the utter folly as well as wickedness of a quarrel than the absurd inconsistencies between it and the reconciliation which it almost always lies in the power of either party to bring about.

You all know what is meant by “noble revenge.” You have read stories of which that is the *motif*. Other things being equal, are there any stories more stirring? are there any in which your sympathy and admiration for the hero are more strongly aroused?

Helen Mar. I never quite liked the word “revenge” in such stories, notwithstanding the “noble.” In fact, I fail to see how *any* kind of revenge can be noble. You might as well speak of hot ice. I don’t see any essential difference between heaping coals of fire on your enemy’s head and heaping them under his barn, except that heaping them on his head is very much the worse.

Dr. Dix. If the only purpose is to cause suffering, there is no essential difference. No doubt such “noble” revenge is often taken. “I will return him good for evil,” one will say, “until he is ready to sink into the earth for shame. He shall not dare to hold up his head in my presence.” And the added thought may be, “Everybody will then see how magnanimous I am, and how contemptible he is.”

But those whose revenge is really noble have no such

thought. They even lament the pain their return of good for evil may cause. They soften the suffering as much as possible by kind, forgiving words and a charitable palliation of the injury done them. "You did not harm me so very much, after all," they will say. "At all events, it is past now, and the future remains to us both."

Then, too, they know well that such "coals of fire" are beneficent rather than evil in their effects; that they burn out nothing but what is bad, only warming the good to life.

Now, let us suppose them to take the opposite course. Suppose they nourish their wrath, and show in every way they dare their implacable hatred towards those who have injured them: what will be the natural result?

Henry Phillips. Their mutual hatred will grow stronger and stronger.

Dr. Dix. And suppose that opportunities come when they can return evil for evil with interest, and that they improve their opportunities, — what then?

Henry Phillips. Matters will only grow worse and worse.

Dr. Dix. Though by superior force they may, in a sense, be said to vanquish their enemies, will they *really* do so?

Henry Phillips. No, Dr. Dix. Their enemies will only wait for a chance to "get even" with them.

Dr. Dix. And so on, back and forth, perhaps from generation to generation. If a man smite thee on the right cheek, smite him in return; and if he dare not repeat his blow, yet will he find some way to strike thee, — in the dark, perhaps. At all events, he remains thine enemy. But turn to him the other also, and lo! the hand that smote thee is outstretched for thy forgiveness. The only absolute conqueror is Love.

XIII.

"GOODY-GOODY" AND GOOD.

Dr. Dix. You have heard of "hero-worshippers." They are almost as solicitous for the welfare and reputation of their favorites as for their own. They are as sensitive to injustice, and especially to ridicule or contempt that may be cast upon their heroes, as they would be in their own behalf. Now, I think I must be an example of the species, for I acknowledge a sensitiveness in regard to a certain class of my fellow-beings, which some of you have touched more than once. My hero is the good boy; my heroine is the good girl; and you must be careful how you asperse either of these in my hearing, for I shall always be their stanch and loyal defender.

Advertisers of merchandise often warn the public against base imitations, which, they complain, tend to injure the reputation of their wares. Certain classes of people suffer from base imitations, but only in the minds of those who cannot distinguish between the genuine and the spurious. The gallant soldier suffers in reputation from the blustering braggadocio who is at heart as cowardly as he is blustering. The saint suffers from the hypocrite; the true scholar from the pedantic sham who astonishes the ignorant with his vast stories of learning; and I suspect, from some things which have been said and which have formed the subjects of some of our Talks, that my hero and heroine have suffered in your estimation from a similar cause.

There are two kinds of base imitations of the good

boy or girl: First, the real, unmitigated hypocrite who pulls his long face and whines out his sanctimonious cant for the deliberate purpose of concealing his villainy. This species, I am happy to believe, is exceedingly rare among young persons; it generally takes more than twenty-one years to develop that degree of contemptible wickedness; so we will not dwell on the revolting picture. The second kind is the "goody-goody" boy or girl, who is usually rather weak than deliberately wicked, although he may have, without suspecting it, some of the most despicable traits joined to his self-righteousness.

Jonathan Tower. What traits, for example?

Dr. Dix. Well, pusillanimity, vanity, treachery, perhaps from a mistaken sense of duty, uncharitableness, and that same canting sanctimoniousness which I have ascribed to the other and far worse species.

Is it not possible that this is the kind of good boy that some of you had in mind when you compared him so unfavorably with the gay, fascinating bad boy of your fancy? If so, I am not sure that I don't agree with you. Many so-called bad boys are far more worthy of respect, trust, and admiration than boys of this type.

But the goody-goody boy and the good boy are no more alike than a solid gold eagle is like a poorly executed counterfeit.

Now, scholars, let me give you my ideal of the really good boy, my hero,—and I wish you to understand that I use the word "boy" generically, as we use the word "man," to denote both sexes.

This is the hero, the knight *sans peur et sans reproche*:¹—

He is *truthful*. He would scorn any approach to a lie as he would scorn any other act of meanness or of cowardice. Do you despise him for this? do you admire a liar?

¹ Without fear and without reproach.

He is *generous*, — in thought, word, and deed. He thinks the best of you that you will allow him to think. If others vilify you behind your backs, he takes up the cudgel in your defence. If you are in trouble, he does his best to help you. How do you like that? Do you prefer a boy who thinks and speaks evil of you, who is selfish and unaccommodating, and who laughs at your trouble?

Geoffrey Jenkins. Dr. Dix, one of the worst boys in town (at least he is called so; he has been expelled from school so often that they are talking of sending him to the Reform School) will always help a fellow when he can. He is the most generous boy I ever knew.

Dr. Dix. So far as he “helps a fellow” in a good cause he is good. Probably no one is utterly bad. As there are faults in the best of men, so there are virtues in the worst. As to his being the most generous boy you ever knew, that may be, but he is not more generous than my good boy, my hero.

Geoffrey Jenkins. But don’t you think that people who have the reputation of being bad are apt to be more generous and free-hearted than those who have the reputation of being good?

Dr. Dix. I am not speaking of reputation; I am speaking of reality. Generosity and free-heartedness in themselves are among the noblest and most admirable qualities we can possess. So far as any one possesses them he is good, noble, and admirable, whatever he may be in other respects. As to what class of men possess them in the greatest measure, I say unhesitatingly, men who are good in other respects, — not goody-goody, you understand, but *good*. It would be a self-contradiction to say the opposite: badness does n’t consist in good qualities, does it? nor goodness in bad qualities.

You must bear in mind one universal principle: con-

trast always brings things out in bolder relief. Kindness of heart is *expected* from a good man, and is not noticed as it would be in an otherwise bad man. It is no more conspicuous in the good than hard-heartedness and selfishness are in the bad. A white handkerchief that would not be seen in the sunlighted snow would gleam like a star on a heap of coal a furlong away. Your reform-school candidate is no more generous and free-hearted than my hero; probably not so much so, for my hero will always stop to think whether his generous impulses if carried out will do more harm than good. But let us go on with our portraiture:—

He is *faithful*, my good boy is. You can trust him. If he has made a promise—and he never makes one that is not right—he will fulfil it, if it is within the range of possibility. He is always at the post of duty. How does that please you? Do you prefer a boy that you cannot trust,—one that lets his post of duty take care of itself? We have spoken of soldiers in the face of the enemy: who do you think would make the best sentinel? Whom would you rather trust your life to as you slept around the bivouac fire?

He is *grateful*. Grateful to all his benefactors, country, parents, friends, teachers, and playmates. Do him a kindness, and see how he will receive it. Do you admire ingratitude?

He is *brave* and *manly*. He is not afraid to do his duty even in the face of ridicule and, if it should come, cruel persecution. In your hearts, what do you think of a boy or a man, a girl or a woman, who is afraid to do right lest he should be laughed at? Do you think him weak or strong, wise or foolish, noble or contemptible?

He *has good habits*. He believes he has duties to himself as well as to his fellow-men. Nay, he knows he cannot properly discharge his duties to others unless he takes proper care of himself. He regards his mind,

heart, and body as priceless treasures entrusted to his keeping; hence he does all he can to keep his body healthy, active, and strong, his mind bright and clear, and his heart warm, pure, and unselfish. Do you prefer the boy of bad habits, who enfeebles his body, stupefies his brain, deadens and perverts his heart, by unhealthful indulgences? Every other consideration aside, which would naturally make the more agreeable companion? Which would you rather do a summer's camping with? You cannot hesitate, for one of the inevitable consequences of his good habits is that —

He is *cheerful* and *light-hearted*. Troubles that would make some boys miserable he laughs at; burdens that would weigh them down to the ground he carries as if they were feathers.

Archibald Watson. Can't a boy be good without being healthy, strong, and bright?

Dr. Dix. I said he does all he can to make himself healthy, strong, and bright. If he has inherited a feeble body or brain, he may at least cultivate a good heart and a cheerful temper; and good habits will reduce his misfortunes to their minimum. What he has not received he will not be held accountable for; the servant who had received but one talent was not required to render an account for ten. But even if he is not naturally vigorous, he may be all I have described. Have you never heard of feeble invalids who have blessed all with whom they came into contact?

XIV.

THE KNIGHT "SANS PEUR ET SANS REPROCHE."

Dr. Dix. It is not necessary that a good boy should be a bedridden invalid. My hero does not happen to be unfortunate in any such way. As I said, he might be so afflicted and yet be essentially all I have described him; but so long as he is not he enters into all healthful, invigorating sports with twice the gusto of your scapegrace with enervating habits.

There are other advantages and disadvantages, besides natural health or disease, that he may have, which have nothing to do with vice or virtue save as they may serve as temptations to the one or inducements to the other. For instance, he may be poor or wealthy, handsome or ugly, graceful or awkward, witty or dull; he may be what is called well or humbly born. These fortunate and unfortunate accidents, like the sunshine and the rain which fall alike upon the just and the unjust, are pretty evenly distributed by Fortune among the good and the bad, although I repeat in this connection what I have said before: If by wit is meant that which is so often coupled with wisdom, you will find the greater share of it where you will find the greater share of its twin blessing, wisdom, — among the good; and as to personal beauty, there is nothing that will enhance it like the frank, clear eyes and healthy vigor that right living gives.

Julia Taylor. I have heard a great many times that vice goes with poverty and ignorance; that the greater proportion of criminals are from the lower classes. If that is true, it seems to me very unjust.

Dr. Dix. In naming certain favorable and unfavorable circumstances which have nothing to do with virtue and vice, I took pains to add, "save as they may serve as temptations to the one or inducements to the other." Great as are the temptations of wealth and station (and the advantages which go with them) to certain vices, there is no doubt that extreme poverty and ignorance are still greater temptations to other and more flagrant sins. Perhaps I should have said these good and ill conditions are pretty evenly distributed among the *naturally* good and bad, or among the evil and well disposed. Many a man lives a fairly good life who under less favorable circumstances might be a criminal. Who shall say that he is really a better man than his unfortunate brother, "a criminal from the lower classes"? In the eyes of an infallible judge the learned dignitary on the bench may be worse than the miserable wretch he sentences.

But let us return to our typical good boy. I have heard you in discussing one another talk about such and such a one's being a "mighty good fellow." Let us see how your hero compares with mine. Tell me about your "mighty good fellow." What does he do?

Geoffrey Jenkins. Well, he's always good-natured and full of fun.

Dr. Dix. Yes; go on.

Archibald Watson. He's always ready to share his good things with the other fellows.

Jonathan Tower. He's always ready to help you if you're in trouble.

Trumbull Butters. He is n't always bothering you, and he does n't look down on you if he is richer and smarter than you are.

James Murphy. He does n't go round telling everything he knows about you.

Joseph Cracklin. He does n't flare up at every little thing you say in fun.

Charles Fox. He knows how to play ball, and tramp, and fish.

Louisa Thompson. He is kind and accommodating to his sisters.

Henry Jones. He knows how to tell stories and do lots of other things.

James Murphy. He would n't lie, nor steal, nor do anything sneaking any more than he 'd cut his head off.

Henry Phillips. He 's bright and clever, does n't say soft things, and is n't afraid of anything.

Dr. Dix. Except what is bad. In short, he is very much the same sort of hero I have been describing. But perhaps, after all, he does things my good fellow does n't do.

Does he swear a round, ringing oath, for instance? Well, mine *could* if he wanted to. It does n't take any great amount of intellect or wit. Your good fellow did n't *invent* swearing, did he? so he can't claim originality, and *anybody* can imitate. A parrot can be taught to swear the biggest oath that ever fell from the lips of a pirate or a stable boy. Does your good fellow feel proud of an accomplishment in which he may be overmatched by a parrot?

Perhaps he is beginning to take a social glass. Well, what superior ability, or genius, or generosity does *that* show? If one were so disposed, it could be done as easily as to take a glass of water; and how generosity can be shown by swallowing anything I confess I am not subtle enough to understand. Like swearing, drinking is an imitative act. I once heard of a monkey who could toss off his glass of wine as jauntily as your jolliest toper. A fine type of good-fellowship that! But Jocko was more sensible than his human boon companions; for when, at last, he took enough to give him a headache the next morning, he knew enough never to repeat his folly. Few men are as sensible as that.

There is no patent on drinking. It is open to all. It is as free to my good fellow as to yours. He can drink whiskey or strychnine, or cut off his fingers with a hatchet, if he chooses, just as easily as your good fellow can.

Perhaps he smokes. Another imitative act, to which the same train of remark will apply, including the monkey. Perhaps he chews. Faugh! We will draw the line there. To associate good-fellowship, in any sense of the phrase, with such ineffable nastiness is too gross a misapplication of terms to merit a moment's discussion.

Trumbull Butters. The first man who swore, or drank, or smoked, or chewed, did n't imitate.

Dr. Dix. We will allow him the full credit for originality. Let him have whatever credit is due him for his invention or discovery.

Geoffrey Jenkins. But, Dr. Dix, I don't understand that men do these things to show their genius or originality.

Dr. Dix. What do they do them for?

Geoffrey Jenkins. Why, I suppose they do them because they enjoy them.

Dr. Dix. They may *continue* them for that reason, but that is not why they *begin* them. No human being ever enjoyed his first glass of whiskey or his first cigar. As to the first profane oath, whatever poor satisfaction may have accompanied it must have been far more than offset by the moral shock, the inevitable sense of sudden degradation, the uneasy consciousness that remained like a foul taste in the mouth. No; men don't begin these things because they enjoy them, but because they wish to be thought clever, and spirited, and jaunty, and manly, especially — like the parrot and the monkey — because they want to do as others do.

Joseph Cracklin. A good many men who are highly respected both smoke and chew.

Dr. Dix. True. Man is a curious animal. He has been most justly called a bundle of inconsistencies. The king who ranks as the proverb of wisdom did some of the most foolish things.

Such habits among the class of men you refer to simply show that they were not always as wise as they are now. There was a time when they were foolish boys. I know an able and highly esteemed judge who has a pirate flag with skull and cross-bones complete tattooed on his left arm. It only serves to remind him of his ante-college days, when he read dime novels and formed a plan, with some of his equally wise and virtuous cronies, to run away to sea, seize a ship, and change its name to "The Black Scourge of the Atlantic." [*Laughter.*]

Archibald Watson. Were they going to kill the captain and mates?

Dr. Dix. I believe their hardihood did n't go quite to that extent. They were going to put them in irons and land them on some uninhabited island, I believe.

The judge that I told you of smokes, too, and, for aught I know, chews. He looks upon both his pirate flag and his tobacco as ineffaceable scars of his youthful folly.

But we will reserve the subject of Bad Habits for a future Talk. I want to say a word more about my hero, who, though every inch a boy, is too sensible to be caught in any such poorly baited trap as tobacco and whiskey. I spoke of myself as a hero-worshipper. I regard him with something more than mere approval and admiration. When I see the fine scorn with which he refuses to speak or even act the smallest lie, the hearty cheerfulness with which he prefers the comfort and pleasure of others to his own, the pluck and energy with which he attacks every obstacle in his path of duty, his inexhaustible store of boyish fun and good humor, and especially when I see his unassuming mod-

esty, as if he were utterly unconscious of doing or being anything particularly worthy of praise, how can I help being a hero-worshipper? I can admire a beautiful landscape or a beautiful statue, but a beautiful *soul* I can more than admire, — I can *love* it.

Nothing is beautiful or lovable that is not good. Beautiful evil exists only in poetry and romance. We may admire the picturesque villain on the stage or in the novel, but in actual life we only abhor him. Milton's magnificent Satan, Goethe's clever Mephistopheles, would be simply horrible as realities. The thoroughly bad, if there were such, would never love, even among themselves; they would herd together simply for the advantage of concerted action; when they had no common prey outside they would prey upon one another. Even if they were capable of love, — other than that purely selfish passion miscalled by that name, — there would be nothing to call it forth, for even the worst people love only what is good, real or imaginary, in one another. Kindness, generosity, self-sacrifice, fidelity, square-dealing, bravery, strength, wit, and beauty, — these, and such as these, are the qualities that are really *loved* among either the good or the bad.

XV.

THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF VICE.

Dr. Dix.

“Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,
As, to be hated, needs but to be seen.”

Would it were always so! Too often, however, the fact is exactly the reverse. The “monster” generally approaches with a most charming front, a most fascinating smile, and the “frightful mien” is assumed when it is too late to escape from her clutches. No, not quite that; it is never too late to escape, if the victim is only willing to make the supreme effort.

Her charming front, her fascinating smile, is a clever disguise. She must needs put it on, else she would never secure her prey. In order that temptations may tempt they must be tempting; only gudgeons are silly enough to be caught with a bare hook.

Boys, do any of you look with admiration and envy upon what is known as the “fast young man”? Do any of you look forward to the time when you hope to be as gay and reckless as he? Look a little further; you may see him in all stages of his career. The wretched old sot that you all view with pity, horror, and disgust was once as gay and debonair as he.

Girls, do any of you find him your most agreeable and fascinating companion? The poor, starved, terrified wife, fleeing for her life, once looked with your eyes and listened with your ears. *She* no longer regards with secret admiration the gay young gallant tossing off his glass of sparkling wine. There’s no cure like satiety.

There is a time in all communities when every one, whether ordinarily inclined to smile indulgently upon the "fast young man" or not, turns to him the cold shoulder. It is when some terrible crime has filled every heart with horror and with loathing. It is then, if never before, that men of true and tried worth are appreciated at their real value. Then the common heart goes out, not to brilliant recklessness or graceful vice of any kind, but to unfailing virtue. No matter how dull, awkward, or simple a man may be, if he be only true and good. Then every man's life and character are rigidly scrutinized in the universal questioning as to who may next turn out a villain.

But it is not at such times alone that this is the question deep down in every heart. There is never an hour when the man of tried virtue and steady sobriety of habits is not more in demand in all the real business of life than his dissolute neighbor, however gay and fascinating. There is never an hour when you will not place your life and property in the keeping of a man distinguished for the homely virtues, rather than in that of the most brilliant reprobate that ever tossed off his glass of sparkling champagne.

George Williams. Dr. Dix, allow me to say that I think there are a great many exceptions to the rule you have just stated. I can name a long list of names of men of notoriously vicious habits, who nevertheless seem to have been trusted in the most important affairs of life. They have been employed to carry into execution great financial schemes, to command armies, and especially to manage affairs of state.

Dr. Dix. I see that I have not made my meaning quite plain. I compared the man of homely virtue with the man of brilliant vice. I emphasized the homeliness of the one and the brilliancy of the other. Perhaps this was hardly fair to the former. I have already enlarged upon the fact that vice has no monopoly of the intellect

and energy of the world ; on the contrary, I have shown that virtuous living conduces directly to the development of power, while vicious living tends as directly to its enervation. Of course, stupidity and ignorance, however combined with virtue, cannot be trusted to accomplish results that demand intelligence and skill ; but if I implied that my man of homely virtue was lacking in intelligence and skill, I certainly did not intend to do so. I emphasized the brilliancy of the other, but it was the brilliancy of vice, not of intelligence,—the fascinating personal presence, and low cunning in the execution of dishonorable schemes, that distinguish many famous but unprincipled men. I also emphasized the homeliness of virtue, but I used the word in no reproachful sense. There is a sort of homeliness that we all value, admire, and trust. When a heavy structure is to be supported, the homeliness of the solid granite column is always preferred to the painting and gilding of the hollow shaft of wood.

Again, I have said that few men are utterly bad. Those who are known to be so are never trusted—nowadays at least—with “great financial schemes,” “the command of armies,” or “the affairs of state.” Men may have “notoriously vicious habits” united with great intellectual power, but they must have—or at least must be believed to have—enough moral principle behind it all to render them safe, or they will not be trusted. Whatever a man’s talents may be, if he is of doubtful moral character the question will always be, in any of the affairs you have named, is his ability preëminent enough to make it worth while to run the risk of his possible rascality ?

In order that two things may be justly compared, they must be compared *per se*, *ceteris paribus*.¹ Given equal ability and skill (and among these I do not include the tinsel brilliancy of the “fast young man” or that of

¹ By themselves, other things being equal.

the more developed rascal of later years), vice stands no chance whatever in the competition with virtue, either in matters of finance, war, or statesmanship.

Joseph Cracklin. Sometimes the low cunning of the rascal that you have spoken of is the very quality that is needed to carry forward an enterprise; then which stands the best chance?

Dr. Dix. I have been speaking of the community of respectable, honest citizens, not of thieves and robbers.

Jonathan Tower. You remarked a few minutes ago that men who are known to be thoroughly bad are not trusted with the management of great enterprises *nowadays*; was there ever a time when they were? I mean, of course, among civilized nations.

Dr. Dix. Civilized nations have not always been as good and wise as they are to-day. The centuries have not passed in vain. Yes, Tower, great villains have been trusted over and over again, and always with the same result: final disaster to themselves and to those who trusted them. By bitter experience men have learned that nothing is to be hoped from cupidity and selfish ambition, unredeemed by some degree, at least, of honor and patriotism, however great may be the talents which accompany them.

Jonathan Tower. Was not Napoleon I. a great villain, and yet was he not of incalculable benefit, not only to France, but to the world?

Dr. Dix. The fact that he was the means of so much good proves conclusively to my mind that he was not an unmitigated villain. No doubt his own glory was first in his heart, but that of France was at least second; and ambitious as he was, I do not believe he would ever have consented to raise himself upon the ruins of his country. Remember, too, that Napoleon I. had his Moscow, his Waterloo, and his St. Helena. But there are not wanting in history examples of ambition as towering as his. Alexander raised his country to the pin-

nacle of magnificence, only, by refusing to appoint his heir, to pull it down at his death about the heads of his successors, as Samson pulled down the temple of the Philistines.

Thus it has always been, and thus it always will be. A thoroughly unprincipled and selfish man can be trusted only so long as his own interests are subserved with the interests of those who trust him.

Upon the Athenian Alcibiades both Nature and Fortune seemed to vie with each other in showering their richest gifts. Brilliant and powerful in intellect, courageous and energetic in character, vigorous and graceful in body, of unbounded wealth and most noble ancestry, he was indeed a paragon among that race of paragons. Who can help being deeply interested in such a character? As we read his story, how we long to learn that he was as honorable, prosperous, and happy as he was clever, brave, and beautiful! But how our admiration cools as we follow him through his career of heartless ambition, ingratitude, and treachery, till we have scarcely pity left for his tragic death and ignominious burial!

What a life, and what a death! How glorious they might have been had those marvellous intellectual and physical endowments been accompanied by a pure heart! As it was, they were like instruments of exquisite workmanship, capable of doing great good or evil according as they are in good or evil hands.

XVI.

CREEPING, WALKING, AND FLYING.

Dr. Dix. One of the most powerful orations I ever listened to was a New Year's sermon. The speaker, already renowned for his burning eloquence, surpassed himself. He seemed like one inspired. From beginning to end his audience sat rapt, almost breathless, in their eagerness not to lose a drop of that flashing stream of eloquence. It seemed impossible that there should have been one in that multitude who could resist the appeal; as if every one must perforce resolve from that day to live the noble life so graphically pictured to them.

On our way home I said something like this to a middle-aged friend of mine. He admitted the power of the address, "but," said he, "it won't last. By to-morrow night nine tenths of it will be forgotten. I used to become an immaculate saint every New Year's; but I got over that long ago. I found it was of no use. It's easy enough to talk about flying into the upper air, but when it comes to the actual flying — we find we haven't got the wings."

"And so," I said, "you think such discourses as we have heard to-day do no good?"

"Oh, I did n't say that," he answered; "I did n't say it would *all* be forgotten, — I said nine tenths. And then even a temporary lift is better than no lift. If it does n't permanently raise us, perhaps it keeps us from sinking lower. If our consciences did n't get a stirring up once in a while they would die from stagnation."

His comparison was a very good one. As our bodies

are held down to earth by gravitation, so our souls are held down by our passions and appetites, and especially by the never-ceasing gravitation of *habit*. A stone thrown upward by a single impulse will quickly come down again: in order to continue its ascent there must be constant applications of power, like the beats of the eagle's wings as he soars towards the heavens.

Frederick Fox. What good does it do to throw the stone up at all? It will come down again just as low as it was before.

Dr. Dix. It may, and it may not. It may be thrown from the bottom of a well to the surface, thence to the house-top, thence to the hill-top, thence by successive throws to the mountain-top.

The moral world is no more truly a plain than the physical world. It has its deep abysses, its hills, its mountains, and — its *clouds*. We cannot rest in the moral clouds any more than we can in the physical clouds. Even the eagle with his mighty wings must find his permanent resting-place upon the solid earth; but he does not rest in the depths of the mines nor in the valleys; his eyry is high up among the mountain crags.

The inspiring oration I told you of was a single impulse upward. With some of those who heard it the fall backward may have been to the same old level, or even to a lower one; but it need not have been. Some of them doubtless were permanently lifted. But, as I said, the ascent could not continue without constant upward impulses, new efforts every day, like the beating of wings. Even those who were permanently lifted maintained their vantage-ground only by clinging and bracing themselves; for, remember, the path of virtue is up a steep mountain side. Few, if any, ever reach the summit. Remember also that the mountain is a *mound*, not a cone nor a pyramid. The path is steepest at the bottom: the higher we climb, the easier the climbing and the firmer the foothold.

Have these Talks, or others that you have heard, or books that you have read, influenced any of you to make good resolutions which seemed at first easy to carry out, but which afterward proved too difficult for you? And have you, therefore, come to the conclusion that there is no use in trying further?

As my friend said, there is a vast difference between talking and doing; between laying out a course of action and carrying it into execution.

Suppose a weak-armed boy should say with desperate resolution, "I *will* lift that weight!" Suppose a young mathematician should clinch his teeth together and say to himself, "I *will* solve that problem!" Then suppose, on making the trial, both should find that they had resolved to do the impossible: would that be a sufficient reason why they should give up trying? No: let them begin with tasks within their power; let them do what is possible. They will find as time goes on that they can do more and more, until finally the big weight is lifted and the eclipse calculated. And let them remember all this time that if they do their best each day, the lifting of the little weight at first is as meritorious as the final magnificent feat.

Archibald Watson. You have been telling us the story of Milo and his calf.

Dr. Dix. Yes, indirectly. Now give me as famous an illustration of the exactly opposite.

Jane Simpson. The eyeless fishes in Mammoth Cave.

Dr. Dix. Yes, — another.

Helen Sawyer. The slave-holding ants of Texas.

Dr. Dix. Tell us about them.

Helen Sawyer. After generations of dependence they have become so helpless that they cannot even feed themselves, and must die of starvation in the midst of abundant food when deprived of their slaves.

Dr. Dix. An unhappy condition which is almost exactly paralleled by some classes of human society, people

who both by inheritance and habit have become so dependent upon their wealth, and the immunity from all kinds of effort which wealth secures, that when suddenly deprived of it they are totally helpless: mental, moral, and physical idleness have so enervated them that they cannot do by a supreme effort what the man brought up to labor does almost without effort.

Suppose one of these unhappy beings, who has inherited mental, moral, and physical helplessness from a line of wealthy and idle ancestors, should chance to hear an eloquent discourse on the nobility and advantages of labor; and suppose that, in the enthusiasm kindled by the eloquence, he should form a sudden resolution to live thenceforth a life of steady industry. He begins with plenty of zeal and spasmodic energy; but in a few days — in a few hours, it may be — his zeal has burnt itself out and his feeble energies are exhausted. The result is inevitable. It is not enough to exercise the will-power. That is always able to choose between right and wrong; but not to do an impossibility is not wrong. It is not enough to will to do; there must also be the well-woven fibres of brain, muscle, and heart to execute.

Henry Phillips. Then is his good resolution of no use?

Dr. Dix. That is what I am coming to. He receives a sudden, powerful impulse upward; must he necessarily fall back to his former level or to a lower one? No; let him retain some of the vantage that has been given him, if it is but a step. Then let him take another step upward. Since he cannot fly, let him climb; if he cannot walk, he can at least creep upward.

XVII.

THE DOCTOR IS FAIRLY CAUGHT.

Dr. Dix. Confession after detection is not generally very highly credited. If any of you acknowledge mischief that I have already detected, you hardly expect me to make much allowance on account of the confession. Now, scholars, I have a confession and an explanation to make to you. The confession is not worth much for the reason I have given, — *I have been fairly caught.* [*Sensation.*] But the explanation and what else I have to say will be, I hope, of some use to you.

Last evening as I sat in my study, not expecting visitors on account of the lateness of the hour, one of you paid me a business call and caught me *in flagrante delicto*.¹ I was in the very act of smoking a cigar. There was no escape; it would have availed nothing to throw the solid evidence of my offence into the grate or out of the window, for the air was thick with odorous, yea, visible evidence, convincing and *strong*. True, I might have left it uncertain as to whether the pungent fumes which filled the room had issued from my own lips or from those of some recent visitor to whom I had hospitably allowed the liberty. I confess that, when I heard the rap on my door and saw through the glass the familiar form of one of my pupils, such a thought flashed through my mind; but I scorned to act on the thought. I was smoking when the lad knocked, — I continued smoking after he had entered. To tell the truth, however, I was not so unconcerned as I appeared. I marked the look of surprised inquiry in his eyes, and

¹ In the commission of the crime.

felt a twinge of self-reproach and — shall I confess it? — shame. I don't think these feelings were so much due to the fact that he had seen me smoking as to the fact that he had caught me doing what he doubtless supposed I would rather conceal. My feeling would have been very different if he had seen me smoking in the open street, — though that is a thing that I should not think of doing any more than I should think of drinking a cup of coffee in the open street.

Geoffrey Jenkins. Would you have felt the same if he had seen you drinking a cup of coffee in your study?

Dr. Dix. I should have had no feeling of any sort in that case.

Geoffrey Jenkins. Why should you have had any more in regard to the cigar?

Dr. Dix. Why do you ask? Do you include coffee and cigars in the same category?

Geoffrey Jenkins. Many people hold that both are injurious to the health.

Dr. Dix. But not equally so.

Geoffrey Jenkins. Then the difference in the fault is only in degree, not in kind.

Dr. Dix. No, Jenkins; I thank you for trying to palliate my fault, but I don't think I will accept your defence, — not until we have considered the matter further, at all events.

So far as my rights and privileges are concerned, I suppose no one would charge me with transcending them. If I choose to indulge in what I must acknowledge to be a bad habit, in the privacy of my own sanctum, I have the undoubted right — liberty, I should say; there is a great difference between a right and a liberty — to do so. Furthermore, I don't know that I am under any moral obligation to publish it abroad. Hitherto I have not felt bound to tell you that I smoke my cigar nearly every evening and Saturday morning, any more than I have felt bound to tell you what I am in

the habit of ordering for my supper. But there is this difference: I don't care whether you know what my supper consists of or not, while I would much rather you should not have discovered that I smoke.

Joseph Cracklin. Why need you have mentioned it, then? The boy who called on you would probably never have spoken of it to any one.

Dr. Dix. That my miserable habit has made such a thought as you suggest possible is punishment indeed!

Geoffrey Jenkins. Why would you rather we should not know?

Dr. Dix. Why would I rather you should not know I smoke? Chiefly for two reasons: First, because I am thoroughly ashamed of it.

Louisa Thompson. We all know that you were a soldier in the war, and everybody was always willing to excuse *him* for smoking.

Dr. Dix. No, no, no! that was no excuse. I learned to smoke long before I went into the army. I suppose as a foolish boy I was as proud of it as I am ashamed of it now.

But the other reason is a much more important one. I would not under any consideration be the means of influencing any one — least of all one of those whom it is my special duty and pleasure to benefit in all ways within my power — to form a habit which I know does no one any good and is the cause of great injury to many. It is with the hope that I may not only counteract the unfavorable influence which the discovery of my weakness might exert among you, but even do much positive good besides, that I decided to make it the subject of our Talk this morning.

I have at least this advantage, boys: I can speak from actual personal experience. I wish you to observe in the mean time that all that I say in regard to the formation and growth of the habit and the increasing difficulty of relinquishing it applies with equal force to

any other habit. So we may consider our Talk to be upon the general subject of

HABITS,

illustrated by one of them. None of you may ever fall into this particular one, — I sincerely hope you may not, — but all of you have already formed others, good and bad, and as you grow older you will form still others. In fact, the greater part of all we do is the result of habits.

I see, by the way, that I was wrong in my conjecture. A few tell-tale smiles and expressive glances show that some of you have already begun to forge the same chains about you that I am wearing. Well, boys, let me assure you that you will not always feel as complacent over them as you evidently feel now. The time will come when some of you, if you keep on as you have begun, will feel as I feel at this moment, — willing to make almost any sacrifice to break your fetters, almost any sacrifice short of — breaking them.

And, girls, though none of you may ever be tempted to smoke cigarettes or to color a meerschaum, yet there are plenty of other temptations that you must meet. So if you mentally substitute them for tobacco you may profit by this Talk as well as the boys.

To illustrate the subject, I shall give you now and then choice bits of my own experience with the fascinating tyrant, which will perhaps help you better to judge for yourselves whether it is worth while to cultivate his acquaintance or to let him alone.

I learned to smoke when I was at Grantham Academy fitting for college. I don't remember that my conscience rebelled in the least at that time. I don't think the question as to whether I was doing right or wrong even entered my mind. I saw other boys puffing their cigars, and, partly from the instinct of imitation, which leads us all more or less slavishly to "follow the fashion,"

partly because it seemed manly, debonair, I heroically endured the agonies of initiation into the practice. "Agonies" is none too strong a word, as I fear some of you already know from your own experience. Boys, ought not that very experience to teach us what a terrible violation of nature we were committing? What but a deadly poison attacking the very citadel of life could blanch our faces, cover our brows with cold sweat, and send that mortal sickness through our vitals? True, Nature speedily adapts herself to the new condition; that is, she no longer warns us so energetically of the true character of the enemy we have admitted within our walls. *The outside sentinel has been slain!* But the enemy is no less deadly for that.

Isabelle Anthony. This morning's "Freetown Patriot" tells of a young man, a graduate of this school, who died a day or two ago of "tobacco-heart."

Lucy Snow. And it was only a week ago, I think, that I read of another who became insane from excessive cigarette smoking.

Archibald Watson. If the tobacco habit keeps on at this rate, it bids fair to become almost as fatal as tight-lacing. [*Laughter.*]

Susan Perkins. Or champagne and absinthe drinking.

Frederick Fox. Or low necks and pneumonia.

Dr. Dix. Both sexes have their full burden of responsibility for suicidal practices. As I said, in our onslaught upon tobacco we will include all bad habits and practices.

The authorities of the Naval Academy at Annapolis tell us that an appallingly large percentage of their applicants for admission are rejected because their constitutions have become irreparably injured by smoking.

Julia Taylor. What a frightful sound there is in that phrase "tobacco-heart"! It quite makes my blood run cold.

Dr. Dix. Indeed, it has a frightful sound! How it brings up before the imagination the human heart, that wonderful organ, so gigantic in its power, so delicate in its construction, struggling like a bird in the coils of some venomous reptile! No wonder your blood runs cold as you realize its true meaning. And yet so mighty is the force of the habit, so completely do men become enslaved by it, that, with the full realization of its evils and dangers, they scarcely make an effort to escape. I once heard a brilliant young physician descant volubly upon the nerve-and-heart-paralyzing effects of tobacco. "In no other form," said he, "is the poison so effective, so penetrating, as in that of smoke." He then slowly filled his mouth from the cigar that he had been puffing all through his talk, and blew it through his white handkerchief. "There," he said, exhibiting with evident satisfaction the deep brown stain which the smoke had left, "that is pure nicotine, one of the deadliest poisons known to my profession. Imagine that in contact with the mucous membrane of my mouth and lungs by the hour, as it was for a second with the threads of my handkerchief!"

Knowing its nature and effect so thoroughly, why didn't he spurn it from him as he would have spurned any other poison? Ah, none but the slave of habit knows the completeness of its mastery!

Mary Rice. I don't think we girls are in danger of ever forming habits that will affect us in that way.

Dr. Dix. I trust you never may. But there are other drugs even more disastrous in their effects than tobacco, to whose slavery thousands of both sexes fall victims. Let me remind you all again, boys and girls alike, that, though I am speaking of one habit in particular, what I say applies with even greater force to many others, — in a measure to all. *Ab uno discite omnes.*¹

¹ From one learn all.

XVIII.

THE CHAINS OF HABIT.

Frederick Fox. Dr. Dix, are the habits you spoke of last Wednesday morning immoral simply because they injure the health?

Dr. Dix. That reason alone would be enough; but there are other reasons. What are some of them?

Isabelle Anthony. They are an annoyance to our neighbors.

Dr. Dix. Some of them most certainly are: perhaps if we should consider further we should find it to be the case with all.

Joseph Cracklin. So are some things we have a perfect right to do.

Dr. Dix. What, for instance?

Joseph Cracklin. Well, building a house and cutting off our neighbor's view.

Dr. Dix. A more fitting comparison would be, building a stable or some other nuisance next his house, and thus interfering both with his health and his comfort.

Susan Perkins. Yes, sir; and the law often recognizes that as wrong and forbids it.

Lucy Snow. Just as the notice is posted up, "No Smoking."

Dr. Dix. A most excellent illustration. Well, give us another reason why the tobacco habit, for instance, is immoral.

Florence Hill. It is filthy; and cleanliness is a duty.

Dr. Dix. Good. And why is cleanliness a duty?

Florence Hill. Because it is necessary not only to our own health and comfort, but also to that of our neighbors.

Dr. Dix. Necessary to the health and comfort of both mind and body. It is a duty, like all other duties, springing from a principle of right. We should be cleanly, as that mirror should be bright. We should be cleanly, healthy, and comfortable, as we should be truthful, honorable, and unselfish. Now, let us have another reason why the habits we are discussing are immoral.

James Murphy. Because other people may follow our example.

Dr. Dix. Yes; I have already alluded to that most unhappy consequence of our misdoing. If for no other reason, when that danger comes, we should strike for freedom.

Frederick Fox. Suppose the injury to our own health were the only objection to the habit, would it be immoral? Was it wrong, for instance, for Robinson Crusoe to smoke his pipe?

Dr. Dix. That is a very interesting question. When Robinson Crusoe had no neighbors to injure or annoy or set a bad example to, how was it possible for him to do wrong?

Archibald Watson. But he *did* have neighbors, — his cats, goats, and dogs.

Dr. Dix [*smiling*]. None of them would be likely to follow his example, in smoking at least: as I remarked some time ago, most animals are too sensible; it is only the one that most resembles man in shape that ever imitates him in this folly. But, granting that Robinson did his full duty to his dumb companions, what other duties devolved upon him?

Julia Taylor. As has already been said, it was his duty to be cleanly.

Dr. Dix. Yes. Go on.

Helen Sawyer. It was his duty to be as cheerful and contented as possible.

Dr. Dix. But why, since there was no one to be affected by his sullenness or discontent?

Helen Sawyer. There was himself to be affected by it.

Dr. Dix. Had n't he the right to do as he chose with himself?

Helen Sawyer. No, Dr. Dix; because he did n't create himself.

Dr. Dix. Right. But even suppose, if such a thing is conceivable, that he did create himself; would he then have had the right to do what he pleased with his own handiwork?

Helen Sawyer. I think not, unless he pleased to do the best; for the best only is duty, as you have said so many times.

Dr. Dix. I am glad the lesson has been so well learned. His best was to cherish mind and body to the very utmost of his ability, to be grateful for the blessings still remaining to him, which, as you remember, he so dutifully offset against his privations, striking the balance in favor of his blessings.

Let us now return to the particular subject of last Wednesday, in regard to which I have somewhat more to say. A young man asked me how it is that men can use tobacco as they do without dying, if it is such a deadly poison. He told me of his grandfather, who has used it for at least sixty years, and who yet seems to be strong and healthy in spite of it.

I have known even more remarkable cases of tenacious vitality than that. I am personally acquainted with a man who carried a bullet in his brain for several years after the war, and for much of that time seemed as well as ever. Does this prove that bullets are not deadly? Habitual arsenic-eaters have been known to survive single doses which would kill a dozen people with systems in the normal condition. Would you argue, therefore, that arsenic is not a deadly poison? The life force seems well-nigh inexhaustible sometimes. If it were not so, neither human nor animal races could

survive the terrible strains they are all subjected to at certain times in their life history. I have no doubt whatever that in the case of the young man's grandfather it is as he says, and that he is as strong and well as he seems. Doubtless nature endowed him originally with very great strength of constitution, which has probably been still further favored by an invigorating out-of-door occupation; but it is pretty certain that he could not have kept up the habit through all those years as our young cigarette smokers practice it to-day: he would doubtless have died long ago of "tobacco-heart." We must not lay too much stress on the fact that there are people who arrive at old age in spite of this and other destructive habits. No one knows how much better and happier lives they might have lived, or how much healthier and stronger they might have been to-day. Especially no one knows how many others of feebler vitality these same habits have laid in untimely graves.

I have no wish to exaggerate the evils and dangers I am urging you to avoid. Besides the moral wrong I should commit in doing so,—if it were done knowingly,—I should defeat my own object. Your own observation would soon reveal the exaggeration, and lead you, perhaps, even farther from the truth in the opposite direction.

Let us admit, therefore, that multitudes of men indulge in the use of tobacco with apparent impunity; yet reason tells us that the impunity is only apparent, that the penalty is exactly in proportion to the degree in which nature is violated; and the solemn, indisputable fact is, that countless numbers are most terribly injured by the habit. Like all other life-sapping practices, it is especially disastrous to the young and undeveloped. I see no reason to doubt the highest medical authorities, who declare that the habit of cigarette smoking, as indulged in by the boys and young men of

to-day, is capable, in a few generations, of making the strongest race on earth the feeblest.

There is no exaggeration, boys, in these statements. Let me make one more: The easiest way to escape this or any other bad habit is, *never to form it*. The old smoker is bound by chains and fetters of steel: he can escape only, if at all, by a long and painful struggle. You whose fresh young lips have never been contaminated never need make a struggle. You are forever free, if you choose, without an uneasy moment.

Geoffrey Jenkins. I never supposed that it was really painful to leave off smoking.

Dr. Dix. *Painful!* Is it painful to feel an unconquerable craving for something that is easily within your reach, and yet resolutely let it alone? to feel this craving growing stronger and stronger the longer it is ungratified, for days, weeks perhaps? to be unable by reason of the torturing hunger to remain at ease in any place or at any occupation long at a time? No one can know what it is until he has experienced it. It is the regular and natural effect of stopping the habitual use of any poisonous stimulant. Inveterate users of alcohol, opium, and other still more powerful agents which I will not name, often become raving maniacs when deprived of what has been their chief necessity. The same result has been known to follow the sudden deprivation of tobacco.

The old proverb, "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure," applies with peculiar force to the formation of this and all other bad habits. If I should say what I have been saying to you to a roomful of old smokers, I should expect that my words would accomplish little or nothing. The probability is that the majority of my hearers would already know and admit the truth of all I have said. Yet, like the young doctor with his cigar and white handkerchief, they would go on poisoning themselves with calm and deliberate unconcern.

But with *you* I hope and expect that the result will be different. You are as yet unscathed, — most of you at least, I hope ; you have scarcely a battle to wage. If any of you, with full realization of what you are doing, deliberately sell yourselves into the abject slavery which I have been describing, you will richly deserve all you will suffer. If I had realized what I was doing when I formed the habit, I firmly believe that not even army life would have betrayed me into it.

There is a question which you have all mentally asked ; only your politeness and respect have prevented your asking it aloud : “ Dr. Dix, why don’t you leave off your cigar *now* ? ”

Well, I don’t say that I shall not. I have tried several times and failed. That is a humiliating confession to make, is it not ? In other respects I believe I am not wanting in resolution. Heretofore, however, I have not been conscious that my bad habit has injured any one but myself. That is wrong, I have said and still say, but as I have indulged in moderation I have felt that I could afford the tax on my vitality. Now, however, I have a new incentive : I am forced to choose between setting you a good or a bad example. There can be no possible uncertainty in my mind as to which is my duty. Nevertheless I shall have a hard struggle. May that struggle of mine be a salutary lesson to all of you, and may the victory which I hope to win be a still more precious lesson, teaching you never to despair, whatever bad habit you may have fallen into, when you may see that even the tobacco habit of thirty years’ standing may be broken.

XIX.

THE ALCOHOL HABIT.

Dr. Dix. The tobacco habit, which we have been considering at some length, naturally suggests its kindred vice, the alcohol habit.

You are all familiar enough with the story of its ravages : how it changes gardens to deserts, homes of thrift, comfort, and happiness to abodes of wretchedness and want ; how it fills prisons, hospitals, and almshouses ; how, in short, it ruins body and soul alike, transforming a man to a fiend, maniac, or imbecile, and bringing him to an untimely grave. You have heard all this from your earliest childhood ; and although not every man who takes his social glass pays the full penalty of his daring, you know well that there are countless multitudes who do pay the penalty. What are the temptations that lead men deliberately into a habit whose possible results are so universally recognized ? It is principally of these that I wish to speak, for it is only with these that any of you can be personally concerned at this stage of your lives.

Tell me, boys, what are some of the inducements that tempt a young man to take his first glass ?

Archibald Watson. His companions invite him, and he is ashamed to refuse.

Dr. Dix. Ashamed ! Of what ? Of refusing what he does not want, and what they know he does not want ?

Archibald Watson. He is ashamed to have *them* know that he does not want it, — to have them think he is a “tenderfoot.”

Dr. Dix. That means, I suppose, one who is not, at

least, an incipient drunkard. So a taste for whiskey is a thing to be proud of, is it?

Archibald Watson. It is not a thing that *I* should be proud of, but the young man we are speaking of and his comrades might be proud of it.

Dr. Dix. I did not suppose you were speaking for yourself. I presume gambling is a thing to be proud of among blacklegs, and thieving among pickpockets. The way to escape the influence of such public sentiment is obvious and easy.

Archibald Watson. To find different society?

Dr. Dix. Even so.

Joseph Cracklin [*with an air of resentment*]. The young man's comrades may be neither blacklegs nor pickpockets; they may be only a party of gay young fellows, who like a good time.

Dr. Dix. We will speak of that "good time" presently. They may be honest enough, as Cracklin says, so far as money is concerned, but what are they doing to the young man? They might far better rob him of his last penny and leave him otherwise unharmed.

Joseph Cracklin. They probably don't think of the harm they are doing to him. At any rate, they don't try to make him any worse off than they are themselves.

Dr. Dix. No; they probably "don't think." That has been their trouble from the first. But we will let them go their way and turn our attention to him. Suppose he should be manly and sensible enough to estimate things at their true value, — his own safety of body and soul and right for its own sake on the one hand, and their passing approval on the other. What then?

Joseph Cracklin. Why, if he thought there was any real danger of his becoming a drunkard —

Dr. Dix. If he thought! Does n't he know there is? What right has he to believe there is no danger for him in what has destroyed so many millions, none of whom were any more anxious to be destroyed than he?

Joseph Cracklin. If he thought enough about it, of course he would refuse.

Dr. Dix. Well, it is a matter worth thinking about. What would be the worst possible consequence of his refusal?

Joseph Cracklin. They would set him down as a muff, a fellow with no fun in him.

Dr. Dix. And perhaps might find him so uncongenial as to cut his acquaintance?

Joseph Cracklin. Perhaps.

Dr. Dix. A terrible fate, indeed!

Joseph Cracklin. They'd treat him *civilly*, of course, whenever they met him.

Dr. Dix. But would n't honor him with invitations to their convivial dinners?

Joseph Cracklin. As he had already declined that sort of thing, they would probably think it of no use.

Dr. Dix. And would that be likely to make him inconsolable?

Joseph Cracklin. A fellow does n't like to lose his friends.

Dr. Dix. Nor would he. You make a great mistake, Cracklin. They would do a great deal more than treat him civilly. There is not one of those gay young fellows, whose friendship is worth a straw, that would not secretly, if not openly, admire the courage and independence that dared to say No,—not one of them that would not in his heart despise the imbecility, folly, and cowardice that would accept possible ruin for fear of ridicule or unpopularity. Men always like a backbone better than a string. It is human nature to despise those over whom victory is easily gained. When a false friend is endeavoring to persuade you to your own disadvantage, yield, and you win only his contempt; firmly refuse, and he at once acknowledges you as his superior. I repeat, not one of those gay young fellows that would not in his heart admire the exhibition of strength,

courage, and independence, and most heartily wish that he possessed the same noble qualities.

Joseph Cracklin. But they would n't really like him, for all that, because they could n't have any fun with him.

Dr. Dix. Hold ; let us see about that. Fun is the natural exercise of wit and light-heartedness, is it not ?

Joseph Cracklin. Yes, Dr. Dix.

Dr. Dix. And wine and whiskey make men witty ?

Joseph Cracklin. Sometimes, not always.

Dr. Dix. There is no wit or humor except what alcohol makes ?

Joseph Cracklin. Oh, I did n't say so.

Dr. Dix. Then there are people who can have fun without getting drunk ? How do they compare with those who cannot ?

Joseph Cracklin. I never thought of it in that light before. I don't want you to think *I* am in favor of drinking.

Dr. Dix. None of our talk is supposed to be personal. Scholars, don't you think a man who cannot be funny or light-hearted unless he is drunk has rather a poor claim to either wit or jovial spirits ?

Chorus. Yes, sir.

Dr. Dix. And what is a company of young men who acknowledge by their acts that they cannot enjoy themselves without the aid of alcohol but a sorry, stupid set, after all ? Compare them with an equal number of bright young fellows whose hearts are always light with health and a clean conscience, whose brains are unfogged and unparalyzed by poison of any kind. The wit of these, inspired only by the wine of native genius and good spirits, sparkles like the pure mountain brooklet laughing in the sunlight ; the wit of those, fuming from the cellar, is like the blue flame whose fitful gleam only shows how heart, brain, and body are slowly but surely burning to ashes !

XX.

BENEFICENT LIONS AND TIGERS.

Dr. Dix. Can any of you tell me how it is that alcohol — not always, indeed, as Cracklin has well said, but sometimes — makes men witty and light-hearted, courageous, enthusiastic, strong for a sudden effort?

Jonathan Tower. It stimulates them.

Dr. Dix. That simply repeats the proposition without explaining it.

Isabelle Anthony. It makes the blood circulate faster, and it is the blood that sustains all kinds of action in our bodies.

Dr. Dix. So healthy exercise in the fresh air quickens the circulation.

Isabelle Anthony. But that is a natural stimulus, whereas alcohol is not.

Dr. Dix. True. Now I will tell you how alcohol stimulates the circulation of the blood. The blood circulates in our bodies almost exactly as the water circulates in the water-works of a great city. Let us see with what minuteness the parallel may be drawn. First, there is the great engine that raises the water in the standpipe or reservoir, and thus gives it "head." What is that in the body?

Chorus. The heart.

Dr. Dix. From the standpipe or reservoir the water is forced into the mains branching through the streets like —

Chorus. The arteries.

Dr. Dix. From the mains it is carried by service-pipes into houses, manufactories, and workshops. These service-pipes correspond to —

Chorus. The smaller arteries.

Dr. Dix. Observe that up to this point neither water nor blood has done any work. In the houses and manufactories the faucets are turned as the water is needed. Then and there it does its work, not in the pipes, but after it has left them. What are the faucets which "turn on" the blood, and where in the body does it do its work?

Frank Williams [hesitatingly]. The veins?

Dr. Dix. No; the blood enters the veins *after* it has done its work, just as in the city the water, having done its work, enters the —

Chorus. Waste-pipes.

Dr. Dix. In the body, however, the blood enters these "waste-pipes" only to be purified and renewed. What lie between the arteries and the veins that correspond to the kitchens, bathrooms, laundries, and workshops of the city?

Chorus. The capillaries.

Dr. Dix. Yes. It is in the capillary network that the blood does all its work, and thus enables our bodies and brains to act.

Now, in the manufactories, kitchens, workshops, etc., of the city the water is turned on only as it is needed. Suppose, however, a horde of reckless vandals, being admitted to the city, should force their way into the various apartments where work is harmoniously in progress, and turn on the water in full stream everywhere at once. That would be a quickening of the circulation indeed! Suppose, moreover, that the mischievous strangers should stand their ground, forcibly preventing the faucets from being closed. There would be plenty of action for a while, though anything but harmonious action. But it would only be for a while: the water, that at first quickened and strengthened action, would soon clog and drown it. After the vandals had been finally driven out and the faucets had been

closed, one by one, and after the surplus water had slowly drained away, things would gradually return to something like their former condition, save here and there, where the sudden flood had wrought irreparable damage.

This, I am assured, is a perfect illustration of the physiological action of alcohol. Nature opens the little entrances to the capillaries only wide enough to admit the blood as it is needed for the normal action of our various organs; but when the vandal King Alcohol is admitted, he goes raging through the body and brain, paralyzing the capillaries, and "turning on" the blood in rushing, drowning, maddening torrents that, in spite of subsequent slow repairs, leave here and there irreparable injury.

And that is how it makes a man sometimes witty, light-hearted, and energetic, but oftener silly and absurd. No wonder he is absurd with all that chaos raging within. Think of the suddenly flooded kitchens and workshops of his poor body and brain!

But, alas, silliness and absurdity are not the only or the worst effects of the internal deluge. Too often it drowns reason and conscience together, and makes the man a maniac, a suicide, a murderer.

Joseph Cracklin. Alcohol sometimes does good in the human system, does n't it?

Dr. Dix. That is a question for the physicians to answer. If my doctor should prescribe it, I suppose I should take it. If I felt called upon to reason upon the propriety of his prescription, I should assume that Nature did not open my capillaries wide enough to meet a sudden emergency, and that Alcohol was sent to help her, not as a vandal horde, but as a quiet, orderly messenger.

Frederick Fox. Should you never feel justified in taking it except upon a physician's prescription?

Dr. Dix. If I should be bitten by a venomous ser-

pent and could get at a jug of whiskey, I should drink all I could possibly swallow, precisely as, if the whole city were on fire, the obvious remedy would be to fight conflagration with flood. But I have not been speaking of the use of alcohol in emergencies. My subject has been, not alcohol, but the alcohol habit. I have shown what it does for the individual.

Does the alcohol habit ever do any good? Political economists and biologists speak of one of its effects on the human race, which we must acknowledge, in the long run, to be a benefit. I will illustrate it by another comparison.

What is known as the survival of the fittest is one of the two great principles upon which depends the development of the races. In the struggle for existence, in both the animal and the vegetable kingdoms, the strong crowd out or prey upon the weak; those best adapted to their environments survive; the rest perish. Among the carnivores, for instance, the strongest and the most courageous destroy their antagonists and are left to feed upon the feebler races. Among these latter the strongest and most active and cunning only escape. Thus only the most highly developed of all races are left to transmit their superiority to succeeding generations.

Frederick Fox. Has n't sheer good luck sometimes as much to do with their escaping as their own strength or cunning?

Dr. Dix. You must learn to generalize, my boy. A few exceptional cases do not invalidate the general law.

Among civilized men there are so few that perform the function which beasts of prey perform among the animal races that the economy of nature demands some other agents to suppress the inferior elements of society and leave the earth a heritage for the superior. The crowding-out process operates to a certain extent, it is true; but that alone would be insufficient, at least

until the world becomes vastly more densely populated than it is to-day.

Jane Simpson. Would it be sufficient in such a city as London or Paris?

Dr. Dix. The fearful rate of mortality among the lowest classes in such centres of population is a most striking illustration of what I have been saying. It is not due to the crowding-out process alone, however, even there: the other agents which Nature calls to her aid in securing the survival of the fittest among men work still more terrible havoc even in London and Paris. But the work of these other agents is not confined to densely populated centres, which, after all, include but a comparatively small part of the world's population. They operate in country as well as in town, where there is plenty of room and provision for all as well as where the feeble must necessarily go under. What are these other agents?

Florence Hill. I suppose the alcohol habit is one of them.

Dr. Dix. And all other self-destructive habits. It is these chiefly which do for the human race what beasts of prey do for the brute creation. Does it not really seem as if it were the deliberate policy of conscious Nature thus to implant in the most undesirable elements of the human race the means of their own extermination? The worst criminals are the shortest-lived class on earth, slain by one another's murderous hands and by the laws they violate, but in enormously greater multitudes by their own base appetites and passions. It is not crime alone that is thus held in check and prevented from overrunning the fair earth; weakness and inferiority in general are, as a rule, accompanied by that moral weakness, that lack of self-command, which makes them an easy prey to the cleansing besom of Nature.

Thus, for the good of mankind at large, as I have

shown, the wicked and the weak are doomed not to live out half their days. When, therefore, you are tempted to fall into the alcohol or any other self-destructive habit, ask yourself what there is in you or about you that should lead Nature to wish to exterminate you and your type from earth.

Julia Taylor. But it is not always the naturally bad or weak that form these self-destructive habits. Do we not often see and hear of the strongest, the most generous and amiable, the most brilliant, falling victims?

Dr. Dix. Once more I say, you must learn to generalize. When a multitude of ruffianly rioters are raging through the streets, the artillery mows them down without regard to an occasional noble exception that may be among them. So Nature's laws must be enforced. But even in the cases you refer to there must always be some weakness joined with the strength, the amiability, and brilliancy, — moral weakness, if no other, — the perpetuation of which would not be good for our race. No drunkard, opium-eater, or any other species of self-indulgent suicide ever died whose mental, moral, and physical make-up, as a whole, it would be for the advantage of mankind to perpetuate. So, I repeat, if you are tempted to fall into any of these bad habits, ask yourself why Nature wants to get rid of you.

XXI.

TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS.

Dr. Dix. Now let us talk of some of the habits we wish to cultivate.

In estimating the values of things, the very first question we ask is, Are they what they seem? Is the glittering yellow mineral gold or only iron pyrites? is the brilliant that flashes in the light a diamond or only paste? is the smiling, benevolent face that appeals to our love and confidence an open window of the soul or only a mask? in short, is what we see and hear the truth or a lie? This is to us the first and most important test of the values of either men or things: hence I shall place at the head of the list

THE HABIT OF TRUTHFULNESS,

in word, act, and appearance.

In a previous Talk I remarked that things always do their duty. With some rare exceptions, of which I shall speak in due time, things always tell the truth. Suppose it were not so; suppose we lived in a world not only of artificial but of natural shams,—mountains, forests, and seas not really mountains, forests, and seas, but only seeming so; what appeared, for instance, a pleasant, inviting field turning out a frightful precipice as we entered it.

Sally Jones. That would be like some fairy tales I have read.

Dr. Dix. And did you ever think you would like to live in the fairyland you read about?

Sally Jones. I have often thought how delightful it would be.

Dr. Dix. What, never know at what moment the pleasant person with whom you were talking would turn into a hideous dragon, or your magnificent palace into a wretched hovel? always expecting to be caught up into the air or sent wandering through caverns at the bottom of the sea? liable at any instant to be transformed into a mouse or an elephant at the pleasure of the wicked magician who lived next door?

Sally Jones. But there would be a good fairy who would be more powerful than the wicked magician, and she would turn me back into a princess.

Dr. Dix. And the poor toad that had befriended you into a splendid prince, eh? But even then there would always be other wicked magicians, for if they were all dead there would be nothing more for the good fairies to do, and it would soon cease to be fairyland.

I sincerely hope the time will never come when fairyland will cease to exist — in the imagination. The destruction of Jack the Giant-Killer, Santa Claus, Titania, Thor, Juno, and Jupiter would be an irreparable loss to mankind. It would be to the world of thought what the destruction of the blue sky (which you know is only a beautiful unreality) would be to the world of sight. But all these delightful personages and their delightful habitations are good only in their proper sphere, the imagination. If Miss Jones will reflect a little, I think she will decide that the real world is better to live in than fairyland would be, — the ground she walks on real solid ground, and not merely a thin shell covering vast subterranean caves, into which the next step may precipitate her; the water she drinks real water, and not a potent charm that may transform her into a marble statue.

Yes, scholars, most happily for us, things tell the truth, — they are what they seem.

Helen Mar. Longfellow says quite the opposite.

Dr. Dix. Ah! in that line Longfellow refers to our misinterpretation of things. It is only of the dead soul that slumbers that he is speaking. To all who are alive and awake life is not an empty dream, and things *are* what they seem, earnest realities.

We are talking just now, however, of things in a more material sense. Our earthly habitation, happily for us, is not a fairyland of gorgeous uncertainty, but a well-ordered reality, to which our senses are adapted by a corresponding truthfulness. I remember once I was standing on a railway while a train of cars was approaching. As the huge, thundering mass came nearer I stepped off the track upon another, and while I stood there gazing a thought passed through my mind somewhat like this : My eyes tell me what track the train is on. Suppose my eyes should deceive me, that the train should be really on the other track. My life would then be only for a few seconds longer. But I felt no doubt. Although the engineer spied me and sounded his shrill whistle, I stood my ground in perfect confidence that my eyes were telling me the truth ; and presently both eyes and ears told me that the train had passed on, leaving me in safety. Now, the sense of sight is only one means of obtaining information ; the speech of my fellow-men is another. Both are valuable in exact proportion to the confidence I can feel in their truthfulness. But, alas, the two are never placed on the same footing. Every one says, "I shall believe my own eyes rather than what any one tells me," thus confessing the superiority of nature to man.

If men were as truthful as their eyes or as the rest of nature, the gift of speech would be of immeasurably greater value than it is. So great is its depreciation, however, that it has given rise to the common saying which I have already quoted several times, "Words are cheap." If not truthful, they are far worse than cheap,

— they not only have no value, but they are a positive curse, like the counterfeits that vitiate the currency of a nation. A bank-note has no value save as it represents value; and its representative value is deteriorated in exact proportion to the degree of uncertainty in regard to its redemption. This uncertainty may be due to either or both of two causes: first, the untrustworthiness of the government or corporation which issues the note; and, secondly, the degree to which successful counterfeiting may be carried. The government of which we Americans are so justly proud is so absolutely trustworthy, and there is so little successful counterfeiting, that its notes are equivalent, and generally preferred, to gold.

Suppose all Americans were as honorable in every respect as their government is in its financial dealings, what a nation we should be! Think of receiving the words of a stranger with the implicit confidence with which we receive his bank-notes! Ah, *then* words would be no longer cheap.

Like the bank-note, the value of words is purely representative; but unlike the bank-note there is no great centre of responsibility. Each individual is his own bank, and his notes are good or not according to his individual reputation for honor and veracity. Let one of his notes go to protest and there is an immediate depreciation of all the rest. Let one after another be unredeemed and finally they are all waste paper.

As the thorough business man has an almost intuitive knowledge of the true value of the commercial paper which passes through his hands, so we all instinctively estimate the value of words by their source. "Who says so?" we ask. "If it is A it must be true, but if it is B, — ah! that is a very different matter."

One of the things we prize most in life is our power and influence over our fellow-men. We cannot all be great leaders, but there is one way in which the weakest

of us may be strong : let it be known that every note we issue is as good as solid gold, that every statement we make is the exact truth, and we shall exercise a sway in comparison with which the power of the most brilliant liar is impotence. Such a reputation is a priceless treasure. As a successful old merchant remarked to me, it is the most valuable capital with which a man can start in business. Mark, I am not speaking now of the real character which alone can secure the reputation, — that is altogether above price ; I am speaking only of the reputation itself. All men, whatever their own reputation for truthfulness, fully appreciate its importance in others. With one accord they will prefer him whose representations need no discount, be he the architect who is to build their houses or the boy who is to carry their messages.

Jonathan Tower. You said, “whatever their own reputation for truthfulness.” Why should not men appreciate its importance in themselves as well as in others ?

Dr. Dix. Because they do not always recognize the fact which I have stated, that the real character alone can secure the reputation, — the lasting reputation I mean, of course. Everybody thinks he reads others more clearly than they read him. This is easily accounted for when we consider that while each one knows not only what he himself says, but also what he thinks, he knows only what others say. If any one of you has been in the habit of thinking himself the one mortal blessed with unerring perception, insight, intuition into the character of others, let him think so no longer : let him remember that he is only one of an innumerable species, that it is more than probable that there are others quite as sharp as he is, — possibly sharper.

Mankind seems gullible enough, it is true ; but, as in almost all other respects, mankind is not what it seems. It is only things that are as they seem. Many rascals

beside those of the notorious Tweed ring have found this out too late. Too late it has dawned upon them that the final crash was but the inevitable result of the slow undermining of the confidence of their fellow-men, who for years, perhaps, showed no outward sign. Too late they find that their boasted cunning has been like that of the ostrich which, thrusting its stupid head into the bushes, fancies its great, awkward, ugly body unseen.

Helen Mar. It seems to me, Dr. Dix, that there must be exceptions. Is not the community often startled by the sudden revelation of wickedness altogether unsuspected before ?

Dr. Dix. Altogether unsuspected by the community, perhaps, because the community may not have been in close enough relations with the perpetrators to be in any sense acquainted with them. The great majority of people whom we call our acquaintances have only a bowing acquaintance with us. I do not claim that such comparative strangers always or often read us aright. This may form the subject of another Talk. But I do not believe there was ever a thorough-going rascal whose true character was not divined by some of those whom he least feared. In many of the cases to which reference has been made, the "startling wickedness" has been the result of undermined moral strength less suspected by the criminal himself than by those around him. It has been like the sudden giving way of the Johnstown dam, slowly but surely eaten away in its foundations, which had seemed firmer and safer to the proprietors than to the keener eyes of less interested — or, as it proved, far more interested — observers.

It is good for us all to know that, if we are not always justly estimated by others, we are generally better known by them than we are by ourselves. It is useless for a confirmed liar to try to deceive his intimates ; and if he could know how clearly his false heart is seen

even by comparative strangers, he would be appalled. With all our mistaken reading of one another, we err least, I think, in our estimate of one another's truthfulness. And with what minuteness we form that estimate, all unconsciously too! How easily we could arrange a table of percentages attached to the names of all our acquaintances in definite order, from the one hundred per cent of our hero and our heroine down to the zero of the poor wretch who will lie even when the truth would serve him better.

From policy, the lowest of all motives to do right, if from no other, never deceive. There is no surer way of disarming yourselves.

XXII.

TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS, CONTINUED.

ALL that has been said of the well-nigh irresistible power of habit might be repeated with especial emphasis in dealing with our present subject. The Castle of Truth cannot be erected in the soul without long and patient effort. Its foundations must be strong and deep-laid; its walls and columns must be solid to the centre of each massive block. Then only will it stand firm and unshaken amid the storms of temptation.

Julia Taylor. Why, then, are little children so often made a proverb of truthfulness?

Dr. Dix. In little children the virtues are chiefly those of negative innocence. They are like tender flowers blooming in the virgin soil where a future city is to be built. They are fragrant and beautiful, indeed: but life is more than a garden; its sweetest flowers must ere long give place to castles or hovels, temples or dungeons.

Habit, habit, habit. There can scarcely be too much iteration of the word. Habit determines almost infallibly what a man shall do in any given situation; it determines with positive certainty what his first unthinking impulse shall be.

"I spoke without thinking," says a boy detected in a falsehood. "If I had stopped to think a moment I should have told the truth." Does he know that he has confessed not one but a thousand falsehoods? If he had declared that he had resisted his first good impulse and had sinned deliberately, it would have been bad enough, indeed, but better, immeasurably better than

it was. My hero would have done neither the one thing nor the other. From his brave, clear eyes and his ready tongue the truth would have leaped forth instantly, pure, whole, unsullied.

There are certain vices that men are more or less proud of. No one is proud of falsehood. The lowest vagrant will scowl and show fight at being called a liar, though he may rarely open his mouth but to lie; for of all the virtues of good men there is none he admires more than their truthfulness; there is none that in his estimation more distinctly marks the difference between them and himself.

I have spoken of the advantage which a reputation for truthfulness gives a man among his fellows. Of infinitely greater value than the mere reputation is the reality. The instant one begins to deviate, though never so slightly, from the truth, he has given his moral structure a wrench that has loosened its very foundation stones. Whatever others may think of him, he knows that he is, in some degree at least, a sham; that there is a hollow place in what may still seem on the outside solid and whole to the centre. Every succeeding lie, whether discovered or not, gives another wrench and takes away another stone, until at last there is nothing left but a shell. There are sins that men may commit and still retain some measure of self-respect, but what must the habitual liar think of himself? He at least, if no one else, can look within and behold the moral void.

Archibald Watson. How, then, can any man retain his self-respect? Are not all men liars?

Dr. Dix. Compared with Absolute Truth all men are liars. So, seen against the face of the sun, a candle flame is a black cone. But all men are not habitual nor intentional liars. As a race, they are earnest lovers of and seekers for the truth. They long to discover it, reveal it to their fellows, and hand it down to their

descendants. What long ages of patient toil they have given to this single pursuit! What expense or pains too great to purge from human knowledge its alloy of error? It was easy to trace upon the map the supposed sources of the Nile, but who was satisfied with the supposed sources? It is a pleasing thought that beyond the icebergs and ice fields there may be a calm, clear sea, in which ships may ride as safely as in their own harbors. But of what value is the mere thought? It is the truth men yearn for, and it is this yearning that has sent so many to the death-chill of the frozen North. And they want the exact truth, not a mere approach to it. Men have for instance, known, for a long time very nearly the distance of our earth from the sun, so nearly that the addition or subtraction of a small fraction of a hair's breadth in instrumental measurements would probably give its exact distance. Every few years an opportunity comes to lessen still further this fraction of error, when the leading governments fit out expeditions at great expense, and scientific men leave their homes and sail to the antipodes, if need be, to take full advantage of these opportunities.

One of our future Talks will be on the moral effect of purely secular study. What possible relation, for instance, can there be between mathematics and virtue? I will anticipate that Talk to say that, whatever its other effects may be, there can be no question that secular study tends very powerfully to develop a love for the truth, the exact truth, and a contempt for error. It is the untrained and untaught mind that is satisfied with half-truth and half-falsehood. The weakness and indolence of ignorance are responsible for more lies and half-lies than all other causes combined. One of the richest fruits of intellectual training is *accuracy*.

George Williams. I have sometimes felt an uncomfortable doubt as to whether accuracy may not be gained at the expense of breadth and vigor.

Dr. Dix. Such a result is by no means impossible; but a sensible man is not likely to make so foolish and unnecessary a blunder. Wholesome, properly conducted intellectual training not only quickens the perceptions, but enlarges their range. A child's or a savage's picture of a horse satisfies his own eye both in detail and in general outline: training would reveal to him the slovenliness of the one no sooner than the gross disproportion of the other. The untrained taste and intellect are satisfied with disproportion in outline and slovenliness in detail in everything, — pictures, architecture, dress, stories, histories, arguments; that is to say, they are as likely to be lacking in breadth and vigor as in accuracy. And when to untrained taste and intellect is added an untrained moral sense, which is satisfied with what I may call slovenly truthfulness, what chance remains for either art or truth?

Julia Taylor. Dr. Dix, I appreciate all that has been said of the importance of truth and truthfulness; but language has other uses besides to impart knowledge: to amuse, for instance; to make us laugh; to please the taste and fancy, as in the cases of fairy tales and mythology, of which you have approved. Has not fiction an important office to perform?

Dr. Dix. Most certainly. I have compared the use of language to communicate knowledge to the use of the art of engraving to produce bank-notes, the representatives of value; but the art of engraving has uses besides that of producing bank-notes. A beautiful picture has an intrinsic value consisting in its beauty; but an ugly scrawl upon a soiled scrap of paper may have a representative value that will purchase a thousand pictures. So the eloquence of an actor on the stage may have an intrinsic value, consisting in its beauty, force, skilfully simulated passion; but an awkwardly expressed statement of fact from an authority may have a representative value outweighing it a thousand times.

A great audience sat listening breathlessly to the outpouring of Othello's grief and remorse by the bedside of his murdered wife. At the very climax of the thrilling scene, when he was about to plunge the dagger into his own breast, a plain man, in every-day dress, stepped upon the stage with a paper in his hand. It was the mayor. "Ladies and gentlemen," he said, "I have come to tell you that *Lee has surrendered!*" What then was Othello? what was Desdemona? Only two of a great multitude shouting in frantic joy.

But even the intrinsic values of which I have spoken — that of the engraving and that of the acting — are, after all, dependent upon their truthfulness, their fidelity to nature and reality. Real art is but the embodiment of truth. The best fiction is truer than much of what professes to be history. There is more truth in Michael Angelo's angels than in most portraits.

Louisa Thompson. Including their wings?

Dr. Dix. Yes, including their wings; for their wings represent nothing but what may be true of the soul, even in this life.

Jonathan Tower. And what of the fairy tales and mythology?

Dr. Dix. They deceive no one, and if written and read aright even they may teach lessons of truth that inartistic stories of real life utterly fail to teach. Compare "Rip Van Winkle" with an ordinary newspaper account of what "actually happened"!

XXIII.

EXTRAVAGANCE IN LANGUAGE.

Archibald Watson. Dr. Dix, notwithstanding the strong detestation which you have expressed for all departures from the truth, I want to ask if there is not a certain kind which may be innocent. There is an old sailor in our neighborhood whom everybody looks upon as an amiable and perfectly harmless fellow, who nevertheless is acknowledged to be the greatest liar in town.

Dr. Dix. Does he acknowledge it himself?

Archibald Watson. No, indeed, not he! He claims to be veracity personified. But we have reckoned up the shortest possible time in which the personal adventures which he relates could have taken place, and it makes him about two hundred and fifty years old. [*Laughter.*]

Dr. Dix. His assumption of veracity is probably only intended to add to the humor of his "yarns." He surely does not expect you to believe them?

Archibald Watson. I only know that he gets furious if any one hints a suspicion of his veracity. He always gives the exact time and place when and where everything happened.

Dr. Dix. But what does he say to your computed aggregate of two and a half centuries? Even Coleridge's Ancient Mariner did not claim to be as ancient as that.

Archibald Watson. He says he does n't care about our "figgerin'." He "reckons" he knows what he saw with his own eyes and heard with his own ears. Now, I want to ask what possible harm his lies can do, since the youngest child knows better than to believe them.

Dr. Dix. He harms himself, if no one else, in more ways than one. He probably has destroyed, as far as possible, his own sense of the difference between truth and falsehood. To him Truth is as if she were not. He has destroyed the value of his power of speech except as a means of idle amusement. What would his testimony be worth in a court of justice? You may laugh at him and even like him in a way; but not even the youngest child, who, you say, knows better than to believe him, can feel for him any real respect. In short, he has destroyed the influence which he might have exerted as a man and reduced himself to a meaningless chatterer.

No untruth told with intent to deceive — which is what constitutes a lie — can be harmless. The destruction of the castle of truth in the soul is one of the direst calamities which can befall her. Do not, I beseech you, belittle that calamity. Remember always that it is no less than the transformation of solidity to hollowness, of reality to sham.

Archibald Watson. At least you will admit that some lies are infinitely worse than others?

Dr. Dix. "Infinitely" is a strong word.

Geoffrey Jenkins. *Infinitely* strong.

Archibald Watson. Well, that's just the word I want to describe some of the lies that are told.

Dr. Dix. I am almost inclined to agree with you, my boy. The word has been so badly abused, however, that it is no longer "infinitely" strong. You spoke a little while ago of one kind of departure from the truth which you thought might be innocent. There is another kind which you and many others may regard as innocent. I refer to the indiscriminate use of such words as the one in question. Is it innocent? Let us see. "Infinitely" meant originally absolutely without limit. When used by those whose "bank-notes pass for their full face value," it still means the same. Space extends

infinitely in all directions, but one young lady's hair is not infinitely longer than another's, as I overheard a third young lady declare the other morning. [*Laughter.*] Time past and future is infinite in duration, but Dr. Long's sermons are not, although I have heard them called so. Now, I do not charge those who habitually use extravagant language with any great amount of moral turpitude. They probably mean no harm; they do not usually intend even what some might regard as innocent deception. When your landlady told you this morning that she had just bought some "perfectly splendid butter," she probably did not intend you to understand that it emitted a dazzling radiance from its golden surface; she simply meant that it was fresh and sweet, and that was all the meaning her words conveyed to your mind. When a young lady informs her confidential friend that the new French teacher is "utterly horrible," she does not mean that he wears horns and is covered with scales, like a dragon; it is only her animated way of saying that he is not altogether agreeable to her. Well, since that is all she means and since that is all she is understood to mean, where's the harm? The harm is exactly that that *is* all she is understood to mean.

Helen Sawyer. I think there would be a great deal more harm if she were understood to mean exactly what she says.

Dr. Dix. If she were so understood she would probably not make use of such language. She and others like her have so corrupted the "coin of the realm" that it has lost, when "uttered" by them at least, the greater part of its value. They have done what they could to destroy the power of language. You often hear the expression, "Words are inadequate to describe," etc. But why are they inadequate? If their original power had been preserved intact, there is nothing in nature or art, in action or feeling that they would not adequately

represent. The most splendid sunset that eyes ever beheld was no more than splendid, but since butter has set up an equal claim to the epithet what remains to describe the sunset? The most horrible monsters that ever existed in fact or in fancy were no more than horrible, but since unpopular, but perhaps well-meaning and even respectable-appearing, instructors in French have been unfortunate enough to fall into the same category, how can we convey any adequate idea of those monsters?

Suppose one of these luxuriant speakers should attempt to describe some experience of which his hearers actually knew nothing save from his description; suppose he had seen what was in actual fact beautiful or magnificent or lovely, or frightful or horrible or utterly revolting. What could he say? The utmost resources of his vocabulary suffice to express only the rather fine, the passably attractive, the somewhat disagreeable. Imagine the struggles he would make for expression, and the final desperation with which he would say, "But words are utterly inadequate to give you the faintest idea of it!"

Julia Taylor. You said that these poor abused words formerly meant more than they do now. Has n't human nature always been the same? Don't you suppose people have always been as prone to extravagant language as they are to-day?

Dr. Dix. No, Miss Taylor. I believe that the ever-increasing stream of modern trashy fiction that is pouring from the press has done more and is doing more to devitalize our language than all other causes combined. Its choicest words, that should be kept sacredly for the rare occasions when they are really appropriate, are spread thickly over every page. The constant struggle of vulgar minds to elevate themselves to the ranks of genius tends only to drag the language of genius down to their own level. In doing the work of peasants

among peasants the kings and queens among words have lost their crowns and their royal robes, and now wear only fustian. Hence the habitual reader of cheap romance finds the works of real genius, past or present, tame and impotent.

Isabelle Anthony. What you have just said solves what has been a mystery to me. I have always wondered in what the superiority of the classics consists. There is so much written to-day that seems to me more brilliant, vigorous, and vivid than anything of Virgil's, or Pope's, or Dryden's, that I have really distrusted the critics, and have suspected that the boasted superiority of the classics is only a tradition.

Dr. Dix. When next you read Virgil, Pope, Dryden, Spenser, Ben Jonson, or Wordsworth, try to forget the decrepitude into which the words they used are rapidly falling, and give to them the power they possessed when they were written.

Florence Hill. But I suppose to-day has its geniuses as well as the past. It is not their fault that language has lost so much of its vigor. What are they to do?

Dr. Dix. Your question brings us back to the authority of the speaker or writer. Do not forget that as a bank-note owes its value to the bank that issues it, so a word owes its force to the person who utters it. A speaker or a writer who is observed to confine his use of words scrupulously to their true meaning will restore to them, in his own utterances at least, much of their original force: all of which is only another way of saying that the man who always tells the truth—as the real genius does, for genius is, after all, only a quicker insight into the true—will always be believed.

Julia Taylor. That will do very well for geniuses, but common, every-day people cannot hope to do much towards restoring to words their original force. If they should try to do so, I am afraid they would only succeed in making themselves seem more stupid, or perhaps

rude, than ever. Suppose, for instance, I should tell my friend whom I had been visiting that I had enjoyed a considerable amount of pleasure, and that I hoped she would return my visit when it should be mutually convenient, instead of fervently assuring her that I had had "a most lovely time," and that I should be "perfectly delighted" to have her return my visit as soon as she possibly could: I am afraid that, instead of giving me credit for truthfulness and for a desire to reform the language, she would simply wonder what had happened to offend me so grievously.

Dr. Dix. If you had been in the habit of gushing, she would probably wonder what had so suddenly checked the stream. But suppose, during your visit, a part of your conversation had been on the very subject we are now discussing, and you had mutually agreed to take each other's words at their real value; then suppose she should reply to you in the reformed style which you have illustrated (which, by the way, would probably understate the real feelings of you both), don't you think you would, already assured of each other's true friendship, be fully satisfied with its expression?

Julia Taylor. I am afraid not. I think we should both feel decidedly chilled.

Dr. Dix. Another illustration of the force of habit. No doubt it would be as you say. It would take you a long time to become reconciled to the strange vocabulary. And if society in general is ever to make this much-needed reform and restore to words their birth-right of power, it must be a long, slow process. But what a grand triumph it would be for truth!

There are some honest souls, however, that would not need to change. My own revered father is one of these. When he said, "That was not right, my son," it was more to me than the severest denunciation from others would have been, and his "Well done" was a eulogy indeed!

XXIV.

SNAKES IN THE GRASS.

Dr. Dix. Last Wednesday morning Watson asked whether some lies are not “infinitely” worse than others. His extravagant adverb supplied in itself a subject for the greater part of our Talk for that occasion. Now let us try to answer the question he intended to ask. What is one of the worst kinds of lies than can be told?

Chorus. Slander.

Dr. Dix. Unquestionably. It is fittingly typified by a serpent hiding in the grass. We have been speaking of liars who are hollow within, though they may appear fair and solid from without. The slanderer is neither hollow within nor fair without, for he is filled within and is reeking without with venom. The ruffian who assaults his victim face to face may at least show a certain degree of brute courage; his victim may have some chance of defending himself, — may at least know that he is attacked, and who his assailant is; but the slanderer makes his cowardly attack without facing either the physical or the moral defence of his victim. Iago sought and enjoyed the friendly confidence of the fair, pure, innocent being whose “sweet body” and good name he was at once so malignantly plotting to destroy. Towards other enemies we may feel placidly defiant, but who so strong, so brave, so well panoplied, that he may defy this one? Only he whose virtue has been tried and proved beyond a doubt. This, the meanest and most cowardly of all foes, is yet the only one before whom the best and bravest have been made to

cower. Few have escaped his deadly fangs, darting forth from dark holes reeking with poisonous slime. The more eminent the victim, the fiercer and more venomous the infernal bites. Even the immortal Washington, whom we look upon as the type of all that is good and noble in man, was during his life the favorite victim of calumny; and once there were no colors black enough to paint our sainted Lincoln in the minds of thousands of our fellow-countrymen.

Learn from this a lesson for to-day and for coming days. Do not believe, as rival political journals would have you, that there are no really good, wise, or patriotic men among our nation's leaders. There is corruption enough, Heaven knows, and fraud enough in public places; but not all our legislators and officials are knaves or fools.

But it is not alone the eminent who feel the stings of calumny. There is scarcely any one in public or in private life who has not suffered in a greater or less degree. Tell me now, what are some of the incentives to this contemptible crime?

Frederick Fox. Envy. Some people cannot bear to see others more prosperous or popular than themselves, and so they take this means to bring them down to their own level or below it.

Dr. Dix. Yes; the serpent calumny is often the spawn of that other serpent you have named. Go on.

Henry Phillips. Revenge. A coward who does not dare to revenge himself openly for a real or a fancied injury may try what seems to him a safer way.

Archibald Watson. Another form of cowardice, which leads a person to try to escape punishment or censure by fastening his own guilt upon another.

Dr. Dix. You may well call it another form of cowardice, and it is hard to say which form is the more contemptible. Go on.

Susan Perkins. Prejudice.

Charles Fox. Uncharitableness.

Lucy Snow. Love of gossip.

Dr. Dix. The last three you have named, particularly the third, may be the least malignant of all the motives to bear false witness against our neighbor, but they probably are responsible for by far the greater aggregate of mischief on account of their greater prevalence.

We need not devote much of our Talk to the more flagrant sins. The greater part of offences against the civil law need form the subject of no long homilies here. Their revolting names are comment enough of themselves. Mankind is a race of sinners, but not of criminals. As comparatively few fall victims to savage beasts of prey, while countless multitudes die from the attacks of invisible foes that people the water and the air, so it is not great crimes that most people need to be warned against, but little faults that grow unseen, perhaps, and unsuspected in their minds and hearts, — little faults which, however, if unrestrained in their growth, may develop into crime. You all know that it was never the first act of dishonesty that consigned a man to the felon's cell, nor the first indulgence in uncontrolled hatred that condemned him to the scaffold.

Let us now return to our specific subject. I have no fear lest any of us may become an Iago, but are we always guiltless of the sin of bearing false witness against our neighbor? If we never cherish the fiercer and baser passions of envy and revenge, if we never screen ourselves from the righteous indignation of our fellow-men by sacrificing to it the reputation of our innocent neighbor, are we always free from the prejudice, uncharitableness, and love of scandal which have made havoc of so many fair names? Do we never form unfavorable opinions of persons with whom we have too little acquaintance to justify any verdict, good or bad? What is more to the point, do we never freely express those opinions to others? Are we always inclined to put the

best constructions upon the words and acts of those who are better known to us? Do we never detect ourselves relating with malicious satisfaction or hearing with equal relish some piece of petty scandal?

Let us never forget that our neighbor's reputation is worth more to him than houses or lands or any other earthly treasure.

Remember that there is nothing more tender than a good name. A shrug of the shoulders, a sidelong glance, a curl of the lip, may wound it "past all surgery." Always think before you speak, but especially before you speak of your absent neighbor, whose utter defencelessness in your hands should appeal to your pity and your chivalry. You know not how many times you may have thoughtlessly lowered him in some one's esteem for the mere sake of being interesting, spicy, or witty. Ah, how many hearts have been pierced, how many fair fames have been besmirched, for the sake of a paltry witticism! Would you destroy your neighbor's property for sport? Do not that which is worse!

Louisa Thompson. I wonder how many there are among us whose consciences are entirely at ease now. And yet, who can avoid prejudice? It is so natural to judge strangers by some unpleasing expression of face or peculiarity of manner. One of the ladies I love and admire most among my acquaintances I once thought the proudest, the most selfish and unapproachable. The worst of it is that I did not hesitate to speak of her as such among my friends. I shall never forget the day when I made her acquaintance and found how completely I had been deceived. If only I were sure that all I have said of her since had entirely undone the mischief, I should be happy indeed. I bitterly realize that a word once uttered can never be recalled. I say these things publicly, in the hope that they may help towards the reparation I am so anxious to make to one of the sweetest-souled women I ever knew.

Dr. Dix [*with feeling*]. You may be assured, Miss Thompson, there is no one here who thinks the less of you for the noble words you have just spoken.

Julia Taylor. Dr. Dix, I suppose you would pronounce pure love of gossip to be the greatest of all the destroyers of reputation?

Dr. Dix. Yes; because, though, as I have said, it may be the least malignant in intention, it is undoubtedly the most prevalent. It pervades all classes, from the cultivated readers of the city society journal to the country sewing circle and the frequenters of the notorious corner grocery.

Thomas Dunn. Pardon me if I take exception to your adjective "cultivated."

Dr. Dix. The word, as Artemus Ward would say, "was spoke sarkastic." But there are none who lay claim to higher "culture" than some of those to whom I referred. Of course their claim is an utterly false one. Personalities are the favorite food of ignorant and empty minds. Those whose thoughts rise to science, art, literature, history, or matters which pertain to the well-being of their race, their country, their state, their city or town, or even the street on which they live, have no leisure for personal gossip, either of town or country, newspaper or rural store.

One of the subjects proposed for our Talks is the relation between secular study and morals. One point has already been made. Here we may add another: One cannot very easily study algebra or Greek, and blacken his neighbor's character at the same time.

XXV.

GREAT IS TRUTH, AND IT WILL PREVAIL.

Dr. Dix. You have observed that in these Talks on Truth and Truthfulness I have made use of very plain language. As the homely saying is, I have called a spade a spade, and not an agricultural implement. The intentional uttering of an untruth with intent to deceive I have called a *lie*. I might have used a word which would have fallen more smoothly upon your ears and upon mine, — “misrepresentation,” for instance, or “equivocation,” “prevarication,” “coloring,” or “embellishment.” Why do these words seem smoother than the little monosyllable which is so obnoxious to people in general, and to the culprit himself in particular? Certainly not on account of their articulate sound. In each of these polysyllables there are harsh consonants, while the little monosyllable contains only a liquid and a vowel sound, — the smoothest of all. It is because the little word is so uncompromising in its significance. Italian to the ear, it is blunt Saxon to the comprehension. Like a smooth, round bullet, it goes straight to the mark. Some people profess to regard it as coarse: it is not coarse; it is simply strong and exact. It is unpopular because it represents an ugly thing in its naked ugliness. Ugly things must be spoken of sometimes: we cannot fight our enemies efficiently without facing them. There are lies which are rarely or never called by their true name, — lies of look and gesture, even of silence and total inaction.

“I did not speak a word to you that was not strictly true,” pleads a clever culprit to the victim of his cunning.

ninely contrived deception. But that is only another lie. The words themselves were but breath: if their import was intended to be misleading, it matters not if their actual meaning could be sworn to, they told as black a lie as if no mean and cowardly cunning had been used in their construction. But perhaps no word whatever was uttered. Still, it matters not. The tongue is not the only organ of speech we possess: the eyes speak, and the hands; the whole body may be eloquent with the utterance of truth or falsehood. If a stranger asks me his way, and I point with my finger in the wrong direction, have I not lied to him? If only the tongue can commit this sin, then it is only necessary for a man to be born deaf and dumb to be the very Truth incarnate.

George Williams. I think people sometimes tell what is not quite true, not from intentional dishonesty, but from mere carelessness. They do not think it worth while to take the pains necessary to state the exact truth; they think that what they say is near enough to the truth.

Dr. Dix. I want to speak of that notion of "near enough" and "well enough." There is no doubt that among the proverbs which have been abused is the one that tells us that "whatever is worth doing at all is worth doing well." If it were always understood to mean exactly what it says, it would be less likely to be abused; but there are some persons who know nothing of adjectives and adverbs but the superlative degree. Many things which are worth doing well are not worth doing in the best possible manner. Nature, with endless time and endless space at her disposal, can afford to aim at perfection in every minute detail of her work; but a man's life is but a span, and he must select. There is such a thing as sacrificing the whole to its most insignificant parts. Chinese pictures are sometimes exhibited as curiosities (they certainly are not

works of art), whose minutest details have been finished with an elaboration appealing equally to our wonder and our pity for the patient toiler, while the general effect may be inferior to that of the caricature on a child's slate.

Joseph Cracklin. Some people study Greek and Latin on the Chinese principle.

Dr. Dix. That stupid blunder has had its day. The classical scholar who makes etymology, syntax, and mechanical prosody an end, rather than a means to the more thorough understanding of classical literature, is an anachronism.

There is far more danger, however, of abuse in the other direction. Things that are worth doing are much more likely not to be done thoroughly enough than too thoroughly. "Well enough" and "near enough" are the greatest obstacles to successful achievement that lie in the way of scholarship or any other department of human effort. They who make these their mottoes are the ones who are surest to fail, and who at best never rise above mediocrity.

We shall soon talk about Industry and Work. What has just been said will then apply as well as now; but we have not yet finished with the great subject of Truth. Whatever else you may be in danger of doing too thoroughly, you can never be too exact in your adherence to the truth. There is no "well enough" here but the very best, no "near enough" but the truth itself.

If you quote an author, do not be satisfied with giving his drift, unless that is all you are pretending to do: give his exact language. By the change of a single word you may unwittingly spoil the force, beauty, and symmetry of the passage you attempt to quote; and you have no more right to slander an author, living or dead, than any other of your fellow-men. A beautiful countenance seen through a twisted pane of glass may be distorted to an ugly caricature. An unskilful por-

trait painter may excite your indignation and disgust by the misplacement of a single line. If you misquote an author, you are like a twisted pane of glass or an unskilful portrait painter.

Florence Hill. An author's works are usually accessible ; but suppose we have occasion to quote a speaker, public or private, what shall we do ? We are not all gifted with the memory of a Webster or a Macaulay.

Dr. Dix. In that case you can, of course, make no pretence of verbal quotation. Your hearers understand fully that you are attempting to give only the substance, and hold you alone responsible for the language. But this does not exempt you from the utmost possible care. This is one of the things you cannot do too well. You have no more right to color or distort the substance of what you have heard than you have to misquote the words you have read.

Henry Jones. Please, Dr. Dix, is n't it sometimes right to tell a lie ?

Dr. Dix [*smiling*]. What do you think yourself, Henry ?

Henry Jones. I think it *is*.

Dr. Dix. When, for instance ?

Henry Jones. My Sunday-school teacher told me that it was better to break a bad promise than to keep it.

Dr. Dix. Your teacher might have explained to you that breaking a bad promise and telling a lie are two entirely different things.

Henry Jones. Why, sir, if a boy promises to help another boy to steal, and does n't keep his promise, has n't he told a lie ?

Dr. Dix. If, when he made the promise, he did not intend to keep it, it was certainly a lie ; but the promise itself was the lie, not the breaking of it.

Henry Jones. Do you think as my Sunday-school teacher does ?

Dr. Dix. Certainly. I agree with him perfectly.

You cannot undo a past fault: the only thing you can do is to repent of it, repair it as far as possible, and resolve not to repeat it.

George Williams. I think I can state cases in which it would be right to tell a lie.

Dr. Dix. Possibly. Let us hear them.

George Williams. In war, to deceive an enemy; in peace, to save life or property from murderers or robbers. Would n't a bank cashier be justified in telling any number of lies to prevent a burglar from robbing hundreds of trusting, innocent people? What would you think of a mother who should scruple to lie to a band of savages to save herself and her children from their tomahawks?

Dr. Dix [*rising, and speaking with deliberate emphasis*]. Scholars, there is lying which is not lying, just as there is killing which is not murder. The command is, Thou shalt not kill; but when your country's enemies are arrayed in battle line against her life, the more killing you do until the hostile flag is struck and the hostile arms are grounded, the braver, better hero you are. May the day speedily come when no such heroism shall be needed! They who feel — and need to feel — no scruples in *killing* to save home and country, neighbor and child, need scarcely hesitate to tell that which is not true in such a cause. Such lying is *not* lying: they who are not entitled to their lives if you can take them are surely not entitled to the truth which you can withhold from them. But all this only serves to show the essential barbarism of war, which seems to justify all lesser evils necessary to its prosecution.

Frederick Fox. Last Wednesday you hinted at some exceptions to the rule that the lower animals and inanimate things tell the truth. Are not these exceptions somewhat similar to those we have just been talking about?

Dr. Dix. I was about to speak of that very resemblance. However, I should much rather hear your views on the subject.

Frederick Fox. We have learned in our study of nature of many curious instances of deception among both plants and animals, either for the sake of defence against enemies or for the sake of more easily securing their prey. If actions speak louder than words, and if a lie may be told by a look as well as by speech, the "walking-stick" is a continual liar. It seems to be always saying, "I am not an insect,—I am only a dry twig; so you need n't trouble yourself to try to eat me." The leaf-insect of Java, and the still more wonderful leaf-butterfly, which when in repose cannot without great difficulty be distinguished from a leaf of the tree or shrub on which it is in the habit of alighting, are greater liars still.

Joseph Cracklin. If Nature sets us such examples of deception, why need we look upon it as so very heinous an offence, after all?

Dr. Dix. They appear to me to be very much such examples as the mother would set, in the case supposed by Williams. Self-preservation is the first law of nature for the humblest insect and plant as well as for man. The very fact that it is shown in this cause, and in this cause alone, should teach us the sacredness both of life and of truth.

As I said at the outset, if a man were as truthful and honest as Nature, he would be a far better and nobler being than he is. Nature never adulterates her goods nor offers lying samples of them. Her apples are always apples, and not base imitations. Nor are they always placed at the top of her barrel. There is never any cheapening glucose in her sugar-cane.

Susan Perkins. Dr. Dix, you told us last week that Washington was shamefully slandered during his life. However great the effect may have been at the time,

it has all passed away. Does n't this show that even slander, wicked and mean as it is, cannot work permanent harm ?

Dr. Dix. Not only slander, but all kinds of untruth are destined to die. Truth only is immortal. History is one long story of the mighty conflict between truth and falsehood, in which the victory is always at last on the side of truth. Each succeeding century has witnessed the crashing ruin, one after another, of the great strongholds of error. They are not all down yet, but they are all doomed.

*Magna est veritas, et prævalebit.*¹

¹ Great is truth, and it will prevail.

XXVI.

HONESTY.

Dr. Dix. We began our consideration of the habits which we wish to cultivate with that of truthfulness. Closely allied to it is the habit of honesty; that is, justice in our dealings with others as regards property. In its widest sense honesty includes truthfulness, but I use the word now in the commonly restricted sense which I have defined. I spoke of the two virtues as closely allied. It is often said, you know, that he who steals will surely lie.

Jonathan Tower. But he who lies will not surely steal.

Dr. Dix. That depends, I suppose, somewhat on what kind of lies he is in the habit of telling.

Archibald Watson. The old sailor I spoke of the other day is thought to be honest enough so far as money goes.

Dr. Dix. Very likely. As a class I believe sailors are not often accused of avarice, whatever their other failings may be. Nevertheless, I think I should prefer to trust my own financial interests to one who is honest in the widest sense of the term, in words as well as in deeds. I intend no personal offence to your nautical acquaintance, Watson. I am speaking only on general principles.

Archibald Watson. I fully agree with you, Dr. Dix.

Dr. Dix. Our national Declaration of Independence names among man's inalienable rights, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. As property of some sort and in some quantity is necessary to at least two of

these, the right to it is generally regarded as next in sacredness to those of life and personal liberty.

Helen Sawyer. The other morning you said that a man's *reputation* is worth more to him than houses or lands or other earthly treasure.

Dr. Dix. And a moment ago I implied a different order, in the general estimation. Perhaps, as man advances in civilization, there may come about a complete readjustment in the acknowledged values of things, when even the courts will inflict a severer penalty upon a convicted slanderer than upon a convicted thief. The tendency seems to be in that direction. The time was when there was no such crime as libel recognized in law, — no crime, in fact, except such as was committed directly against person or property. The penalty for all other offences was left to the sufferer himself, who often wiped them out in the blood of the offender.

Isabelle Anthony. That he was allowed to do this seems to show that those other offences were recognized as crimes, even if the law did not punish them.

Dr. Dix. Not necessarily, for the most trivial insult was often punished in this way, though it might excite only the laughter of all save the aggrieved party himself.

Charles Fox. You refer to the duel?

Dr. Dix. Yes. That was the only means of redress men once had for all offences which were too subtle in their nature for the clumsy hands of the law to lay hold upon. If we look back far enough in history, we shall find that there was no other redress even for theft. Between that day and this, when such offences as libel and the "alienation of affection" are punishable by law, there is a wide gulf indeed! If the improvement goes on, if the time ever comes when all things shall be estimated at their true value, and those offences which are in reality the worst shall meet with the severest penalties, the mere stealing of one's purse will stand lower

in the list than it stands to-day. The slaying of the body is not the only crime that is worse than robbery or libel; the slaying of the soul is immeasurably worse than either. Is it not a singular commentary on the civil code that the chief offence attributed to the impersonation of all evil is rarely punishable by human laws? They among men who most closely resemble that impersonation in their wickedness, they whose lives are devoted to the work of undermining virtue and purity in the souls of their fellow-men, are, so far as human laws are concerned, very often totally unwhipped of justice.

Joseph Cracklin. Dr. Dix, do you believe there is such a being as the devil?

Dr. Dix. It matters not whether I do or not. Suffice it that there is a spirit of evil rampant among men, a moral gravitation which tends to draw their souls downward, as the earth draws their bodies downward. Against this power there is an inward force which tends to hold them erect. And as their bodies grow strong by continual resistance to the downward pull of earth, so may their souls grow strong and erect by their never-ending battle with evil.

In what I said before this digression do not understand me to belittle the wickedness of theft. That there are still lower depths of wickedness does not diminish the depth of this. Its guilt is so obvious, so palpable, that though, as I said, it has not always been subject to legal penalty, there can never have been a time when it was not looked upon as a heinous offence.

Helen Sawyer. The ancient Spartans are said to have encouraged and rewarded it.

Dr. Dix. The ancient Spartans were an exceptional people even for the savage times in which they lived. They encouraged theft, not as a meritorious act in itself, but as affording opportunities for the exercise of the courage, skill, and address which they prized so highly.

If these virtues were lacking, as shown by failure in the attempt or by detection, both the attempt and the lack of virtues were punished together.

From the very first the undisturbed possession of property must have been regarded by men in general as one of their inalienable rights. It has always been indispensable to their comfort, happiness, even life. Without it, the most powerful incentive to industry and the exercise of skill would not exist. The rudest savage must always have looked upon it as the just reward of his labor. The bow and arrows he had made, the hut he had built with his own hands, were, as a matter of course, his very own; and the attempt on the part of his fellow-savage to deprive him of them, without giving him a fair equivalent, was, as a matter of course, to be resented and punished.

Julia Taylor. But when his chief required them, even without recompense, I suppose he had no thought of resisting.

Dr. Dix. Like his civilized brother he was obliged to yield to superior force; but the inmost feelings of his heart were, no doubt, very much the same as yours would have been in his place.

Out-and-out, naked theft or robbery is one of those gross crimes which I described the other morning as needing no comment. Its revolting name is comment enough for all in whose souls the light of conscience is not yet extinguished. But there are forms of stealing and robbing which may well be commented on in a series of Talks on Morality, because their real nature is not always recognized. Like some forms of lying which we have mentioned, they are disguised by euphemisms: they are not naked, out-and-out thefts and robberies, but "embezzlements," "defalcations," "breaches of trust," "sharp practice," "able financiering," etc. Masquerading under these more or less respectable aliases, they take their places among other business transac-

tions as well-dressed thieves and robbers mingle among honest men. But, in reality, two little words name them all, just as one little monosyllable names all forms of intentional deception. The man who takes that which does not justly belong to him, either by intelligent, free gift or fair exchange, is a thief or a robber, whether he does it with or without the sanction of the law. He may call himself, and others may call him, a clever business man, an able financier; he is a thief or a robber as truly as if he had literally as well as virtually picked his victim's pocket.

Henry Phillips. Why is it necessary to use two words? Why is not simply "thief" enough?

Dr. Dix. Because there is an important moral as well as legal distinction between the two words. Theft is properly defined as the wrongful appropriation of property without the owner's knowledge or consent, while robbery is the wrongful appropriation of it with his knowledge and with or without his consent, which may be wrongfully gained, as, for instance, by threats or violence. There are numerous legal subdivisions of each of these crimes, but the moral law is but little concerned with them. In its view all who take that which does not rightfully belong to them are either thieves or robbers, whether they do so with or without the sanction of the civil law.

Isabelle Anthony. Why does the civil law ever sanction the wrongful appropriation of property?

Susan Perkins. Why, indeed, does it sanction any act that the moral law condemns?

Dr. Dix. That is too broad a subject to enter upon to-day. We will try to answer you next time.

XXVII.

HONESTY, CONTINUED.

Dr. Dix. "Why does the civil law ever sanction the wrongful appropriation of property? Why, indeed, does it sanction any act that the moral law condemns?"

One reason is that its province is necessarily so largely confined to what is external, material, and tangible. What a man does with his body may be known to all; what he does with his mind is known fully only to himself. Every offence of the one may, therefore, meet with full recompense at the hands of the law, while the deepest wickedness of the other may be unrecognized and unpunished, save by that moral retribution which awaits both open and secret sins with equal certainty.

So what a man involuntarily suffers in his body through the means of another may be known to all and the offender may be duly punished; what he suffers in his mind and character through the baleful influence of an evil companion may be known scarcely to himself. This deepest of all wrongs is the one which most completely evades the civil law.

But though the civil law may permit the ruin of my soul with impunity, why, you ask, need it permit the theft or robbery of my purse, a purely physical matter?

Because, though my purse is a purely physical matter, the act by which it is wrongfully taken from me may not be; it may be, in fact, as purely psychical as the act by which my virtue is taken from me.

If a man puts his hand into my pocket and takes my purse without my knowledge, he is a thief, whom the

law may severely punish ; if he snatches it from my hand, or takes me by the throat and rifles it from my pocket, he is a robber, and may be punished with still greater severity ; if he persuades me to part with it by promise of a material equivalent, and does not make good his promise according to specifications, he has obtained it "under false pretences," and may be dealt with, but not so severely as the technical thief or robber ; if he persuades me to part with it by offering or promising that which he knows to be valueless, or of less value than the price I pay, he is a swindler, and may or may not be punished, according to circumstances.

But there are plenty of ways in which he may wrongfully take it from me with absolute impunity, so far as human laws are concerned. He may do it without my knowledge, as by charging unreasonable profits ; or with my consent obtained through my folly, ignorance, or weakness (which is morally the same as no consent), as by selling me some worthless or worse than worthless nostrum, or by inducing me to invest in some enterprise which he knows to be hopeless. In either case he is as truly a thief as the poor, unskilled wretch who knows not how to steal according to statute. Again, he may do it with my full knowledge and in contemptuous defiance of my indignation and powerless attempts at self-protection, as many a millionaire, trust company, or other monopoly has done and is doing to-day. How does he or they differ in reality from the strong, bold, insolent robber who seizes his victim by the throat and rifles his pocket?

Joseph Cracklin. Are millionaires, trust companies, and monopolies always robbers ?

Dr. Dix. Your question is not a call for information, but an implication against my fairness and candor. You know very well that they are not always robbers, that some of the noblest men the world has ever seen have

been men of great wealth honestly obtained. You know, furthermore, that combinations of men for greater efficiency in business do not necessarily involve dishonesty in dealing, that such combinations may be, and often are, of the greatest benefit not only to the individuals composing them but to the general public also.

Thomas Dunn. It is true, however, is it not, that such combinations, especially when they amount to monopolies, offer very strong temptations to dishonesty?

Dr. Dix. Great power is always a great temptation, whether it be physical, moral, political, or financial. But virtue may be strong enough to withstand even that temptation. Of actual monopolies, as they are frequently secured and managed, I have no defence to make. Too often their prime object is fraud. Secured by the ruthless crowding-out of weaker rivals, one by one at first, and finally by hundreds or by thousands at a time, and when secured carried on by the wholesale legalized plundering of society, — what name can be properly applied to them but that of gigantic robbers?

If, however, men were as mighty in virtue as they are in intellect, even monopolies might be as powerful agents for good as they are for evil.

Henry Phillips. How would that be possible?

Dr. Dix. There is nothing necessarily dishonest or cruel in organization. On the contrary, when its purposes are right and just it is most beneficent in its effects. If all the charitable people, for example, in our State should unite into one body and carry out their schemes of benevolence under one well-managed system, their power for good would be immensely increased. That would be nothing more or less than a monopoly of practical beneficence. So if all the competent workers at the various guilds should be allowed by their stronger representatives respectively to organize for the more efficient and economical carrying on of their business, there might be a grand system of

monopolies that would be of incalculable benefit both to the workers themselves and to society in general.

Thomas Dunn. Always supposing the controlling powers were honest and public-spirited. I suppose the civil codes of an age afford us a pretty fair means of judging of the average standard of morality of that age.

Dr. Dix. It is often said that the rulers elected by a people fairly represent their average morality. As to the laws which those rulers enact, they more generally represent the average standard aimed at as attainable than that actually attained. How far short of the standard of the moral law that is, we have already illustrated to some extent. And yet the conduct of many so-called respectable men shows plainly that the civil law is their highest standard. In all their dealings their aim seems to be to keep just within its requirements. So long as they do this they defiantly challenge criticism of their conduct, though they may rob the widow and the fatherless with relentless cruelty.

Julia Taylor. However great future improvements may be, I don't see how it can ever be possible for the two standards to be the same.

Dr. Dix. If the day ever comes when they are the same, it will certainly not be by the enforcement of such civil penalties as are now in vogue. When the civil law requires, as the moral law has always required, that the rich shall not grind the faces of the poor in any way whatsoever, that the intelligent and the educated shall not use their intelligence and education to oppress the ignorant and the simple, it will be obeyed not through dread of fines or imprisonments, but through the fear of overwhelming public obloquy, — a far more terrible penalty to many persons than either fine or imprisonment.

Susan Perkins. If the time you speak of ever comes, there will be no need of the civil law; the moral law will be all-sufficient.

Dr. Dix. Not quite all-sufficient, Miss Perkins. The prevention of crime is not the only function of the civil law. The simplest form of society — even of those whose intentions were morally unexceptionable — could scarcely hold together without laws governing their intercourse in many ways upon which the moral law has no bearing. Such laws are the only ones in which multitudes to-day are personally interested so far as their own conduct is concerned. Did you ever think how small a proportion of the crowds that walk the streets of a city have any personal relations with the blue-coated guardians of its peace, — ever notice, in fact, whether they are on their beats or not?

Helen Mar. I was struck by your mention of the abuse of intellectual as well as physical power. A strong-armed ruffian that overpowers his victim and robs him of his purse is looked upon and punished as one of the worst of criminals, but the strong-brained ruffian that overpowers his victims by the thousands, perhaps, and robs them of purse, house, and land together by his superior intellectual power is looked upon, as you have said, only as a great financier. I do not see why one is not in reality a criminal as well as the other, and as much greater a criminal as his robbery is greater.

Dr. Dix. So the moral law regards him; so in fact he is.

XXVIII.

A BLACK LIST.

Dr. Dix. You may mention this morning some of the common ways in which the law of honesty as respects the right of property is violated.

Archibald Watson. Shall we include those we have already talked about?

Dr. Dix. Yes.

Archibald Watson. Well, then, there is plain out-and-out stealing, such as is recognized and punished by the law.

James Murphy. And robbery.

Frank Williams. And obtaining goods under false pretences.

Henry Jones. Forgery.

Lucy Snow. Counterfeiting.

Charles Fox. Overcharging for goods or services.

Jonathan Tower. Failing in business.

Jane Simpson. Is it necessarily dishonest to fail in business?

Dr. Dix. No more than in any other department of human effort, — no more than it is dishonest to fail in art, or authorship, or oratory.

Jonathan Tower. But does n't a man who pays only twenty-five cents to a man to whom he owes a dollar cheat him out of seventy-five cents?

Dr. Dix. Whether you can properly call it cheating or not depends entirely on the circumstances. Men in the business world sustain a very close relation to one another: the misfortune, folly, inefficiency, or guilt of one necessarily involves others in difficulties for which

they are in no wise responsible ; unforeseen changes in demand and supply often reduce one to ruin while they may raise another to affluence, through no fault of the one or merit of the other. It is for the general interest of all that failures from such causes should not be irretrievable, — that the unfortunate should be allowed a fair chance to go on in their business or to begin anew. By just provisions of the law and by general consent they are allowed to do so.

Jonathan Tower. When I said “failing in business,” I should have added “to make money.”

Dr. Dix. Ah, that is a very different matter. No one will dispute the dishonesty nor the meanness particularly contemptible of that kind of “failing.” Well, scholars, you may go on with your black list.

Henry Phillips. Usury.

Jane Simpson. What is usury ?

Dr. Dix. Phillips ?

Henry Phillips. Charging more than the legal rate for the use of money.

Jane Simpson. I should n't think you could call that dishonest. You need n't borrow money if you don't want to pay what the lender asks for it.

Henry Phillips. The trouble is, you may be obliged to borrow, whether you want to or not.

Jane Simpson. Then go to some one else.

Dr. Dix. In other words, if you don't want to be robbed, go to some one who will not rob you. That is rather a poor plea for the robber, is it not ? So the murderer might say of his victim, “If he did n't want to be killed, he should n't have come to me ; he should have gone to some one who would not have killed him.”

Henry Phillips. Besides, there might have been no one else who would be willing to lend.

Jane Simpson. But is n't usury ever right ?

Dr. Dix. Yes, there are circumstances when it might

be justified. Suppose, for instance, a man should ask a loan of a person who would rather keep his money for other purposes than lend it at the legal rate, but who could afford to accept a higher rate. There would be nothing morally wrong in a mutual agreement satisfactory to both, unless, indeed, the borrower were of that improvident class who are always trying to borrow at ruinous rates, and who need to be protected from their own recklessness.

Geoffrey Jenkins. Are there not some people who hold that all interest is wrong?

Dr. Dix. It is difficult to understand the basis of their objection. It is, of course, more advantageous to me to have my money in my own possession than in that of another: if I submit to disadvantage for the benefit of another, it seems no more than equitable that I should be compensated. However, this may be one of the controverted topics that are ruled out of our discussions. Go on.

Helen Mar. One of the worst and most cruel forms of dishonesty is taking advantage of the necessities of the poor to buy their goods or labor for less than their value.

Dr. Dix. Yes: this is what we mean when we speak of "grinding the faces of the poor."

Ah, when will the day come when the heart of Mercy will no longer be wrung by the sight of man's inhumanity to man! The poor woman in Hood's "Song of the Shirt" may speak for all her suffering kindred. Miss Mar, will you repeat the poem?

.

Dr. Dix. But sometimes it is the poor man who wrongs the rich man. He says to himself, "A few pennies or a few dollars are nothing to him; but they are bread to me." So he feels no compunction. He wrongs his rich neighbor, but he wrongs himself still more. What is bread to his body is poison to his soul.

Geoffrey Jenkins. Should he starve to death rather than steal?

Dr. Dix. Happily that is an alternative to which few are forced in this age, at least in this country. Charity, public or private, will generally come to his aid long before that extremity is reached.

Susan Perkins. Not always. A few days ago I read of a whole family dying from starvation in the very heart of New York city.

Dr. Dix. I read the same account. Before they would call for help they were all too far gone to make their condition known, and it was not discovered till too late. Terrible as was their fate, therefore, they were themselves chiefly responsible for it, — not, of course, for the state of society that makes such extreme poverty possible. Society itself is responsible for that, and a fearful responsibility it is. Who knows what a fearful reckoning may come some day!

Florence Hill. That family might never have been able to make their condition known. Perhaps they would not have been believed if they had tried.

Dr. Dix. Yes; all that is possible.

Lucy Snow. If it was so, it was no better than murder.

Isabelle Anthony. It was no better than murder as it was.

Geoffrey Jenkins. Dr. Dix, would you have blamed those poor people if they had stolen to save themselves from starvation?

Dr. Dix. It would be a hard heart, even if a just judgment (which I do not say it would be), that would do so. Yet if they had had the energy to steal they would have had the energy to beg.

Jane Simpson. Some poor people would rather starve to death than either beg or steal.

Dr. Dix. But they have no right to starve to death if they can prevent it. Begging is humiliating, but not

wrong if unavoidable. Suicide, whether by starvation or any other means, is an immeasurably greater crime even than theft.

Geoffrey Jenkins. So, if one must either starve or steal, it would be right for him to steal?

Dr. Dix. My best answer is to say that the English judge who not only acquitted the poor, starving woman who snatched a loaf of bread from a baker's stand, but took up a subscription in her behalf, did precisely as any other man with a heart in his bosom would have done in his place.

But, as I said, there is little probability that any of you will ever be forced to choose between these terrible alternatives. Let us return to our list. The wealthy employer is not always the defrauder; sometimes it is the poor laborer. How?

Jonathan Tower. By joining in a "strike."

Dr. Dix. Ah, that is one of the controverted subjects that we must not discuss here.

Jonathan Tower. I beg your pardon. By wasting time when working "by the day."

Joseph Cracklin. By slighting his work when working "by the job."

Henry Phillips. By doing more than he knows is required or desired when the opportunity is given, for the sake of getting more pay.

Dr. Dix. Please illustrate.

Henry Phillips. Why, for instance, a mechanic sometimes puts very fine work into an article that he knows is to be used only for common purposes.

Isabelle Anthony. And a doctor sometimes continues to make his calls upon a patient when he knows that his services are no longer needed.

Dr. Dix [*laughing*]. I suppose the physician himself must be allowed to be the best judge of that. Go on with your black list.

Julia Taylor. Borrowing without intending to repay,

or without being reasonably sure of being able to repay, or carelessly neglecting to repay.

Lucy Snow. Returning borrowed articles in a worse condition than when borrowed.

Jonathan Tower. Borrowing goods and returning them when the market price has fallen.

Thomas Dunn. Borrowing money when prices are low and returning it when they are high.

Dr. Dix. That's rather a subtle point for this place, is n't it, Dunn?

Thomas Dunn. I don't think it need be; it is about the same thing Tower said.

Dr. Dix. Yes, that is true, goods being the price of money. Go on.

Frederick Fox. Coining silver.

Dr. Dix. That topic I rule out altogether. Try once more.

Frederick Fox. Making "corners in the market."

Dr. Dix. I think I will allow that. You may explain.

Frederick Fox. The usual way is for capitalists to buy up all they can get of some article for which there is, or may be, a demand, store it away, and thus produce an artificial scarcity. This brings the article up to an unnatural price. Articles of absolute necessity, such as wheat or other grains, are most often chosen for this purpose, because the profits are surer: men must have bread whatever its prices may be. It is, in my opinion, the most gigantic and villainous kind of robbery that can be committed, because by it everybody is robbed.

Dr. Dix. Your language is strong; but perhaps none too much so. Proceed.

Geoffrey Jenkins. Giving false returns of your property to escape taxes.

Archibald Watson. Moving out of town just in season to escape taxes.

Charles Fox. Not paying a debt until long after it is due, when you know that no interest will be asked for.

Dr. Dix. Yes; great cruelty is often inflicted in this way upon poor people who are dependent on prompt payments.

Isabelle Anthony. Being less careful of a hired horse or house than you would be of your own.

Florence Hill. Putting the best fruit on the top of the barrel.

Susan Perkins. Selling water for milk, sand for sugar, and slate for coal.

Jane Simpson. Men do worse than that; if they did n't put poison in our food, we could, perhaps, tolerate their water, sand, and slate.

Julia Taylor. Not paying your fare on the cars if the conductor forgets to collect it.

Helen Mar. Wantonly injuring private or public property, as, for instance, whittling fences, marking on walls, books, etc. I heard a story once of a man who whittled the counter in a store. The proprietor came behind him and snipped off a piece from his coat. "What did you do that for?" asked the whittler in great indignation. "This piece of cloth will just pay for that chip of wood," replied the proprietor.

Sally Jones. They were both thieves, were n't they?

Dr. Dix. Yes, they were both thieves; but the petty vandal richly deserved his loss. Go on.

Frank Williams. Not trying to find the owner of anything you have found.

George Williams. Putting a few cents' worth of sarsaparilla and iodide of potassium into a bottle and selling it for a dollar.

Henry Phillips. Gambling.

Joseph Cracklin. I know that gambling is wrong; but I don't see how you can call it actual dishonesty.

Henry Phillips. If a man takes another man's prop-

erty without giving him an equivalent, what else can it be ?

Joseph Cracklin. But he does that whenever he accepts a gift.

Henry Phillips. Winnings are not gifts.

Dr. Dix. They are not looked upon as such by either the loser or the winner. Until they are paid they are regarded as debts as truly as if they were so much borrowed money.

Henry Phillips. They are considered even more sacred: they are called "debts of *honor*."

Joseph Cracklin. But there is a sort of equivalent given.

Dr. Dix. What is it ?

Joseph Cracklin. An equal chance to win the other man's money.

Henry Phillips. An equal chance to rob the other man of his money, that is. That does not prevent it from being robbery, any more than the equal chance on both sides to take life prevents duelling from being murder.

XXIX.

HONOR.

Dr. Dix. My good boy — my hero *sans peur et sans reproche* — is the “soul of honor.” What does that mean? It means that he is honest, not because “honesty is the best policy,” but because it never occurs to him to be dishonest. If dishonesty were the best policy, as some shrewd men seem to believe, if we may judge by their conduct, he would still be honest. It means that he is truthful, not because he is afraid of the penalty that might follow if he were detected in a lie, but because he loathes a lie with his whole soul: the very thought of it makes his lip curl with scorn. It means that he is generous, not because he hopes and expects to be rewarded for his generosity, but because it is as natural for him to be big-hearted as it is for an athlete to be broad-shouldered: he could n’t be dishonorable or mean any more than a giant could be a dwarf; if he should try, he would n’t know how to set about it. He will stand by a friend, not because he expects his friend to stand by him, but because that is the only thing to do: active and suggestive as his mind is, it is not suggestive enough to think of leaving his friend in the lurch. It means that he is grateful for benefits received, not because it would not look well to be ungrateful, not because men would despise him if he were ungrateful, but because he can’t help being grateful.

You have heard of antipathies. There are some persons who will grow faint at the sight of a spider, and others who will almost become wild at the sight of a snake. It is useless to convince them that the spider

and the reptile are actually as harmless as butterflies, — they are not harmless to them. The soul of honor has a very similar antipathy to all things that are mean and contemptible. The soul without honor has no such antipathy : to it they may seem as harmless as butterflies ; it might not even be able to recognize them as mean and contemptible except that it has learned that they are so regarded by others.

The general sense of mankind is a very important guide to those who are below the average in honor and virtue : whatever they may be within their own hearts and souls, it enables them to preserve a certain respectability in their outward conduct. The fear of what others will think of them is the chief or only restraint upon their meanness and wickedness, unless it be the stronger, even more ignoble fear of what others will do to them.

But though they have learned that there is a generally recognized standard of honor and respectability above their own natural standard, still they cannot believe in its reality : in their secret hearts they believe it is an artificial standard, raised from motives of general policy. In other words, they cannot help judging others by themselves. Living in a valley and breathing its noxious gases, they cannot see the heights above them where others dwell in a purer atmosphere. To them there are no really honest men. "Every man has his price, if you only bid high enough." Fabricius, who "could no more deviate from the path of honor than the sun could leave his course in the heavens," is to them a myth, an impossibility. Boys and girls, put no faith in the man who believes that there is no honor in his fellow-men : be sure he is judging others by himself. There are authors who describe only villains, — they little know that they are only showing to the world their own bad hearts. Dean Swift had a clever brain, but a villainous heart.

Lucy Snow. Is not the general sense of mankind important to the honorable as well as to the dishonorable — That is not exactly what I meant to say. I meant, Ought not every one to regard the opinions of others ?

Dr. Dix. Most certainly, Miss Snow. But while the man of honor duly values the opinion of others, he values his own opinion of himself still more highly.

Lucy Snow. What is the difference between that and vanity or egotism ?

Dr. Dix. The difference is, that vanity and egotism are most sensitive to the opinion of others, while honor is most sensitive to that of self. Vanity thirsts for admiration on account of personal beauty, dress, wit, fine horses or houses, graceful accomplishments, etc. ; when the objects of the desired admiration are less frivolous, such as intellectual achievements, social, financial, military, or political power, vanity rises to ambition more or less laudable ; when the object is still higher, virtuous, benevolent, honorable conduct, it becomes no longer vanity, but a most noble and praiseworthy aspiration. The man of honor may feel all these in due measure, but high above them all is his desire for the approval of his own conscience and self-respect.

To the man absolutely devoid of honor his own opinion of himself is nothing : that of others is everything, either on account of the love of approbation, which the lowest possess in some degree, or for a worse reason.

Frank Williams. For what worse reason ?

Dr. Dix. For the reason that a sheep's clothing sometimes serves a wolf better than his own.

The moral furnishings of some persons are very much like the household furnishings of a family I once visited with my father on his professional rounds, when I was a very small lad, so small that the family did not think it necessary to keep me confined in the "show rooms" where their other callers sat. As you will never know who this family were or where they lived, I do not feel

that I am violating confidence in telling you about them. The contrast between the "show rooms" and the rest of the house was so strong that it made an indelible impression upon my childish mind. Such neatness and elegance here, such abominable dirt and squalor there! Nothing, evidently, was too fine for the parlor, dining-room, and guest chamber, where the outer world sometimes penetrated; but as to the kitchen and family bedrooms, what did it matter? "No one would see them." Ah, how many of us furnish the secret chambers of our minds and hearts as richly as we furnish the parlors?

Most people are exceedingly lenient critics of themselves; they rarely underestimate their own wisdom, cleverness, or personal attractions, and as to their moral qualities, they generally consider them well up to the average. They may be conscious of having committed acts which they would severely condemn in others, but then there are always peculiarly mitigating circumstances in their own cases. It is astonishing how tenderly a culprit will view his own derelictions from duty. Surely no one else was ever so strongly tempted; it was the fault of his peculiar temperament, and, pray, how could he help that? Besides, what he has done was not so very bad, after all, under the circumstances; others have done worse; you yourself would probably have done the same if you had been in his situation. Or he may go still further and throw the blame entirely on some one else who put the temptation in his way, and virtually obliged him to yield to it. If men in general always judged others by themselves there would be few misanthropes; it would be a pretty good sort of world, after all.

James Murphy. What is a misanthrope, Dr. Dix?

Dr. Dix. Well?

Helen Sawyer. One who hates or despises the whole race of men — except himself.

Dr. Dix. Sometimes he includes himself, but oftener

he judges himself in the lenient way I have been describing, and maintains the balance in his judgment by undue severity towards others.

But the man of honor is his own severest critic. What he might pardon to the weakness or peculiar temptations of others he cannot pardon in himself. He is especially severe in regard to what he does or is tempted to do in secret. "Coward!" he will say to himself, "would you do this thing because there is no eye to see you? Shame upon you!"

We will suppose that a private letter falls in his way. He sees from the superscription that it is intended for his political rival. It probably contains information that would be of the greatest importance to himself. The seal has already been broken: he might read it through and through, and no man but himself would be the wiser. Does such a thought enter his mind? If so, he spurns it from him as if it were a venomous reptile.

He encloses it in an envelope and addresses it to his rival with a polite note of explanation. The receiver opens it and — turns pale. His wily plans are all known; he knows what human nature is, he knows what *he* would have done. As the sender has not condescended to make any statement, his conviction is the stronger.

He acts upon his conviction: he informs his henchmen that it is all up with them, and gives his grounds for the information. Indirectly it comes to the ears of the finder of the letter that he took the dishonorable advantage which fortune threw in his way. What does he do?

Geoffrey Jenkins. The time was when he would have taken the only recognized course to vindicate his honor.

Dr. Dix. Challenged his slanderer?

Geoffrey Jenkins. Yes, Dr. Dix.

Dr. Dix. And would that have accomplished his purpose?

Geoffrey Jenkins. It would at least have silenced the tongue of slander.

Dr. Dix. As well as his own tongue or that of his antagonist forever. But how would that have affected the fact of his real honor or dishonor? Whatever that fact was, the challenge would probably have followed the accusation.

Geoffrey Jenkins. It would not have affected the real fact in the least.

Dr. Dix. What would he probably do in this more civilized age?

Geoffrey Jenkins. He would indignantly deny the charge, and trust to what men already knew of his character for the vindication of his honor.

Dr. Dix. Yes; that would probably be all-sufficient. But a far better course would be to treat the accusation as utterly beneath the notice of the man of honor he professes to be. His friends—who could testify that whatever he might have discovered from the tempting document he kept scrupulously to himself—would do the rest.

XXX.

“WHEN THE CAT’S AWAY THE MICE WILL PLAY.”

Dr. Dix [*entering his schoolroom late and finding it in disorder*]. Ah, it seems that I have interrupted your diversions and pastimes. This sudden unnatural stillness is quite oppressive. — Pray go on just as if I were not here. — Well, why don’t you go on? Why don’t you throw that crayon, Cracklin, as you were intending to do?

Joseph Cracklin. Do you order me to throw it, sir?

Dr. Dix. By no means. I asked you to do as you would if I were not present. Would that justify you? Would it release you from the proper penalty of your misconduct?

Joseph Cracklin. N-no, Dr. Dix. But I was not the only one; the others were —

Dr. Dix. We have already expressed our sentiments on the courage, manliness, and honor of throwing blame upon others. They will undoubtedly speak for themselves.

Geoffrey Jenkins. I threw crayons, Dr. Dix.

Archibald Watson. And so did I.

Jonathan Tower. And I.

Dr. Dix. That is very well so far. “Open confession is good for the soul.” Does any one else wish to relieve his mind?

Henry Phillips. I drew that picture on the blackboard; but — but I was intending to rub it out before you came.

Dr. Dix. And you think, I suppose, that that intention palliates your offence. I shall allude to that kind

of palliation presently. I await further acknowledgment that any one has to make.

Charles Fox. I called on Butters to make a speech.

Dr. Dix. Yes; and, Butters, did you respond?

Trumbull Butters. No, Dr. Dix. He and the rest of the boys are all the time nagging me,—all except Dunn. He tried to keep order while you were away,—he and some of the big girls.

Dr. Dix. Nagging is another subject that we shall do well to consider. Dunn and the “big girls” deserve, and hereby receive, my hearty and sincere thanks.

Susan Perkins. I am sorry to say, Dr. Dix, that *all* the “big girls” are not altogether blameless; I for one am not. I confess and apologize.

Jane Simpson. And I wish to do the same.

Dr. Dix. That is the most honorable thing you can do now, except to resolve not to offend again. Well, if there are no more confessions, I will now hear any further excuses or explanations that any one has to offer.

Geoffrey Jenkins. We only thought we would have a little fun; we did n't think there was any harm in it as long as you were not here. We could n't do much studying, you know.

Dr. Dix. Why not?

Geoffrey Jenkins. Because—because there was so much noise. [*Laughter.*]

Dr. Dix [*joining in the laugh*]. If all your fun was as funny as that, you must have enjoyed yourselves!

Archibald Watson. But do you really think, Dr. Dix, there was any harm in our having a little fun as long as you were not here to direct our work?

Dr. Dix. Fun is a most excellent thing. It is one of the greatest blessings conferred upon our race; it is good for the body, for the mind, for the heart, for the soul. Laugh and grow fat; be jolly and long-lived. I will not yield to any one in my fondness for fun. But no good thing, even fun, is good at the wrong time and

in the wrong place. The time you have given to it this morning belonged to *work*. What if I was not here? When the hours of work and play were laid down for you no such condition was affixed as "if Dr. Dix is here." I may be late again, as I was this morning.

You say, "*We* wanted a little fun." Who are the *we*? It seems there were some of your number who did not want it,—some who "tried to keep order." They wanted the time for study, and they had a right to it. Why should you defraud them of their right? Your fun, therefore, was of the kind we spoke of some time ago, that which injures or annoys others. It is not unlikely that that fact had something to do with its being funny, — that and the other fact that it was in violation of the rules of school. Are you quite sure that if it had not been for these two conditions it would not have been rather tame fun?

I say, what if I was not here? Am I to understand that my presence is indispensable to the performance of your duty? Do you do right only because you are afraid of *me*? If that is the case, how do I differ from the policeman who stands with his billy on the corner of the street, and how do you differ from those who are watching for him to disappear around the corner? Is that why your fathers and mothers obey the civil laws, — because they are afraid of the policeman? Is that why *you* will obey the civil laws when you in your turn become men and women? School is a civil community on a small scale; it is governed by its laws just as the state and the city are governed by their laws. If you need a teacher-policeman to keep you from small violations of law here, what guarantee have we that you will not need a rougher policeman to keep you from greater offences and harsher penalties hereafter?

Susan Perkins. Dr. Dix, we need your presence here, not because we are afraid of the punishments you may inflict, but because we are afraid of displeasing *you*.

Dr. Dix. It is very gratifying to hear you say so; still, the principle is the same, for my displeasure is a punishment to those who care for it. I believe you all do care for it, and for this time it shall be your only punishment, — at least the only one *I* shall inflict.

But I wish you to observe that I have more than ordinary reason to be displeased. Have you forgotten our last Talk? What was its subject?

Several Voices. Honor.

Dr. Dix. Your lowered tones and your downcast eyes show how you think you have illustrated that subject this morning. Does the man of honor need a policeman to keep him to his duty? What cares he for a policeman, whom a whole regiment with fixed bayonets could not drive from the path of duty!

As I said a long time ago, I cannot expect that one Talk or a hundred will work a complete transformation. Character is a structure that is slow in building; but it is all the more solid when built. But may I not hope that both our Talk and the practical lesson of this morning may do something to strengthen the principle of HONOR in this school?

XXXI.

NAGGING.

Dr. Dix. I promised to speak of nagging. The glances of resentment and strong disapproval which were directed to the boy who publicly reported his grievance did not escape my notice. "The boys are all the time nagging me," he says. Perhaps you think, boys, he was not honorable in reporting you. Well, since "honor is the subject of my story," let us consider his course and yours from that standpoint.

In the first place, I wish to give you full credit for the manly courage and promptness with which you reported your own misconduct, and, girls, I pay a like tribute to your womanly courage and promptness.

The young man in question acted the part of an informer, a talebearer; hence your glances of scornful disapproval. I think I understand your feelings. I was a boy myself once; I did not spring into an existence of full maturity, like Minerva from the brain of Jove. And I have not forgotten how I felt when I was a boy; so I suppose you are willing to admit my competency to discuss this matter with you.

I say I have not forgotten how I felt when I was a boy. Why don't I feel in the same way now that I am a man? Is it because I have grown less generous and honorable? I should be sorry indeed to believe so. Is it because my judgment is less clear? I can hardly believe that, since judgment is one of those faculties which are usually most strengthened by years and experience. No; my philosophy is, that boys develop unsymmetrically in their judgment and sentiments, just

as they do in their bodies. While they are growing, sometimes their legs and arms are too long for their bodies and sometimes they are too short; sometimes their hands and feet are too large and their shoulders too narrow, or they are otherwise "out of drawing." Never mind; healthy maturity will bring symmetry, or at least an approach to it. There are similar disproportions in growing minds and hearts, which full healthy maturity will go far to correct. The imagination and fancy, for example, like the legs, are too long, while the reason and judgment, like the body, are too short. "The Bloody Scalper of the Plains" is the ideal hero, who will hereafter subside into the vulgar criminal he is. But especially is the immature sense of honor out of proportion. I know of scarcely anything more grotesque in the whole range of human nature than the average boy's notion of certain points of honor. Don't feel hurt, boys; I don't include all points of honor, by any means. On some of the most important, boys are generally admirably strong and sound. On none are they more utterly absurd than the whole human race, young and old, has been time and again. As the biologists say, the life-history of the race is repeated in that of the individual. Our race has passed through its infancy and childhood; but whether it has fully emerged from its boyhood is a question that can be determined only by comparing its present with its future development. Surely no boys' code of honor could be more thoroughly wanting in the first principles of true honor or common sense than that which has been especially dignified by that title.

But I think the individual case we now have in hand will illustrate some of the points of honor on which boys as a class are not always particularly strong and sound. Let us consider the facts.

Butters told me nothing that I did not already know. I am not quite deaf nor quite blind. I see and hear

more, perhaps, than you think. The only question I was in doubt about was, whether your continual "nagging" really troubled him. He bore it with such good-natured indifference, so far as I could see at least, that perhaps you were in equal uncertainty with myself in regard to its actual effect upon him.

Archibald Watson. No, Dr. Dix; we *knew* it really plagued him, or we should not have kept it up.

Dr. Dix. Ah, then I must give you credit for clearer perceptions than my own. And yet I might have known, for the advice I always give in such cases is, let them see that you don't care for their nonsense, and they will soon tire of it. That is precisely what I thought Butters was doing, and I rather wondered why the usual effect did not follow. But then I knew how persevering boys are in such matters; if they showed a like perseverance in a worthier cause we should see better results on Promotion Day.

Let us return to our facts. You "knew it plagued him," and therefore you "kept it up." Could we have a better illustration of the kind of fun you have all agreed with me in condemning? Is it in accordance with the boys' code of honor?

I wish it had not plagued him. There are some strong natures that really care no more for such petty persecution than for the buzzing of flies. But we cannot all be like them. Because the elephant's hide is impervious to the mosquito, the same does not follow of the horse's hide or even of the tiger's.

Trumbull Butters. But boys are bigger than mosquitoes, — some of them are bigger than I am. They would n't have nagged me so much if they weren't. [*Laughter.*]

Dr. Dix. A palpable hit, Butters. You seem able to defend yourself with your tongue, at least.

Trumbull Butters. I think I could defend myself if they did n't all side against me. Twenty to one is too big odds.

Dr. Dix. That deserves generous applause, boys. . . . There, that will do for the present.

Trumbull Butters. They don't mean it for applause, Dr. Dix ; it's only some more of their foolish nonsense. But *I* don't care for 'em.

Dr. Dix. No ; you 're wrong there, Butters. That was genuine, — was it not, boys ?

Chorus. Yes, Dr. Dix.

Geoffrey Jenkins. Well, I will let him alone hereafter. I should have been willing to apologize for my share of it, if he had n't peached.

Dr. Dix. No, Jenkins ; I beg your pardon, you would have done nothing of the sort. If he had not done exactly what he did do, you would have gone on indefinitely with the rest of the "twenty against one." Why should n't he "peach," as you call it ? What other defence had he against your continued annoyance ? As he himself has so justly and pertinently said, there were too big odds against him to attempt his own defence.

Geoffrey Jenkins [*sullenly*]. If he had wanted it, we would have given him fair play.

Dr. Dix. You mean that you would have made a ring and let him fight it out with you, one by one ?

Geoffrey Jenkins. Y-yes, Dr. Dix [*suddenly coloring*] — I — I did n't mean that — I" —

Dr. Dix. Ah, I see you have some wholesome recollections of the past. Well, this becoming exhibition of feeling encourages me to believe that our Talks have not been entirely without effect.

Suppose these battles had been fought, even if Butters would have been justified in his share, — which, mark, I do not necessarily admit, but I need not tell you on which side my sympathies would have been, — what would you think of your own share in them ?

Geoffrey Jenkins. I — I take back what I said.

Trumbull Butters. I *offered* to fight 'em more than once, big as they are ; but they would n't fight, — they only gayed me worse than ever.

Dr. Dix. Evidently our Talk on that subject has not converted *you*.

Trumbull Butters [*disconsolately*]. You told us that returning good for evil would make them ashamed. I honestly tried that for a while; but it did n't seem to do any good. Then I thought I would try the other way.

Dr. Dix. You did n't try long enough. It did more good than you thought. There's not one of your tormentors who is not thoroughly ashamed at this moment, down in his secret heart. I challenge one of them to deny it. What do you say, Watson?

Archibald Watson. I never saw him try to return much "good for evil." He was always *talking* about fighting, but nobody supposed he really meant it.

Trumbull Butters [*valourously*]. They would have found out whether I meant it or not if they had tried. [*Derisive laughter, which the Doctor instantly checks.*]

Dr. Dix. I suspect, Butters, that your attempt to overcome evil with good was rather feeble and short. I am thankful, however, that there was an attempt. I shall never cease trying so long as there is so much fruit as this. Come, my boy, you are now the only obstacle to a complete reconciliation. The boys have already advanced a long way to meet you; but you have not as yet yielded an inch. As long as you maintain this hostile and implacable attitude you cannot expect them to advance much further.

Trumbull Butters. I am willing to be friends if they are.

Dr. Dix. Then we'll have no more talk about fighting. I say, boys, why should n't your victim peach? Under what possible moral obligation was he to endure your abuse day after day and week after week? Give him credit for the long time he endured it before he did peach. When your fathers and mothers are wronged, they do not wait until they can endure it no longer

before they appeal to the proper authorities for protection and redress.

Archibald Watson. They would n't mind a little nagging.

Dr. Dix. In the first place, we are not talking about a *little* nagging; and in the next, grown-up men and women do not often indulge in such amusement, — their sense of honor is usually developed beyond that point. Of course you understand I am speaking of respectable men and women, as you are of respectable boys and girls.

I will leave it to your own consciences and to the influence of our past Talks to decide whether the joining of twenty against one — with the knowledge that that one could not defend himself by his own unaided power, and with the belief that in deference to the boys' code of honor he would not inform against you — was generous or mean, manly or unmanly, chivalrous or dastardly, brave or cowardly, honorable or dishonorable.

Now, a few words on the subject of nagging in general. When there is fair play, and when it is not carried to the extent of being really a serious annoyance, it is not an unmitigated evil. If one is too thin-skinned, it may be an excellent remedy. Socrates, as you know, placed a very high value upon one species of it as a means of discipline. But the option should always be allowed the subject of the remedy as to whether it shall be applied or not. If he is sensible, he will submit to it with a good grace and return the favor for the benefit of his physician, who should submit with equally good grace. If he is not sensible enough to do this, no one has the moral right to force it upon him.

Joking at other people's expense is often very funny, and the victims are often as much amused as others. Sometimes, however, it is far otherwise; you cannot always tell how deep the wound is under the indifferent or smiling exterior. If this kind of joking becomes a

habit, like all other habits it will grow until, before he is aware, the joker may have become intolerable to all his acquaintances. Intimate friends among boys, and girls too, are especially liable to the habit: they sometimes carry it to such an excess that nearly everything they say to each other is some sort of disparaging joke.

All this may be very entertaining up to a certain point, but gradually the little stings, which at first only tickled the skin, begin to reach the quick. Never let your fun go as far as this. Watch yourselves. Remember that too much of a good thing is often worse than none of it. If you find that pretty nearly everything your friend does or says suggests to you some unpleasant witticism at his expense, stop short; forego for a while those stale, vulgar old insinuations in regard to his miraculous gastronomic powers or the superiority of his pedal over his cerebral development. [*Laughter.*] Let your next words to him be something really agreeable: you have no idea how refreshing and delightful you will both find the change.

On the other hand, don't be oversensitive. Some persons have the notion that extreme sensitiveness is an indication of extreme refinement. It is more often a sign of extreme selfishness and egotism. It is only what offends themselves that excites their super-refined resentment; the nerves of others may be rasped to any extent in their sight and hearing without disturbing them very seriously. And, above all, don't be that particularly unlovable character that is always ready to give a thrust, but never ready to receive one.

XXXII.

INDUSTRY, WEALTH, HAPPINESS.

Dr. Dix. Among the habits of the highest importance, from its effects upon health of body, mind, and heart, upon happiness and prosperity, is the habit of industry.

Perfect health is that condition in which all the functions of body, mind, and heart are in harmonious action, in perfect harmony with their environments.

Henry Jones. What are environments and functions?

Dr. Dix. Well?

Helen Mar. Environments are surroundings: all things outside of us with which we have anything to do are our environments. Functions are offices to perform, things to do. For instance, the function of the legs is to walk and run; that of the eyes is to see; that of the brain is to think.

Dr. Dix. Yes, and if any part of us does not perform its proper function it speedily loses its health and power. If the legs do not walk or run, they shrivel. Look at the poor cripple who rides every day through the streets upon his "velociman." If the eyes do not exercise their power of sight, they eventually lose it.

Activity, then, is an indispensable condition both to health and happiness, — continued and regular activity; that is, industry.

No wish is more often felt and uttered than the wish for money enough to live without labor. Do those who so often feel and express this wish know what it really means? It means for most people a wish to lose the

only thing which forces them to be healthy and happy. That lost, all that would remain would be their own sense of the usefulness of effort and their resolution to continue it in spite of its irksomeness. Do they know how efficient that sense and that resolution would be? Let them try a very simple experiment: let them resolve to take a mile walk every morning simply for its healthfulness. Hundreds and thousands of people do try this experiment, but I will venture to say that not one in a hundred continues it year after year. It works very well for a while, but gradually it gets to be less interesting, then somewhat of a bore, then most decidedly a bore; then a morning is omitted occasionally, then every alternate morning is omitted, — then the walk is taken only on very pleasant mornings, and finally it is dropped altogether in disgust. Indolence with its present ease and future penalties is preferred to industry with its present irksomeness and future rewards. So the muscles are allowed to grow flabby, and the vitals to grow sickly and feeble.

Such is the usual end of labor performed for the sole purpose of benefiting the health. But suppose the mile walk is a matter of necessity, to take a man from his home to his office, shop, or school. Unless it increases the tax upon his powers beyond the limit of healthfulness, — which is, of course, possible, — who but the incorrigibly lazy man ever thinks of it as other than a pleasant and wholesome variety to his life of enforced effort?

Joseph Cracklin. The loss of the advantage of being obliged to work for a living may be a great loss, but I don't believe the person ever lived who could not easily be reconciled to it. I think I could bear it myself without repining.

Dr. Dix. I have no doubt of it, Cracklin. If such a misfortune should befall me, I don't think I should be utterly inconsolable. But neither good nor bad fortune

is to be measured by the present rejoicing or mourning at occasions. Children often cry for what their wiser parents know will not be good for them. The wisest of us are but children of a larger growth, and it is well for us that we have not the ordering of our own fortunes. Both you and I might bitterly lament at a later day what we now might look upon as the best of good fortune.

Joseph Cracklin. Nevertheless I should be perfectly willing to take the risk.

Dr. Dix. You may have the opportunity. There's no knowing. And it might not, after all, prove a misfortune to you. All would depend upon your character, — the stuff you are made of. But however it might be in your individual case, with the majority the effect is more or less disastrous. Let us suppose a by no means unusual instance: —

One of the millions who sigh so eagerly for that greatest of all blessings, a fortune, suddenly falls into one. Ah, now he is going to be happy; no more grinding labor for him; he is now going to live a life of elegant ease, of luxury, of "style." He is not going to be absolutely idle, of course, — he understands that occupation of some sort is necessary to his health; but now he can choose his occupation, — he is no longer forced to toil at his former uncongenial employment; he is going to improve his mind and his taste, — perhaps, now and then, he may even do some sort of work that is useful to others.

Well, he begins his new life with great enthusiasm. But somehow or other it does not prove just what he expected. He finds that improving his mind and taste is not so agreeable an occupation as he thought it was going to be: there is hard work in it that he had not counted on. He still finds it easier to read a cheap novel than a good one, a history, an essay, or a poem. He meant to study music and art; but his wealth does not diminish

one iota the irksomeness of the laborious beginnings. To his dismay, he finds that the same is true of all the best things he looked forward to with such delightful anticipations ; they all cost *hard work*. The mere consciousness of his wealth, at first a delight in itself, soon loses the charm of novelty, and with it its power to delight, — all things do that, scholars, which are in themselves unchanging, and which demand no effort of mind, heart, or body ; the social position which his wealth gives him, that at least to which he aspires, can be maintained only by the cultivation of those graces which require work, work as hard as that from which his wealth delivered him, — ay, harder, for that he performed under the stimulus of necessity, while this costs the effort of resolution.

Stronger and stronger the inclination grows upon him to do that which is agreeable in the doing, leaving the consequences to take care of themselves. Why should n't he follow his inclination ? What is there to prevent ? Has n't he money enough to do as he likes ? And so it is the story of the mile walk over again. His muscles, once hard and strong, become flaccid and shrunken ; his mind, once full of energy and vigorous interest in his honest labor, becomes vacant and listless ; the days, once too short for the unappreciated happiness that filled them, become long and tedious ; the nights, once almost unknown to his consciousness, are even worse than the days, — fortunate, indeed, is he if their weariness is not beguiled with the vices that lead by the shortest path to ruin of body and soul.

The bitter "Curse of Nature" has been removed, but a bitterer curse has taken its place ; the grievous burden of labor has been lifted from his shoulders, but a heavier burden has fallen thereon.

Julia Taylor. But the bitterer curse and the heavier burden do not always follow : did n't you say it depends on the character of the individual ?

Dr. Dix. Yes, Miss Taylor, and I repeat it. I have told you the story of multitudes who have been lucky enough to come into a fortune through no effort or merit of their own.

Charles Fox. Why should n't the same results follow, even if the fortune was acquired by their own efforts?

Dr. Dix. Because the habits of industry and energy which were necessary to acquire the fortune are generally too firmly fixed to be easily dropped.

Charles Fox. But the necessity to labor has been removed in either case.

Dr. Dix. No. To one who has acquired through his own effort there is an ever-increasing necessity to acquire more, while the free gifts of Fortune are usually large enough to satisfy the ambition undeveloped by effort. "What comes easily goes easily." The only use of unearned money is to be freely spent.

I have told you the story of multitudes who have been lucky enough to come into a fortune through no effort or merit of their own. It is not the story of all. To some strong, noble natures suddenly-acquired wealth proves really a blessing, and not a curse, but it is not because it relieves them from the necessity of labor. Industrious before, they are now still more industrious, if possible, and in a broader field. They are not obliged to toil for their daily bread, but there are other necessities which to them are more urgent than hunger or thirst. There is a hunger of the mind which impels to effort the day laborer knows not of; there is a thirst of the soul which can be satisfied only by a life of patient industry in the cause of human welfare.

XXXIII.

INDUSTRY, WEALTH, HAPPINESS, CONTINUED.

Helen Sawyer. It does n't seem to me that the necessity to work for a living is indispensable to either health or happiness, notwithstanding the Talk of last week.

Dr. Dix [smiling]. I have sometimes complained that you young people do not generalize enough. Here is an instance of too wide generalizing. What we said last week of the majority, Miss Sawyer evidently understood us to apply to all. If she had paid a little closer attention, or if she had remembered more accurately, she would not have ignored the important exceptions we were so particular to make.

Helen Sawyer. But it seems to me that there are a great many more exceptions than were mentioned. I know plenty of people who, I am sure, never earned a dollar in their lives and who never needed to earn a dollar, and yet they are healthy and happy enough, so far as I can see. They always seem to have enough to do, too: what with reading, writing letters, traveling, yachting, driving, going to the opera, playing tennis, visiting, and attending parties, their time seems to be pretty well occupied. And they are so bright and rosy, too, — at least some of them, — so full of life and spirits. I don't see what good it would do them to have to work for a living. I can't help thinking it would only make them dull and stupid; at any rate, that it would take a good deal of the brightness out of their lives.

Dr. Dix. You have drawn a most charming picture, Miss Sawyer. It seems an ungracious task to paint out

any of those brilliant colors. And yet if the picture is to be true to life I fear it must be done. I must be the ogre in your paradise.

Joseph Cracklin. In her "fool's paradise."

Helen Sawyer [with spirit]. He would like to be one of the fools, all the same. We all heard him say so. [*Laughter.*]

Dr. Dix. Well, if you two have finished your passage at arms, the ogre will proceed with his ungracious task.

If the experience of all mankind has established one principle more firmly than another, it is that a life devoted solely to pleasure-seeking is the one most likely to fail in its object. Such a life will do well enough for the butterfly, — it seems to be what it is made for; but man was made for a different purpose, a purpose immeasurably nobler and higher, — a purpose upon which not only his usefulness, but his health and happiness depend. He is endowed with faculties and energies which call for action, as his stomach calls for food, as his lungs call for air. If they are denied action they will starve. Mere pleasure is not their proper food nor their proper air; it is only their confectionery and their wine. Hence a life devoted to pleasure is a life of mental and moral starvation.

All that Miss Sawyer and the rest of us have observed may be true, so far as external seeming goes. Nature adapts herself wonderfully to circumstances. She will endure the violation of her laws for years, sometimes, without apparent penalty. Throughout the years of youth she is particularly forbearing. But the penalty is none the less sure because it is delayed. It is an infallible law that no pleasure is enduring that costs no effort of mind or body.

Helen Sawyer. But some of the pleasures I have mentioned do cost effort, and plenty of it.

Dr. Dix. Yes, I was coming to that. I was about to say that even those whose sole object in life is pleasure

have discovered the law, and hence some of their pleasures call into vigorous play certain powers of mind and body ; in certain instances they even cost severe and irksome labor in preparation. These pleasures, I scarcely need say, are the longest-lived of all. But even these fail after a time, because their object is not high and noble enough to last.

You have described the votaries of pleasure as they appear to you. But you see them only, perhaps, while their pleasures are yet new, before they have lost their charm. Seek them out a few years later, when they have withdrawn from the society that no longer interests them ; when the wine of pleasure has lost its effervescence, and their jaded appetites find no substitutes for the sweetmeats that have lost their taste. Their powers, unused to effort, save for that which no longer pleases, refuse to be aroused by less stimulating objects : they cannot read, for the sensational novel is to them no longer sensational ; they cannot work, for labor is even more insupportable than ennui. In short, they are "the most mournful and yet the most contemptible wrecks to be found along the shores of life."

Helen Sawyer. Oh, Dr. Dix, what a terrible ruin you have made of my "charming picture"! And is that to be the fate of all those delightful people?

Dr. Dix. I truly hope that it may be the fate of no one of them ! I truly hope that the mere butterfly's life may satisfy no one of them for even one year of their bright, vigorous youth ! Their travelling and their sailing, their opera-going and their tennis-playing, and all the rest of their round of elegant pleasures are most excellent in themselves, — would that every human being could have his share ! — but they are excellent only as diversions, never as the regular business of life.

To those who are not destined by Fate to labor for their daily bread, let me say, Do not be disheartened. [*Laughter.*] Bread is not the only thing worth labor-

ing for. Though you may be possessed of millions, there are yet objects enough in life to call forth all your powers of mind and body. Nay, it is in your power to count the bounties of Fortune among your greatest and truest blessings: rightly used, almost nothing else will so broaden your field of noble activities.

Archibald Watson. If work is so good for us, I don't see why it was made so disagreeable.

Dr. Dix. Here is another example of too wide generalizing. What is true of some work to some workers you have no right to predicate of all work to all workers. Aversion to labor is a frequent but not a universal feeling; nor is it normal in those to whom Nature has given the ability to labor. The beaver shows no dislike for his laborious task, nor the ant, nor the bee, nor the winged nest-builders. The change from an abnormal to a normal condition is often a disagreeable process, as every physician knows. Learning to like labor is such a process. Strength is gained only by overcoming resistance: if we had not always had gravity to overcome, none of us would have the strength to stand erect against it to-day, and the effort to do so would have been disagreeable. There is no greater or more obstinate resistance to overcome than our own indolence: while the process of overcoming it continues, all kinds of effort are disagreeable, but no longer. To man in his normal condition work in proper amount is no more disagreeable than to the beaver or to the bee. On the contrary, he finds in it his keenest pleasure; a pleasure, too, that, unlike the pleasures of passive indulgence, never loses its zest while the ability to labor lasts.

Frederick Fox. That may be true of some kinds of work. I can understand how the artist and the writer, who are gaining fresh laurels with every new achievement, or the merchant and the manufacturer, who are continually adding to their wealth, may enjoy their

labor. But how can the man who does the same thing day after day for each day's bread help finding his toil disagreeable? Do you suppose anybody ever did enjoy his daily promenade in the treadmill?

Dr. Dix. Probably not. Certainly not when, as is too often true, that "daily promenade" demands all his waking hours. But those are not the conditions of labor brought about by Nature's beneficent design. We are not now speaking of the abuse of labor, but of labor under normal conditions. Under such conditions its humblest form might be a pleasure as well as a benefit to the laborer. Why should not the artisan feel the same pride and enthusiasm that his more aristocratic kinsman, the artist, feels in making his work the very best possible? That is the feeling of every man who enjoys his labor, — the artistic impulse. The stone-cutter, for instance, may take the same kind of interest in making his rough ashlar true and smooth that the sculptor takes in moulding the exquisite features of his Venus or of his Apollo: the difference is only in degree. I am not so disposed as many are to ridicule the custom of certain people in comparatively humble employments to call themselves "artists." If the ambitious title will only stimulate them to do their very best to raise their employments to the dignity of arts, so much the better for their customers as well as for themselves.

Jonathan Tower. Would you include bootblacks?

Dr. Dix. Why not? There is a wide range of skill in the blacking of boots, from that which covers them with a coarse, fibrous, lustreless paste to that which changes them to polished ebony. I tell you, I have seen an artistic zeal and pride in his work in a shabby, grimy little street Arab which would have redeemed many an ambitious canvas from ignoble failure.

Surely this class of laborers are far more entitled to respect and sympathy than their opposites. I sincerely hope no one among you will ever look down upon his

business, however humble it may be in general estimation. If what you do is of real service and benefit to any fellow-creature, your position in life is immeasurably above that of the mere pleasure-seeker, though he live in a palace and wear a crown of diamonds upon his brow.

Yes, the pen and the pencil, the hammer and the needle, even the pick and the spade are more honorable in human hands than the jewelled fan or the gracefully brandished walking-stick. If justice were done, the idler, whatever his station, would doff his hat to the humblest laborer. "He has the right to live in a world that is better for his living in it," he would reflect; "he has the right to hold up his head in the proud consciousness that he has earned the coarse bread he eats and the humble clothes he wears. But what of *me*, whose only use in life is to consume what he and his fellow-toilers have produced?" And the reflection should impel him, in deference to his own self-respect, to be no longer a mere parasite on human industry.

XXXIV.

VOCATION, VACATION, AND AVOCATION.

Helen Mar. It seems to me, Dr. Dix, that there is more complaint nowadays against too much than against too little industry. Americans, in particular, are said to work too hard rather than not hard enough.

Dr. Dix. Yes, Miss Mar, there is wrong and ruin in excess as well as in deficiency. "Drive neither too high nor too low," was the sun-god's advice to Phaeton. "*In medio tutissimus ibis.*"¹ It is not enough that the engine of life be amply supplied with steam; there must be a wise engineer in the cab to turn it on and shut it off as occasion requires. Without him the engine will either not move or it will rush on to its own destruction. Activity is indispensable to health and happiness; but it must be regulated by wisdom and conscience. Alternate labor and rest is nature's law.

Jonathan Tower. How shall we know when we have done work enough?

Dr. Dix. It will not be difficult to decide. The penalties of overwork are as plain as are those of idleness. Nature is a faithful sentinel, and she gives her warnings with no uncertain sound. The loss of cheerfulness, of elasticity, the growing sense of weariness which the night's broken slumbers do not dispel, are unmistakable warnings. If these are not heeded, others will come which must be heeded; if rest is not taken as a sweet reward, it will be enforced as a bitter punishment.

It is not long now, scholars, before vacation. The old-fashioned advice was, not to lay aside your books.

¹ Thou wilt go safest in the middle course.

Teachers and school trustees are wiser now. "Lay them aside," we say, "and don't touch them again till vacation is over."

But that does not mean, Spend your days in utter idleness. Many students make that unhappy mistake. They congratulate themselves on having finished, for a time, their mental toil, and promise themselves the luxury of complete mental rest. They soon find, however, that rest is a luxury only while it is rest. As soon as the faculties have fully recovered from their weariness, if new and vigorous employments do not take the place of the labors of school, they find that rest degenerates into that ennui which I have already described as the permanent curse of the habitual idler. Nay, they find it even more insupportable than the habitual idler finds it, for inaction is in any degree tolerable only to powers which are torpid by nature or by habit.

Jonathan Tower. Then how shall we spend our vacations ?

Dr. Dix. Spend them in such a manner as to give yourselves the maximum of rest, health, and happiness, in such a manner as best to fit yourselves for the faithful, vigorous performance of the next year's work. That is the best rule I can give you.

Jonathan Tower. But *how* shall we do that ?

Dr. Dix. In different ways, according to circumstances, opportunities, tastes, and dispositions. There are few definite rules I can give you that will fit all cases. To those who are not actual invalids the only true rest is a change rather than a cessation of action. To the healthy mind and body there is no harder work than continued inaction. Each day nature supplies a certain amount of nervous energy, which demands an outlet in some direction. If it does not find that outlet it accumulates, and creates a growing sense of uneasiness : few maladies are harder to bear than what is known as the Lazy Man's Dyspepsia.

In order to be interesting and satisfying, the employments of vacation need to be systematized as well as those of vocation. To depend upon the caprices of each day for each day's occupations will do well enough for a while; but soon the question, Well, what shall we do to-day? becomes the dreaded bugbear of each successive morning. Plan for yourselves, then, some sort of systematic employment that shall take a good part of your vacation. It matters little what it is, so long as it is honest, harmless, interesting, and as unlike your regular work as you can make it. This last condition is especially important; — your vacation employment should be literally an *a*-vocation, a call *away from* your vocation. Your daily instalment of nervous energy will then neither call into action those brain-cells or those muscles which are already exhausted, nor will it accumulate upon and congest your nerve centres, as it would do in complete and continued idleness, but it will find a safe and delightful outlet through a different set of brain-cells or a different set of muscles.

Jonathan Tower. What avocations would you recommend for us?

Dr. Dix. Oh, there is a long list. Some of them Miss Sawyer has already mentioned. I believe she began with

READING.

To a student, reading as an avocation should be on subjects different from those he is studying at school. Should it, therefore, involve no study? We will suppose its sole purpose is to give rest and pleasure to the tired brain. What a delightful sound there is to that well-worn phrase, "Summer Reading"! What charming pictures it calls up of luxurious hammocks on breezy piazzas, or of shady nooks beside mountain rivulets! "I want something that I can read without the least effort," you say to yourself as you make your se-

lection, "something that will carry me along by its own power." And so you gather up a score, more or less, of the freshest, spiciest novels, and nothing else. Essays you abominate; histories you eschew utterly; poems are a little better, but they require closer attention than you feel like giving in vacation: so your stock of mental pabulum consists entirely of literary caramels and comfits and bottles of literary champagne, with something stronger for an occasional intellectual carouse.

Now, the natural and desired effect of healthful rest is to invigorate, to render brain and body better fitted for labor; nay, to give them a renewed appetite and relish for labor. How a good night's sleep sweetens that which the night before was a dreary task! Well, your summer vacation is over, your score, more or less, of novels have been read, and you resume your studies. How much do you find your mind *rested*, applying the test I have named? how much keener is your relish for your trigonometry and your political economy than it was before vacation?

Helen Sawyer. I have done almost exactly what you have described, over and over again, and I don't remember that my school studies seemed any more distasteful on account of the novels.

Dr. Dix. Neither you nor I can ever know how they would have seemed to you, if you had not done exactly what I described, "over and over again." Most pupils perform duties at school cheerfully that they could not be induced to perform anywhere else; the stimulus of competition carries many through studies that would otherwise be intolerably distasteful. Let me ask you how your long and uninterrupted courses of novel-reading have affected your taste for other kinds of reading? how do you enjoy an elaborate magazine essay, for instance? how do you like McMaster's United States or Macaulay's England?

Helen Sawyer. To be candid, I never read such things : I have history enough in school, and magazine essays are generally altogether beyond my feeble comprehension.

Dr. Dix. Oh, no, Miss Sawyer, not beyond your comprehension, for you easily comprehend things here in school, quite as difficult and abstruse as anything in the average magazine article ; what you meant to say is, that they are beyond your inclination.

Now I am not going to make an uncompromising attack upon novel-reading. If I should condemn it utterly I should only exhibit myself as a narrow-minded bigot. So long as the novel keeps its place, — the good novel, I mean, — it is one of the very best things in life. It is only when it usurps the place of other kinds of reading that it becomes a positive evil. But I think I am not extravagant when I say that, with the average mind, its inevitable tendency is to usurp the place of all other kinds of reading. Almost every librarian will tell you that the majority of his readers take scarcely anything but novels.

Helen Sawyer. Well, suppose what the librarians say is true, — do not their readers find in their novels much truth, much valuable instruction, especially in regard to human life, motives, and character ? Is it not the novelist's peculiar province to — to unveil the human mind and heart ?

Dr. Dix. Yes, that is, or should be, the novelist's highest aim. If fiction were generally studied by the reader as well as by the writer with this object in view, it would justly take its place high among the fine arts. There are such writers and such readers. All honor to them. It is not of these that I complain, but of those whose motives are by no means so high or noble.

Love of narrative is a natural passion, and should be gratified to a reasonable and healthful extent ; but it is a passion, the keenness of which is easily blunted by

over-gratification. In the normal condition of the mind the simplest narrative of actual events, or of events which might easily be actual, is interesting enough to carry the reader or the listener along without effort on his part. But the trouble is, that neither the average writer nor the average reader of fiction is satisfied with such narratives; so the passion is gratified with so highly seasoned material that it no longer finds pleasure in the simple tales of nature and real life. The jaded appetite becomes finally too feeble to tolerate even the fragments of essay or actual history which are thrown in here and there to give "body" to the romance, and they are impatiently skipped in the languid desire to see "how the story is coming out." I can liken the mind in this pitiable condition only to a stomach which has been fed so long on confections, spices, and worse stimulants that it can relish only the strongest of these.

Susan Perkins. Then it is better and safer to avoid novels altogether, is it not?

Dr. Dix. No, indeed, Miss Perkins; everybody ought to read some fiction, but only the best. Why, indeed, should any but the best ever be read? There is enough for all, and it is as cheap and as easily obtained as the poorest. Why should any one drink of the muddy, stagnant pool when the clear, sparkling spring bubbles just beside it?

But do not let even the best novels get the mastery over you. The moment you find that they have blunted the keenness of your relish for more solid reading it is time for your "vacation" in reading to end for a while.

CRUELTY TO ANIMALS.

Dr. Dix. Referring again to Miss Sawyer's list —

Helen Sawyer. Oh, Dr. Dix, I did n't intend anything so formidable as a *list*. If I had, I should have given it in alphabetical order.

Dr. Dix. Referring again to Miss Sawyer's casual remark, we find travelling mentioned among the favorite occupations of those who are privileged to do as they please. We may include it among our summer avocations; but, mark you, it must be travelling with a definite object in view, not in the listless, fruitless way in which many travel. You might as well dawdle away your time and sigh with mental dyspepsia at home as in a palace-car. Miss Sawyer mentioned yachting: that must also have a definite object; observe that no one enjoys this avocation or profits by it more than the man who sails the yacht. Tennis was another amusement she named, to which we will add cricket, base-ball, and all similar games; but you must set about them with an energetic determination to excel, or they will afford you little of either pleasure or profit. Among still other avocations I will mention the collection of minerals, plants, and — and —

Trumbull Butters. Postage stamps?

Dr. Dix. Yes, though this is better suited to a mechanic or a farm laborer than to a student. He needs something that will give him more physical exercise and out-of-door air.

Charles Fox. Birds' eggs and insects?

Dr. Dix. I was about to mention these. I hesitated

for a moment because the thought of them suggested another subject of which I wish to speak, *Cruelty to Animals*.

In the collection of minerals and plants there is nothing that need be painful to the most tender sensibility, though I heard a lady once say she never pulled a beautiful flower to pieces without feeling like a vandal. There is a wide difference between this lady and the man who for mere sport can wantonly destroy the most magnificent animal without compunction. Think of the heart that finds one of its keenest enjoyments in the destruction of joyous, beautiful life! It has been accounted for, and it can be accounted for, only in one way: We are descended from a race of cruel savages, and the savagery has not all been civilized out of us.

Joseph Cracklin. Would you, then, forbid all hunting, trapping, and fishing?

Dr. Dix. For mere sport, yes: for food or other legitimate uses that may be made of the poor mangled victims of man's superior strength, skill, or cunning, or for defence against their depredations, no.

Joseph Cracklin. But would you thus not greatly restrict one of the best means men have of cultivating their power, skill, and manly courage and hardihood?

Dr. Dix. If they choose they can find plenty of other means equally good of cultivating their power and skill. It takes far more of either quality to study successfully the nature and habits of an innocent beast or bird, to find out where and how it lives, than to kill it. For my own part, I would rather hear a blackbird or a nightingale sing and note down its song on my musical scale, than to still its beautiful voice forever; to watch it as it preens its feathers, than to ruffle and stain them with its blood, or as it builds its nest, than to leave its tiny architecture, all unfinished, to fall into ruin.

As to "manly courage and hardihood," it takes a wonderful amount, truly, to make war upon harmless

creatures whose only wish or effort is to escape ! Think of a band of stalwart heroes armed with guns and mounted upon fleet horses, with an auxiliary force of bloodthirsty hounds, all in courageous pursuit of one little terror-stricken fox ! What pæans of victory should welcome their return with their formidable antagonist defeated and slain !

“See, the conquering heroes come !
Sound the trumpet, beat the drum !”

Joseph Cracklin. I never looked at it in that light before : it does seem rather unfair to the fox, to be sure.

Dr. Dix. Unfair ! I can admire the heroes of a lion or of a tiger hunt as enthusiastically as any one, but I confess I cannot sound my trumpet nor beat my drum very loudly in honor of the heroes of a fox hunt.

Joseph Cracklin. But they don't boast of their courage in attacking and killing the animal ; they think only of their skill in the chase — they don't think of the animal at all.

Dr. Dix. You mean, they don't think of the odds between them and their victim ?

Joseph Cracklin. Yes, Dr. Dix ; that's what I mean.

Dr. Dix. Because it is only an animal, and because the odds is so enormous that it eludes thought altogether. They would scorn to try their prowess with an inferior human antagonist, and the greater the disparity the greater they would deem their cowardice in such a trial. If we see a great, strong man abusing a defenceless child, our hearts swell with indignation and contempt ; but if it be a creature a thousand times feebler and more defenceless than the child, he may abuse it or kill it at pleasure, with little or no imputation upon his manliness or chivalry.

Henry Phillips. But, Dr. Dix, it is simply impossible to look upon human beings and animals in the same light.

Dr. Dix. I admit it. I admit that it is better that an animal should suffer pain and death rather than that a human being should suffer pain. I go still further: If the death of an animal can really benefit a human being, it is right that the animal should die. I do not admit, however, that it is right to take harmless lives, simply to gratify a cruel love of sport, or to gratify a still more cruel vanity — whether it be to adorn a lady's bonnet or an Indian's belt.

Jane Simpson. Oh, Dr. Dix, do you compare the birds on a lady's bonnet to scalps taken by a savage?

Dr. Dix. To my mind there are striking points of resemblance: both are the trophies of a cruel warfare, — though in one case the fighting is entirely on one side, the slaughter entirely on the other, — both are the ornaments of hideous death.

Jane Simpson. Ugh! I will never wear a bird on my bonnet again.

Geoffrey Jenkins. But what of killing birds for natural history collections?

Dr. Dix. As the design of that is to benefit human beings by affording them better opportunities of studying nature, I have already expressed my opinion upon it. For the same reason, you remember, I began by approving of the collection of birds' eggs and insects. But even this should not be done at the sacrifice of our humane sensibilities. Let the death of the poor martyrs to our needs and conveniences be as nearly painless as possible; and, above all, do not waste the lives so precious to them. Do not rob the nest of all its store; do not leave the tiny mother's tiny home utterly desolate.

Archibald Watson. I suppose there's no need of being careful about wasting the precious lives of insects injurious to vegetation.

Dr. Dix. That topic has already been disposed of, since their destruction is beneficial to man.

Lives so precious to them, I said. Did you ever think when you thoughtlessly crushed the life out of some harmless little creature, that you had in an instant destroyed what the combined skill of all mankind could not restore? that you had wantonly taken away one happy being's whole share in the universe of being? Think how bountiful Nature has been to you, and how niggardly to your victim. Could you not, with your thousands of herds, have left it its one ewe lamb?

If it is cowardly to treat an inferior with cruelty, why should not the cowardice be estimated in proportion to the degree of the inferiority? You say, we cannot look upon the human and the brute creation in the same light. This, in general, I have admitted. But pain is pain and death is death, whoever or whatever suffers them. The man or the boy who can inflict torture upon a dumb animal without a stirring of pity in his heart is not likely to be very tender of any suffering but his own.

The timidity of the animal creation is a constant reproach to man. The wild deer spies him in the distance, and scours away in terror: birds that alight fearlessly upon the broad backs of the buffalo dart away at man's approach, while their shaggy steeds plunge headlong over the precipice in their mad attempt to escape.

It need not have been so. It is pathetic to witness the affection with which creatures so often maltreated return kindness. The Arab's steed loves his master with almost the love of a child for its father; the dog's affection for his master is entirely unselfish; birds can be tamed so that they will feed from your hand.

Louisa Thompson. Alexander Selkirk in his solitude laments that the beasts that roam over the plain

"Are so unacquainted with man,
Their tameness is shocking to me."

Dr. Dix. And shocking it should be to any humane

heart, but not for the purely selfish reason which made it so to him.

It is well for us that there is no race on earth for whose sole benefit we ourselves are supposed to have been created. Who knows what there may be in future ages? Science has shown that we have been evolved from this same inferior creation that we sacrifice so ruthlessly to our needs and pleasures: John Fiske to the contrary notwithstanding, who knows positively that there may not be evolved from us an angelic race as far above us as we are above the anthropoid apes — in all respects save the sense of what is due to inferiors?

Imagine these glorious beings hunting, wounding, and slaying us for the sake of angelic "sport," and for the sake of cultivating their strength, skill, and angelic courage and hardihood! Imagine them harnessing us into their chariots; peeling the skin from our tongues and setting our teeth into agony with icy bits; strapping our heads back till our necks ache beyond endurance, to make us look spirited; blinding our eyes lest we should notice things by the way too curiously; and then, perhaps, driving us until we drop dead with exhaustion. Imagine them forgetting us in our cages and letting us die of cruel hunger and still more cruel thirst, or leaving us to languish in unvisited traps and snares; transporting us thousands of miles so closely packed together that we can neither stand, sit, nor lie without pain, and neglecting to give us food or drink because it would take too much time and trouble; destroying our fair-haired women by the thousands for the sake of their tresses to adorn their angelic bonnets withal; collecting us for natural history museums and biological lectures. In short, imagine them inflicting upon us any of the myriad torments we so thoughtlessly and heartlessly inflict upon the unfortunate inferiors that Fate has thrown upon our mercy. Then, in fine, sup-

pose we should hear them justify their cruelty with the plea: "They are only *men*, and it is impossible to look upon *men* and *angels* in the same light!

Florence Hill. But such things would not be possible with such a race of beings; they would be as superior to men in kindness to their inferiors as they were in all other respects.

Dr. Dix. You are right, Miss Hill. I supposed the exception only for the sake of helping us to see ourselves as others — angels, for instance — might see us. Such a race as I have imagined may never exist on earth, but I have no doubt that the Coming Man will be greatly superior to the present representatives of the race in kindness of heart as well as in all other respects; and I believe that he will look back upon the atrocities of this age, those inflicted upon animals among the rest, as we look back upon the gladiatorial shows of ancient Rome or the torture of prisoners in ancient Carthage.

Geoffrey Jenkins. Dr. Dix, *all* people are not cruel to animals. There are some who seem to think more of them than they do of human beings. I have seen ladies take better care of a snarling little puppy than they would ever think of taking of a baby.

Joseph Cracklin. And I have seen girls pet a kitten while they were making mouths at their brothers.

Helen Sawyer [*promptly*]. That is because kittens always *behave* so much better than brothers do! [*Laughter.*]

Joseph Cracklin. While *sisters* are always such patrons of gentleness, patience, and sweet —

Dr. Dix. The time to close our discussion has come.

XXXVI.

CHARITY.

Dr. Dix. In our last Talk we spoke of our duties to the lower animals: let us now return to our duties to our own race. We may dispose of Jenkins's remark, that some people think more of animals than of human beings, with the reflection that such sentiments can awaken only pity or disgust in any well-regulated mind. What should be our feelings and conduct towards our fellow-men, particularly those who need our sympathy and help, will be our subject this morning.

I said awhile ago that no life is more certain to fail in its object than that one which is devoted to selfish pleasure-seeking. The rule extends to all self-seeking of whatever kind. The purely selfish man may gain all he strives for: wealth, power, learning, fame, idle amusement, — all save the one thing that he most ardently desires, and to which all the rest are sought as merely stepping-stones — happiness.

Now how shall happiness be obtained? It has been defined as that condition in which all the functions of mind and body are in perfectly harmonious action, — perfect harmony with their environment. It is not probable that such a condition has ever yet been attained in this world, but the nearest approach to it has been where to a healthy body and mind has been joined a heart so filled with love for fellow-men that it has had little or no thought for self. For, scholars, Happiness comes to us most readily when she is not sought for her own sake. She is beautiful and sweet, but she is an arrant coquette. "Pursue her," says an old proverb, "and she will flee; avoid her, and she will pursue."

But the selfish man will not believe this. Day by day, and year by year, he goes on straining all his energies for that which is designed to benefit only himself; and with each successive triumph comes disappointment, astonishment, that the happiness he so fondly expected does not follow. He concludes, at length, that whatever satisfaction there is in life comes in the process of acquiring and not in the acquisition itself, and so — he goes on, still striving.

But he makes a fatal mistake. There is a satisfaction far greater than that of the mightiest and most successful struggle for self, — a satisfaction, too, which does not end with success, but goes on ever increasing.

It would be well for him if the three spirits that visited Scrooge on that famous Christmas night would visit him also. Then, when he had seen how much wretchedness there is in this sad world that he might relieve, how many bitter tears that he might dry, how many heavy hearts that he might cheer, perhaps he could taste the happiness which all his years of labor and of triumph cannot bestow. Instead of feeling a dead weight of discontent, of unsatisfied longing for he knows not what, forever pressing down upon his heart, he might cry, like the transformed Scrooge, laughing and crying in the same breath, —

“I don’t know what to do! I am as light as a feather, I am as happy as an angel, I am as merry as a school-boy, I am as giddy as a drunken man. A merry Christmas to everybody! A happy New Year to all the world! Hallo, here! Whoop! Hallo!”

George Williams. Scrooge was a rich man: he had it in his power to do all those benevolent deeds. But if happiness depends on that sort of thing, there was n’t much chance for the poor people he helped; and he could n’t have succeeded in making them really happy, after all, however comfortable he may have made them.

Dr. Dix. Ah, Williams, giving money is not the

only way to benefit our fellow-men. A kind word, a cheery smile, has many times lightened a sorrow-laden heart as money could not have lightened it; and none of us are so poor that we cannot, now and then, give a crust of bread, a cup of cold water, or a helping hand to those in need. The giving of money, indeed, often does more harm than good. The careless rich, who satisfy their pride and their consciences by the indiscriminate scattering of their bounty, are responsible for most of the culpable pauperism in the world. To give to a lazy, shiftless man is only to defeat the beneficent purpose of Nature and Fortune, which is to force him by the stern discipline of necessity to use the energies they have given him. To feed his laziness and shiftlessness is little better than to give strong drink to the drunkard or laudanum to the opium slave. The only help which those who are wise and really sincere in their benevolence will vouchsafe such a man is encouragement and assistance to help himself.

This is the best work of the great charitable organizations which do so much to distinguish our age from the cruel past.

Frederick Fox. I have heard bitter complaints against charitable organizations: that a great deal of the money given them is spent in fat salaries to officials and in useless decoration and printing, but especially that there is so much red tape about their operations that those who are actually most in need of their aid do not know how to set to work to get it, and, even if they did know, would have neither the time nor the energy to go through with the necessary preliminaries.

Dr. Dix. While there is probably some foundation for such complaints, you must bear in mind that there is nothing many people enjoy so much as fault-finding, and generally those who know the least of what they are talking about are the most severe in their criticism. Most frequently, I suspect, their criticisms are pro-

nounced merely as the most effective way of saving their own money.

I have taken some pains to inquire into the methods of several of the best known charitable associations, and I have yet to find an official overpaid. On the contrary, most of them fill their offices at an actual personal sacrifice. I have found no useless decoration, and as to printing, every business man knows how essential that is to the efficiency of any enterprise, whether charitable or otherwise. The "red tape" you speak of is not an unmitigated evil. I do not think there is generally any more than is necessary to prevent imposture. It is well, too, that help should not be obtained too easily, so long as it comes in time to those in actual need.

Florence Hill. But how many thousands there are in the sorest need, to whom it never comes!

Dr. Dix. Alas, yes. If those who are so liberal with their complaints and criticisms would be but half as liberal with their help, they would find far less to complain of and criticise. Scolding is not the best way to correct abuses, scholars.

Let me now make a practical suggestion to you: Whether you ever become active working members of such associations or not, at least inform yourselves thoroughly in regard to their methods and the steps necessary to secure their aid, so that when a case of need comes to your knowledge you may know exactly what to do, and how to do it in the best and quickest way. And, let me add by the way, do not wait for such cases to come to your knowledge accidentally. *Seek them out.* None of you will be too busy in your own behalf or in that of those dependent upon you to do an occasional act of kindness of this sort. Do it, not for the sure reward of happiness it will bring *you*, especially on your last day, but for the love you bear *your* suffering brother or sister.

XXXVII.

WITH HAND AND HEART.

Dr. Dix. Do your kindnesses, I said last Wednesday, with your heart as well as with your hand. This morning I say, Do them with your hand as well as with your heart. The seed that germinates, but never sends its shoots into the sunlight, is no better than a stone; the plant that puts forth leaves, but neither flower nor fruit, is little better.

Jane Simpson. But did n't you say, a kind word, a cheery smile, often do more good than more substantial gifts?

Dr. Dix. And so they do. They are the *flowers* of kindness, and flowers are sometimes more needed than fruit. Did you never see a beautiful, fresh bouquet brighten the eyes of a weary invalid as the choicest viands would not have brightened them? I have, and I have seen a ragged child in the city laugh with delight over a poor little nosegay, who would have pocketed your dime with scarcely a "thank ye, sir."

Lucy Snow. And what are the *leaves* of kindness?

Dr. Dix. Oh, they are merely Talks about kindness. All that we say here, if it results in neither a kind word and a cheery smile to those more in need of them than of the helping hand, nor in both the kind word and the helping hand to those in need of both, is "nothing but leaves, nothing but leaves."

Helen Mar. And the germinating seed that never reaches the sunlight is, I suppose, the mere thought of kindness in the heart that never finds expression either in words or deeds?

Dr. Dix. Precisely. But let us not run our figure into the ground, — I refer to the figure, not the seed. [*Laughter.*]

Do your kindnesses with your hand as well as with your heart: do not be satisfied with unspoken impulses, nor yet with eloquent panegyrics on the beauty and the nobility of benevolence.

Florence Hill. If the hand does not obey the impulse of the heart, is there not good reason for suspecting the genuineness of the impulse?

Dr. Dix. There is, indeed. A great deal of such impulse that is taken for real benevolence, especially by the subject himself, is but the flimsiest kind of sentimentalism. Oh, what a vast amount of it there is! what floods of tears are shed over the romantic sorrows of fair creatures that never breathed, by readers who can hear of real living distress without a tinge of pity! what heart-throbs and suppressed sighs over the picturesque woes of the stage heroine in her velvet, satin, and jewels, — heart-throbs and sighs which even the knowledge that the persecuted fair one gets her thousand dollars a night cannot mitigate!

Helen Mar. Such grief seems absurd enough when we think of it coolly, and yet I can't think it is entirely heartless. Only those whose imaginations are vivid enough to make the scenes read and witnessed a reality for the time being, can feel it. To them the suffering is real suffering, so the pity they feel and the tears they shed — their sighs and their heart-throbs — are genuine after all.

Dr. Dix. Don't lay too much stress on the reality, Miss Mar. Reality would lead genuine feeling to some sort of action, whereas the most remote notion of being anything more than a passive spectator, whatever outrages are perpetrated, never enters the most lively imagination of the theatre-goer or the novel-reader.

Geoffrey Jenkins. I never heard of but one man to

whom the persecuted stage heroine was a *bona fide* reality.

Dr. Dix. Well, you may tell us about him, if it will not take too long.

Geoffrey Jenkins. He was a big-hearted, chivalrous Irishman who, when he could restrain his outraged feelings no longer, stood up in his seat in the gallery, shook a most formidable fist, and shouted at the top of his voice, "Av ye don't lave her alone, ye currely-headed, murtherin' thafe o' the wurruld, I'll —" But before he could pronounce the "murtherin' thafe's" doom he was summarily repressed.

Dr. Dix. There was heart and hand, surely.

Archibald Watson. Or rather, heart and *fist*.

Dr. Dix. Yes, and, I remember, I made a distinction. No one could doubt the genuineness of *his* impulse. Whether Jenkins's story is true or not, it illustrates more forcibly than anything I could say the shallowness of sentimental emotions. The natural outbreak of a heart whose warmth and strength, unimpaired by artificial excitement, overmastered its owner's judgment and reason, was simply ridiculous to his fellow spectators, who neither felt nor wished to feel more than the hollow semblance of his emotion.

There is a certain amount of sentimentalism in nearly all of us. Something of the theatrical or, at least, of the dramatic is needed to arouse our hearts to lively emotion. We read in our morning paper of a great railway disaster. If the reporter is a plain statistician, without imagination or power of word-picturing, how many of us feel more than a momentary thrill of horror? how many feel even that strongly? But let the story of one of the sufferers be skilfully told, and we lavish upon him the sympathy that we withhold from the many. Nay, let the story of suffering that we know was never endured be told with sufficient dramatic power, and it will arouse emotions, perhaps tears, that

not even Waterloo or Gettysburg has ever brought to us.

Louisa Thompson. But the vivid emotion is only momentary, while the other is lasting.

Dr. Dix. What there is of it.

Louisa Thompson. Even if there is not much of it, do you think it necessarily implies heartlessness? We cannot feel until we realize. The reality is too much for us; we cannot feel it because we cannot comprehend it.

Dr. Dix. Yes, all that is true. But full realization does not always bring the emotions that are due, that would arise in a heart in its normal condition. I have heard the most eloquent pity poured out for a beggar-girl in a painting from people who I know would never notice the original.

What I wish to impress upon you is that mere emotion, it matters not how vivid, does not necessarily imply real goodness of heart, nor on the other hand does the absence of vivid emotion imply a want of goodness of heart. We see this principle illustrated every day. It is not real distress that affects people of shallow emotional natures, but the pathetic manifestation of distress, particularly if that manifestation is graceful and pleasing, a beautiful sorrow in the eye or a mournful music in the voice. Literary, dramatic, or musical pathos is the only pathos that will move them, whether in fiction, on the stage, or in real life. It follows that there must be nothing in the distress too disagreeable to witness, — nothing decidedly repulsive: the filth and squalor so often inseparable from it are utterly out of the question.

In short, the chief concern is not so much for the sufferer as for self.

“I cannot visit the homes of the extremely poor,” says one of these tender creatures; “my sympathies are too strong, — and as to hospitals, how any one with

a heart can bear to enter them, I cannot understand." And so the extremely poor might suffer on, the hospital patient might languish uncheered and unnursed, without disturbing his equanimity, so long as they remained out of his sight and hearing. I have heard a man boast, as if he thought it was really creditable to his good heart, that he always got away from a crowd assembled around an object in the street as quickly as possible, for fear it might be somebody killed or badly hurt.

Joseph Cracklin. Would he show a better heart if he should elbow his way through the crowd and stand like them staring at the man that was killed or hurt, just out of curiosity?

Dr. Dix. That there are lower depths of cruelty and selfishness than his own does not imply that he is not cruel and selfish. There are still lower depths than that to which probably any one in that crowd has sunk. People have lived who would not only gaze with pleasure upon suffering and death, but would, if permitted, help them along, as boys throw fuel upon a bonfire. The utmost that the man I spoke of can claim is neutrality to the suffering of others and tender consideration of his own sensitive feelings. He can claim no positive goodheartedness until, at the sacrifice of feeling, he has offered his help, or has learned that no help is needed.

It is good to feel the heart swell with tender sympathy for the pain of others, it is good to express tender sympathy in well-chosen and effective words, but it is better — oh, immensely better — to *do* that which will help to relieve that pain.

Do your kindnesses, then, with hand as well as with heart. Son, do not merely pity your anxious father, so sorely beset in the battle of life: stand by his side when he needs you most, and fight the battle with him. Daughter, when your sympathetic heart is touched by your overburdened mother's pale face and drooping figure, do not be satisfied with embracing her and pouring

forth a wordy flood of pity and affectionate remonstrance, and then leaving your "cold-hearted," undemonstrative sister the humdrum task of actually lightening your poor mother's burden. Take hold bravely and help her with your own fair hands. Never mind if the strain on your long cherished selfishness and love of ease is a little severe at first, persevere; it will do *you* good as well as her — though heaven forbid that this should be your prevailing motive — and you will find the strain grow less and less, until what was at first an irksome task will become one of your purest pleasures.

XXXVIII.

POLITENESS.

Dr. Dix. We cannot finish our Talks on Benevolence without some mention of Politeness, which may be defined as Benevolence in Little Things. The polite man desires that everybody around him should be at ease, and by being at ease himself, he does what he can to bring about that result. He is polished, he has no rough surfaces to rasp those with whom he comes in contact, no sharp corners nor edges to push into or cut into them.

Now, as a rule, we find the greatest development of politeness, or at least *polish*, where people are most thickly congregated together: hence our words *urbane*, from the Latin *urbanus*, belonging to the city; and *civil*, from *civilis*, belonging to the citizen in distinction from the savage, although it by no means follows that every resident of a city or a state is either urbane or civil, polite or polished. Some persons are so coarse-grained and obstinate in their natures that no amount of attrition will wear them smooth.

There is an illustration of the process that polishes the manners of men which, though somewhat hackneyed, is so good that I will give it: —

Stones which have not been subjected to the attrition of one another or of water retain the rough surfaces and sharp corners and edges which they had when they were first broken from the earth's crust. But go down to the seashore or to the river-bed, and you will find that the continual washing of the waves and the rolling of the stones together have polished their rough

surfaces and worn off their sharp corners and jagged edges.

So men who live much by themselves are apt to be rude and unpolished, to have, so to speak, sharp corners and jagged edges. More frequent contact with their fellow-men would render these roughnesses intolerable to themselves as well as to their neighbors, and so they would be of necessity worn off. The country farmer in the midst of his wide acres has plenty of room to stick out his elbows as far as he pleases, and as there are so few to be offended by his unpolished speech and his indifference to personal appearance, he may indulge in them with comparatively little inconvenience. But imagine a crowded city in which such were the prevailing speech, manners and dress ! what a chaos of rasping and elbowing, pulling and pushing, mutual anger and disgust, it would be ! With all the many and great disadvantages of city compared with country life, it has, at least, one great advantage : it enforces mutual forbearance and consideration.

Susan Perkins. Do you mean to imply that city people are really more benevolent than country people ?

Dr. Dix. By no manner of means, Miss Perkins. I have been speaking of external politeness, or polish, to show how it is produced and, merely superficial as it is, how essential it is to comfort and happiness in our intercourse with one another.

No, real benevolence is peculiar to neither city nor country. The roughest exterior may cover the kindest and noblest heart, while the most polished exterior may hide the basest and most selfish. It is none the less true, however, that the noble heart would be all the nobler if it were not satisfied with benevolence on a large scale, but condescended to little kindnesses also. Life is, after all, more concerned with little than with great things. There are men who would not hesitate to lay down their lives for their families, who never think

of the little courtesies which make so much of the sunshine of life.

There are children who in their hearts love and venerate their parents, who nevertheless shamefully neglect the visible and audible manifestation of their love and veneration. Both parents and children should know that love is a plant that needs to put forth leaves, flowers, and fruit, lest, hardy as it is, it may languish and die.

There are men, too, — you are quite as likely to find them on the farm or in the backwoods as in the most crowded city, — “Nature’s noblemen,” who are always polite, not according to any prescribed code of etiquette, but from the unerring instinct of native refinement and a kind and noble heart. Theirs is the only politeness which has the true ring. I make a distinction between true politeness and mere external polish: the one is solid gold, only brightened by the wear of daily life like the gold eagle passed from hand to hand; the other is but gilding, which soon wears off and shows the base, corroded metal beneath.

But the purest gold is sometimes hidden under a surface of base metal; it is good, indeed, to know that the gold is there, and that it will come out when emergency demands it, but how much better that it should always gladden the eye! Let there be no base metal either within or without.

Granting, then, that the heart is good and true, how shall the manners be polished? I have spoken of men whose unerring instinct makes them always polite. But goodness of heart alone is not enough to give them this unerring instinct: there must be also refinement and good taste.

In manners as well as in morals it is not safe for men to judge the standards of others by their own. What is good enough for them is not necessarily good enough for others. A half-blind man should not rely upon his

own perception in preparing things for others to see. Untidy and ill-fitting garments may not offend their wearers, but their wearers should not suppose, therefore, that others will view them with like indifference. A generous, whole-souled fellow may drum with grimy fingers upon his plate, or use his knife instead of his fork, with the most serene complacency, totally oblivious of the fact that he is inflicting a sort of mild torture upon his neighbors, who never did him any harm. This is neither polite nor benevolent; it is not doing as he would be done by. He should know that all skins are not as thick as his own.

Trumbull Butters. But how can he be blamed if he does n't know any better?

Dr. Dix. He has no right not to know any better; he has no right to be guided by his own standard of taste and comfort where the taste and comfort of others are concerned. If he is to mingle with other people it is his duty to learn their requirements in manners as well as in morals. In fact, as I have already plainly said, good manners are properly included in good morals. No man can justly be a law unto himself in respect to either: he must abide by the accepted laws, and it is a recognized principle of all law that an offender cannot be exculpated on the plea of ignorance.

Lucy Snow. I confess I never thought of the rules of etiquette in that light before.

Dr. Dix. Is it not the right light? The laws of good manners are as truly laws as are those of the civil government; the rewards of obedience and the penalties of disobedience are as assured.

Now, the man who drums with grimy fingers on his plate, and substitutes his knife for his fork, is an extreme case of ignorance and vulgarity. He and others like him are not the only persons who are satisfied with too low a standard of good breeding. The girl who shouts from the school-room window to a companion

across the street, who tears her French exercise into tiny bits and showers them down upon the floor in serene obliviousness of the uneasiness they cause her more tidy neighbors, who talks commonplace slang at home and abroad, apparently indifferent to, but secretly proud of, the attention she is attracting from total strangers — how should she know that their glances betoken either disgust or an admiration that she would rather not awaken? — who is affable and sweet to those who care little for her and for whom she cares as little, but is cross and snappish to those who are all the world to her and to whom she is all the world, — this girl, most certainly, has too low a standard. She may have a heart of gold, but it is so deeply buried under the outside coating of dross that it is difficult to believe in its existence, until some crucial test comes to burn away the dross and reveal the gold pure and shining.

And the boy who swaggers and swears, with the absurd notion that he is exciting general admiration for his spirit and dash, instead of contempt and dislike from all except those on or below his own low plane; who complacently sports his flashy jewelry (the African savage shows precisely the same complacency in his monstrous adornments); who makes himself obnoxious by his aggressive conduct in the public thoroughfares and conveyances; who treats with flippant disrespect those whose superior age, wisdom, and worth entitle them to his profound reverence; who is unchivalrous to the other sex, especially his own mother and sisters, — this boy most assuredly has too low a standard, both of benevolence and of good breeding.

Jonathan Tower. Is n't something more than benevolence, native refinement, and good taste needed to make people always polite?

Dr. Dix. I said that one who has these qualifications will always be polite, though he may not conform to any prescribed code of etiquette.

Joseph Cracklin. That does n't matter much, does it ?

Dr. Dix. The education that one acquires in cultivated society bears the same relation to manners that the education of school and college bears to intelligence and learning. One can be self-taught in both directions ; but it is no more than reasonable to suppose that the combined judgment and good taste of many learned and cultivated people are superior to those of one person, however intelligent and refined by nature.

It is the habit of some persons to speak slightly of the rules of etiquette ; but they are generally those who know little of them. More intimate knowledge would convince them that, for the most part, these rules are founded in common sense and pure benevolence, — that they are the very best that can be devised to secure the highest degree of ease, comfort, and refined pleasure in social intercourse.

XXXIX.

PROFANITY AND OBSCENITY.

Dr. Dix. *Pro*, before; *fanum*, a temple. So the old Romans compounded the word from which comes our word *profane*.

We picture to ourselves a low-browed, villainous-looking lout standing before the portico of a noble edifice, and with insulting gestures pouring upon it a torrent of vulgar abuse. What to him is the spotless purity of that Pentelican marble, the ineffable grace of those fluted columns with their exquisitely chiselled capitals? What to him is that realization of the poet's loftiest dream, the marble imagery of the pediment; or the majestic symmetry of the whole structure, which seems instinct with the spirit of the goddess whose superb figure stands within?

He sees them all,—the columns, the smooth, pure walls, the sculptured gods and nymphs; but they inspire no noble awe or tender admiration in his base-born soul. He stands there like a dragon befouling them with his fetid breath.

It matters not that the temple he profanes is the sanctuary of a pagan religion, that the divinity he insults exists only in the imagination of a deluded people. It is enough that the temple is a sanctuary, that the divinity is to many far nobler souls than his own a cherished reality, that to many other noble souls who may not believe in the religion they represent, they are, at least, the expression of a lofty ideal of beauty, power, and majesty.

Louisa Thompson. That was the way in which the

most intelligent people of Greece and Rome looked upon their divinities, was it not ?

Dr. Dix. So the best classical authorities assure us. Now, as you have been told repeatedly, this is not the place either to attack or to defend any of the forms and teachings of our modern religions ; but it is both my privilege and my duty to impress upon you the solemn obligation that rests upon you as moral beings, bound to do unto others as you would that they should do unto you, to treat with respect and veneration all that is sacred from the good there is in it or the good it may cause, whether it is ancient or modern, whether it is in itself a demonstrated reality or only the belief of good and honest hearts.

Profanity is the violation of this most solemn obligation, if it is not a very much greater crime. Why does a man insult the name which so many millions of good men and good women regard as the most sacred of all names ? If he believes it is but a name, he can have no purpose but to insult those who believe it is infinitely more ; otherwise his words have neither point nor significance : if he believes as they do, what words can measure his awful wickedness ?

Archibald Watson. Probably no one who swears realizes what he is doing.

Dr. Dix. I am convinced of that. Surely no one who did realize it, whatever his religious belief or unbelief, would be guilty of an offence, which of all offences offers the smallest return. The profane swearer has been aptly described as the only gudgeon among men that is caught with an absolutely naked hook. His profanity brings him neither gold, power, nor glory. What does it bring him, boys ? what does any man swear for ?

Geoffrey Jenkins. He thinks it sounds bold and reckless ; it gives him an air of jaunty hardihood, which he and others like him particularly admire.

Dr. Dix. Yes ; it *sounds* bold, and reckless, and hardy ; but, as we have said in a very different connection, "words are cheap." And of all words, none are cheaper in a certain way (though they are dear enough in others) than the generality of profane oaths, — none more absolutely meaningless. Every one knows that the dire curses which fall so recklessly from the habitual swearer's lips are but the idlest of idle breath. He curses with equal vigor what he likes and what he hates, his sonorous profanity is applied with utter impartiality to what strikes his vulgar mind as good or bad, beautiful or ugly, honorable or mean. As to its indicating real boldness or hardihood, any one that would be terrified by such senseless babble, however sonorous and blood-curdling (if it really *meant* anything), must be timid indeed !

"Shall I be frightened when a madman stares ?"

asks Brutus of his choleric friend. With a very slight change, the question might be asked by any of us,

Shall I be frightened when a madman *swears* ?

They who understand human nature know very well that the loud-mouthed blusterer, whose hot oaths pour forth from his mouth like a stream of molten lava from the crater of a volcano, is very apt to be perfectly harmless as a fighting man. It is the *quiet* man, whose conversation is Yea, yea ; nay, nay, that is to be guarded against when his righteous wrath becomes white-hot within him.

Joseph Cracklin. I should think that anything that serves as an escape valve for "white-hot wrath" must be a good thing, even if it is profanity.

Dr. Dix. Not for righteous wrath, which is the kind I mentioned. No escape valve is wanted for that, — there is altogether too little of it in the world to cope with the evils that are rampant.

Joseph Cracklin. But what if the wrath is not righteous ?

Dr. Dix. Ah, then I grant you that even the profanity of a blustering bully may be the less of two evils, — that is, supposing his profanity serves as a substitute for anything else, which, by the way, is not likely; he is probably too cowardly to risk anything but terrible words.

Joseph Cracklin. But there are others besides cowards and bullies who swear.

Dr. Dix. Undoubtedly; and their swearing does not prevent other forms of wickedness. A cool, courageous villain will accomplish his villainy — and swear too. The point is, that it is not his swearing that shows his courage or hardihood. He knows this as well as others, and he knows, too, that it is not his swearing that will test the courage or hardihood of others; that if any one fears him it is on account of his *lightning*, not his *thunder*.

We will admit that so far as sound goes, profanity is bold, reckless, and hardy; but towards whom or what is the noisy boldness, recklessness, and hardihood shown? If the speaker believes that the sacred names he blasphemes stand for nothing, wherein does his boldness consist, even in sound? I have heard it said that when a negro child in the South wishes to be particularly insulting to his playmates he abuses their *mothers*. Is it in a similar way that the profane swearer desires to show his manly courage by insulting what multitudes of good people hold most sacred? If he believes as they do, is he willing to accept the penalty he believes he merits? or does he expect to escape by timely repentance, and is that his notion of *courage* and *honor*? Would he utter his blasphemies if he believed that merited punishment would follow instantly upon the offence?

Jonathan Tower. But a man does n't always swear

because he is angry, — he does it sometimes simply to be emphatic and forcible, or witty.

Dr. Dix. Yes, I have already credited him with perfect impartiality in the bestowal of his epithets. Things are profanely good and profanely bad, profanely great and profanely small, profanely sad and profanely funny, and so on throughout the list. I will make the same remark about him that I made about the drunkard: his force, emphasis, or wit is of a very cheap order. The really eloquent and witty man is dependent upon neither alcohol nor profanity for his eloquence and wit; he shows the genuineness and power of his gifts by doing without such aids: nothing shows essential poverty of mind and character like a reliance upon either.

But besides being insulting to good men and to the Being whom so many good men believe in and worship, the profane man is unutterably vulgar. I return to my picture of the clown before the beautiful, noble temple, — he is like a dragon befouling it with his fetid breath. In fact, profanity is very often and very properly mentioned with, as it is usually accompanied by, another still grosser form of vulgarity, of which I shall now speak.

Virgil has typified *obscenity* in his Harpies, those “obscene birds” than which “no more revolting horror has come forth from the Stygian waves.” While Æneas and his companions are feasting in the Strophæades, the disgusting creatures swoop down upon their banquet from the adjacent mountains, with hoarse, discordant croakings, flapping their great wings and emitting an offensive odor, and what they do not devour of the feast they defile with their horrible filth.

The Harpies are not yet extinct. Their foul contact still pollutes many a choice banquet; their trail is over many a fair fruit and beautiful flower.

Obscenity is filth, — uncompromising, unmitigated

filth. And, like all other forms of corruption, it is found in the greatest abundance at the lowest levels. It is not usually the mountain top or the wind-swept plain that calls loudly for the cleansing besom, but the deep gutter and the rotting swamp. So it is among the lowest classes of men that both obscenity and profanity run their wildest riot. Savage races are almost invariably indescribably nasty in thought and word as well as in person and habits of life, while among civilized nations it is most often in the slums that the household words include the foulest in the language.

But corruption does not confine itself to the lowest levels. Its miasma rises and spreads, with greater or less attenuation, to all heights and distances. It enters the open windows and doors of palace and cottage. It is breathed alike by the strongest and by the most delicate lungs. So the foul word may fall upon the most jealously guarded ears.

But it is not always in the gutter or in the swamp that the poison has its origin: the palace and the cottage may breed their own foul germs. So moral filth may gather in the millionaire's home, the impure thought may spring in the most delicately nurtured mind, and the foul word may soil the daintiest lips.

What an incongruous combination, scholars! a refinement that cannot brook a speck of physical dirt, but can tolerate, even enjoy perhaps, moral nastiness! a fastidious taste that is disgusted by the sight of a soiled glove, but cherishes the foul thought, and listens to and utters the foul word without wincing!

How can any one pretend to refinement or good taste who relishes dirt of any kind, on the outside of the platter or within? And if there must be dirt in either place, is it not better that it should be on the outside? Ah, yes; far better soiled hands, the sooty face, and the dusty blouse without than the impure mind within.

Would you keep clean from this kind of filth? Keep

the windows and doors of your mind closed against it; keep the hearthstones within clean-swept, lest it gather from within. Tolerate no evil companion, book, or picture.

It is not that which is external, but that which is internal, that defileth the man. The microbes of disease and death are well-nigh omnipresent; they infest the air we breathe, the water we drink, and the food we eat. But persons whose physical systems are in a state of vigorous health are rarely subject to their deadly invasion; it is those whose vitality is already impaired that fall easy victims. So, if our hearts and minds are in vigorous health, and especially if our thoughts are fully occupied with good honest work and pleasure of one kind and another, the microbes of disease and death that infest the moral atmosphere will not find easy lodgment therein.

"Blessed are the pure in heart."

XL.

WHAT HAS ALGEBRA TO DO WITH VIRTUE?

Dr. Dix. We will now discuss a subject which we promised to consider a long time ago.

You are accustomed to hear education coupled with morality, ignorance with immorality. The common-school system of America is looked upon as a greater preventive of crime than all her court-houses and prisons. Yet among the list of regular studies prescribed for schools there is rarely one which has a direct bearing upon personal morality. In introducing this series of Talks as a regularly appointed exercise, we have made an abrupt departure from long established custom. True, it is required and expected that instructors shall always exert a good moral influence over their pupils, that they shall use their best endeavors to make of them good citizens and true, noble men and women, but there is usually no special time set apart for this most important of all objects. On the contrary, the hours of school are so completely appropriated to purely intellectual work, that, unless some arrangement is made like that which we have adopted, whatever time is taken for moral instruction must in a certain sense be stolen or, to put it more gently, must be taken "under a suspension of the rules."

Nevertheless, the desired result is in a great measure accomplished, — not so completely as could be wished, of course, or as we hope it will be accomplished under improved conditions, but yet so completely that, as I said in the outset, you are accustomed to hear education coupled with morality, and ignorance with immorality.

This being the case, it follows that intellectual work has a direct salutary effect upon the moral nature. It is difficult, at first thought, to understand what relation there can be between the two. How, for example, can the pure mathematics, which of all the subjects engaging the thoughts of men seems to have the least relation with either virtue or vice, make them more honest, kind, temperate, or patriotic?

George Williams. I am glad you are going to talk about this subject, Dr. Dix. I have often wondered, when I have heard so much about school making people good, what algebra had to do with virtue.

Dr. Dix. I cannot promise to answer the question to your satisfaction. There are a great many facts in nature which we can only accept as facts: our attempts to explain them go but a very little way. *Why* one plant bears grapes and another thistles, no man can explain; he can only know that such is the fact. Now, we know that intellectual culture is a tree that generally bears good fruit; the experience of all ages and all countries has established this beyond question; and though we may not be able to explain it in full, we can present some considerations which may throw a little light upon it. We have already incidentally mentioned two of these considerations, which I will ask you to review.

Frederick Fox. One effect of intellectual training is to inspire a love of truth and a contempt for error. It is only the untrained mind that is satisfied with half-truths, slovenly conclusions, unproved propositions.

Dr. Dix. Yes; and it seems natural that the mind that is in the habit of insisting upon the strict truth, or the nearest possible approximation to it, in matters of science, history, or mathematics should, at least, be strongly predisposed in favor of the strict truth in all other matters. Go on.

Isabelle Anthony. In one of the Talks on truthful-

ness you remarked that the person who is thoroughly absorbed in his algebra or in his Greek cannot at the same time be engaged in blackening his neighbor's character.

Dr. Dix. Or in any other kind of mischief. Every one will admit that, if there were no other good result of intellectual occupation, this would be enough to establish its moral usefulness.

George Williams. May not the same thing be said of any kind of useful occupation, whether intellectual or physical?

Dr. Dix. Yes, with modifications. It is generally true that those who are usefully occupied in any way are not engaged in mischief at the same time, — not actively engaged, at any rate, although it does not necessarily follow that the mind and the hands are always occupied with the same thing. While the hands are busy with good, honest work the heart may be as busy in nourishing hatred, revenge, envy, pride, or discontent; and the brain may be equally busy in devising schemes for gratifying the bad passions of the heart.

George Williams. Is not that being "actively engaged in mischief"?

Dr. Dix. Not in the commonly accepted sense of the phrase. That demands the actual execution of the evil designs of the mind and heart, which, so long as the hands are usefully occupied, is not usually easy.

Florence Hill. The useful employment of the hands may not prevent the tongue from doing mischief at the same time.

Dr. Dix. Very true, Miss Hill. Most employers will tell you, however, that an active tongue is not often found associated with very busy hands. Neither, indeed, for that matter, are a mind and heart which are not fixed on the work of the hands. Even in the most mechanical employments the hands will sometimes lapse into idleness, that the thoughts may have freer play.

Helen Mar. Dr. Dix, you never attended a ladies' sewing circle, if you think that the tongue and hands cannot be busy at the same time. [*Laughter.*]

Dr. Dix [*smiling*]. No, Miss Mar. I confess I have never had that pleasure. I am speaking from my own limited experience. With a more extended experience, I should undoubtedly modify some of my opinions. But let us go on:—

It is evident that the only time we are absolutely secure from all temptation to evil is when the thoughts are completely absorbed in some good and useful, or at least harmless occupation. It is also evident that the mere employment of the hands is not enough: the homely old lines, —

“For Satan finds some mischief still
For idle hands to do,”

should be understood to include idle brains and hearts as well.

Now, it would be absurd to claim that algebra, Greek, geography, and the other branches that occupy so much of our attention here are the only things that can completely absorb men's thoughts. It might even be said of certain individuals among us, whom I will not name, that these studies are about the only things that *cannot* completely absorb their thoughts. [*Laughter.*] But we will suppose that they fulfil their mission, that they are among the good, useful, at least harmless, things which absorb men's attention, and thus keep them from possible mischief. We have already a pretty good answer to the question, “What has algebra to do with virtue?”

Louisa Thompson. Why should unoccupied minds, or rather those which are free to act according to the impulse of each moment, — for I suppose it is true that no waking mind can be really unoccupied, — why should they be so prone to evil? why shouldn't they be equally prone to good?

Dr. Dix. Why, indeed? It is a question easy to ask, but hard to answer. It seems to be the general policy of Nature that good should be the prize of effort and evil the penalty of idleness. A garden left to itself bears a crop of ugly, useless, or noxious weeds, with only now and then a pleasing flower or a wholesome fruit. A mind left to its own undirected thoughts is very much like the neglected garden. What a crop of rambling, inane fancies, of unreasoning discontent, of foolish sighing for the impossible, or perhaps of hatred, envy, and impurity, with all their poisonous, bitter fruits, it will bear!

Frederick Fox. Yet some of the brightest thoughts in literature and even some of the important discoveries in science are said to have been struck out in an idle hour.

Dr. Dix. Not often, however, by habitually idle minds. The unoccupied hours of habitually busy minds are not what we are speaking of. The busiest worker must have his hours of rest. Still, there may be exceptions to the rule I have been laying down. As I have said, the neglected garden may bear, now and then, a pleasing flower or a wholesome fruit.

But the moral function of intellectual work is not alone to prevent evil or useless thoughts by preoccupying the ground,—it has also a positive influence upon the moral nature.

It is commonly said that a large proportion of our acts have none of what is called the moral quality; that is, they are in themselves neither virtuous nor vicious. The act of buying and paying for a piece of property for pleasure or convenience might be mentioned as an instance. That of studying a lesson in algebra or Greek in school would seem, at first thought, to be another equally good example. A little consideration will show us, however, that it is essentially different from the first mentioned. In the first place, it calls into play

industry and, usually, self-denial, two important virtues; in the next, it disciplines the mind, between which and the heart there is a closer connection than many suppose. Our three natures, the moral, the intellectual, and the physical, are not separated by distinct lines of demarcation, like adjacent states on the map: there is a subtle interweaving among them, like that of the three primary colors in a ray of light. The same blood that nourishes our muscles nourishes our hearts and our brains. Each of man's three natures suffers or is benefited with the rest. But what affects his intellectual nature seems to be especially marked in its effects upon the other two. Intellectual Greece and Rome, cruel as they were, surpassed the barbarians around them no less in humanity than in physical prowess. To-day the educated European is superior to the Australian savage both in his bodily and in his moral stature, and among civilized men those of purely intellectual pursuits are, as a class, not only among the longest-lived, but also among the most virtuous.

We conclude, then, scholars, that intellectual training does not stop with the intellect, but that it strengthens and ennobles the whole threefold nature of man.

Joseph Cracklin. I have heard that it makes only the good man better, — that it makes the bad man worse.

Dr. Dix. If that be true, the vast majority of men must be good, — *otherwise our prisons and penitentiaries would be the centres of learning, instead of our schools and colleges.*

XLI.

HOME AND COUNTRY: THE GOOD SON AND THE GOOD CITIZEN.

Dr. Dix. The child's habit is to take things for granted, to accept the blessings of home and country as matters of course, like sunshine and water. As he grows older it gradually dawns upon him that these blessings do not come of themselves, but are the fruits of unremitting labor and care. Still later he begins to realize that the time is not far distant when he must bear his share of the burden.

The management of such a country and government as ours is a most momentous responsibility. It requires the highest statesmanship, the stanchest loyalty, and eternal vigilance. Those upon whom that responsibility now rests will soon pass away, and you and your generation will be called, by your suffrages and personal influence at least, to take their places. The older you grow, if you fulfil the law of your being, the less you will live for yourselves alone.

Let us talk this morning of those great responsibilities that are coming to you all.

In one of our earlier Talks, we spoke of the heroic soldier as a human type of that perfect fidelity to duty which we saw in the inanimate and in the lower animate creatures. Neither he nor they exist for themselves alone, but for the great wholes of which they are parts.

The strength and efficiency of an army depend upon the faithfulness of each member of it; the harmony of the universe depends upon the fidelity to law of each world that rolls, of each atom that vibrates.

The good citizen is another human type of the same fidelity to the general good.

To make each one of you a good citizen is the great object of all these Talks and of all our other efforts in school.

The first duty of either men or things is *obedience*. Universal faithfulness to this duty would bring about universal harmony; universal neglect of it would bring about universal chaos.

No stage or position in life is exempt from the duty of obedience. The child owes it to his parents, the pupil to his teachers, the workman to his employers, the soldier to his officers, the citizen to his rulers, and all to the laws under which they live, especially to the laws of morality and the dictates of conscience.

George Williams. Suppose there is a conflict of authorities?

Dr. Dix. In all cases precedence is to be given to the highest, which I named last.

George Williams. Then a child may disobey his parents if his conscience so dictates?

Dr. Dix. Certainly. But he must be sure that his conscience is right and his parents are wrong: he must bear in mind their superior age, wisdom, and experience, and the possibility that he does not understand what may be good and sufficient reasons for their commands. If they should order him to commit an unmistakably criminal or immoral act, it is not only his right but his duty to disobey them; in all other cases it is his duty to trust to their judgment and parental fidelity. Gratitude and natural affection should incline him to obedience where otherwise he might hesitate.

Do you realize, boys and girls, what you owe your parents? Think of your infancy, of the tender care and the utter forgetfulness of self with which your helplessness was guarded and your every need supplied; of the long, long years of your childhood, of the won-

derful patience with which your folly, petulance, and thoughtless ingratitude were borne, — not merely borne, but repaid with unremitting devotion to your happiness and welfare.

This devotion still continues. Never so long as you live will your parents cease to love you better than themselves, to hold your interests more sacred than their own. You can never repay them for all their love and self-sacrifice, — they do not ask for repayment, — but you can make them happy by your grateful reverence and obedience in your youth; you can make them happy and proud by leading noble, upright, and aspiring lives in your manhood and womanhood, and you can bless their declining years by returning some of the devotion and self-sacrifice which they lavished so freely upon you in the years of your helplessness.

You owe all this not only to them, but also to yourselves and to your country; for the most dutiful son is likely to become the most faithful citizen. As he passes out from under the parental roof, the filial obedience and fealty which he has so long practised will be most likely to extend to “Father-land,” to “Mother-country.” He will recognize a similar debt of gratitude for blessings received, great and manifold, and a similar obligation to stand by and support with heart, brain, and hand.

The man otherwise intelligent and honest who neglects his duties to his country, from indolence, culpable ignorance of what these duties are, selfish absorption in his own private interests, or the mistaken notion that she does not need his help, is unworthy of a country bought by the blood of his fathers and preserved by the blood of his brothers. She does need his help, his most earnest and constant help: to defend her from her enemies, and to strengthen the hands of her friends; to protect her treasure from the spoiler, and her public places from those who seek to gratify only their own greed and selfish ambition. There was no lack of public

spirit among the founders of the republic. It was their devotion to the public good and their sacrifice of private interest to it which gave us the best government on earth. It is only a like devotion among their descendants which can keep it the best government on earth. The immortal epigram, "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty," was never more true than it is to-day, and it will never be less true.

You hear men excusing their neglect of public duty by the plea that politics has degenerated to a contemptible, mercenary trade, and that no self-respecting man will have anything to do with it. Happily their charge is only partially true; there are still noble, unselfish statesmen and loyal patriots in public places, there are still multitudes of men who vote, as they would fight, for their country's best good. But if the charge were wholly true, those who bring it could blame none but themselves.

These very men, honest, honorable, intelligent, and at heart patriotic, are in the vast majority if they but knew it: they have the power in their own hands if they chose to exercise it. It is not the great mass of voters who are to be benefited (nor would they be benefited if they could) by the plunder of the public treasury; it is not *they* that wish the chairs of office to be filled by those who seek only their own interests. If the good men and true of the nation would bestir themselves, take a little pains to inform themselves of what is going on all around them, and of the proper steps to take the whole control of elections into their own hands, they would make short work of the fraud, corruption, and trickery which are such a reproach to our still fair republic. The "machine" is formidable only to those who are too indolent or too timid to walk straight up to it and see what a mere scarecrow it really is. It could not stand against the persistent opposition of the united honesty and patriotism of the land.

Frederick Fox. The general prosperity is so great, notwithstanding the evils you name, that it is hard to arouse the people. They see the public corruption plainly enough, but they think the country can stand it, and so they do not think it worth while to take the pains to correct it.

Dr. Dix. Yes, Fox, that is the great trouble. As some one has truly said, the danger to a small republic comes from without, to a great republic it comes from within. When the existence of our government was unmistakably in danger, men forgot their pursuit of gain, pleasure, and personal power, and rushed bravely to its defence. Now that it is, as they imagine, no longer in danger of actual destruction, they do not concern themselves with the smaller dangers to which it is exposed. They are like a man who will peril his life to protect his home from a pack of hungry wolves, but will carelessly and stupidly allow it to be slowly undermined by vermin or dry rot without lifting a finger to save it.

Cato said, "When vice prevails and impious men bear sway, the post of honor is a private station." It was such sentiments as this which hastened imperial Rome to her ruin; and if our own great republic shall ever fall, it will be due to the same cowardly and selfish sentiment prevailing among those who should be her saviours.

But she will not fall. Men will not always love their private ease better than their country's good; they will see that the "post of honor" is never a "private station" when she is in peril either from without or within.

George Williams. It is of very little use for any one man or for any small body of men to come to her rescue. Even if it is true that all the honest and patriotic men might take the control of affairs into their own hands by uniting, what good is there in that, so

long as they will not unite? What would the attempt of a few amount to?

Dr. Dix. It would amount to an honest, faithful attempt; it would amount to their doing their duty, even if all other "honest and patriotic" men neglected theirs.

George Williams. But they could n't accomplish anything.

Dr. Dix. Could n't accomplish anything! They are the ones who are destined to accomplish the salvation of the country. Each year they will grow stronger; each year thousands will be encouraged by their growing strength to rally under their standard. That is the way all great reforms, from the very foundation of the world, have been accomplished.

Frederick Fox. One chief difficulty is that there are so great differences of opinion among really honest and patriotic men. Might not this alone give the balance of power to fraud and corruption, even if indolence and selfish neglect of duty did not?

Dr. Dix. Differences of honest opinion there must necessarily be; but they would be enormously diminished if men would but take the pains to sift more carefully the evidences on which their opinions are based.

Jonathan Tower. How can they do this? What one party journal declares the other party journal contradicts, — and I suppose most men will believe their own paper rather than its political rival.

Dr. Dix. When you get to be voters I hope you will not be slaves either to your party journals or to your parties themselves. Don't be satisfied with a party name, however respectable or historic. Attend its meetings, find out for yourselves what its principles and representative men are to be before you commit yourselves to its support. Do not receive your ticket already cut and dried; have a voice and hand yourself in its making-up.

Jonathan Tower. How can we do that?

Dr. Dix. By being alive and awake at the *primary meetings*.

Not that your vigilance should end there. "*Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.*" But he who would control the course of an arrow will do well to have a hand and an eye in its aiming. Once sped, only a strong wind can turn the direction of its flight. Especially would I warn you against feeling in the least degree bound by the decisions of "our party," unless they accord with your own convictions of what is expedient and what is *right*.

Do not admit the necessity of choosing between evils. If you can agree with none of the great political parties in what you honestly regard as essential to the welfare and honor of the state, join the party with which you *can* agree, no matter how feeble and insignificant it may appear at first. If it is really in the right, it is destined to triumph sooner or later, and you will have the proud satisfaction, the glory, of being one of its pioneers.

You are preparing to take your places among the educated men and women of our nation. Upon you as such will devolve the greatest power, the greatest influence, the highest responsibility. Remember that the noblest product of education is

THE GOOD CITIZEN.

FOURTH IMPRESSION

Socialism and the American Spirit

By NICHOLAS PAINE GILMAN

One of the best books ever written on the subject of socialism. The author's philosophic breadth of view, scientific temper, and ample knowledge of the facts are attested by every chapter. The book is written in a clear and even fascinating style. — J. G. SCHURMAN, *President of Cornell University*.

This is much the best thing which this author has written. It treats an old theme in a thoroughly original way. The author analyzes socialism not as a body of doctrines, but as a type of character. He is not so much concerned with tracing its economic results as its psychological conditions. . . . All must welcome the kind of treatment which he has applied to the subject as a whole. — A. T. HADLEY, *President of Yale University*.

Mr. Gilman has presented most admirably the American answer to the questions and claims of socialism. The reviewer is in little danger of overpraising a book so sane in its judgments, so comprehensive in its survey of facts and tendencies, so carefully written as this book is. The reader turns its pages with the satisfaction that is born of mental contact with full and accurate information and unfailing common sense. — PROF. F. H. GIDDINGS.

If we can venture to compress into a single sentence the significance of a brilliantly and most temperately written volume, it is an attempt to rationalize social discontent in America. It is a most wholesome book in its moral tone, contains chapters remarkable for analytical power, and is well written and thoroughly digested from cover to cover. — *The Tribune, New York*.

This volume does a work most timely and necessary for American readers in examining and explaining the relation of socialism to the spirit which characterizes the American people. We never have met with a more acute and accurate portrayal of this spirit and of the mood and attitude toward the claims and the phenomena of socialism which it produces. . . . The great body of sober, generous, public-spirited men and women will approve, we have no doubt, the temper, the method, and the practical suggestions in detail which Mr. Gilman has illustrated or recommended in this book. — *The Congregationalist, Boston*.

The most remarkable point about this book is its readability. It easily holds the reader's interest to the end. . . . Those who really understand the American spirit, and know human nature thoroughly, will consider this volume as probably the most valuable contribution thus far made to the American phase of the subject. — *The Literary World, Boston*.

One volume, crown 8vo, pp. 376, \$1.50, or 6s. 6d.

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY, BOSTON

MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED, LONDON.

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY



3 9999 09777 034 9

